# Neg Round 1 vs Mary Washington LP

## 1NC

### T – PTC

**A. Definitions –**

**For is a term of exclusion – requiring direct action upon**

US CUSTOMS COURT 39 AMERICAN COLORTYPE CO. v. UNITED STATES C. D. 107, Protest 912094-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT, THIRD DIVISION 2 Cust. Ct. 132; 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 35 The same reasons used by the appellate court may be adopted in construing the language of the statute herein involved. If the words "for industrial use" mean no more than the words "articles of utility," there could be no reason for inserting the additional words "for industrial use" in the paragraph. Therefore, it must be held that the [\*135] new language "for industrial use" was intended to have a different meaning from the words "articles of utility," as construed in the case of Progressive Fine Arts Co. v. United States, [\*\*8] supra. Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word "industrial" as follows: Industrial. 1. Relating to industry or labor as an economic factor, or to a branch or the branches of industry; of the nature of, or constituting, an industry or industries \* \* \* . The transferring of the scenes on an oil painting to a printed copy is a branch of industry under the definition above quoted. Some of the meanings of the preposition "for" signify intent, as shown by the following definition in the same dictionary: For. 2. Indicating the end with reference to which anything is, acts, serves, or is done; as: a. As a preparation for; with the object of; in order to be, become, or act as; conducive to. \* \* \*. d. Intending, or in order, to go to or in the direction of. Therefore, the words "articles for industrial use" in paragraph 1807 imply that Congress intended to exclude from that provision articles either purchased or imported with the intention to use the same in industry for manufacturing purposes.

**B. Violation – They violate the terms FOR and FINANCIAL INCENTIVES - the affirmative does not increase FINANCIAL incentives FOR energy production they increase indirect incentives –**

Dyson et al, 3 - International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Megan, Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows, p. 67-68) Understanding of the term ‘incentives’ varies and economists have produced numerous typologies. A brief characterization of incentives is therefore warranted. First, the term is understood by economists as incorporating both positive and negative aspects, for example a tax that leads a consumer to give up an activity that is an incentive, not a disincentive or negative incentive. Second, although incentives are also construed purely in economic terms, incentives refer to more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are the “positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context.”80 Third, it is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect incentives, with direct incentives referring to financial or other inducements and indirect incentives referring to both variable and enabling incentives.81 Finally, incentives of any kind may be called ‘perverse’ where they work against their purported aims or have significant adverse side effects. Direct incentives lead people, groups and organisations to take particular action or inaction. In the case of environmental flows these are the same as the net gains and losses that different stakeholders experience. The key challenge is to ensure that the incentives are consistent with the achievement of environmental flows. This implies the need to compensate those that incur additional costs by providing them with the appropriate payment or other compensation. Thus, farmers asked to give up irrigation water to which they have an established property or use right are likely to require a payment for ceding this right. The question, of course, is how to obtain the financing necessary to cover the costs of developing such transactions and the transaction itself. Variable incentives are policy instruments that affect the relative costs and benefits of different economic activities. As such, they can be manipulated to affect the behaviour of the producer or consumer. For example, a government subsidy on farm inputs will increase the relative profitability of agricultural products, hence probably increasing the demand for irrigation water. Variable incentives therefore have the ability to greatly increase or reduce the demand for out-of-stream, as well as in-stream, uses of water. The number of these incentives within the realm of economic and fiscal policy is practically limitless.

**C. Prefer our interpretation**

**1. Limits - Broad definitions could include 40 different mechanisms**

Moran, 86 **-** non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development and holds the Marcus Wallenberg Chair at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University(Theodore, Investing in Development: New Roles for Private Capital?, p. 29 - googlebooks) Guisinger finds that if “incentives” are broadly defined to include tariffs and trade controls along with tax holidays, subsidized loans, cash grants, and other fiscal measures, they comprise more than forty separate kinds of measures. Moreover, the author emphasizes, the value of an incentive package is just one of several means that governments use to lure foreign investors. Other methods—for example, promotional activities (advertising, representative offices) and subsidized government services—also influence investors’ location decisions. The author points out that empirical research so far has been unable to distinguish the relative importance of fundamental economic factors and of government policies in decisions concerning the location of foreign investment—let alone to determine the effectiveness of individual government instruments.

2. **Ground – They do not spend federal money, this eliminates key ground on spending, politics, and trade-off debates – it also allows them to have highly specific evidence about their mechanism – they acquire additional solvency.**

**D. Topicality is a voting issue – if it were not the affirmative could run the same case year after year or unbeatable truths like sexual discrimination is harmful.**

### Saudi

#### Saudi freaks out in response to the plan - floods the market and crashes oil prices

HULBERT ’12 - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review; Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations; Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “OPEC's Pending Bloodbath”. June 10, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/06/10/opecs-pending-bloodbath/)

That’s unlikely to happen, precisely because Riyadh can bring further pricing pressures to bear if it wants to get its way in the cartel. The Kingdom’s policy space has admittedly tightened over the past couple of years, but they remain the only producer capable of significantly increasing or reducing production at will. Initial tanker data from Europe suggests Riyadh may have started reigning in production that was running around 6% over OPEC quota. It’s also raised July benchmarks for Arab Light grades in Asia. But Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria will want restraint to come far faster and far deeper to firm prices. The line being spun from the ‘free lunch’ brigade is that storage should easily cover any Iranian spikes when EU sanctions come into full effect 1st July, while OPEC quotas should be pared down to 29.5mb/d (or less). Cheap words from petro-hawks, not least because they’ll all continue to cheat on quotas to squeeze out every last drop they have. Riyadh knows that of course; hawks want a price floor to be set at $100/b to sustain political regimes, but to do so entirely at Saudi expense. Russia is no different outside the cartel: free riding 101. Saudi Arabia (and its GCC partners) might be willing to play ball given ongoing concerns from the Arab Awakening, but with some budgetary tweaks and counter-cyclical cash to burn, they could all easily survive at $85/b making Iran et al sweat. Tehran might decide to rip up formal quotas as it did in June 2011, but that would be a costly mistake. If the Saudis let prices fall, political outages across smaller producer states could help to set a floor for them anyway. Iran would have no say in the matter. Given such ‘pricing perils’, Saudi Arabia holds all the aces to settle institutional issues, not to mention giving the global economy more breathing space (and Washington greater leeway over Iranian sanctions). But the real reason to let prices fall a little further isn’t just to make very clear to OPEC states where the ultimate volume and pricing power rests, but to fight Riyadh’s bigger battle over the next decade: Retaining 40% of OPEC market share in the midst of supposedly huge non-OPEC supply growth. It didn’t go unnoticed that despite Saudi production averaging 31 year highs and prices hitting $128/b in March 2012, the forward curve for 2018 was trading at $30/b discounts relative to spot. You’d think with the cartel maxed out and proximate demand side problems looking bleak, five year curves would be exactly the other way, in sharp contango (i.e. far above prompt prices) once the global economy and demand side fundamentals were fixed. The fact they weren’t is principally because the market thinks vast swathes of unconventional production will come online, not just in North America where production is back above 6mb/d, but in Canada, Brazil and even Arctic extremes. At $100/b that was a fair bet to place, but once benchmark prices drop back to two figures, the 6.4 trillion barrels of unconventional reserves sitting in the Americas look a far less certain prospect. Canadian tar distinctly sticky; Brazilian pre-salt horribly deep; Russian Arctic plays simply impossible. So when OPEC meets in Vienna expect Saudi Arabia to call the shots. The new Secretary General will either be a Saudi national, or a compromise candidate Riyadh can live with. Quotas will stay close to 30mb/d with minor reductions possible. Thinly veiled threats of sustained (or increased) production will be made if Iran doesn’t play ball. Yet the long term price point to watch isn’t just one that keeps OPEC in business and Riyadh in control, but where the al-Saud can maintain secular market share. Letting prices informally slide to $85-90/b might be the kind of warning shot Riyadh wants to send to scrub unconventional plays off global balance sheets. Its OPEC colleagues will see that as sailing far too close to the political wind, but a Saudi bloodbath now, might be just the medicine OPEC requires to sustain its long term health, not unless the cartel is absolutely determined to keep pricing itself out of existence.

#### Low oil prices will destroy Russia’s economy

SHELIN ’12 – Political Columnist (Shelin, Sergey. “Putin Without Oil “. April 30, 2012. http://en.novayagazeta.ru/business/52381.html)

Russia’s economic dependence on the oil trade is not just important, it is critical The traditional Prime Minister’s farewell speech delivered to the state Duma by Vladimir Putin was for the most part, boring with one major exception. He listed various programs, projects and promises, but never once indicated that they are only feasible if oil prices continue to rise year on year. In response to a timid and planted question by a deputy of his own United Russia party, the president-elect dismissed any link regarding the success of their plans being reliant on future oil revenue. “All the initiatives I have set forth are in no way dependent on oil or gas revenues… Even if the price falls to $70 a barrel, we will be able to fulfill all of our commitments to the Russian people.” This statement overwhelmingly contradicts the common belief that the Russian economy is heavily dependent on its oil exports. This view is also misleading. The oil trade is not just important for Russia, it is vital. In the first quarter of 2012, the average price of Urals Crude was $117 a barrel; compare that with Q1 2010 when the price barely touched $70. In Q1 2012, Russia’s exports totaled $135 billion and imports made up $73 billion, a healthy margin of $62 billion. However, due to negative balance of payments, services and other economic parameters the Russian current account stands at a more modest $42 billion. Moreover, since the net outflow of private capital from Russia for the same three months was $35 billion, the country’s economy is more or less breaking even. If oil prices were to fall down to the 2010 mark of $70 a barrel, and along with it other energy resources that make up more than 70% of all Russian exports, then total revenue would fall by some $40 billion, from the current $135 billion to $95 billion. In addition, Q1 2010 saw Russian imported goods totaling $46 billion and export of private capital touching $15billion, 1.6 and 2.3 times lower than today’s figure respectively. If world oil prices do indeed crash, it is believed that Russians will panic and the country’s private capital exports will accelerate dramatically. A drop in oil prices will not be matched by the required cut in imports and to restore fiscal balance the Kremlin will have to decide whether to raid their foreign reserves or cut their expenditure on imports by half. The result would lead to a sharp devaluation of the ruble, a drop in consumer confidence and a surge in inflation.

#### Extinction

Filger 9 (Sheldon, Author and Writer @ the Huffington Post, Former VP for Resource Development at New York’s United Way, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### Carbon Tax

#### The United States federal government should implement a phased in tax on carbon starting at $37 per ton of carbon used. The carbon tax should increase with the cost of fossil fuels.

#### CP solves case better – avoids picking winners

Mee and Miller 11 (Nathan – Associate with Shearman and Sterling, and Marc, vice Dean at the Ralph W. Bilbly Prof @ U of Arizona Law, Wiliam and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, 36 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 119)

Though, as a recent investigation by the New York Times has indicated, government investment in renewable energy saw a spike in connection with the stimulus bill, these were one-time expenditures, and do not significantly affect the level of spending over the long term, compared to fossil fuel sources that receive billions of dollars in subsidies through multiple mechanisms year after year. [n172](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1345216353538&returnToKey=20_T15340264169&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.556203.0333822722" \l "n172) By comparison, during the period of 2002 to 2008, government support (largely through subsidies written into the tax code) to the developed and profitable fossil fuel industry averaged over ten billion dollars annually, whereas support for renewables averaged approximately four billion. [n173](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1345216353538&returnToKey=20_T15340264169&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.556203.0333822722" \l "n173) In the "spike" year of the $ 700 billion stimulus bill, subsidies to renewables peaked at a one-time high of $ 14.7 billion, but that program will end in December 2011. [n174](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1345216353538&returnToKey=20_T15340264169&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.556203.0333822722" \l "n174) Implicit in *any* direct subsidy or loan-guarantee regime, however, is the possibility that the project will fail. The recent collapse of Solyndra is a classic example. [n175](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1345216353538&returnToKey=20_T15340264169&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.556203.0333822722" \l "n175) This is one of the primary benefits of a carbon tax [\*147] or other carbon-pricing system over direct subsidies-it makes it much harder for governments to pick lousy technologies to fund. [n176](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1345216353538&returnToKey=20_T15340264169&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.556203.0333822722" \l "n176) There may be a silver lining to the Solyndra story, however. As Paul Krugman, the Princeton economist and New York Times columnist, recently observed, one of the main causes of Solyndra's failure was the precipitous drop in the cost of the solar panels that were in their competition. [n177](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1345216353538&returnToKey=20_T15340264169&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.556203.0333822722" \l "n177)

#### Carbon tax would solve and make renewables more efficient

Randazzo 5/5/12 (Ryan, “Debate Over Continued Incentives for Energy Companies”) <http://www.azcentral.com/business/articles/2012/05/05/20120505federal-money-supports-most-forms-energy-debate-over-continued-incentives.html>

Alternative energy is unlikely to ever become widely used without subsidies, or a larger policy shift addressing global warming, because technologies like solar and wind are less efficient at generating electricity than fossil fuels that are densely packed with energy, he said. "If we are ever going to move away from (fossil fuels), it is going to require some help," he said. "We just have to make decisions, as citizens, if this is the way we want to go. Even if I invent a new renewable fuel tomorrow (that can compete with oil), there is no infrastructure to get it to market. There are some things we need to be doing to open up the market a little bit." Gautam Gowrisankaran, an economics professor at the University of Arizona Eller College of Management, said the hodgepodge of U.S. incentives is a result of not having a clear energy policy. Without political consensus on energy and global warming, interest groups win support for their individual causes. "I believe in free markets and would rather the government just tax carbon rather than get into the politics of which energy sources to subsidize," he said. "If there is a harmful element to the environment from carbon-dioxide emissions (from coal, natural gas and oil), that is the policy to implement. But politically we are not there yet. So to substitute for that, we like to subsidize renewable energy rather than tax traditional fossil fuels." With a carbon tax, solar, wind and other alternative energy would not need subsidies because they would be economically competitive with fossil fuels, he said.

### CIR

#### Immigration reform will pass – Obama is pushing, GOP on board, top of the agenda.

CSM 12-28. [Christian Science Monitor "Immigration reform likely to be at the top of Congress’ agenda in 2013" -- www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/12/28/immigration-reform-likely-to-be-at-the-top-of-congress-agenda-in-2013/]

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely.¶ The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal.¶ The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high.¶ The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform.¶ Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.¶ "It has to be in 2013," says Rep. Raúl Labrador (R) of Idaho, an immigration lawyer who thundered into Congress in the tea party wave of 2010. "If we wait until 2014, it's going to be election time. And you know how efficient we are here during election time."¶ Recent weeks have seen a flurry of activity on Capitol Hill. In the Senate, a "Gang of Eight" – led by longtime immigration reformers Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York and Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina – has added freshman Sens. Michael Bennett (D) of Colorado and Mike Lee (R) of Utah, while potential 2016 presidential aspirant Sen. Marco Rubio (R) of Florida leads his own initiative.¶ Members of the House have seen movement, too. "One thing clearly has changed," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) of Illinois, the lawmaker who co-wrote a 2005 comprehensive immigration reform measure with now Sen.-elect Jeff Flake (R) of Arizona. "Nobody is talking about self-deportation. Nobody is talking about how [Arizona's controversial immigration law] should be the standard applied across the land. Nobody is talking about vetoing the DREAM Act," which offers a path to citizenship for some young undocumented immigrants.¶ "We are having wonderful conversations," Representative Gutierrez says.¶ That more moderate tone from the GOP is what the November election has wrought.¶ In a postelection analysis and poll of Latino voters, Republican polling group Resurgent Republic offered a searing critique of the GOP's political strategy of pumping up turnout among white voters, often by championing hard-line policies on immigration issues that turn off key Asian and Hispanic voters.¶ "Republicans have run out of persuadable white voters," wrote conservative pollster Whit Ayres and Jennifer Korn, the head of the right-leaning Hispanic Leadership Network, in a recent research memo. "Trying to win a national election by gaining a larger and larger share of a smaller and smaller portion of the electorate is a losing political proposition."¶ Between 2008 and 2012, white voters shrank two percentage points to 72 percent of the electorate, while Asian and Latino voters expanded a percentage point each to 3 percent and 10 percent, respectively.¶ While GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney won 60 percent of white voters, 71 percent of Latinos and 73 percent of Asian-Americans backed Mr. Obama – up four percentage points and 11 percentage points from 2008, respectively.¶ And those numbers of minority voters are only going to grow. For the next two decades, 50,000 Latino voters will turn 18 every month, adding an additional New Hampshire of voters to the US each year into the 2030s.¶ While Resurgent Republic's poll showed that Hispanics aren't singularly focused on immigration issues, Republican politicians who favor immigration reform see the issue as primary: The GOP's message of conservative family values, entrepreneurship, and individual freedom won't reach Latino voters unless the immigration question is solved.¶ "This is like a wall that stops the other issues from getting through," says Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R) of Florida, a longtime immigration reform advocate. "And while that wall is there, the Republican Party has a serious problem."¶ House Speaker John Boehner (R) of Ohio signaled a shift when he told ABC News a day after the election that "a comprehensive approach [to immigration] is long overdue, and I'm confident that the president, myself, others, can find the common ground to take care of this issue once and for all."¶ That's a departure from previous immigration-reform attempts, in which the GOP brass wasn't on board.¶ Perhaps just as important, though, is that several leading lawmakers with near-pristine conservative credentials are also involved.¶ Two tea party superstars – Senators Rubio and Lee, both of whom knocked out establishment Republican figures to win their seats – are going to be key players in any reform.¶ In the House, the involvement of House Judiciary chairman Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R) of Virginia and Representative Labrador of Idaho can provide cover to conservative lawmakers from the party's right flank.¶ "The fact that you're going to have strong conservative voices helping lead this debate is going to be critical to solving it instead of using it as a political wedge," says Rep. Steve Scalise (R) of Louisiana, incoming chairman of the Republican Study Committee, the largest and most conservative caucus in the House.¶ It's notable that both Labrador and Rubio believe in, one way or another, a path to citizenship for some illegal immigrants, even while they leave open just who can get on that path.¶ Some conservatives say any form of citizenship given to illegal immigrants – no matter the conditions attached to it – constitutes an "amnesty," which is a guarantee only of more illegal immigration unless the nation's borders are firmly secured and stringent workplace verification systems are put in place.¶ But a recent poll by George Washington University and Politico found 62 percent of Americans support a proposal that would allow illegal immigrants to earn citizenship over a period of several years, with 40 percent strongly supporting such a measure. Only 35 percent opposed it.¶ Some Democrats on the Hill are extending a friendly hand to the GOP. When the Congressional Hispanic Caucus – which is entirely Democratic – offered its vision for immigration reform, for example, it served up principles rather than a specific bill, a move received by Republicans as attempting to maximize common ground.¶ But Democrats also know they are in a position of power.¶ "You've got a realization on the part of GOP leadership not just in the House but in the Republican Party writ large that if they don't do something about it, they aren't going to win the presidency again," says Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D) of California, a leading immigration reform advocate.¶ For that reason, she says, Republicans "aren't going to get the credit" for pushing immigration through, but they "can still get the blame if they block" it.¶ Latino advocacy groups and labor unions, emboldened by the community's growing electoral power, vow to take the fight to those who stand in immigration reform's way in 2013.¶ "This comprehensive immigration reform for the Latino community is personal. The fact that we've come out in record numbers in 2012 was personal. And that's a calculation that members of Congress don't understand," says Maria Teresa Kumar, executive director of Voto Latino. "If they are not with us, 2014 may not look pretty with them."¶ The president, too, has political pressure to pursue immigration reform. He has already come up short once on immigration-reform promises: In 2009, he said that a comprehensive immigration solution would be a top priority.¶ Yet his first term also saw record numbers of undocumented immigrants deported. Only this summer, after he directed immigration officials to defer deportation of some young illegal immigrants, was he seen as making good on promises to the Latino community.¶ "The president says that his biggest failure in the first term was not moving forward with immigration reform," says Hector Sanchez, executive director of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement. "The Latino community decided to give him a second chance."¶ Obama has publicly vowed to make immigration reform an immediate priority in his second term, which could begin just on the other side of the "fiscal cliff" negotiations.¶ "He's the one who has the mandate on this subject; he's the guy who got the voters who care most intensely about this," says Bruce Morrison, a former Democratic congressman from Connecticut who was involved in immigration reform efforts in the 1980s and early '90s.

#### Plan’s massively unpopular

The Wall Street Journal 1/1/13 (“Renewable Energy Tax Breaks Pass Despite Headwind”) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323635504578215790054677734.html

The fiscal-cliff deal approved in the Senate included a $12 billion extension of a wind-power tax credit and other support for renewable energy, sparking opposition from House Republicans who said it was an example of the kind of government spending they wanted to cut. The opposition ultimately wasn't enough to topple the bill, which the House approved late Tuesday without changes. But the debate was a reminder of the differences between President Barack Obama, who has described clean energy as a top priority of his second term, and many Republicans. "Rather than prop up an industry that still can't stand on its own feet, it's time to pull the plug," Rep. Paul Broun (R., Ga.) said through a spokeswoman Tuesday. Looking Over the Fiscal Cliff The federal government faces a rolling series of deadlines over the next few months in its continuing budget battle. Take a look ahead. View Interactive Falling Over the Fiscal Cliff See some scenarios for how different groups of people may be affected by the tax changes that will take place if the fiscal cliff isn't resolved by the Jan. 1, 2013, deadline. View Interactive More photos and interactive graphics The package also included tax credits for parochial causes from coal mining on Indian reservations to producing motor fuels from nonedible plants. While these provisions were a relatively small part of the bill in dollar terms, a number of House Republicans raised them as symbols of what they called the Senate bill's inadequate efforts to cut federal spending. "This bill in its present form is not good enough," Rep. Darrell Issa, the California Republican who is chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, said in a CNN interview that followed an afternoon meeting of House Republicans to discuss the deal. "What we find missing from it is any kind of reasonable spending reductions."

#### Capital is critical to get a deal

Shifter 12/27/12 (Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?”)

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear. There is also a chance that something unexpected could happen that would put off consideration of immigration reform. Following the horrific massacre at a Connecticut elementary school on December 14, for example, public pressure understandably mounted for gun control, at least the ban of assault weapons. But a decision to pursue that measure -- though desperately needed -- would take away energy and time from other priorities like immigration.

#### Immigration reform is critical to US-Latin American relations

Barshefsky and Hill April 12 (Charlene and James T., Chairs Council on Foreign Relations, US-Latin America Relations: A New Direction For a New Reality”)

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation . The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue . Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

#### Spills over to broader relations – solves warming, prolif, and democracy.

Shifter 12. [Michael, President of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum Intern-American Dialogue, "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America" Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report -- April -- www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to ¶ pursue more robust ties .¶ Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and ¶ expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources . Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market ¶ and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin ¶ America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance . For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become ¶ more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future .The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean ¶ would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters ¶ as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human ¶ rights . With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 ¶ million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and ¶ Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis ¶ for hemispheric partnership. Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between ¶ the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the ¶ current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild ¶ vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both ¶ from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean

#### Prolif causes nuclear war

Taylor 6 [Theodore B., Chairman of NOVA. July 6 2006, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” http://wwwee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html]

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

**Extinction**

**Diamond ’95** (Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

### Solvency

#### Wind power fails – technology easily breaks and is clogged

Driessen 5/8/12 (Paul, Senior Policy Advisor for the Committee For a Constructive Tomorrow, “Time to Terminate Big Wind Subsidies”)

 (1 megawatt (MW, 1 million watts) of power output 3 24 hours 3 365 days 5 8,760 megawatt-hours (MW-h) energy per year; if a 1-MW wind turbine actually produces 1,752 MW-h over a year, owing to the variability of the wind and other factors, its capacity factor is 1,752/8,760 5 0.20, or 20%.) In high winds, ironically, the turbines must be stopped because they are easily damaged. Build-up of dead bugs has been shown to halve the maximum power generated by a wind turbine, reducing the average power generated by 25% and more. Build-up of salt on off-shore turbine blades similarly has been shown to reduce the power generated by 20%–30%.

#### Natural gas prices crush the wind market -

Broehl 11 (Jesse, Windpower Monthly Magazine, “New Gas Extraction Threatens Wind’s Competitiveness in the US”)

A lack of long-term federal policies such as a federal renewable electricity standard or a long-term enactment of tax credits or subsidies is challenging wind. But some experts believe gas prices bear the main responsibility for the US wind market's problems. The new shale deposits do not bode well. "The real story is this shale gas. It's flooded the market and they haven't touched half the shale deposits here in the US and haven't even begun to touch the shale gas that's available in Canada," says Andrew Redinger, managing director and group head of the alternative energy group of KeyBank Capital Markets. Redinger arranges debt financing for building wind projects in the US. The timing for shale gas taking off has been especially poor for wind in the post-economic collapse and credit crunch - and at a time when the Obama administration was hoping to provide major backing for renewable energy. "Six months after we pass the stimulus bill and get renewables going, all of a sudden it seems like out of nowhere there was a technology breakthrough and we can get gas out of shale far cheaper than anybody thought. No one ever saw the amount of natural gas that they're now predicting from these shale deposits," says Redinger. Recent estimates in the Marcellus shale field say the reserves could be valued at around $1 trillion and represent two years of America's current total national gas consumption level.

#### Current levels of development are unsustainable – regardless of the PTC

Brown 6/20/12 (Phillip, Specialist in Energy Policy, Congressional Research Service, “US Renewable Electricity: How Does the Production Tax Credit Impact Wind Markets”)

In essence, the pending PTC expiration at the end of 2012 has actually created a short-term surge in wind-related manufacturing and employment. Due to lead times—generally 12 to 18 months— required to fully develop wind projects, most manufacturing activities supporting 2012 wind capacity additions likely occurred either in 2011 or during the first quarter of 2012. Wind-related employment and economic development activity in the second half of 2012 will be primarily focused on construction, installation, and commissioning activities for projects in development. Based on current market conditions and other factors, it is unlikely that 2012 wind development levels can be sustained in either the near or long term, regardless of PTC availability

#### Too many alt causes – RPS, electricity demand, and nat gas prices

Brown 6/20/12 (Phillip, Specialist in Energy Policy, Congressional Research Service, “US Renewable Electricity: How Does the Production Tax Credit Impact Wind Markets”)

Production tax credits for wind-generated electricity provide a financial incentive for project developers and investors to install wind projects in the United States. However, the PTC incentive is only one of several factors that influence wind development, and a PTC extension, in isolation of other market factors, may not result in ever-larger levels of wind deployment. Other important factors for project development include state renewable portfolio standards, electricity demand growth, and natural gas prices. Each of these factors is discussed in more detail below. The following sections provide some background on how a PTC extension might impact U.S. wind project installations and manufacturing. A brief discussion of the potential impact of a short-term versus long-term PTC extension is also provided.

#### Extension won’t increase DEMAND – the recession killed the wind industry

The Daily Energy Report 11 (“Windpower’s PTC: Secondary to State Mandates”) <http://www.dailyenergyreport.com/2011/12/windpower%E2%80%99s-ptc-secondary-to-state-mandates/>

Section 1603 is expected to expire this year and the wind industry has again turned its attention to extending the production tax credit (PTC). Ditlev Engel, chief executive officer of Vestas Wind Systems A/S complained that U.S. turbine sales may “[fall off a cliff](http://www.windaction.org/news/33576)” unless lawmakers extend tax credits beyond 2012. Sales may decline, Mr. Engel, but not because of the PTC. The 2008 recession slowed economic growth causing demand for electricity to drop. Many States, including [California](http://www.windaction.org/documents/33056), are now signaling their renewable mandates [are being met](http://www.environmental-finance.com/news/view/2129) which will weaken demand for wind. Recent discoveries of abundant shale gas reserves are expected to keep gas prices low and stable through to 2020 and likely longer.

#### Competitive wind businesses can still thrive – PTC expiration won’t collapse the Industry

McCue 3/19/12 (Dan, “US Wind R&D crucial as competition cranks up”) <http://social.windenergyupdate.com/turbine-supply-chain/us-wind-rd-crucial-competition-cranks>

Many major players in the wind industry have warned that if the production tax credit (PTC) is allowed to lapse, the US wind sector would see 2012 end in crisis. However, Daniel C. Shreve, director and partner at MAKE Consulting, a renewable energy-focused practice in Boston, Massachusetts says, if anything, private sector R&D efforts in the U.S. will accelerate in the absence of a production tax credit. "As the debate over the PTC continues, we've all learned that there are many within the Congressional ranks that feel wind power is a mature technology and, as a consequence, no longer requires large-scale government-funded research grants to further it along," Shreve said. "That's a matter of opinion - one which we tend not to agree with it - but it's out there, and could adversely affect research that's currently government funded," he said. "But on the flip side, from the perspective of private enterprise, there's every reason to continue R&D programs if not expand them." He says that as PTC draws to a close, there will be a substantial reduction in demand in 2013, which possibly could carry over to 2014. Accordingly, big players like Siemens have been anything but complacent in crafting a US R&D strategy that will make their products stand out in an increasingly competitive market. Even without the PTC, Siemens will simply draw on internal funding “as needed”, Henrik Stiesdal, Chief Technology Officer, Siemens Wind Power told Wind Energy Update. “Seimen’s own wind research can certainly stand on its own two feet,” he said.

#### Turn- innovation

#### Government guarantees create moral hazards- creates risky market structures- causes instability and turns case

Gerdin ’11 (Erik Gerding, Associate Professor at University of Colorado Law School. His research interests include securities, banking law, financial regulation generally, and corporate governance, “The Inherent, Ineluctable Instability of Financial Institution Regulation”, <http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/09/the-inherent-ineluctable-instability-of-financial-institution-regulation.html>, September 12, 2011)

Here is my second contribution to the Faculty Lounge Online Forum on the legislative and regulatory process of financial reform. Check out the posts by the other contributors including, Kim Krawiec (Duke), Christie Ford (Univ. British Columbia), Brett McDonnell (Minnesota), Saule Omarova (North Carolina), and Dan Schwarz (Minnesota). In my last post, I concluded that the presence of government subsidies – particularly guarantees explicit (deposit insurance) and implicit (Too-Big-To-Fail) – makes the political economy of financial institution regulation different from other areas of the regulatory state. In this post, I argue that these government subsidies and moreover, the underlying reason for government subsidies, contributes to the inherent instability of financial institution regulation. The presence of government guarantees – explicit or implicit – creates strong incentives for financial firms to externalize the cost of their risk taking onto taxpayers. But there is more to government guarantees than moral hazard. Consider the following: Market distortion: When the government subsidizes some financial firms but not others, it distorts the market. A lower cost of capital allows the subsidized firms to undercut their competition. This can drive competitors either out of business or, if risk is being mispriced because of an asset boom, into riskier market segments (a phenomena I explored in a symposium piece). Cheaper debt and leverage: Government guarantees also. make debt cheaper than equity This supercharges the incentives of financial firms to increase leverage. Higher leverage of financial institutions, in turn, works to increase the effective supply of money. More money can fuel asset price bubbles and mask the mispricing of risk (phenomena explored by Margaret Blair in this paper, as well as by me in a forthcoming symposium piece in the Berkeley Business Law Journal.) Cheaper debt and regulatory capital arbitrage: Cheaper debt also supercharges financial firm incentives to game regulatory capital requirements (something I am writing about in the context of the shadow banking system. See also Jones; Acharya & Schnabl; Acharya & Richardson. Bailouts and correlated risk: Governments face pressure to bail out firms when their risk taking is highly correlated (because multiple firms will fail at the same time). On the flip side, this creates a strong incentive for financial firms to take on correlated risk. (See, e.g., Acharya et al.). Correlated risk taking reinforces the kind of herding that behavioral finance scholars have analyzed in the context of asset price bubbles. So feedback loops abound. What to do, then, about government subsidies? “Stop us before we bail out again” One approach is to erect barriers to the government providing subsidies and bailouts. Dodd-Frank is chock full o’ provisions that aim to do just this. But legal scholars need to give policymakers a dose of reality about the ability of law to hardwire “no bailouts, no subsidies.” I just came back from a conference last week in which a number of economists kept saying that this hardwiring was exactly what law needed to contribute to financial reform. Here is how some of the law professors in the room (including your friend and mine Anna Gelpern) responded: 1. Legal rules are by nature incomplete and, under pressure, firms and regulators will seek ways around rules. 2. It ain’t so easy for a sovereign to bind itself. In the end, what is the remedy and who will enforce it? 3. There is nothing to stop Congress from amending the law. Legislatures can’t entrench laws against amendments by future legislatures (although the government must honor contractual obligations – for a discussion of these issues, see U.S. v. Winstar) True, Dodd-Frank’s prohibitions on bailouts and governments are not just pieces of paper. Law does constrain government behavior to a degree and can promote political accountability. However, we should not expect “law” to work like a wind-up toy that is self-executing without worrying about issues of interpretation, compliance, incentives, and the norms of government actors. I restrained myself at the conference from delivering a little legal koan: “the law will bind government officials, if they believe it binds them.” As an aside: it strikes me that the legal academy has to do a much better job of educating economists, policy makers and the public about what is “law” and how it operates. We have to do this in an accessible manner and without undermining important norms of legal compliance. Financial reform proposals are replete with calls for more “automatic regulations” – whether to counter capture or political pressure to spike the economic punch when the party gets startin’. (For example, economists have proposed the very sensible policy of counter-cyclical capital buffers) But fetishizing automatic regulations can pervert financial regulation. Over-reliance on automatic regulation: Ignores the fact that regulators and lawmakers must interpret laws; and Discounts the likelihood or regulatory arbitrage or regulatory evasion. In short, we need to have a much richer discussion of what the “law in action” means. Letting it Burn: Confusing Bailouts with Other Externalities of Financial Institution Risk-Taking What if restrictions on bailouts and government guarantees work too well? There is a rationale for government interventions like deposit insurance, lender-of-last resort, and bailouts. They are not just about “capture.” Financial institution failure can impose significant negative externalities (which is a fairly antiseptic description of the social costs of financial crises). Counterparty and market discipline don’t force firms to internalize all of these externalities. I respect the intellectual consistency and fervor of those who believe that bailouts and government interventions are the root of all financial regulatory problems. But I wouldn’t trust them in any position of responsibility. Deposit insurance and bailouts aren’t the only ways governments distort markets when they act to avoid crises. Lender-of-last resort actions and even interest rates changes can create a type of moral hazard (see “Put, Greenspan”). It is a lot harder for central banks to calibrate liquidity responses to market seizures than armchair critics think. Countering Subsidies So if some government subsidization of the financial firms is inevitable, it is critical that the government counter these subsidies -- whether by limiting firm risk-taking or charging firms for the subsidy. Absent attempts to counter subsidies, we are right back where this post started – moral hazard, distortion, cheap debt --> leverage and capital arbitrage.

#### And government financial intervention causes corruption- generates dependency – instability- shifts private investment towards flawed programs- turns case

Loris and Spencer ’11 (Nicolas Loris and Jack Spencer, Nicolas D. Loris is a Policy Analyst and Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “Obama's Department of Energy Should Not Be the Green Banker”, <http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=52893pageid=16pagename=Opinion>, October 11th 2011)

On July 14, 2011, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee marked up the Clean Energy Financing Act of 2011 (S. 1510). The bill would establish a federally owned, nonprofit Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA) in the Department of Energy (DOE) to support the deployment of politically defined clean technologies. CEDA, also known as a “green bank,” is an outgrowth of the loan guarantee programs of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the 2009 stimulus package. It would provide government-backed low-interest loans, credit enhancements, loan guarantees, and other financial mechanisms for certain energy and automotive projects that Washington deems worthy. President Barack Obama included a similar proposal for green projects in the infrastructure bank section of his American Jobs Act. However, while proponents call this “innovative financing,” in reality it is a substantial and costly subsidy that invites unjustified government intervention into the private energy marketplace. The Department of Energy has no business playing banker. CEDA would redirect capital inefficiently and create a massive taxpayer liability. CEDA: A Permanent Loan Guarantee Expansion When the federal government provides a loan guarantee, it enters into a contract with private creditors to assume the debt if the borrower defaults. According to the DOE, the purpose is to “allow the Federal Government to share some of the financial risks of projects that employ new technologies that are not yet supported in the commercial marketplace or where private tinvestment has been inhibited.” If a company defaults on a federally backed loan guarantee, the taxpayer is on the hook. This is not an appropriate role for the federal government. Two existing federal loan guarantee programs are of dubious value and have questionable objectives. Under Section 1703 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, DOE has provided billions of dollars in loan guarantees for technologies that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.” Section 1705 of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, more commonly known as the stimulus bill, added $8 billion to support additional loan guarantees, including funding for the scandalous Solyndra project. CEDA would permanently extend these misguided policies by granting DOE unlimited authority to authorize loans without limiting the number of loans it can issue. The initial capitalization or expenditure would be $10 billion, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects CEDA to cost an additional $1.1 billion over the next five years. Picking Losers Although the status of many loan guarantees is either conditional or recently closed, the first loans granted by DOE illustrate some of the problems with the program. The solar company Solyndra received one of the first stimulus loan guarantees—a $535 million loan. During a visit to the plant in 2010, President Obama said, “Companies like Solyndra are leading the way toward a brighter and more prosperous future.” In 2010, Solyndra closed one of its facilities and canceled its initial public offering. In August 2011Solyndra filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and laid off its 1,100 workers. The company is now under criminal and congressional investigations into how it secured the loan guarantee, and Solyndra owes the taxpayers $527 million. Solyndra is not the only “green” company having financial troubles. First Wind Holdings, another loan guarantee recipient, withdrew its initial public offering. In these instances, the reason for providing financing was unclear because they were not economically viable endeavors. When the government makes decisions best left to the market, it increases the opportunity for and likelihood of crony capitalism, corruption, and waste. Loan guarantees artificially make even dubious projects appear more attractive and lower the risk of private investment. For instance, private investors sunk $1.1 billion into Solyndra. Much of the private financing came after the Department of Energy announced Solyndra was one of 16 companies eligible for a loan guarantee in 2007. Private investors look at loan guarantees as a way to substantially reduce their risk. Even if a project seems to be a loser but has a huge upside (especially if complemented with other policies like a federal clean energy standard), private companies can invest a smaller amount if the government will back the loan. If the project fails, they still lose money, but the risk was worth it. Without the loan guarantee, these projects would probably not have been pursued, and that is why they fail. Subsidizing Winners In other cases, private financing was available so there was no need for preferential financing. For instance, Nordic Windpower received private funding in 2007, two years before the company received its loan guarantee. Google invested $100 million in Shepherds Flat Wind Farm. Although that investment was made after the loan guarantee, Google determined it to be a worthwhile investment. If that is the case, then the project should not need a loan guarantee. Even if a project with a federally backed loan is successful, attributing the project’s success to the loan guarantee is a huge assumption. Venture capitalists and other investors, who have much more expertise and knowledge than government bureaucrats in making investment decisions, are in a better position to determine which ideas and businesses have the most potential. Without the loan guarantee, projects with the least promise would either not attract investment or simply fail, freeing capital for risky, but more promising ventures. In contrast, a government loan guarantee program ensures that the public pays for the failures while the private sector reaps the benefits of any successes. Loan Guarantees Distort the Market Proponents of loan guarantees who argue that these programs come at minimal cost and are not subsidies ignore the fact that CEDA loans cause the same harm as direct government subsidies by distorting normal market forces and encouraging dependence on the government. By subsidizing a portion of the actual cost of a project through a loan guarantee, the government is allocating resources away from more-valued uses to less-valued uses. In essence, these guarantees and loans direct labor and capital away from more competitive projects. A loan guarantee program signals to the energy producer that the project does not need to be competitive. Rather, the green bank simply has to like it. This reduces the incentive for the energy investor or business to manage risk, innovate, and increase efficiency, and it crowds out other innovative energy projects that do not receive loan guarantees. While a loan guarantee or a below-market loan may be good for the near-term interests of the individual recipient, it is not good for taxpayers or long-term competitiveness. Loan guarantees also encourage more government dependence. If the government moves to more actively subsidizing clean energy technology through CEDA, investors will wait to determine who the government winners will be before they spend more of their own money on innovative ideas, expanding their businesses, or hiring more employees. As Darryl Siry, former head of marketing at Tesla Motors (a loan guarantee recipient), said, “The existence of an 800-pound gorilla putting massive capital behind select start-ups is sucking the air away from the rest of the venture-capital ecosystem…. Being anointed by DOE has become everything for companies looking to move ahead.” Reshaping,

### Economy

#### Multipolarity inevitable. Engagement leads to violent war-filled transition

Layne 2006 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) “The Peace of Illusions” p 190

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

#### Heg unsustainable – domestic issues

Cohen 2012 (Michael, ow at the Century Foundation, February 21, "Rotting from the Inside Out", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting\_from\_the\_inside\_out?page=full)jn

There is, however, one serious problem with this analysis. Any discussion of American national security that focuses solely on the issue of U.S. power vis-à-vis other countries -- and ignores domestic inputs -- is decidedly incomplete. In Kagan's New Republic article, for example, he has little to say about the country's domestic challenges except to obliquely argue that to focus on "nation-building" at home while ignoring the importance of maintaining U.S. power abroad would be a mistake. In fact, in a recent FP debate with the Financial Times' Gideon Rachman on the issue of American decline, Kagan diagnoses what he, and many other political analysts, appear to believe is the country's most serious problem: "enormous fiscal deficits driven by entitlements." Why is this bad? It makes it harder, says Kagan, for the United States to "continue playing its vital role in the world" and will lead to significant cutbacks in defense spending. However, a focus on U.S. global dominance or suasion that doesn't factor in those elements that constitute American power at home ignores substantial and worsening signs of decline. Indeed, by virtually any measure, a closer look at the state of the United States today tells a sobering tale of rapid and unchecked decay and deterioration in a host of areas. While not all of them are generally considered elements of national security, perhaps they should be. Let's start with education, which almost any observer would agree is a key factor in national competitiveness. The data is not good. According to the most recent OECD report on global education standards, the United States is an average country in how it educates its children -- 12th in reading skills, 17th in science, and 26th in math. The World Economic Forum ranks the United States 48th in the quality of its mathematics and science education, even though we spend more money per student than almost any country in the world. America's high school graduation rate is lower today that it was in the late 1960s and "kids are now less likely to graduate from high school than their parents," according to an analysis released last year by the Editorial Projects in Education Research Center. In fact, not only is the graduation rate worse than many Western countries, the United States is now the only developed country where a higher percentage of 55 to 64-year-olds have a high school diploma than 25 to 34-year-olds. While the United States still maintains the world's finest university system, college graduation rates are slipping. Among 25 to 34-year-olds, America trails Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in its percentage of college graduates. This speaks, in some measure, to the disparities that are endemic in the U.S. education system. If you are poor in America, chances are you attend a school that underperforms, are taught by teachers that are not as effective, and have test scores that lag far behind your more affluent counterparts (the same is true if you are black or Hispanic -- you lag behind your white counterparts). Can a country be a great global power if its education system is fundamentally unequal and is getting steadily worse? What about national infrastructure -- another key element of national economic power and global competitiveness? First, the nation's broadband penetration rates remain in the middle of the global pack and there is growing divide in the United States between digital haves and have nots. Overall, its transportation networks are mediocre compared to similarly wealthy countries and according to the World Economic Forum, the United States ranks 23rd in the OECD for infrastructure quality -- a ranking that has steadily declined over the past decade. American commuters spend more time in traffic than Western Europeans, the country's train system and high-speed rail lines in general pale next to that of other developed nations, and even the number of people killed on American highways is 60 percent higher than the OECD average. Part of the problem is that the amount of money the U.S. government spends on infrastructure has steadily declined for decades and now trails far behind other Western nations. In time, such infrastructure disadvantages have the potential to undermine the U.S. economy, hamstring productivity and competitiveness, and put the lives of more Americans at risk -- and this appears to be happening already. Finally, a closer look at the U.S. health care system is enough to make one ill. Even after the passage of Obama's 2010 health care reform bill (which every Republican presidential candidate wants to repeal) the United States is far from having a health care system that meets the needs of its citizens. According to a July 2011 report by the Commonwealth Fund, "the U.S. has fewer hospital beds and physicians, and sees fewer hospital and physician visits, than in most other countries" even though it spends far more on health care per capita than any other country in the world. In addition, "prescription drug utilization, prices, and spending all appear to be highest in the U.S., as does the supply, utilization, and price of diagnostic imaging." Long story short, the United States spends more for less on health care than pretty much any other developed nation in the world. That might also explain why life expectancy in America trails far behind most OECD countries. The United States also has the unique distinction of having one of the highest rates of income inequality in the world, on par with such global powerhouses as Cameroon, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ecuador. It has the fourth worst child poverty rate and trails only Mexico and Turkey in overall poverty rate among OECD countries. And when it comes to infant mortality, the U.S. rate is one of the worst in the developing world. But not to fear, the United States still maintains some advantages. For example, it is one of the fattest countries in the world, with approximately one-third of the country considered obese (including one out of every six children). In addition, the United States has, by far, the largest prison population -- more than China, Iran, and Cuba -- one of the highest homicide rates in the world, and one of the highest rates of death from child abuse and neglect. This steady stream of woe is certainly dispiriting, but the more optimistic might be inclined to respond that America had has problems before and has always found a way to right the ship. Certainly, this is a legitimate counter-point. The problem is that anyone looking to Washington today would have a hard time imagining that Congress and the White House will lock arms anytime soon and fix these various national crises. And this political gridlock is the biggest reason to be concerned about decline. Perhaps at no point in recent American history has the country's politics been less capable of dealing with serious challenges. Certainly, when one party basically rejects any role for the federal government in providing health care, improving educational opportunity, or strengthening the social safety net, the chances for compromise appear even slimmer. As Harold Pollack, a professor at the University of Chicago, said to me, "What future president, witnessing Barack Obama's difficulties over health reform, will make an equivalent political investment regarding climate change or another great national concern? I fear that we are headed for a kind of legislative Vietnam syndrome in which our leaders will shy away from the large things that must be done."

#### Heg cause prolif – multipolarity will solve it

Weber et al 07 Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley (Steven with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,)

Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power. SHARING GLOBALIZATION'S BURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn't matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn't seek nuclear weapons. It didn't need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea's founder, Kim II Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim's son rules the country with an iron fist. America's conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein's great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state 'with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden.

#### Proliferation leads to nuclear war

Utgoff 02, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses., Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102 “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

#### Heg causes terror – 9/11 proves

Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University, 2006, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 190-191)

The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would be if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoff­man says, is “about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change.”56 If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives.87 As Clausewitz observed, “War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.”88 September 11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s geopolitical—and cultural—hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.89 U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic funda­mentalism, which is a form of “blowback” against America’s preponderance and its world role.

#### Extinction

Gordon 2002 [Harvey Gordon, Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, Psychiatric Bulletin, v. 26, 2k2, p. 285-287, online: http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285.]

Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life (Hoge & Rose, 2001). Such potential global destruction, or globicide as one might call it, supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of ‘suicide’ bombers, the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life, including their own.

#### Regional threats ensure balancing behavior – even if the U.S. does not scare states into military buildup, its security guarantee can never be strong enough to dissuade it in all instances.

Layne 2006 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) “The Peace of Illusions” p 151

Up until now, other states have foregone overt counterbalancing because they benefit from American hegemony. However, Washington's ability to provide other major states with collective goods—in both the security and economic spheres—is a wasting asset. Although other states have relied on U.S. security guarantees to protect them against regional rivals and instability, the credibility of America's extended deterrence commitments is increasingly problematic. As other major states experience growing doubts about whether they can count on the United States to protect them, they will move—and, indeed, in some cases already have--to acquire military capabilities so that, if necessary, they can defend themselves without U.S. assistance.67 When other major states build up militarily as a hedge against abandonment by the United States, they open a second avenue to multipolarity. Regardless of how multipolarity comes about—as the result of balancing against the United States, or as a result of others arming themselves as a hedge against regional rivals—the consequences for America's hegemonic grand strategy are the same. Precisely because multipolarity is antithetical to the Open Door world that the United States seeks, the aim of American grand strategy is to prevent the other major powers—even U.S. allies—from gaining autonomy in the realm of security.

#### American withdrawal would be coupled with cooperation with new regional powers – this makes the transition smooth and avoids great power wars – sooner is better than later.

Kupchan 2003 (Charles A., Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier )

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of **a concert-like directorate** of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the **strongest incentives** to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

**Their impact turns are silly – U.S. engagement actually increases the likelihood of war in Asia and Europe – these areas can easily secure themselves.**

**Gholz et al ’97** (Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 )

The selective engagers’ strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers **overstate the effect** of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today’s world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America’s effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is **little reason** to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America’s major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country’s attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world’s GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world’s GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe’s strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders.

#### Multiple solutions fill-in for U.S. leadership – regional cooperation, spheres of influence, and balance of power arrangements – solves their offense.

Barbara Conry (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute) 2/5/1997 "U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman" CATO INSTITUTE <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1126>

A more critical issue is the evolution of the international system after U.S. hegemony. Washington can exert considerable influence (though not full control) over the development of that system. Although a number of different scenarios may be acceptable to the United States, Washington should make certain that any global system that succeeds American hegemony has two important characteristics. First, international power and responsibility must be decentralized; the transfer of U.S. global influence and responsibilities to another state, alliance, or global organization such as the United Nations should not be permitted. It is as unrealistic to base the international system on the illusion that some other country or international organization can effectively lead the world as it is to depend on U.S. global leadership. Second, the international system must include a means of checking aspiring hegemons. Regional Security Organizations Such a system could take several forms. One possibility is the strengthening of regional security organizations, such as the Western European Union. Regional security organizations are an effective way of keeping order among member states and can also take care of contingencies in their general areas. Had the European countries not been so dependent on NATO, for example, the WEU should have been able to subdue the crisis in the former Yugoslavia if the conflict had been perceived as a wider threat to Europe. Regional organizations could also serve as potential partners to the United States in the event of a serious threat to their mutual interests elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, regional security organizations require a high degree of cohesion among member states and therefore are not possible in many parts of the world. The WEU is probably the only such organization that is viable in the near future, although effective regional security organizations encompassing some Latin American and Asian countries are not inconceivable. In much of the rest of the world, however, there is little evidence of the cohesion and common interest that would be a precondition for a functioning regional security organization. Spheres of Influence An alternative to regional security organizations is the creation of spheres of influence. The notion of spheres of influence has in the past carried a rather sinister connotation and could still be troublesome if a dominant regional power sought to subvert its neighbors, especially if it subsequently aspired to challenge other major powers. But as long as dominant powers restrict their activities to typical "great power" behavior--which would generally mean shoring up security and prestige but not expansionism--there is nothing inherently evil about spheres of influence. Several prominent foreign policy scholars have pointed out the feasibility of spheres of influence. Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California has written, Regional disturbances that do not threaten the world power balance should be dealt with by the major powers of the region, ideally with the endorsement of the international community. Instead of seeking an ephemeral global security, we should, as Charles William Maynes has argued in Foreign Policy, encourage a policy of "regional self-reliance [that] would recognize that certain powerful states in each area will inevitably play a special security role." In other words, we must accept the reality of the longstanding tradition of spheres of influence--a tradition that we scrupulously insist upon in the Western Hemisphere under our unilaterally imposed Monroe Doctrine. [61] Spheres of influence make sense because the world's major powers have an interest in, and usually the ability to maintain a degree of order in, their regions. There is always some risk that the leading power in a particular sphere of influence may abuse its position or develop expansionist ambitions. The decentralization of international power, however, should ensure that the United States, other major powers, or regional security organizations--acting alone or in concert--could check unacceptable behavior on the part of a dominant regional power. Balance of Power Yet another alternative is the establishment of regional balance-of-power arrangements, which may be appropriate in the Middle East, for example. There are serious obstacles to the creation of a viable regional security organization in that area--as demonstrated by the problems the Gulf Cooperation Council has faced--and there is no clear dominant power around which a sphere of influence is likely to develop. Instead, the locus of power tends to shift among the larger states. The United States has in the past sought to manipulate the balance of power by bolstering certain countries as a means of checking others. That risky strategy had disastrous consequences with respect to Iran and Iraq, and, given the unpopularity of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and those regimes' close identification with Washington, it may well backfire again. Allowing the balance of power in the region to evolve without U.S. interference would help shield the United States from the consequences of violent and sudden shifts in the balance but could still be expected to prevent a regional hegemon from rising. As University of Chicago political scientist Stephen M. Walt pointed out in The Origins of Alliances, Compared with the other hypotheses examined in this book, the general hypothesis that states choose allies in order to balance against the most serious threat was the clear winner. Its merits were shown in two important ways. First, balancing was far more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially weak and isolated states. Second, the importance of ideological distinction declined as the level of threat increased; ideological solidarity was most powerful when security was high or when ideological factors and security considerations reinforced each other. [62] The tendency of states to balance against a prospective hegemon, instead of "bandwagoning," has been evident in the Middle East. As Walt observed, "Despite the fact that the Middle East lacks an established tradition of balance of power statecraft . . . , the advantages of seeking allies in order to balance against threats have obviously been apparent to the various actors in the Middle East. . . . the ascendancy of ambitious regional powers (such as Iraq under Nuri al-Said and Egypt under Nasser) consistently led other regional actors to join forces . . . to resist the attempt." [63] The strategic environment of the Middle East of the 1990s remains conducive to balancing, as an assortment of similarly sized powers--Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran--continue to share an interest in preventing the rise of any single power to primacy. The United States may have to tolerate a degree of instability as power shifts among those states, but American vital interests should be reasonably safe as long as power remains diffused throughout the region. If a hegemon were to arise, especially if it were clearly hostile to U.S. interests, the United States would still have the option of acting alone or joining forces with European and other powers to deal with that problem.

**No impact to the transition**

IKENBERRY ‘8 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

#### No china rise – they can’t catch up and they won’t go to war

Zenko and Cohen 12 (Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and MIchael Cohen, Senior Fellow at the American Security Project, serves on the board of the National Security Network and has taught at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, served in the U.S. Department of State, former Senior Vice President at the strategic communications firm of Robinson, Lerer and Montgomery, bachelor’s degree in international relations from American University and a master’s degree from Columbia University, 3/14/2012, "Clear and Present Safety", yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/clear-and-present-safety)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

#### Hegemony inevitable- newest trends prove- culture determines

Asghar ‘11 (Rob Asghar is a Fellow at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy and a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, Special to CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/17/opinion/asghar-globalization/index.html, November 17, 2011, LEQ)

The rapid growth of China and India does not mean the U.S. has fallen behind, Rob Asghar says Both face major environmental and infrastructural challenges within the next decade, he says Many East and South Asia societies are facing resistance to progress, Asghar says Asghar: U.S. may sabotage its tilt toward innovative growth if political dysfunction continues Editor's note: Rob Asghar is a Fellow at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy and a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy. Los Angeles (CNN) -- China is poised to become the world's largest economy within a decade, according to some economists. Rising giant India already has a middle-class population that is larger than the entire United States population, according to others. Such nuggets fuel an industry of prophetic warnings of decline, exemplified by the phrase "How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented" in the subtitle of Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum's recent best-seller. The rapid growth of China and India and other Asian tigers does not mean that the United States has "fallen behind," however. It takes a panicked perspective to even ponder the point. China and India have immense economies, each with state-of-the-art technological centers that put others to shame. But they are also ranked 125th and 162nd, respectively, in GDP per capita (according to the CIA's World Factbook), lacking clean water and safe food for too many citizens. Rob Asghar Rob Asghar Both face massive environmental and infrastructural challenges within the next decade. Neither country is in range of providing an American level of services to its citizenry, much less the comfortable level typical of flourishing Northern European economies. And if we consider the deeper cultural dimensions of globalization and innovation, one could go so far as to argue that the globalization game is and will remain rigged in America's favor, with other nations not being able or even willing to catch up. In truth, many societies in East and South Asia are confronting ambivalence and resistance to developments that we might see as progress but that their traditionalists see as moral and social decline. Iran and Pakistan are just two examples of nations whose rapid modernization was undercut by underlying reactionary cultural forces. For related reasons, the various proud Asian tigers are not on an unbendable trajectory. Current trends are not destiny; it is more accurate to say that culture is destiny. Western academics may deride the "unoriginal" thinking of Chinese or Indian students, but this critique is based on an entirely different (some would say culturally imperialistic) worldview. Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching," still proudly full of wisdom today, stands as a reminder that disruption, individualism and innovation are inherently heretical in many traditional societies -- and if they occur in one area of a traditional society, a backlash typically follows in another. Gandhi's spirit, with its vigorous opposition to consumer capitalism, is hardly extinct. Meanwhile, America is the best at being America, because America is the closest thing to a society that unambivalently enjoys being American. The United States has cultural and demographic traits that remain unique -- for better and worse. American culture is peculiarly tilted toward valuing disruptive new ideas and welcoming the immigrant who brings such ideas into its society. An individualistic, heterogeneous, novelty-seeking American culture, strengthened by a critical mass of interdisciplinary American research universities that draw the world's best minds, represents a considerable edge in social and economic innovation. For today's emerging economies to become long-term giants, rather than variations of prerevolution Iran and the Soviet Union, they must become more economically and socially integrated. And to become economically integrated, they must become culturally integrated, which means a host of conflicts are on the horizon regarding varying societal views on change, tradition, materialism, social mobility, openness, patronage and so on. It will not be easy, and success is not inevitable. Many emerging nations are like a young child on the precipice of a tense and unpredictable adolescence. Eastern nations may in time become better than the West at the freewheeling socioeconomics that America and the rest of the West invented, but not without considerable social turmoil. A true taste for innovation and adaptation will result only from a vigorous clash between individualistic impulses and communitarian ones -- clashes that will take decades to play out, with uncertain outcomes. Americans may block their own path and sabotage their own cultural tilt toward innovative growth if political dysfunction continues. But with even some sensible reform of the political system, a resilient, forward-thinking and forward-moving economy should result. America was the key force in popping open the Pandoran box of commercial and cultural globalization, with all the attendant anxieties and unintended consequences. But the globalization game is an inherently American game, and it will take a great deal of luck, strategy and determination for someone else to play the game better than Americans are able to play it.

#### The economy is resilient

**Lamy ’11**(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

The bigger test came with the 2008-2009 Great Recession, the first truly global recession since World War II. When the international economy went into free fall, trade went right along with it. Production and supply are today thoroughly global in nature, with most manufactured products made from parts and materials imported from many other countries. These global value chains have a multiplier effect on trade statistics, which explains why, as the global economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, trade volume shrank by more than 12 percent. This multiplier effect works the other way around as well: **Growth returned** to 4.6 percent and trade volume grew by a record 14.5 percent over the course of 2010. Projections for trade in 2011 are also strong, with WTO economists predicting that trade volume will rise 6.5 percent during the current year. This sharp rebound in trade has proved two essential things: **Markets stayed open despite ever-stronger pressures to close them**, and trade is an indispensible tool for economic recovery, particularly for developing countries, which are more dependent on trade. Shortly after the crisis broke out, we in the WTO began to closely monitor the trade policy response of our member governments. Many were fearful that pressures to impose trade restrictions would prove too powerful for governments to resist. But **this is not what happened**. Instead, the system of rules and disciplines, agreed to over 60 years of negotiations, **held firm**. In **a series of reports** prepared for WTO members and the G-20, we found that governments acted **with great restraint**. At no time did the trade-restrictive measures imposed cover more than 2 percent of world imports. Moreover, **the measures** **used** -- anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and countervailing duties to offset export or production subsidies -- **were those which**, in the right circumstances, **are permissible under WTO rules**. I am not suggesting that every safeguard measure or countervailing duty imposed during those difficult days was in compliance with WTO rules, but responses to trade pressures were generally undertaken within an internationally agreed-upon framework. Countries by and large resisted overtly noncompliant measures, such as breaking legally binding tariff ceilings or imposing import bans or quotas. As **markets stayed open, trade flows began to shift**, **and countries** that shrugged off the impact of the crisis and **continued to grow** -- notably China, India, and Brazil -- became ever-more attractive markets for countries that were struggling, including those in Europe and North America. Trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the developing world, a fact reflected in the far greater trade-to-GDP ratios we see there. In 2010, developing countries' share of world trade expanded to a record 45 percent, and this trend looks set to continue. Decisions made in Brasilia, Beijing, and New Delhi to open their respective economies to trade have been instrumental in enabling these countries to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

#### No impact to econ collapse; recession proves.

Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's

#### Wind turbines don’t create economic growth – gut local tourism, decrease in property value

Rosenbloom 6 (Eric, Writer and Science Editor for Wind Watch Online, “A Problem With Wind Power”)

The energy companies also claim that they increase the local tax base. But that is more than offset by the loss of open land, the loss of tourism, the stagnation or decrease in property values throughout a much wider area, the tax credits such developments typically enjoy, and the taxes and fees consumers must pay to subsidize the industry. Even surveys by wind promoters show that a quarter to a third of visitors would no longer come if wind turbines were installed. That is a huge loss in areas that depend on tourism. The wind developers say that the turbines themselves are an attraction, but visitor centers at wind farms in Britain are already closing for lack of business. A few people get more money from leasing their land for the towers (until the developer starts withholding it for some small-print reason, or even disappears after the tax advantages slow down—Altamont Pass in California is littered with broken-down wind towers owned by companies long gone), but that’s the opposite of an argument for the general good.

#### The wind industry is too uncertain – no investor will back it up

Platzer 11 (Michaela, “US Wind Turbine Manufacturing: Federal Support for an Emerging Industry”)

Nonetheless, there are several obstacles that may impede the expansion of wind energy manufacturing in the United States. One is the history of policy-induced boom-and-bust cycles in wind energy investment, which may lead wind turbine manufacturers and component suppliers to conclude that future U.S. demand for their products is too uncertain. Another significant challenge affecting the sector’s future is the availability of adequate transmission for power generated by wind farms. Most wind farms are located at a distance from the urban areas where most electricity is consumed, and a shortage of transmission capacity could hamper wind farm creation or expansion. Congress may wish to evaluate the seriousness of transmission issues in the context of other federal efforts to support wind generation.

### Warming

**No impact to resource wars – decline will spur cooperation, not war**

**Bennett and Nordstrom, 2K** – department of political science at Penn State
(D Scott and Timothy, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44:1, “Foreign policy substitutability and internal economic problems in enduring rivalries”, ProQuest, WEA)

#### Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a "guns versus butter" world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

#### Corals will adapt

GOKLANY 8 (Indurt, PhD, U.S. Delegate to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, U.S. Representative to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Center, Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, <http://www.catostore.org/index.asp?fa=ProductDetails&method=cats&scid=32&pid=1441339>)

How often have you heard that coral reefs are fragile and would be wiped out by global warming? If you google “fragile coral reefs” (without the quotes) you’ll get 493,000 hits. So imagine my surprise on stumbling on a news report titled, “Marine life flourishes at Bikini Atoll test site.” The report tells us: It was blasted by the largest nuclear weapon ever detonated by the United States but half a century on, Bikini Atoll supports a stunning array of tropical coral, scientists have found. In 1954 the South Pacific atoll was rocked by a 15 megaton hydrogen bomb 1,000 times more powerful than the explosives dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion shook islands more than 100 miles away, generated a wave of heat measuring 99,000ºF and spread mist-like radioactive fallout as far as Japan and Australia. But, much to the surprise of a team of research divers who explored the area, the mile-wide crater left by the detonation has made a remarkable recovery and is now home to a thriving underwater ecosystem. 99,000 degrees Fahrenheit! By comparison the upper-bound estimate for global warming is a puny global temperature increase of 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit (less in the ocean). So even if global warming wipes out life on earth, global warming catastrophists can take comfort that nature will, as it inevitably must, reassert itself. Some, convinced that humanity is the problem, may even welcome such an outcome — no humans, but plenty of nature (over time). [Fifty-four years later at Bikini Atoll, recovery is not complete. Perhaps 28 percent of coral species may still be absent.]

#### No impact to disease

**AMNH 98** – (The American Museum of Natural History “How did Hyperdisease cause extinctions?” http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit2.html)

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

#### No impact to water wars

Victor 7 (David G., Professor of Law – Stanford Law School and Director – Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, “What Resource Wars?”, The National Interest, 11-12, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)

While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen-usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny-the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same

#### No warming and it’s not anthropogenic

Watson 9 (Steve, citing a report conducted by the Japan Society of Energy and Resources, the academic society representing scientists from the energy and resource fields, “Top Japanese Scientists: Warming Is Not Caused By Human Activity,” February 27th, <http://www.infowars.com/top-japanese-scientists-warming-is-not-caused-by-human-activity/>, EMM)

A major scientific report by leading Japanese academics concludes that global warming is not man-made and that the overall warming trend from the mid-part of the 20th Century onwards has now stopped. Unsurprisingly the report, which was released last month, has been completely ignored by the Western corporate media. The report was undertaken by Japan Society of Energy and Resources (JSER), the academic society representing scientists from the energy and resource fields. The JSER acts as a government advisory panel, much like the International Panel on Climate Change did for the UN. The JSER’s findings provide a stark contrast to the IPCC’s, however, with only one out of five top researchers agreeing with the claim that recent warming has been accelerated by man-made carbon emissions. The **government commissioned** report criticizes computer climate modeling and also says that the US ground temperature data set, used to back up the man-made warming claims, is too myopic. In the last month, no major Western media outlet has covered the report, which prompted British based sci-tech website The Register to commission a translation of the document. Section one highlights the fact that Global Warming has ceased, noting that since 2001, the increase in global temperatures has halted, despite a continuing increase in CO2 emissions. The report then states that the recent warming the planet has experienced is primarily a recovery from the so called "Little Ice Age" that occurred from around 1400 through to 1800, and is part of a natural cycle. The researchers also conclude that global warming and the halting of the temperature rise are related to solar activity, a notion previously dismissed by the IPCC. "The hypothesis that the majority of global warming can be ascribed to the Greenhouse Effect is mistaken." the report’s introduction states. Kanya Kusano, Program Director and Group Leader for the Earth Simulator at the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science & Technology (JAMSTEC) reiterates this point: "[The IPCC's] conclusion that from now on atmospheric temperatures are likely to show a continuous, monotonic increase, should be perceived as an unprovable hypothesis," Shunichi Akasofu, head of the International Arctic Research Center in Alaska, cites historical data to challenge the claim that very recent temperatures represent an anomaly: "We should be cautious, IPCC’s theory that atmospheric temperature has risen since 2000 in correspondence with CO2 is nothing but a hypothesis. " "Before anyone noticed, this hypothesis has been substituted for truth… The opinion that great disaster will really happen must be broken." Akasofu concludes. The key passages of the translated report can be found here. The conclusions within the report dovetail with those of hundreds of Western scientists, who have been derided and even compared with holocaust deniers for challenging the so called "consensus" on global warming. The total lack of exposure that this major report has received is another example of how skewed coverage of climate change is toward one set of hypotheses. This serves the agenda to deliberately whip up mass hysteria on behalf of governments who are all too eager to introduce draconian taxation and control measures that won’t do anything to combat any form of warming, whether you believe it to be natural or man-made.

#### Newest data proves the greenhouse effect is a hoax

**IBT 11** (International Business Times, Citing report from NASA’s Terra Satellite, “Global Warming a Hoax? NASA Reveals Earth Releasing Heat into Space,” 7/30, <http://sanfrancisco.ibtimes.com/articles/189649/20110730/global-warming-hoax-nasa-earth-releasing-heat-space.htm>, EMM)

With new data collected from a NASA's Terra satellite, the previous model may be proven as a hoax. Hypothesis based on the satellite's findings show that planet Earth actually releases heat into space, more than it retains it. The higher efficiency of releasing energy outside of Earth contradicts former forecasts of climate change. Dr. Roy Spencer, a team leader for NASA's Aqua satellite, studied a decade worth of satellite data regarding cloud surface temperatures. "The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show...There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans," said Dr. Spencer. By cross examining data with other Climate Change models, he concluded that carbon dioxide is just a minor part in global warming. His studies have garnered media attention and that the data are going against the beliefs of global warming alarmists by disproving their theory.

#### No extinction

**NIPCC 11**. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>

In a paper published in *Systematics and Biodiversity*, Willis *et al*. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas *et al*., 2004; Solomon *et al*., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford *et al*., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

If it’s real then it’s irreversible - it’s too late to stop the greenhouse effect

Harris 9 (Richard, Science Reporter for National Public Radio, Peabody Award Winner, American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award, “Global Warming Irreversible, Study Says,” January 26th, NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)

Climate change is essentially irreversible, according to a sobering new scientific study. As carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise, the world will experience more and more long-term environmental disruption. The damage will persist even when, and if, emissions are brought under control, says study author Susan Solomon, who is among the world's top climate scientists. "We're used to thinking about pollution problems as things that we can fix," Solomon says. "Smog, we just cut back and everything will be better later. Or haze, you know, it'll go away pretty quickly." That's the case for some of the gases that contribute to climate change, such as methane and nitrous oxide. But as Solomon and colleagues suggest in a new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, it is not true for the most abundant greenhouse gas: carbon dioxide. Turning off the carbon dioxide emissions won't stop global warming. "People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide that the climate would go back to normal in 100 years or 200 years. What we're showing here is that's not right. It'**s** essentially an irreversible change that will last for more than a thousand years," Solomon says. This is because the oceans are currently soaking up a lot of the planet's excess heat — and a lot of the carbon dioxide put into the air. The carbon dioxide and heat will eventually start coming out of the ocean. And that will take place for many hundreds of years.

#### Status quo solves

Brown 9 (Lester, President of the Earth Policy Institute, “US Headed for Massive Decline in Carbon Emissions,” October 14th (EVAN MCCARTY’S BIRTHDAY), <http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_19389.cfm>)

For years now, many members of Congress have insisted that cutting carbon emissions was difficult, if not impossible. It is not. During the two years since 2007, carbon emissions have dropped 9 percent. While part of this drop is from the recession, part of it is also from efficiency gains and from replacing coal with natural gas, wind, solar, and geothermal energy. The United States has ended a century of rising carbon emissions and has now entered a new energy era, one of declining emissions. Peak carbon is now history. What had appeared to be hopelessly difficult is happening at amazing speed. For a country where oil and coal use have been growing for more than a century, the fall since 2007 is startling. In 2008, oil use dropped 5 percent, coal 1 percent, and carbon emissions by 3 percent. Estimates for 2009, based on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) data for the first nine months, show oil use down by another 5 percent. Coal is set to fall by 10 percent. Carbon emissions from burning all fossil fuels dropped 9 percent over the two years. Beyond the cuts already made, there are further massive reductions in the policy pipeline. Prominent among them are stronger automobile fuel-economy standards, higher appliance efficiency standards, and financial incentives supporting the large-scale development of wind, solar, and geothermal energy. (See data in Excel.) Efforts to reduce fossil fuel use are under way at every level of government-national, state, and city-as well as in corporations, [and] utilities, and universities. And millions of climate-conscious, cost-cutting Americans are altering their lifestyles to reduce energy use. For its part, the federal government-the largest U.S. energy consumer, with some 500,000 buildings and 600,000 vehicles-announced in early October 2009 that it is setting its own carbon-cutting goals. These include reducing vehicle fleet fuel use 30 percent by 2020, recycling at least 50 percent of waste by 2015, and buying environmentally responsible products. Electricity use is falling partly because of gains in efficiency. The potential for further cuts is evident in the wide variation in energy efficiency among states. The Rocky Mountain Institute calculates that if the 40 least-efficient states were to reach the electrical efficiency of the 10 most-efficient ones, national electricity use would be reduced by one third. This would allow the equivalent of 62 percent of the country's 617 coal-fired power plants to be closed. Actions are being taken to realize this potential. For several years DOE failed to write the regulations needed to implement appliance efficiency legislation that Congress had already passed. Within days of taking office, President Obama instructed the agency to write the regulations needed to realize these potentially vast efficiency gains as soon as possible. The energy efficiency revolution that is now under way will transform everything from lighting to transportation. With lighting, for example, shifting from incandescent bulbs to the newer light-emitting diodes (LEDs), combined with motion sensors to turn lights off in unoccupied spaces, can cut electricity use by more than 90 percent. Los Angeles, for example, is replacing its 140,000 street lights with LEDs-and cutting electricity and maintenance costs by $10 million per year. The carbon-cutting movement is gaining momentum on many fronts. In July, the Sierra Club-coordinator of the national anti-coal campaign-announced the hundredth cancellation of a proposed plant since 2001. This battle is leading to a de facto moratorium on new coal plants. Despite the coal industry's $45-million annual budget to promote "clean coal," utilities are giving up on coal and starting to close plants. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), with 11 coal plants (average age 47 years) and a court order to install over $1 billion worth of pollution controls, is considering closing its plant near Rogersville, Tennessee, along with the six oldest units out of eight in its Stevenson, Alabama, plant. TVA is not alone. Altogether, some 22 coal-fired power plants in 12 states are being replaced by wind farms, natural gas plants, wood chip plants, or efficiency gains. Many more are likely to close as public pressure to clean up the air and to cut carbon emissions intensifies. Shifting from coal to natural gas cuts carbon emissions by roughly half. Shifting to wind, solar, and geothermal energy drops them to zero. State governments are getting behind renewables big time. Thirty-four states have adopted renewable portfolio standards to produce a larger share of their electricity from renewable sources over the next decade or so. Among the more populous states, the renewable standard is 24 percent in New York, 25 percent in Illinois, and 33 percent in California. While coal plants are closing, wind farms are multiplying. In 2008, a total of 102 wind farms came online, providing more than 8,400 megawatts of generating capacity. Forty-nine wind farms were completed in the first half of 2009 and 57 more are under construction. More important, some 300,000 megawatts of wind projects (think 300 coal plants) are awaiting access to the grid. U.S. solar cell installations are growing at 40 percent a year. With new incentives, this rapid growth in rooftop installations on homes, shopping malls, and factories should continue. In addition, some 15 large solar thermal power plants that use mirrors to concentrate sunlight and generate electricity are planned in California, Arizona, and Nevada. A new heat-storage technology that enables the plants to continue generating power for up to six hours past sundown helps explain this boom. For many years, U.S. geothermal energy was confined largely to the huge Geysers project north of San Francisco, with 850 megawatts of generating capacity. Now the United States, with 132 geothermal power plants under development, is experiencing a geothermal renaissance. After their century-long love-affair with the car, Americans are turning to mass transit. There is hardly a U.S. city that is not either building new light rail, subways, or express bus lines or upgrading and expanding existing ones. As motorists turn to public transit, and also to bicycles, the U.S. car fleet is shrinking. The estimated scrappage of 14 million cars in 2009 will exceed new sales of 10 million by 4 million, shrinking the fleet 2 percent in one year. This shrinkage will likely continue for a few years. Oil use and imports are both declining. This will continue as the new fuel economy standards raise the fuel efficiency of new cars 42 percent and light trucks 25 percent by 2016. And since 42 percent of the diesel fuel burned in the rail freight sector is used to haul coal, falling coal use means falling diesel fuel use. But the big gains in fuel efficiency will come with the shift to plug-in hybrids and all-electric cars. Not only are electric motors three times more efficient than gasoline engines, but they also enable cars to run on wind power at a gasoline-equivalent cost of 75¢ a gallon. Almost every major car maker will soon be selling plug-in hybrids, electric cars, or both. In this new energy era carbon emissions are declining and they will likely continue to do so because of policies already on the books. We are headed in the right direction. We do not yet know how much we can cut carbon emissions because we are just beginning to make a serious effort. Whether we can move fast enough to avoid catastrophic climate change remains to be seen.

#### Conventional power ensures that wind energy doesn’t cool the planet -

Bryce 10 (Robert, August 24th 2010, Senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, The Global Warming Policy Foundation, “Wind Power Won’t Cool down the Planet”)

None of it will lead to major cuts in carbon emissions, for two reasons. First, wind blows only intermittently and variably. Second, wind-generated electricity largely displaces power produced by natural gas-fired generators, rather than that from plants burning more carbon-intensive coal. Because wind blows intermittently, electric utilities must either keep their conventional power plants running all the time to make sure the lights don't go dark, or continually ramp up and down the output from conventional coal- or gas-fired generators (called "cycling"). But coal-fired and gas-fired generators are designed to run continuously, and if they don't, fuel consumption and emissions generally increase. A car analogy helps explain: An automobile that operates at a constant speed—say, 55 miles per hour—will have better fuel efficiency, and emit less pollution per mile traveled, than one that is stuck in stop-and-go traffic. Recent research strongly suggests how this problem defeats the alleged carbon-reducing virtues of wind power. In April, Bentek Energy, a Colorado-based energy analytics firm, looked at power plant records in Colorado and Texas. (It was commissioned by the Independent Petroleum Association of the Mountain States.) Bentek concluded that despite huge investments, wind-generated electricity "has had minimal, if any, impact on carbon dioxide" emissions.

#### Can’t solve fast warming –any emissions reduction will take a decade

Science Daily 2/16/12 (“Low-carbon technologies ‘No Quick-Fix”: May Not Lessen Global Warming Until Late This Century”)

These power plants were compared to wind power, nuclear power, hydroelectric power, carbon capture and storage, and natural gas. Solar photovoltaics (harnessing the sun for electricity) and solar thermal (harnessing the sun for heat) were also compared. "Achieving substantial reductions in temperatures relative to the coal-based system will take the better part of a century, and will depend on rapid and massive deployment of some mix of conservation, wind, solar, and nuclear, and possibly carbon capture and storage," the researchers write.

#### New studies prove

Science Daily 2/16/12 (“Low-carbon technologies ‘No Quick-Fix”: May Not Lessen Global Warming Until Late This Century”)

Furthermore, it states that technologies that offer only modest reductions in greenhouse gases, such as the use of natural gas and perhaps carbon capture and storage, cannot substantially reduce climate risk in the next 100 years. The study, published February 16, in IOP Publishing's journalEnvironmental Research Letters, claims that the rapid deployment of low-greenhouse-gas-emitting technologies (LGEs) will initially increase emissions as they will require a large amount of energy to construct and install. These cumulative emissions will remain in the atmosphere for extended periods due to the long lifetime of CO2, meaning that global mean surface temperatures will increase to a level greater than if we continued to use conventional coal-fired plants.

## 2NC

### AT: Wind Industry – Ext. Alt Causes

#### Demand is not set to increase –

Brown 6/20/12 (Phillip, Specialist in Energy Policy, Congressional Research Service, “US Renewable Electricity: How Does the Production Tax Credit Impact Wind Markets”)

Electricity demand growth is an important factor when considering opportunities for renewable electricity for two primary reasons. First, generally, the greater the annual demand growth the more new electricity capacity needed to satisfy that demand. Larger annual requirements for new electricity capacity create more opportunities for renewable electricity projects to compete. Second, large annual demand growth can result in a larger base of electricity to which RPS policies are applied. The larger the electricity base, the greater the amount of renewable electricity required to comply with state percentage-based RPS policies. However, EIA projects modest growth levels for U.S. electricity demand over the next several years

#### Gas prices and regulation swamp the PTC

Linowes and Short 11 (Lisa and Bill, November 28th 2011, “Windpower’s PTC Secondary to State Mandates”) [**http://www.masterresource.org/2011/11/windpower-ptc-state-mandate/**](http://www.masterresource.org/2011/11/windpower-ptc-state-mandate/)

The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) insists the industry is at risk of a slow-down if Congress does not act quickly to [extend the Production Tax Credit](http://www.awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC-Fact-Sheet.pdf) (PTC), the federal incentive most often credited for market growth in the wind sector. The PTC expires at the end of 2012. [1] But if the PTC were to expire, the damage would be less than what the AWEA claims.The industry has clearly grown addicted to the production tax credit, but our findings suggest that attributing market activity to the PTC is overly simplistic and fails to consider other crucial (government) factors driving wind development in the U.S. The PTC was established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to stimulate use of renewable technologies for power generation by providing a production-based credit for the first 10 years of project operations. Initially set at 1.5¢/kWh, the credit is adjusted annually for inflation and today stands at 2.2¢/kWh. When adopted, the House Ways and Means Committee insisted on an expiration date (June 30, 1999) to give Congress an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the credit in meeting its goal. In each of the five years following the PTC’s enactment [wind capacity declined](http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/xls/stb0811a.xls). It wasn’t until 1998 and 1999 before the trend drifted upward. While it’s possible the market needed time to respond to the new subsidy, other more significant factors likely stalled growth.The U.S. was awash in generation and oil prices were low and stable. Deregulation shifted plant ownership to independent power producers which led to improved plant management and increased efficiencies. This was particularly true for nuclear power where average capacity factors grew from 66% in 1990 to more than 90% currently.

### A2 Nat Gas

#### Status quo solves gas- regional hubs initiative

Muro, 8-20 -- Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program policy director

(Mark, and Jessica Lee, "Hubs of Manufacturing: Let’s Get Started," 8-20-12, www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/08/20-hubs-of-manufacturing-muro-lee, accessed 10-3-12, mss)

Now, it’s great to see the Obama administration moving to pilot another proposed national network of innovation hubs aimed at catalyzing regional growth ecosystems, this time in manufacturing. In this case, the news surrounds the launch last week of a robust new public-private institute for manufacturing innovation in Youngstown, OH, that will seek to provide a proof-of-concept for the creation of a $1 billion national network of up to 15 such institutes around the country. Focused on the hot new process of “3-D printing,” the new National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute (NAMII) will seek to bolster U.S. leadership on one of the critical Next Big Things in industrial production and will do it through an award of $30 million of federal funding that will be matched by $40 million from a winning consortium of 60 companies, universities, community colleges, and non-profit organizations arrayed around the Ohio-Pennsylvania-West Virginia “Tech Belt.” To that extent it’s reassuring to see concerted effort to strengthen the nation’s competitive advantage on advanced manufacturing through an embrace of regional hubs and ecosystems. There’s been an awful lot of dithering in recent years and it’s time to move forward on bolstering U.S. manufacturing! And yet what’s equally gratifying is the intellectual sophistication of the administration’s innovation strategies, which have consistently sought to aid and abet local innovation by supporting regional, multi-party collaboration. Turning to manufacturing, multiple agencies are again working in concert to implement carefully developed ideas about how government can accelerate industrial growth. Last month, most notably, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) provided strong grounding for the new push in a new report exploring how best to strengthen the nation’s advanced manufacturing sector. Along with solid ideas on securing the talent pipeline and improving the nation’s business climate PCAST carefully set out the rationale for the creation of a network of regionally focused manufacturing research centers such as our colleagues Howard Wial and Susan Helper set out last winter. Such centers, like the energy institutes, can act as powerful hubs of innovation by drawing university and national laboratory research into focused collaborations with firms, manufacturing supply chains, financiers, and the career-focused education provided by community colleges. Such centers can be particularly **transformative** by helping SMEs surmount the challenge of adapting to new product and process innovations, which in turn will bolster what Gary Pisano and Willy Shih have described as the “industrial commons.” Yet beyond concentrated collaboration the regional focus of PCAST’s Manufacturing Innovation Institute model also affirms another central preoccupation of ours: the metropolitan nature of the nation’s economy. Innovation and its deployment does not happen just anywhere. It happens in places, most notably, within metropolitan regions, where firms and workers tend to cluster in close geographic proximity, whether to tap local supplier networks, draw on local workers, or profit from formal and informal knowledge transfer. If properly channeled, these “co-location synergies,” as economist Greg Tassey has dubbed them, will **ensure** that value added through **innovation** spreads through and **remains** within the **domestic** manufacturing supply chain. Nor is this only a “soft” benefit. Such local synergies—accumulated region by region—can foster greater efficiency within and across manufacturing supply chains and add to the nation’s overall **competiveness**. In sum, regional centers like the Manufacturing Innovation Institutes look like a very shrewd way to encourage collaboration on critical challenges, spur knowledge transfer, and help reinforce regional synergies for the nation’s benefit. Let’s launch some more of them!

#### Status quo solves gas- robots

Matthews, 9-27 – Time Business reporter

(Christopher, "Can Robots Bring Manufacturing Jobs Back to the U.S.?" Time Business, 9-27-12, business.time.com/2012/09/27/can-robots-bring-back-manufacturing-jobs-to-the-u-s/, accessed 10-3-12, mss)

Meanwhile there are others who think that robotics can help America make a more **permanent play** for manufacturing jobs. This may be a bit counterintuitive. After all, as robotics becomes more cost-effective, won’t machines do more of the work that humans are currently doing and therefore take those jobs? Not necessarily, according to Rodney Brooks, co-founder of Rethink Robots, a Boston-based robot manufacture. Rethink is releasing a new manufacturing robot called “Baxter,” which is equipped with sophisticated software that can help the machine actually learn tasks, recognize different objects and react intelligently to force. Baxter is designed to help manufacturers automate tasks inside their factories so that human workers are free to do more complicated jobs. And at a price of $22,000, Baxter is much cheaper than traditional manufacturing robots and could even be cost effective for small manufacturers. Brooks told Bloomberg Businessweek: “We are spending hundreds of billions of dollars doing this kind of work in China. We want companies to spend that here, in a way that lets American workers be way more productive.” Brooks argues that Baxter is inexpensive enough to do the kind of rote tasks that many firms are paying workers in developing countries to do. This way, manufacturers can keep their factories **at home and stay competitive on price.**

### AT: Wind Industry – Ext. No Collapse

#### It’s a double bind – either the wind industry won’t fail OR it is doomed regardless

Handley 8/14/12 (Meg, Business Reporter for US News and World Report, “Wind Energy Tax Credit: More Hot Air or Key Job Creator?”) <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/08/14/wind-energy-tax-credit-more-hot-air-or-key-job-creator?page=2>

But not everyone believes the expiration of the PTC will be the industry's death toll. Already supported by large government subsidies—at times more than 60 percent government interest, according to some estimates—wind energy projects and producers also enjoy mandates that require at least some of the state's energy to come from renewable sources, including wind, in 26 other states. But subsidies won't sustain an industry that can't stand on its own without the government. Just look at Europe, whose governments are now turning away from heavy subsidies for alternative energy production, says Dan Kish, senior vice president for policy at the Institute for Energy Research. "Europe is backing away from subsidies as fast as they can because they realize they're running out of money," Kish says. "Once the burden is shifted [from the government to the consumer] utilities are going to have to start charging more."

### Heg Link

#### Card 1

Ettlinger, Vice President for Economic Policy, and Gordon, Vice President for Energy Policy at the Center for American Progress, 4-7-11

(Michael, Kate, “The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing,”

http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf, accessed 9-6-12, CMM)

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations,¶ the strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the¶ machines and the men and women who worked them. We need manufacturing¶ to continue to be a bedrock of strength for generations to come. Manufacturing¶ is woven into the structure of our economy: Its importance goes far beyond what¶ happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing¶ carries implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the¶ well-being of all Americans.¶ Manufacturing today accounts for 12 percent of the U.S. economy and about¶ 11 percent of the private-sector workforce. But its significance is even greater¶ than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a¶ part of the picture.¶ First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of¶ Americans. Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to¶ hard-working, middle-skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens¶ and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy.¶ What’s more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs that¶ are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher-skill¶ service jobs that include the accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated¶ with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs including basic research¶ and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations¶ and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work.¶ Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership.¶ The problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a¶ period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing¶ elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper¶ labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually¶ many of these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves,¶ the feedback loop from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing¶ operation—a critical element in the innovative process—is eventually broken.¶ To maintain that feedback loop, companies need to move higher-skill jobs to¶ where they do their manufacturing.¶ And with those jobs goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This¶ is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and associated service jobs in¶ the United States matters. The “industrial commons” that comes from the crossfertilization¶ and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and¶ government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness.¶ Manufacturing also is important for the nation’s economic stability. The experience¶ of the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing¶ plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest of the economy, it is on the¶ rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction, still¶ languish. Diversity in the economy is important—and manufacturing is a particularly¶ important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly affected¶ by broader economic events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer¶ goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external markets—¶ gives it great potential resiliency.

#### Card 2

Swezey, Breakthrough Institute project director, 2010

[Devon, “Testimony: The Challenge of China’s Green Technology Policy” <http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/testimony_the_challenge_of_chi_1>, accessed 8-21-12, TAP]

As the United States searches for new sources of growth amidst a sluggish economic recovery, the rapidly growing clean energy industry represents an important job creation and export market opportunity. Global private investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies is estimated to reach $450 billion annually by 2012 and $600 billion by 2020.¶ Unfortunately, the United States risks losing out on this opportunity, as it lags behind economic competitors in Asia and Europe in the production of virtually all clean energy technologies. The United States produces only 5 percent of the world's solar cells, relies on foreign-owned companies to manufacture the majority of its wind turbines, and is losing ground on hybrid and electric vehicle technology and manufacturing. Measured by market capitalization, only four of the world's top 30 solar, wind, and advanced battery companies are American.¶ At the same time, other nations are moving quickly to implement comprehensive clean energy investment strategies, which will allow them to gain first-mover advantages ahead of the United States and capture a majority of the economic benefits--in terms of jobs, tax revenues, and growth--associated with this burgeoning industry.¶ China in particular, has emerged as a clean energy powerhouse. It is now the world's largest manufacturer of solar cells and wind turbines and has also taken the lead in commercializing plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles, as well as manufacturing the advanced batteries that power them.¶ China is not out-competing the United States through some inherent comparative advantage, but through targeted and comprehensive public policy characterized by large and sustained public investment across the entire industry.¶ China's investment strategy includes major funding for clean energy research and development; subsidies and tax incentives for domestic manufacturers; ambitious clean energy deployment targets and incentives and procurement policies to develop its domestic market; and major investments in enabling infrastructure.¶ Local and provincial governments are also offering clean energy companies free land, tax breaks, and other subsidies to facilitate the development of clean energy clusters--dense regional networks of investors, manufacturers, suppliers, universities, and other actors that can confer lasting competitive advantage to the region as a whole. One prime example of this is the city of Baoding, which has transformed into the fastest growing hub of wind and solar energy equipment makers in China. The city is home to "Electricity Valley," an industry cluster modeled after Silicon Valley, composed of nearly 200 renewable energy companies.¶ To make matters worse, the Chinese government is set to massively out-invest the United States over the next five years, even assuming passage of the American Clean Energy and Security Act. We documented these clean energy investment estimates in our November report, "Rising Tigers, Sleeping Giant," written with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Already, China's public investment strategy has helped the country attract the bulk of private investment in clean energy. Last year, China attracted $34.6 billion in investment, nearly twice the $18.6 billion invested in the United States.¶ As clean energy manufacturing and investment shifts overseas, research and innovation activities -- America's historic "comparative advantage" -- have started to follow. Perhaps the highest-profile example is Silicon Valley giant Applied Materials, the global leader in supplying the manufacturing equipment used to make solar cells, which recently decided to construct the world's largest, most advanced solar R&D facility in Xian, China.¶ Applied Materials is not alone. IBM has announced that it will invest $40 million to create the company's first "energy-and-utilities-solution lab" to develop innovative new technologies for smart grid and other applications. The new lab will also be located in China. These decisions follow those of leading U.S. companies such as GM, Dow Chemical, and Intel, which have all constructed high-tech research labs in China, and show that high-value R&D is starting to follow manufacturing abroad, threatening America's historic leadership in innovation.¶ We believe that the decisions the United States government makes in the next five to ten years will largely determine whether the country can emerge as a global leader in these new growth industries. Unfortunately, proposed legislation in Congress would not be enough to keep the U.S. competitive.¶ Some say that pricing carbon is the most important policy the U.S. can adopt to become a leader in the global clean energy industry. But it is important to understand what a price on carbon would and would not accomplish. For political reasons, the carbon price established by both the House and Senate climate bills would remain much too low to substantially increase demand for clean energy technologies. A low carbon price also would not be sufficient to support growth in domestic clean energy manufacturing.¶ To develop a globally competitive clean energy industry, the United States needs a comprehensive investment agenda that prioritizes large and sustained public investment in clean energy technology. Today, clean energy is still too expensive to be widely deployed at scale around the world, and most governments are unwilling or unable to impose high carbon prices or sustain large subsidies to make clean energy cost-competitive. Therefore, the overarching goal of a new clean economy strategy should be to make clean energy cheap in real, unsubsidized terms.¶ Accomplishing this goal will require robust and long-term investments in areas such as research and innovation, manufacturing, market creation, education, and the development of industry clusters. The primary role of carbon pricing should be to raise the revenue needed for these critical investments.¶ We don't have to look far for examples of past public investment strategies that created whole new industries and unleashed waves of economic prosperity. In the 1950s, the Defense Department's procurement of microchips facilitated market development and dramatically reduced chip costs. Today's vibrant IT sector exists largely thanks to early, sustained public investments in R&D, computer science, infrastructure, and procurement. Government investment was also crucial for the development of railroads, radios, computers, the Internet, and many other technologies.¶ We believe America can still lead the global clean energy industry. The U.S. remains one of the most innovative and entrepreneurial countries in the world. But without a comprehensive clean energy investment strategy, America will lose out on one of the greatest economic opportunities of the 21st century.

#### Card 3

Caploe, 4/7/9

[David Caploe is CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia., “Focus still on America to lead global recovery”, April 7, The Strait Times, lexis]

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US. This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. At the same time, this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that there is no other engine for the world economy - and hasn't been for the last six decades. If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead. As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are failing not just there but around the world as well. Which raises the question: If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine, which country will? The obvious answer is China. But that is unrealistic for three reasons. First, China's economic health is more tied to America's than practically any other country in the world. Indeed, the reason China has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it has structured its own economy to complement America's. The only way China can serve as the engine of the global economy is if the US starts pulling it first. Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global consumer of last resort. China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income, even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale. Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency? This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system. The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history. It will try to avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades. Given all this, the US will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.

### Warming Turn

#### Attempts to sustain heg empirically kill international solutions to warming

**Roberts, 11** (J. Timmons, Center for Environmental Studies at Brown University, “Multipolarity and the new world dis(order): US hegemonic decline and the fragmentation of the global climate regime”, *Global Environmental Change,* 5/5/11, accessed ScienceDirect, JD)

In his 2009 “Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics?” piece, Matthew Paterson argues that Europe has taken the lead in the area of global climate policy, surpassing the US. However in Copenhagen, we saw the rise of BASIC, especially China, as the real challenger to US hegemonic power.12 As Arrighi and Silver say, the hegemon is typically the only power with the ability to lead the world in protecting “global public goods.” This suggests that the US, as declining hegemon, is leaving its climate mess for the rising economic hegemon (seemingly China) to clean up. As Arrighi and Silver put it about economic issues: “An equally essential condition is the emergence of a new global leadership from the main centres of the East Asian economic expansion. This leadership must be willing and able to rise up to the task of providing system-level solutions to the system-level problems left behind by US hegemony”(p. 279). Whether China will be the next global hegemonic power is uncertain. And though China has the ability to mobilize extraordinary economic resources and it has invested heavily in renewable energy sources, its leadership's overall emphasis on addressing climate change remains uncertain because it has economic growth as its top priority (see also Mol, 2011). Whether China, another nation, or a regional bloc becomes the next global hegemon, Arrighi and Silver's work supports the idea that they will inherit a climate mess requiring someone to take the lead in cleaning up. 5. Discussion and conclusion Observing many years of turmoil in negotiations over global nations’ response to climate change, leading ever further away from principles and practice of climate justice, one is tempted to chalk it up to stubbornness on the part of a few selfish nations: the US and Saudi Arabia most obviously and for the longest time, but Canada might be put in this group, and also one could say China and India, for different reasons. Poor leadership by the Danish Presidency at Copenhagen was clearly a factor, as deft leadership by Mexico in Cancun confirmed. The list could go on. Certainly short-sighted selfishness has been a major factor in creating our current dire situation on climate change, but I argue here that the roots of failure to reach consensus on a global response to climate change lie in the global economic structure and its current phase of restructuring. Many nations in the global South remain frustrated that in spite of many decades of promises and striving that they face persistent inequality and stalled economic development. In the case of the US, its pigheadedness in negotiations might be seen as having been driven by insecurity in a shifting global political economy about its ability to provide jobs for its workers in the future where all sorts of work is moving to China and India. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver point us to two central parts of that dynamic. First, while developing nations may be industrializing, the majority of citizens in those nations are not getting rich (or even getting to global middle class status in GDP/capita terms) in the process [Arrighi and Silver, 2001], [Arrighi et al., 2003] and [Arrighi et al., 2005]). This happens because lower-profit parts of the product cycle are offshored to those countries, with owners looking for cheap labor havens.13 This persistent and growing inequality between and within nations exacerbates the frustration of many in the developing world about their stalled prosperity, which also dampens their enthusiasm about limiting their future growth – an issue we’ve discussed at length elsewhere ([Roberts and Parks, 2007] and [Parks and Roberts, 2010]). The current article therefore begins to address two major gaps in our previous work, which was more focused on explaining non-cooperation by developing countries. Those gaps are (1) explaining fragmentation in the global South, and (2) the roots of resistance by the US Senate and executive branch to a meaningful and binding climate treaty. For two decades now, the US has been the bull in the china shop of climate negotiations – repeatedly smashing any small progress that was being delicately arranged. It has not been alone in wrecking the negotiations, but its intransigence has provided a shield behind which many other nations can conveniently hide. The US government's unwillingness to take active steps to address this looming global crisis is exactly the kind of failure of leadership that Arrighi and Silver describe among hegemons in the “autumns” of their decline. This has been true since the Genoese, Dutch, and British rode waves of boom and bust over the past centuries. In the current case it's fairly simple: US fear of job loss to China lay behind the July 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution that arguably sunk the Kyoto Protocol, tying the Clinton administration's hands the summer before the COP 3 in that Japanese city. That resolution read that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol … which would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions … unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States (US Senate, July 25, 1997) US stubbornness in the climate negotiations is driven by fear of job loss and competitiveness to China, India, and elsewhere, while China and other rapidly developing nations in turn fear the treaty being used by the US and others to dampen their growth and defer their dreams.14 Global economic and geopolitical restructuring also opens up fracture lines within the bloc of G-77 and China countries, at least partially along the lines of paths of economic development. Beyond the old North-South categories of solidarity by wealth, the negotiating blocs described in Table 1 can be seen as being determined by three main factors: (i) responsibility for climate change; (ii) capability to act and help others act (both determined by position in the global economy); and (iii) vulnerability to climate impacts (a geographic factor but mostly an economic one, determined by climate, land quality, poverty, wealth, and political and economic factors – a burgeoning set of research attempts to document this). These are not merely immediate economic interests: beyond economic causation of bargaining positions, there has also been strong solidarity and identity by developing nations in the G-77 bloc due to years of poor experience in attaining their goals in the realm of development and political advancement. Climate negotiations cannot be separated from those on broader development and trade issues, nor those of a broader political nature. Table 1. Negotiating groups and positions in Kyoto and Cancun climate talks. Kyoto negotiating groups in 1997 Goals/positions at Kyoto Cancun negotiating Groups in 2010 Goals/positions in Cancun Round 2010\* EU-17 (European Union) −15% of 1990 levels by 2010, EU “bubble” and tradable permits EU-27 (European Union) More ambitious emissions reductions (−20 or −30% by 2020) (but more fractious) JUSSCANNZ (Japan, US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, New Zealand) −3% to +10% of 1990 levels by 2012; want developing countries to make binding commitments ‘flexible measures’ (tradable and bankable permits, joint implementation, removals by sinks) Umbrella Group (usually made up of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US) Build upon the Copenhagen Accord EIT (Economies In Transition – Central/Eastern Europe, Russia) Baseline critical, with economic, “hot air” to sell with tradable permits (some have joined the EU, others CACAM; Russia negotiates alone or with the Umbrella Group) “brokers in the middle” (Philippines, Argentina, S. Korea) Intermediate positions Environmental Integrity Group (Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland) Much more ambitious emissions reductions/ based on the science G-77 and China Per capita emissions standard, historical responsibility, no binding commitments on themselves, technology transfer, and adaptation assistance from rich nations G-77 and China Multilateralism; continuity w/Kyoto and REDD+; financial mechanism w/Adaptation Fund and Tech Transfer; 1.5% of Appendix 1 countries’ GDP in funding Rapidly Developing Nations (BRICs--Brazil, Russia, India and China) No limits to economic growth BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) No binding limits in the short term; Voluntary emissions promises; nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) OPEC No limits / compensation OPEC Compensate for “response measures” AOSIS 20% reductions by 2005 AOSIS 1.5 °C, sharp emissions reductions, Fast Start adaptation funding “emissions entrepreneurs” (Costa Rica, Central America, Ecuador) Carbon trading, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and forest credits Least Developed Countries Direct and easy access to 1.5% GDP adaptation funding thru Adaptation Fund CACAM (Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova) ?? Coalition of Rainforest Nations REDD+ Arab States Compensate for “response measures” ALBA (Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) No trading, compensation for climate debt African Group 1.5% of GDP for adaptation funding Group of Mountain Landlocked Developing Countries Adaptation assistance? Central American Integration System Predictable, sustained, additional adaptation funds\* Cancun Round 2010 negotiations included meetings in Bonn (March and June), Bangkok (September), and Cancun (late November–early December). The dynamics in Copenhagen between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and US President Barack Obama had the smell of an interaction between a rising and a declining hegemon, on an issue they both would have preferred to avoid: binding emissions reduction targets on greenhouse gases. Peter Christoff (2010) argues that China was: …by Copenhagen… well on the way to being the global leader in clean energy technologies, and was moving ever faster along its development path. A re-emergent, cooperative USA presented a threat to its various leadership aspirations…. A deal constraining China's emissions could – depending on its strength – serve to limit its economic growth, internal security and capacity for future global extension. So a strong deal was not in China's short term interests. And avoid the issue of binding targets they did. In spite of language claiming that it was an important step, the Copenhagen Accord was in fact the weakest possible agreement, since it included only a “pledge and review” approach to controlling carbon emissions, and with those pledges now totaled up, condemns us to +4° C global warming. The latter will mean an extremely disruptive future for us and for our children, since temperatures are heading to an extraordinary new level, yet to be fully explored.15 The Cancun Agreements moved the unjust “pledge and review” method of determining action requirements further towards legitimation in the UN bargain. In terms of the most fundamental ((iv), (v), and (vi)) of the climate justice criteria reviewed in the second section of this article, the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements mark a complete failure to “prevent dangerous climate change,” an abrogation of what was agreed back in Rio in 1992. The four meetings in Bonn, Bangkok, and Tianjin, China in 2010 were a desperate effort to “pick up the pieces” of Copenhagen and rebuild international trust and a process by which to go forward to sign a treaty at Cancun or beyond. Hopeful institutionalists and environmentalists not focused on social justice believe this is the necessary and feasible route forward – constructing global management structures through the UN ([Clapp and Dauvergne, 2007] and [Biermann et al., 2009]; etc.). Realists might laugh at any expectation of success on the road to Durban and beyond; rational choice institutionalists like Keohane (1984) and Haas et al. (1993) might not be surprised, arguing that even with weakened hegemons, that international cooperation can continue. In contrast, I would argue that any attempt to rebuild the international process on climate change requires acknowledging the structural reshaping of the global political economy going on today: fragmentation in interests along the four lines of responsibility, capability, vulnerability and solidarity, while we have a hegemonic crisis, decline and a failure in leadership. Based on historical experience with such economic transitions, Arrighi and Silver observe that the typical characteristics of this phase are sharply increased competition, social conflict, and systematic chaos, where the existing political structures cannot address the problems they face (2003: p. 271). In the context of the UN, there is little question that our multilateral governance system has been ineffective in addressing the climate crisis. Setting aside the UN process is not an option if developing nations (especially smaller and poorer ones) are going to be part of a global solution.

# Neg Round 4 vs Kentucky GS

## 1NC

### T – Export

#### A. Energy production is the extraction of primary energy forms—Their evidence assumes Energy End-Use

Sagar, Oliver, and Chikkatur 06

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n1 The energy sector encompasses activities relating to the production, conversion, and use of energy. Energy production includes the extraction of primary energy forms such as coal, oil, and natural gas, or growing biomass for energy uses. Energy conversion pertains to the transformation of energy into more useful forms: this includes the refining of petroleum to yield products such as gasoline and diesel; the combustion of coal in power plants to yield electricity; the production of alcohol from biomass, etc. Energy end-use encompasses the final use of energy forms in industrial, residential, commercial, transportation and other end-uses.

#### B. Violation: Export Restrictions are NOT Production Restrictions

Shih 9 Wen-chen Shih is an associate professor of law in the Department of International Trade at National Chengchi University, Taiwan. "ARTICLE: Energy Security, GATT/WTO, and Regional Agreements" Natural Resources Journal Spring, 2009 Natural Resources Journal 49 Nat. Resources J. 433 lexis

Such an argument has been questioned by others. Broome cautions that a material distinction remains between export restrictions and production restrictions. n91 He argues that oil in its natural state--oil still in the ground--cannot be characterized as a "product" within the meaning of Article XI, as it has not gone through a production process. n92 Only oil in commerce--oil that is extracted and produced for consumption can be regarded as falling under the GATT jurisdiction. n93 Therefore, only when OPEC countries restrict the quantity of oil in commerce made available for export to foreign consumers could they then violate Article XI:1. n94 He further points out that, while the jurisprudence tends to interpret Article XI:1 broadly, absurd and unintended consequences could arise if the panel or the Appellate Body does not pay attention to such differences; when a WTO Member took some measure to reduce domestic production in a particular industry, any WTO Member could complain that the country was violating Article XI:1 by influencing prices via supply restrictions. n95 In other words, "any measure that prevents an industry from operating at maximum capacity might constitute an export restriction." n96 Broome, thus, concludes that the production quotas maintained by OPEC countries should not constitute quantitative restrictions that contravene Article XI:1. n97

#### C. Standards

#### 1- Limits: Allowing export restrictions AFFs justifies a massive expansion of an already huge topic by justifying any AFF that results in a better financial market for topic energies. Everything from currency manipulation to tax cuts to increase demand would be topical.

#### 2- Makes the topic bidirectional: AFFs could reduce subsidies for oil and natural gas to help make wind and solar more competitive which makes it impossible to be neg because even the most basic generics don’t apply in the world of reduced direct financial incentives.

#### Voting Issue: Topicality tells the negative what they should and should not be prepared to debate.

### Saudi

#### Saudi freaks out in response to the plan - floods the market and crashes oil prices

HULBERT ’12 - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review; Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations; Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “OPEC's Pending Bloodbath”. June 10, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/06/10/opecs-pending-bloodbath/)

That’s unlikely to happen, precisely because Riyadh can bring further pricing pressures to bear if it wants to get its way in the cartel. The Kingdom’s policy space has admittedly tightened over the past couple of years, but they remain the only producer capable of significantly increasing or reducing production at will. Initial tanker data from Europe suggests Riyadh may have started reigning in production that was running around 6% over OPEC quota. It’s also raised July benchmarks for Arab Light grades in Asia. But Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria will want restraint to come far faster and far deeper to firm prices. The line being spun from the ‘free lunch’ brigade is that storage should easily cover any Iranian spikes when EU sanctions come into full effect 1st July, while OPEC quotas should be pared down to 29.5mb/d (or less). Cheap words from petro-hawks, not least because they’ll all continue to cheat on quotas to squeeze out every last drop they have. Riyadh knows that of course; hawks want a price floor to be set at $100/b to sustain political regimes, but to do so entirely at Saudi expense. Russia is no different outside the cartel: free riding 101. Saudi Arabia (and its GCC partners) might be willing to play ball given ongoing concerns from the Arab Awakening, but with some budgetary tweaks and counter-cyclical cash to burn, they could all easily survive at $85/b making Iran et al sweat. Tehran might decide to rip up formal quotas as it did in June 2011, but that would be a costly mistake. If the Saudis let prices fall, political outages across smaller producer states could help to set a floor for them anyway. Iran would have no say in the matter. Given such ‘pricing perils’, Saudi Arabia holds all the aces to settle institutional issues, not to mention giving the global economy more breathing space (and Washington greater leeway over Iranian sanctions). But the real reason to let prices fall a little further isn’t just to make very clear to OPEC states where the ultimate volume and pricing power rests, but to fight Riyadh’s bigger battle over the next decade: Retaining 40% of OPEC market share in the midst of supposedly huge non-OPEC supply growth. It didn’t go unnoticed that despite Saudi production averaging 31 year highs and prices hitting $128/b in March 2012, the forward curve for 2018 was trading at $30/b discounts relative to spot. You’d think with the cartel maxed out and proximate demand side problems looking bleak, five year curves would be exactly the other way, in sharp contango (i.e. far above prompt prices) once the global economy and demand side fundamentals were fixed. The fact they weren’t is principally because the market thinks vast swathes of unconventional production will come online, not just in North America where production is back above 6mb/d, but in Canada, Brazil and even Arctic extremes. At $100/b that was a fair bet to place, but once benchmark prices drop back to two figures, the 6.4 trillion barrels of unconventional reserves sitting in the Americas look a far less certain prospect. Canadian tar distinctly sticky; Brazilian pre-salt horribly deep; Russian Arctic plays simply impossible. So when OPEC meets in Vienna expect Saudi Arabia to call the shots. The new Secretary General will either be a Saudi national, or a compromise candidate Riyadh can live with. Quotas will stay close to 30mb/d with minor reductions possible. Thinly veiled threats of sustained (or increased) production will be made if Iran doesn’t play ball. Yet the long term price point to watch isn’t just one that keeps OPEC in business and Riyadh in control, but where the al-Saud can maintain secular market share. Letting prices informally slide to $85-90/b might be the kind of warning shot Riyadh wants to send to scrub unconventional plays off global balance sheets. Its OPEC colleagues will see that as sailing far too close to the political wind, but a Saudi bloodbath now, might be just the medicine OPEC requires to sustain its long term health, not unless the cartel is absolutely determined to keep pricing itself out of existence.

#### Low oil prices will destroy Russia’s economy

SHELIN ’12 – Political Columnist (Shelin, Sergey. “Putin Without Oil “. April 30, 2012. http://en.novayagazeta.ru/business/52381.html)

Russia’s economic dependence on the oil trade is not just important, it is critical The traditional Prime Minister’s farewell speech delivered to the state Duma by Vladimir Putin was for the most part, boring with one major exception. He listed various programs, projects and promises, but never once indicated that they are only feasible if oil prices continue to rise year on year. In response to a timid and planted question by a deputy of his own United Russia party, the president-elect dismissed any link regarding the success of their plans being reliant on future oil revenue. “All the initiatives I have set forth are in no way dependent on oil or gas revenues… Even if the price falls to $70 a barrel, we will be able to fulfill all of our commitments to the Russian people.” This statement overwhelmingly contradicts the common belief that the Russian economy is heavily dependent on its oil exports. This view is also misleading. The oil trade is not just important for Russia, it is vital. In the first quarter of 2012, the average price of Urals Crude was $117 a barrel; compare that with Q1 2010 when the price barely touched $70. In Q1 2012, Russia’s exports totaled $135 billion and imports made up $73 billion, a healthy margin of $62 billion. However, due to negative balance of payments, services and other economic parameters the Russian current account stands at a more modest $42 billion. Moreover, since the net outflow of private capital from Russia for the same three months was $35 billion, the country’s economy is more or less breaking even. If oil prices were to fall down to the 2010 mark of $70 a barrel, and along with it other energy resources that make up more than 70% of all Russian exports, then total revenue would fall by some $40 billion, from the current $135 billion to $95 billion. In addition, Q1 2010 saw Russian imported goods totaling $46 billion and export of private capital touching $15billion, 1.6 and 2.3 times lower than today’s figure respectively. If world oil prices do indeed crash, it is believed that Russians will panic and the country’s private capital exports will accelerate dramatically. A drop in oil prices will not be matched by the required cut in imports and to restore fiscal balance the Kremlin will have to decide whether to raid their foreign reserves or cut their expenditure on imports by half. The result would lead to a sharp devaluation of the ruble, a drop in consumer confidence and a surge in inflation.

#### Extinction

Filger 9 (Sheldon, Author and Writer @ the Huffington Post, Former VP for Resource Development at New York’s United Way, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356)

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### Big CIFIUS

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should

#### – provide financial incentives for state and local governments to establish China-based representative offices that offer investment incentives targeted at Chinese investors.

#### – hire Chinese-proficient staff at relevant governmental bodies to guide investments.

#### – support U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty negotiations.

#### – place The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

#### – publicly highlight recent successes of Chinese companies in the approval process of CFIUS.

#### – mandate that CFIUS provide better data that officials could use to show how Chinese companies can successfully navigate the approval process.

#### Solves the aff

AMCHAM 10 – The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (AmCham Shanghai), known as the “Voice of American Business in China,” is the largest and fastest growing American Chamber in the Asia Pacific region (June, “Chinese FDI in the U.S.,” http://www.amcham-shanghai.org/ftpuploadfiles/publications/viewpoint/vp\_financial.pdf)

Recommendations Like other foreign investment in the United States, such as Japanese car maker Toyota’s job-creating factories in the U.S., investment from China has the potential to create American jobs, promote growth and increase U.S. exports. We believe this should be encouraged. Too often Chinese investors face obstacles, political and otherwise, which hinder capital flows that would benefit both the American and Chinese economies and further strengthen the U.S.-China commercial relationship. AmCham Shanghai and the AmCham Shanghai Financial Services Committee have developed the following recommendations that provide a general overview of measures that federal, state and local governments and their corporate constituents can take to invite, prepare for and capture a greater share of Chinese FDI: • Encourage state and local governments to establish China-based representative offices that promote business opportunities and investment incentives targeted at Chinese investors. More than 30 states and a handful of cities have representative offices in China and we applaud this growing trend toward increased state- and citysponsored investment initiatives. • Balance and negotiate stakeholder involvement in investment deals to develop winwin outcomes for Chinese investors and U.S. companies. Foster a supportive investment environment in your state by engaging community stakeholders to create investment initiatives that have community support. • Bridge the gap between different cultural business practices. Hire Chinese-proficient staff at relevant governmental and quasi-governmental bodies to guide investments through the right channels. Understand who they are, the concerns of the community and how to bridge the business gap. • Support U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) talks. BITs are regarded as crucial to boosting confidence in cross-border investments and have the potential to increase trade volume, especially during the signing and implementation stages. In particular, through support of a most favored nation (MFN) treatment clause in the BIT under negotiation, Chinese investment projects in the U.S. would receive treatment no less favorable than that accorded to investment from any other party. At a minimum, BIT negotiations provide a channel for high-level discussions on the bilateral investment relationship. • Make efforts to depoliticize the U.S. regulatory process over which CFIUS dictates the foreign investment deals chosen for review. In light of recent, highly-politicized bids by Chinese SOEs to acquire American targets in strategic industries, Chinese investors are increasingly concerned that its investments may be hampered by U.S. national security restrictions and may serve to drive much needed investment to Canada, Mexico and other countries.

#### The counterplan accesses a huge internal link

Marchick 12 – managing director at the Carlyle Group, where he is global head of external affairs, author of U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct Investment (David M., 02/09, “POLICY INNOVATION MEMORANDUM NO. 13,” PDF)

RECOMMEN D A T I O N S 1. Clarify and Amplify U.S. Policy. President Obama has made strong statements about overall U.S. policy toward foreign investment. But to this point, no president, Republican or Democrat, has stated U.S. policy toward Chinese investment as clearly as Vice President Joseph Biden did in October 2011: “President Obama and I, we welcome, encourage and see nothing but positive benefit from direct investment in the United States from Chinese businesses and Chinese entities. It means jobs.” President Obama should seize the opportunity with Vice President Xi to state clearly that the United States welcomes Chinese investment and that additional investment is in both countries’ economic interest. 2. Clarify Myths and Perceived Biases. Perceived biases on the part of Chinese executives significantly impede Chinese investment in the United States. The vast majority of Chinese investments in the United States do not require any regulatory approval, and a number of important recent deals with Chinese companies that do require it have been successfully approved by CFIUS in the initial thirty-day review period. For example, CNOOC, the same company that encountered opposition in its bid for Unocal in 2005, recently acquired minority interests in both the Eagle Ford Shale (in Texas) and Niobrara Shale (in Wyoming and Colorado) without any controversy. Senior U.S. officials should highlight these successful investments during the Xi visit. 3. Quantify CFIUS’s Results. The recent CFIUS annual report said that sixteen transactions involving Chinese firms were reviewed by CFIUS between 2008 and 2010, but did not say how many of these were approved. CFIUS is prohibited from publishing results on individual transactions. But CFIUS should provide better data that senior Treasury officials could use to highlight and show how Chinese companies—including SOEs—can successfully navigate the CFIUS process. 4. Remove Impediments and Irritants to FDI. In addition to correcting misperceptions, policymakers can remove impediments to Chinese investment through improvements in visa and tax policies and procedures. Chinese executives who pose neither a security threat nor a risk of staying in the country illegally still face delays and hassles obtaining visas. Tax policies, such as the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA), which was adopted in 1980 to curtail Japanese investment in U.S. farmland, now impede foreign investment in the U.S. real estate sector at a time when such investment is needed. Other U.S. laws intended to reduce tax avoidance by citizens and residents have created burdensome reporting requirements that deter foreign investment in the United States. The likelihood of a successful Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) agreement in the foreseeable future remains small because of divisions in both governments and because China would find it hard to commit to binding open investment principles. Nevertheless, China and the United States should continue to advance BIT negotiations.

### CIR

#### Immigration reform will pass – Obama is pushing, GOP on board, top of the agenda.

CSM 12-28. [Christian Science Monitor "Immigration reform likely to be at the top of Congress’ agenda in 2013" -- www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/12/28/immigration-reform-likely-to-be-at-the-top-of-congress-agenda-in-2013/]

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely.¶ The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal.¶ The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high.¶ The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform.¶ Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.¶ "It has to be in 2013," says Rep. Raúl Labrador (R) of Idaho, an immigration lawyer who thundered into Congress in the tea party wave of 2010. "If we wait until 2014, it's going to be election time. And you know how efficient we are here during election time."¶ Recent weeks have seen a flurry of activity on Capitol Hill. In the Senate, a "Gang of Eight" – led by longtime immigration reformers Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York and Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina – has added freshman Sens. Michael Bennett (D) of Colorado and Mike Lee (R) of Utah, while potential 2016 presidential aspirant Sen. Marco Rubio (R) of Florida leads his own initiative.¶ Members of the House have seen movement, too. "One thing clearly has changed," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) of Illinois, the lawmaker who co-wrote a 2005 comprehensive immigration reform measure with now Sen.-elect Jeff Flake (R) of Arizona. "Nobody is talking about self-deportation. Nobody is talking about how [Arizona's controversial immigration law] should be the standard applied across the land. Nobody is talking about vetoing the DREAM Act," which offers a path to citizenship for some young undocumented immigrants.¶ "We are having wonderful conversations," Representative Gutierrez says.¶ That more moderate tone from the GOP is what the November election has wrought.¶ In a postelection analysis and poll of Latino voters, Republican polling group Resurgent Republic offered a searing critique of the GOP's political strategy of pumping up turnout among white voters, often by championing hard-line policies on immigration issues that turn off key Asian and Hispanic voters.¶ "Republicans have run out of persuadable white voters," wrote conservative pollster Whit Ayres and Jennifer Korn, the head of the right-leaning Hispanic Leadership Network, in a recent research memo. "Trying to win a national election by gaining a larger and larger share of a smaller and smaller portion of the electorate is a losing political proposition."¶ Between 2008 and 2012, white voters shrank two percentage points to 72 percent of the electorate, while Asian and Latino voters expanded a percentage point each to 3 percent and 10 percent, respectively.¶ While GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney won 60 percent of white voters, 71 percent of Latinos and 73 percent of Asian-Americans backed Mr. Obama – up four percentage points and 11 percentage points from 2008, respectively.¶ And those numbers of minority voters are only going to grow. For the next two decades, 50,000 Latino voters will turn 18 every month, adding an additional New Hampshire of voters to the US each year into the 2030s.¶ While Resurgent Republic's poll showed that Hispanics aren't singularly focused on immigration issues, Republican politicians who favor immigration reform see the issue as primary: The GOP's message of conservative family values, entrepreneurship, and individual freedom won't reach Latino voters unless the immigration question is solved.¶ "This is like a wall that stops the other issues from getting through," says Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R) of Florida, a longtime immigration reform advocate. "And while that wall is there, the Republican Party has a serious problem."¶ House Speaker John Boehner (R) of Ohio signaled a shift when he told ABC News a day after the election that "a comprehensive approach [to immigration] is long overdue, and I'm confident that the president, myself, others, can find the common ground to take care of this issue once and for all."¶ That's a departure from previous immigration-reform attempts, in which the GOP brass wasn't on board.¶ Perhaps just as important, though, is that several leading lawmakers with near-pristine conservative credentials are also involved.¶ Two tea party superstars – Senators Rubio and Lee, both of whom knocked out establishment Republican figures to win their seats – are going to be key players in any reform.¶ In the House, the involvement of House Judiciary chairman Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R) of Virginia and Representative Labrador of Idaho can provide cover to conservative lawmakers from the party's right flank.¶ "The fact that you're going to have strong conservative voices helping lead this debate is going to be critical to solving it instead of using it as a political wedge," says Rep. Steve Scalise (R) of Louisiana, incoming chairman of the Republican Study Committee, the largest and most conservative caucus in the House.¶ It's notable that both Labrador and Rubio believe in, one way or another, a path to citizenship for some illegal immigrants, even while they leave open just who can get on that path.¶ Some conservatives say any form of citizenship given to illegal immigrants – no matter the conditions attached to it – constitutes an "amnesty," which is a guarantee only of more illegal immigration unless the nation's borders are firmly secured and stringent workplace verification systems are put in place.¶ But a recent poll by George Washington University and Politico found 62 percent of Americans support a proposal that would allow illegal immigrants to earn citizenship over a period of several years, with 40 percent strongly supporting such a measure. Only 35 percent opposed it.¶ Some Democrats on the Hill are extending a friendly hand to the GOP. When the Congressional Hispanic Caucus – which is entirely Democratic – offered its vision for immigration reform, for example, it served up principles rather than a specific bill, a move received by Republicans as attempting to maximize common ground.¶ But Democrats also know they are in a position of power.¶ "You've got a realization on the part of GOP leadership not just in the House but in the Republican Party writ large that if they don't do something about it, they aren't going to win the presidency again," says Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D) of California, a leading immigration reform advocate.¶ For that reason, she says, Republicans "aren't going to get the credit" for pushing immigration through, but they "can still get the blame if they block" it.¶ Latino advocacy groups and labor unions, emboldened by the community's growing electoral power, vow to take the fight to those who stand in immigration reform's way in 2013.¶ "This comprehensive immigration reform for the Latino community is personal. The fact that we've come out in record numbers in 2012 was personal. And that's a calculation that members of Congress don't understand," says Maria Teresa Kumar, executive director of Voto Latino. "If they are not with us, 2014 may not look pretty with them."¶ The president, too, has political pressure to pursue immigration reform. He has already come up short once on immigration-reform promises: In 2009, he said that a comprehensive immigration solution would be a top priority.¶ Yet his first term also saw record numbers of undocumented immigrants deported. Only this summer, after he directed immigration officials to defer deportation of some young illegal immigrants, was he seen as making good on promises to the Latino community.¶ "The president says that his biggest failure in the first term was not moving forward with immigration reform," says Hector Sanchez, executive director of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement. "The Latino community decided to give him a second chance."¶ Obama has publicly vowed to make immigration reform an immediate priority in his second term, which could begin just on the other side of the "fiscal cliff" negotiations.¶ "He's the one who has the mandate on this subject; he's the guy who got the voters who care most intensely about this," says Bruce Morrison, a former Democratic congressman from Connecticut who was involved in immigration reform efforts in the 1980s and early '90s.

#### Plan costs massive political capital

Orol 12 – MarketWatch (Ronald D., 08/06, “Cnooc-Nexen U.S. opposition becomes bipartisan,” http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-08-06/economy/33061155\_1\_cfius-unocal-corp-national-security)

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) — Congressional concern about Chinese energy giant’s Cnooc Ltd’s $15.1 billion deal to buy Nexen Inc. officially has become bipartisan as a key Republican added his voice to critics of the transaction. “I have serious national security concerns with the Chinese government, acting through one of its corporations, purchasing a company that will give it control over significant U.S. oil and gas resources,” U.S. Sen. James Inhofe, Republican from Oklahoma, told MarketWatch in an emailed statement. “This combined with China’s closed economy, its prohibition on direct, full investment in Chinese business operations by U.S. firms, and its blatant disregard to U.S. intellectual property rights make this transaction even more concerning.”

#### Capital is critical to get a deal

Shifter 12/27/12 (Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?”)

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear. There is also a chance that something unexpected could happen that would put off consideration of immigration reform. Following the horrific massacre at a Connecticut elementary school on December 14, for example, public pressure understandably mounted for gun control, at least the ban of assault weapons. But a decision to pursue that measure -- though desperately needed -- would take away energy and time from other priorities like immigration.

#### Comprehensive reform is key to food security

**ACIR ‘7** (December 4, 2007 THE AGRICULTURE COALITION FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM

Dear Member of Congress: The Agriculture Coalition for Immigration Reform (ACIR) is deeply concerned with pending immigration enforcement legislation known as the ‘Secure America Through Verification and Enforcement Act of 2007' or ‘SAVE Act’ (H.R.4088 and S.2368). While these bills seek to address the worthy goal of stricter immigration law enforcement, they fail to take a comprehensive approach to solving the immigration problem. History shows that a one dimensional approach to the nation’s immigration problem is doomed to fail. Enforcement alone, without providing a viable means to obtain a legal workforce to sustain economic growth is a formula for disaster. Agriculture best illustrates this point. Agricultural industries that need considerable labor in order to function include the fruit and vegetable, dairy and livestock, nursery, greenhouse, and Christmas tree sectors. Localized labor shortages have resulted in actual crop loss in various parts of the country. More broadly, producers are making decisions to scale back production, limit expansion, and leave many critical tasks unfulfilled. Continued labor shortages could force more producers to shift production out of the U.S., thus stressing already taxed food and import safety systems. Farm lenders are becoming increasingly concerned about the stability of affected industries. This problem is aggravated by the nearly universal acknowledgement that the current H-2A agricultural guest worker program does not work. Based on government statistics and other evidence, roughly 80 percent of the farm labor force in the United States is foreign born, and a significant majority of that labor force is believed to be improperly authorized. The bills’ imposition of mandatory electronic employment eligibility verification will screen out the farm labor force without providing access to legal workers. Careful study of farm labor force demographics and trends indicates that there is not a replacement domestic workforce available to fill these jobs. This feature alone will result in chaos unless combined with labor-stabilizing reforms. Continued failure by Congress to act to address this situation in a comprehensive fashion is placing in jeopardy U.S. food security and global competitiveness. Furthermore, congressional inaction threatens the livelihoods of millions of Americans whose jobs exist because laborintensive agricultural production is occurring in America. If production is forced to move, most of the upstream and downstream jobs will disappear as well. The Coalition cannot defend of the broken status quo. We support well-managed borders and a rational legal system. We have worked for years to develop popular bipartisan legislation that would stabilize the existing experienced farm workforce and provide an orderly transition to wider reliance on a legal agricultural worker program that provides a fair balance of employer and employee rights and protections. We respectfully urge you to oppose S.2368, H.R.4088, or any other bills that would impose employment-based immigration enforcement in isolation from equally important reforms that would provide for a stable and legal farm labor force.

#### Food insecurity sparks World War 3

**Calvin ’98** (William, Theoretical Neurophysiologist – U Washington, Atlantic Monthly, January, Vol 281, No. 1, p. 47-64)

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands -- if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem -- and could lead to a Third World War -- but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

### Solvency

#### Mutual economic incentives ensure Chinese investment in U.S. energy

Rahemtulla 12/12 – Investment Director, Oil & Energy Daily (Karim, “China’s Secret Play for U.S. Energy Assets,” http://www.oilandenergydaily.com/2012/12/12/chinas-secret-play-for-u-s-energy-assets/)

This is an economic necessity for countries in the West, which are asset-rich but cash-poor. Don’t get me wrong, Canada isn’t exactly cash-poor, but its neighbor to the south certainly is. And with political gridlock stymying budget talks, Chinese investment in the United States is inevitable. In fact, it’s already begun… While regulators have previously prevented Chinese companies from acquiring large U.S. energy companies directly, the CNOOC deal marks an important foothold. It’s a backdoor way for China to access U.S. assets. Remember, Nexen is one of the largest leaseholders in the Gulf of Mexico, with more than 100 exploration prospects and reserves of approximately 116 million barrels of oil equivalent. But that’s just a stepping stone. China’s ultimate goal is to buy up U.S. shale oil and gas properties to feed the monstrous demand back home. There’s no telling where China will strike next, but we’re talking big game hunting, here. That means energy giants like Chesapeake (CHK) and Devon (DVN) are both possibilities. Canada’s Encana (ECA) remains in play, as well. What’s especially troubling about this is that assets like Nexen’s are now controlled by a foreign sovereign entity – one that ranks at the bottom of the global pile when it comes to transparency and corruption. And in the years to come, we’ll see even more questionable buyers come to the aid of cash-strapped countries and companies. In addition, if China can make the Nexen deal work and show transparency for a while, it will be even harder for Congress to block future attempts from Chinese companies to take over U.S. assets.

#### Empirics and future predictive evidence goes neg

PR Newswire 12 (11/15, “U.S. to Attract Up to $400 Billion in China Investment by 2020 with California a Top Target Finds Asia Society Report,” http://en.prnasia.com/story/71201-0.shtml)

SHANGHAI, November 15, 2012 /PRNewswire/ -- A new report published today by the Asia Society predicts that the U.S. will attract up to $400 billion new direct investment from China by 2020 and that the State of California in particular will benefit. Before 2008, annual Chinese direct investment in the United States typically stood well below $1 billion. Since then, Chinese investment in the U.S. has exploded, reaching nearly $2 billion in 2009 and a record $5.8 billion in 2010. In the first three quarters of 2012, Chinese ？？？rms completed transactions worth $6.3 billion, setting the stage for a new record year for Chinese investment in the United States.

### China

#### China unsustainable- collapse inevitable

Dickson ’12 (Micah Dickson, SeekingAlpha, Investor Trading Online News, “The Cracks In The Great Economic Wall Of China”, November 27, 2012)

China has just gone through their once in a decade power transition. While the transition of power has appeared to have gone smoothly, it does not mean that the challenges facing China have diminished at all. Xi Jinping and his regime face a host of challenges. These challenges vary from economic to societal in nature. The current course China is on is utterly unsustainable. The question is, can the new Chinese leadership make the necessary reforms to keep the country from a political and economic collapse? Investors must consider the size and scope of the challenges facing China as they make decisions on where to allocate their assets for the coming year. Economic Challenges Any true economic growth is based upon investors and consumers acting on information. The accuracy of that information can decide if that economic growth is sustainable or not. Many of the basic economic numbers coming from China have largely been called into question. Li Kepiang, possible future premier of China, said in 2012 that the GDP figures were "man-made". There has also been documented cases of the growth in many Chinese industries being quite different from the overall GDP numbers that are reported. Unfortunately, China's state owned enterprises are becoming a prime example of the failure of accurate information from China itself. State owned enterprises are filled with Communist Party leaders who use them to bolster the Party's power. Included in the list of state owned enterprises are banks that provide loans to businesses. These businesses include other non-financial state owned enterprises. These loans are given at lower interest rates and in unlimited amounts. This incestuous relationship gives state owned enterprises an advantage over other smaller enterprises inside the country. Besides being incredibly corrupt, this system has led to what has been referred to as "zombie companies". These are companies that should be going bankrupt because they are unable to repay their debt. The Chinese government is not allowing these companies to go bankrupt. Instead the state owned banks are being forced to continue to lend money to the enterprises despite their inability to repay the debt. Matthew Boesler from the Business Insider commented on the effects of these practices in this way, "This is causing a deterioration in asset quality on banks' balance sheets, and increases the chances that the government will have to bail them out down the road". Some estimate that the debt to equity ratio of many state owned enterprises exceed 230%. This is a staggering figure. Even with all of these negative developments, the "official" amount of non-performing loans in the Chinese banking sector is only 0.9%. This obvious contradiction is why so many of the numbers out of China are deceptions. The banking sector numbers are not the only numbers that are troubling. The state owned enterprises have been showing weakness for a while. These enterprises make up 40% to 50% of GDP. From 2001 to 2009, these state owned enterprises made 5.8 trillion Renminbi (RMB). This would equal $931.1 billion in the United States. Normally, this would be a tale of their success. But if you remove the government subsidies for that same time period, the real average return on equity for the state owned enterprises would be a negative 6.29%. These problems are compounded by a growing real estate bubble. Part of China's growth has come from the government's investment in the building of infrastructure. Robin Banerji and Patrick Jackson of the BBC describe the expansion like this, "The country is said to have built the equivalent of Rome every two months in the past decade". The problem with this rapid expansion is that supply is beginning to overtake demand. Satellite images are showing entire Chinese cities empty many years after their construction. The World Bank's Holly Krambeck gave a frightening example of this in the city of Chenggong. She says, "In Chenggong, there are more than 100,000 new apartments with no occupants". This is becoming the story all over China as new buildings, office spaces, and other projects are lying empty due to the lack of occupants able to fill these empty structures. These factors should cause investors to be cautious about their positions in China. A red flag to any investor should be the inability for Chinese companies to be audited by firms outside of China. If these large economic challenges are not addressed, China may see anemic economic growth as Japan did in the 1990s or worse, an economic catastrophe that could rock the world markets as investors begin to move their capital to other parts of the world. This could be hastened by the growing perception of many in the United States, China's largest customer, that companies that do business there are hurting American workers. Political Turmoil China is currently finishing their once in a decade transition of political leadership. This however has not come without serious hiccups in the road. There is serious tension inside the Chinese hierarchy which is beginning to reveal itself. As Dean Cheng reported about the 2012 National People's Congress session, "As this year's session came to a close, outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao warned of the potential for chaos and cited the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976". This statement immediately preceded the ousting of Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai from the Communist Party. Bo, his wife, and many extended family members were also charged with a variety of crimes including corruption, murder, and adultery. His populist tone and rising star in the Communist Party made him an attractive candidate for higher office and many reports say he was campaigning for a position on the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. This committee is the most important and power part of the Chinese leadership. Bo's rising star quickly extinguished after his former police chief tried to defect to the United States. Because of how common corruption is inside the Party, many find it strange that Bo Xilai was ousted and charged so quickly and publicly. Dean Cheng makes this comment regarding the scandal: "Such major developments-occurring in the midst of one of China's most public political events-suggest that Chinese politics are in major turmoil." While the event with Bo Xilai is scandalous, it is an extension of the ongoing concern of many inside the Party of the increasing corruption and the deterioration of the perceived legitimacy of the Party. Premier Wen, who is exited his position during this most recent transition has even publicly called for the power of the Communist Party to be reduced. In the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Premier Wen was quoted as saying: A ruling Party's most important duty is to follow the constitution and the law, and restrict its activities within the constitution and the law…. This requires changes in the use of the Party as a substitute for the government and in the phenomenon of over-concentration of power. For this, we need to reform the leadership system of the Party and the country. But these reforms will be close to impossible to carry out as the 70 wealthiest members of the National People's Congress are ten times wealthier than the top 660 government officials here in the United States. This is due to the fact that state owned enterprises are run by members of the National People's Congress or by a close relative of those members. Any reforms would mean these members would have to give up their sources of wealth and power. As we've seen in many cases, economic troubles can strain political relations even further. If China does not make changes, the corruption and decadence in the ruling Communist Party could become the scapegoat for any "hard landing" China experiences. If China experiences a hard landing, it would lead to the second largest economy in the world falling into political chaos. This would create uncertainty that would trump the uncertainty experienced from the problems in the European Union. Societal Challenges The political problems in China are compounded by the fact that there is growing unrest among the average citizen in China. The largest problem is that of forced evictions by the Chinese government. After the Financial Crisis of 2008, the Chinese government began implementing an extremely large stimulus package. The main thrust of the stimulus package is to build up infrastructure across the country. In order to do this, many Chinese cities are forcibly and violently evicting citizens who live on land that is going to be used for new government building projects. The stories of these forced evictions have caused outrage throughout the Chinese population. An example of how outraged many citizens are is the Chinese fishing village of Wukan. The citizens of the village became fed up with land grabs from the government. In response, they rushed the offices of the local government during a protest. After the protest, one of the protest leaders died while in custody. This led to the village ousting the Communist Party leadership in the village and democratically electing local leaders. While this rebellion is an extreme example, what caused the outrage is still there and is becoming prevalent among the Chinese people. Land grabs are not the only problems, income disparity, working conditions, and many more social ills are beginning to bubble over. In 2010, China experienced 180,000 protests, riots, and mass demonstration. This is staggering. Unfortunately, many of the complaints are too narrow to begin a nationwide movement that will cause sweeping reforms inside China. That will not last for long. More and more of the protest leaders admit that the underlying problem with the country is the one party system that has dominated the government for so long. This growing public anger combined with the political turmoil inside the country could combine to create a deadly chemical reaction. Conclusion The Chinese model is quickly becoming a potential Chinese nightmare. While it has created incredible wealth inside China, it has created a monster that does not seem to be able to make the necessary changes. China has to go back to the path of reforms that Deng began in 1970s in which their economy becomes freer. Unfortunately, the incredible corruption that has sprang up from China's economic growth is beginning to insulate itself. Communist Party leaders have shown hostility toward any change. Investors must consider these factors when looking toward China for the growth that is missing in the United States. While that growth may be advantageous in the short to medium term, it could be an incredibly risky bet in the long term. If China does not address its economic, political, and societal challenges, the Great Wall that is the rising Chinese economy may have a mighty fall.

#### The CCP is will survive no matter what

Epstein 10 (Gady, Beijing Bureau Chief for Forbes, “The Chinese Communist Party Is Like God,” Forbes, 5-21, <http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/21/china-communist-party-god-book-opinions-contributors-beijing-dispatch_2.html>, EMM)

BEIJING -- A common parlor game in the China-watching crowd used to be debating how long the Communist Party could hold on to power. A number of bets on the party's demise were made a decade ago that can't be called until they expire in 2020 or 2030, but today those bets look silly. Few would bet against the party now without getting lottery-like odds. How did that come to be? How has China's ruling party become a seemingly durable authoritarian regime? Why, two decades after a period of uncertainty and upheaval, do the people seem satisfied enough to acquiesce to being ruled by the party? A fascinating and ambitious nonfiction book helps answer the how, and a clever Chinese dystopian novel seeks to answer the why. Together they pull back the curtain on one of the most intriguing characters of our time, the Communist Party of China. In his revealing new book The Party, author Richard McGregor, who covered China for London's Financial Times, lays bare the secretive machinery of the party, how it operates far more pervasively in public life and commerce than many suspect. A powerful symbol of this hidden reach of the party is the secure internal network of "red machines," phones that sit on the desks of some 300 of the nation's most elite officials. Even more interesting is on whose desks you'll find those phones: not only members of the Politburo, but also the chief executives of 50 of the nation's biggest companies. Paranoid conspiracy theorists on China will have plenty to feast on in McGregor's accounts of the failed deals of Chinalco and Unocal. (Though you're not really paranoid if Beijing really is calling the shots for their big resources companies.) "The Party is like God," a professor from People's University in Beijing tells McGregor. "He is everywhere. You just can't see him." (Read an essay adapted from The Partyhere.) The Party is not simply an account of how the party succeeds in ruling through its mechanisms of autocracy. The party's Achilles' heel--its lack of any independent check on its power--undermines at every turn its efforts to police corruption, vet its members, reform its bureaucracy and respond to crises. The maneuvering required to conduct a high-level corruption investigation sounds like it is out of a mafia movie. Taking down a Politburo member, former Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu, required a side deal to keep hands off of the family of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, whose consent for the takedown was required because he was the reigning kingpin of the Shanghai faction, despite the fact that he no longer held any official leadership posts. The party's apparatus of control dominated every stage of decision-making in the disastrous Sanlu milk powder scandal, from covering up melamine contamination that poisoned thousands of babies to censoring media coverage that could have saved lives to blocking legal action that could have given families some measure of justice and deterred future corporate misbehavior. At every stage where some check or balance might exist in a democratic system, the one-party system failed its people. But, as McGregor notes, the party does succeed at its main task, protecting itself. In exchange for acquiescence to autocratic rule, the party delivers on the economy and largely stays out of people's private lives. And as Chan Koon Chung writes in his novel The Fat Years, the people indeed acquiesce.

#### No Asia war

Bitzinger and Desker 9

[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

 The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely. This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security and stability – and, from Washington’s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly sees China as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‘major and emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States’.1 Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. A rising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficult than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. While Beijing is increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlike China. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‘soft power’ process can be described as an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’ in regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examined closely, it is clear that the country’s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, is not quite as threatening as some might argue.

#### Plan collapses global fracking regs and the economy

Obold, 12 -- J.D. from the University of Colorado

(Jason, "Leading by Example" Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 473, Summer 2012, l/n, accessed 9-18-12, mss)

The potential impacts of passing the FRAC Act and forcing fracking back into the federal regulatory scheme go beyond the borders of the United States. With more experience developing unconventional hydrocarbons than any other nation, the United States is a **coveted advisor** for many countries looking to develop their tight oil and gas resources in a manner that is both efficient and sustainable. n15 The world's two most populous countries, **China and India**, are among the nations [\*477] that have come to the United States looking for help. n16 **The importance of fracking regulation cannot be understated**. Fracking catastrophes abroad could devastate densely populated regions, which would inevitably impact the United States because of the interconnected global economy. Now, with the global unconventional hydrocarbon boom in its infancy, the United States must act to prevent fracking from contaminating its domestic environment and to avoid an environmental catastrophe abroad that might **cripple the U.S. economy**. The FRAC Act establishes a regulatory foundation the United States can take to the international community to begin discussing the adoption of serious reforms in fracking regulation worldwide.

#### Triggers Chinese environmental crises

Mandel, 12 -- E&E Reporter

(Jenny, "Will U.S. shale technology make the leap across the Pacific?" E&E, 7-17-12, www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/07/17/1, accessed 9-18-12, mss)

A much bigger issue is the industry's water use. As in the United States, some of the most promising shale gas fields in China are in water-poor areas where municipal use and agriculture already compete for limited surface flows. When observers talk about "environmental concerns" with hydraulic fracturing in China, they are generally not referring to earthquakes, groundwater contamination or chemicals in reinjected fracking waste, but simply the several million gallons of water required at each well to break open the rocks. That also ties to worries over emissions from caravans of diesel trucks carrying water to remote drilling sites and carrying wastewater away, because **vehicle exhaust is one of the areas where Chinese environmental sensitivity is** relatively **high**. In the United States, shale gas developers point out that their water use is lower than that of agriculture or other forms of energy development, like coal mining. But those arguments may hold limited sway when it comes to establishing a new industry in regions where there is not enough water to go around or in building up a significant presence in regions where other users have staked prior claims (ClimateWire, Oct. 14, 2011).

#### Sino-India conflict settled with diplomacy now – antagonism is a misperception

**The Hindu ’10** (1/8/2010 (Ties with china on even keel, p. http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article77301.ece)

While maintaining that ties with China were on an **even keel**, India on Thursday was hopeful of amicably settling the border dispute **through dialogue**. “We have a long border with China and talks are being held between the Special Representatives. We are looking forward to an **amicable settlement**,” said External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna here on Thursday. The complicated issue was being handled by seasoned diplomats proficient in issues relating to national security, he said in response to a spate of media questions on alleged Chinese intrusions in the eastern and western sections of the Sino-India border. Dialogue with China had helped preserve peace and tranquillity on the border for **over two decades** and the confidence building measures intended to reduce or eliminate the perception of threat from each other had **worked satisfactorily** well. “Let me reiterate that India does not view China or its development as a **threat**. That said, however, we recognise that cooperation and competition can overlap, as it is not possible to have a perfect congruence of interests between two nations as vast and diverse as India and China. Such competition or lack of cooperation must not be **misunderstood as antagonism**. Our differences, when they exist, must be handled **with dialogue and diplomacy**,” he said. As the border is not marked, both sides go by perceptions. And there are differences in this, he said, while agreeing with a questioner on the lack of understanding in India about the contours of the relationship.

#### No US-Sino war

Rosecrance et al 10 (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

#### several alt causes prevent containment of SCS conflict – energy cooperation isn’t key

Cronin, Center for New American Security Asia-Pacific security program senior director, 9-7-12

Patrick, “Averting Conflict in the South China Sea” http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/averting-conflict-in-the-south-china-sea/

We should expect the United States to continue to place a general priority—in its diplomacy, trade, and military operations—on the increasingly powerful Indo-Pacific region. But the essence of US strategy is economic interests—maintaining freedom of the seas, and freedom throughout the global commons—and that calls for further China-US cooperation. The United States needs to treat China with respect and do more to foster cooperation. Areas most ripe for such cooperation include in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, science and technology (especially, involving the resources of the South China Sea), and practical energy cooperation. As a model production-sharing accord between Brunei and Malaysia demonstrates, the resources of the South China Sea will only be harnessed when there is such cooperation.

#### No SCS conflict

Gupta 11

Rukmani Gupta, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,10/23/11, South China Sea Conflict? No Way, the-diplomat.com/2011/10/23/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/

These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. Despite the rhetoric, conflict in the South China Sea may well not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon the Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. And recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This isn’t to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated.

### Iran

#### Prolif will be slow but antiproliferation efforts only force it underground, which is more destabilizing

Wesley 2005 ( Austrailian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59 No.3)

My central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons will probably continue at the rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue that the NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear – not chemical or biological\*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT\*/the positives and the negatives\*/and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.

#### Nuclear prolif creates incentives for de-escalation and guarantees international stability – plus, new proliferators won’t be destabilizing.

Asal & Beardsley, 2007

[Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, 44:2, Sage]

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.4 While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) ‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members. Supporters of proliferation do not see leaders of new nuclear states as being fundamentally different from those of the old nuclear states in terms of their levels of responsibility (Arquilla, 1997), nor do they see them facing unique challenges in managing and securing these weapons (Feaver, 1992/93: 162–163). The response to the argument that small powers, non-Western powers, and military powers will behave less responsibly than the USA and other ‘responsible’ powers is that the evidence does not support the view that new nuclear powers are ‘different’ in the worst sense of the word (Lavoy, 1995; Hagerty, 1998; Arquilla, 1997; Feldman, 1995; Karl, 1996/ 97). Van Creveld (1993: 124) sums up this viewpoint when he points out that ‘where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared’. Dismissing the fear that deterrence will not work if the arsenal is not big enough or under enough control, Chellaney (1995) contends that the Cold War is evidence that even minimum deterrence is sufficient. In support, Feaver (1992/93: 186) argues that ‘even a modest nuclear arsenal should have some existential deterrent effect on regional enemies, precisely because decapitation is so difficult’. There are those who argue that security is increased at a systemic level when the number of nuclear states increases because of the level of uncertainty created when more than one or two players are playing with a nuclear deck. When this happens, ‘the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations’ (Brito & Intriligator, 1983: 137). Cimbala (1993: 194) agrees, arguing that ‘it is only necessary to threaten the plausible loss of social value commensurate with the potential gains of an attacker’.

#### Iranian prolif stabilizes the region – creates a counter to Israeli nukes.

**Kaye & Wehrey, 2007**

[Dalia Dassa Kaye, Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, Frederic M. Wehrey, International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours,” Survival, 49: 2, 111-128]

Public opinion in the Arab world is largely **sympathetic to an Iranian nuclear option**, viewing it as a counter to Israel and a way to overcome the perceived double standard of allowing Israel, but not others in the region, to get away with the bomb.55 Turkish public opinion also does not perceive Iran or the nuclear issue in particular as a threat, nor does the current Islamist leadership in Ankara (serious concerns are largely limited to the Turkish military).56 Some regional security elites also expressed some acceptance, and even benefits, of a nuclear Iran, although they are more inclined to recognise the accompanying dangers than the public at large. In Jordan, for example, some strategic analysts suggested that Iran could serve as a balance to Israel and suggested that many in the region view the issue this way.57 A high-level Jordanian official raised the example of South Asia to suggest that the nuclear tests actually had a stabilising regional effect by leading to a renewed peace effort.58 Interestingly, one Israeli analyst also suggested that a bilateral nuclear balance between Israel and Iran – while dangerous in many other ways – could also **lead to political agreements by putting more pressure on Israel to deal with Syria and Lebanon.**59 In the Gulf, regional tolerance of a nuclear-armed Iran is even more likely, particularly by Oman. Given its long history of economic and cultural interdependence with Iran, Muscat has adopted the most accomodating posture of all the Gulf states. A retired Omani military commander pointed to Iran’s pre- revolutionary support of Oman during the 1970s insurgency in the western Dhofar region, arguing for a degree of continuity in neighbourly relations that would overcome Iran’s belligerent rhetoric or regional fears of a ‘Shia bomb’.60 Why should we be more afraid of a nuclear-armed Iran than a nuclear Pakistan?’ this same official asked. In contrast to fears of an emboldened Iran, he believed that a nuclear-armed Iran would incur increased economic burdens and that its conventional forces would atrophy. A Kuwaiti scholar echoed this prediction of economic decline, arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran, faced with increased isolation and sanctions, warranted increased Kuwaiti investment in anti-smuggling capabilities, to counter the anticipated spike in Iranian black-market activity.61

#### Iranian prolif prevents middle east war [it also won’t cause any terrorist or first strike]

Sadr ’05 (Ehsaneh Sadr, Dept of Government and Politics at Univ. Maryland, Middle East Policy)

 In an article on U.S. options for a post- Cold War nuclear policy, Charles Glaser criticizes the work of foreign-policy analysts who “focus on a single criterion for evaluating U.S. security – the damage United States society would suffer in a war – but overlook other criteria for measuring U.S. security, specifically those criteria that measure the likelihood of war.”61 The same criticism might be leveled at Israeli security analysts whose preoccupation with the devastation a nuclear Iran could inflict upon the Jewish nation clouds their evaluation of the ways in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons affects the likelihood that Iran would initiate hostilities in the first place. The above analysis indicates that a nuclearized Iran is extremely unlikely to pose an existential threat to Israel. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction holds in the Iranian context: Iran’s clerical rulers, anxious to protect their own power, citizens and civilization, will not launch a war that will lead to their own destruction. Iran’s rulers are extremely unlikely to pass nuclear material on to terrorist actors whose loyalty they cannot ensure. They are also unlikely to step up conventional or terrorist harassment of Israel for fear of the escalation of hostilities to nuclear warfare. The impact of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons upon Israel’s regional interests is less problematic than one might think. Although the regime-change option would be off the table, it is not clear that it has ever been a feasible alternative given current geopolitical realities. Any increase in domestic political support for the Iranian regime is likely to be temporary. Iran may indeed be empowered to pursue its own regional interests, but such pursuit is not necessarily bad for Israeli interests. Finally, it will be many years before Iran’s weapons stockpile begins to approach Israel’s and the latter is compelled to engage in an expensive arms race. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Iran’s access to nuclear weapons may increase the prospects for regional stability and even Middle East peace. Given the horrendous consequences of an accidental nuclear war, it will be imperative that Iran and Israel develop some sort of ability to communicate with one another directly. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the institutionalization of such communications may be the first step in the normalization of relations between the two countries and the future integration of Israel into its neighborhood.

Solves China

Rosemon ‘8

[Henry. Prof Em. Of IR @ U of Maryland. “Is China a Threat?” Foreign Policy in Focus, 23 March 08. lexis ]

Unfortunately, the highly invasive foreign policies of the United States, combined with its overwhelming military superiority, provide the Chinese with very good reasons to continue distrusting U.S. motives (including the TSN). It is therefore the responsibility of the United States to take meaningful initiatives to build support for closer cooperation with the soon-to-be world’s second largest economic power. Some of those initiatives would deal directly with China, such as providing materiel and advanced training for the Chinese military to conduct search-and-rescue missions. The United States could also foster far greater trust and cooperation specifically with the Chinese by clarifying the U.S. position toward Taiwan. Taipei should understand that the United States will come to its immediate aid in case of attack. But should Taipei seek independence and a seat at the UN, Washington will use all its diplomatic strength to insure that other nations do not recognize these claims. The United States could also signal to China that it is willing to be a more cooperative international player. For instance, the United States could significantly reduce its nuclear stockpile and renounce the first-strike use of nuclear weapons, as China did long ago. It should also [sign and ratify](http://www.maximsnews.com/107mnunnovember07ianwilliamsunitednationslawofsea.htm) the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as 155 nations have done (including China) since it was promulgated in 1982. Ending the brutal occupation of Iraq is another global measure, as would placing U.S. troops in Afghanistan under UN administration and signing a peace treaty with North Korea (55 years after the cease-fire). Holding out an olive branch to Iran, and stopping the one-sided U.S. support of the Israelis would also provide clear signals to the Chinese and the rest of the world of a major shift in U.S. foreign policy. A reduction of U.S. threats to the world – from nuclear weapons, regional wars such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and potential conflicts with Iran and North Korea – would decrease the likelihood of confrontation with China as well as undercut any rationale for China’s own increased military spending. Such a shift in U.S. national security strategy would not only increase the security of China and the United States but the world as well. \

#### Iranian nuclear modernization trades off with Iranian conventional force development

Chubin ‘01

 (Shahram, Dir Research – Geneva Centre for Security Policy, www.nixoncenter.org)

Access to conventional arms are still a problem. This could be rectified as economic reforms are undertaken and relations are improved with neighbors and Europe. Defense considerations would argue for the continued improvement of the conventional forces, especially in their mobility and in joint operations. Expenses devoted to a nuclear weapons program will ensure that capabilities important for security will remain deficient. At the same time, a nuclear weapons program may detract from the kind of military professionalism that Iran still lacks. It may also pose problems of control and raise issues of doctrine that the military so far at least have shown little sign of comprehending. It will be no easy matter to develop a nuclear weapons program and develop a conventional capability together. Any tendency to substitute the former for the latter would be extremely dangerous. A related question worth only posing here is what would constitute a “capability”: one, three, a dozen weapons? How could a national capability be created without a broad program within the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty? And what about the costs of leaving the treaty, in terms of the reactions of the European and other states? Similarly, Iran’s leaders have to ask themselves whether if they choose to acquire nuclear weapons, other states may not also do so and what the net effect of this chain reaction might be on Iran’s security?

#### Iranian conventional modernization leads to war over the Strait of Hormuz

Jane’s Defence Weekly ‘97

 (4-7, Lexis)

The USA has long contended that one of the primary objectives of Iran’s naval build-up, the main focus of the rearmament programme which Tehran undertook after the 1980-88 Gulf War against Iraq, is to close the chokepoint strait if it felt threatened. Recent acquisitions include 10 Chinese Hegu class missile craft, three Russian “Kilo’ class type 887 EMK submarines and a whole array of cruise and anti-ship missiles-including shore-based batteries concentrated along the strait that is the only access to the Gulf. Tehran’s Kayhan International newspaper conmiented on 27 April that the manoeuvres, the most ambitious staged by Iran, were designed to send a signal to the USA. “The present circumstances require Iran to send a message to Washington that any military adventurism against Iran may have unpredictable repercussions,” the report said.

#### That shatters the global economy

Carus ‘96

 (Seth, Research Analyst – Center for Naval Analysis, 9-12, Eng Test)

The strategic importance of Iranian naval armaments grows from the economic geography of the Persian Gulf. Through the waters of the Persian Gulf transit much of the world’s petroleum. Every oil producing country in the Gulf exports at least some of its oil using tankers that must pass through the Strait of Hormuz to reach international markets. Even Saudi Arabia, which has a pipeline that carries much of its oil to a port on the Red Sea, transports most of its oil by ship from the Gulf. As a result, safe passage through the waters of the Persian Gulf is vital to the international economy. By its geographic position, Iran dominates the Gulf. It has the longest coastline in the Gulf, which stretches its entire length from the border with Iraq to the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, Iran casts a looming shadow over everything that happens in the Gulf. In particular, it dominates the routes that tankers must travel to leave the Gulf. Besides its control over half of the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian controlled islands inside the Gulf sit astride the key tanker routes. Thus, Iran is well positioned to challenge the movement of tankers.

### Invest

#### Econ collapse doesn’t cause war – anything would be small-scale

Pickering 7 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kansas State University (Jeffrey, Emizet F. Kisangani, “Diverting with Benevolent Military Force: Reducing Risks and Rising above Strategic Behavior,” International Studies Quarterly 51, 277–299, JSTOR)

Our results underscore the utility of broadening the conception of diversionary force and using the agenda setting framework to understand leaders’ decisions to divert. As the agenda setting approach anticipates, we find that leaders in democracies and mixed regimes tend to prefer a comparatively low-risk, low-profile type of military force when they attempt diversion. They use what we term SEI in their attempt to clear the domestic policy agenda. They presumably hope that the use of such seemingly controllable, low-scale force will provide a brief reprieve from the public and the media’s focus on issues that have damaged their political reputations and threatened their terms in office. If low politics force succeeds in providing leaders with the window they seek, they can be expected to do all they can to reshape the policy agenda in the hope of saving their political careers. Autocratic leaders, in contrast, do not appear to use any form of external armed force to bolster their domestic standing when they encounter domestic unrest or economic difficulty. Our results also highlight the need for further theoretical development of the SCA framework. In our cross-national sample of democracies, SCA does not seem to constrain democratic leaders to the extent that is implied in the literature. For example, we find no evidence that SCA prevents democratic leaders from using PSI, and democratic leaders often used SEI even when SCA was present (see especially Table 5). The only time SCA seems to obstruct democratic leaders is when they attempt SEI in the face of rising levels of inflation or mass unrest. We did not expect target states to be able to employ SCA to inhibit SEI, but this result at least provides some evidence for the theoretically compelling and logical influence of SCA on democracies. This outcome and the unanticipated influence of SCA on autocracies suggest that the SCA framework requires greater precision. As noted previously, adding measures that capture extant relations or affinity levels among potential actors and targets may enhance the explanatory power of SCA. Another possibility is that we are trying to generalize a phenomenon that has limited scope. It may be that target states only worry about diversion from extremely powerful states and perhaps some unstable, unpredictable autocracies, which might explain why David Clark (2003) and Benjamin Fordham’s (2005) results diverge from those found in this paper and by Christopher Sprecher and Karl DeRouen (2005). Careful empirical study will have to determine if this is the case, and if it is not why SCA appears to constrain certain types of actors experiencing certain types of domestic troubles but not others. Different methods will have to be used to pinpoint the prevalence and the impact of SCA. While powerful and suggestive, the ZIP method is based on a theoretical assumption: that SCA is the exogenous influence that prevents leaders from using military force. Although this is plausible and the evidence presented by David Clark (2003) and Benjamin Fordham (2005) is extremely compelling for the United States case, there could be other exogenous influences that have similar effects on leaders in other countries. Powerful opposition parties (Schultz 1998) or increasing tensions or instability within the government itself could, for example, tie leaders’ hands in a way that prevents the use of military force. Given the significant institutional variation that characterizes democracies and mixed regimes across the globe, both detailed qualitative and country-specific quantitative analyses will be necessary to trace the empirical boundaries of SCA and to refine the theory. In sum, this paper adds to the growing body of literature that suggests that leaders in democracies and mixed regimes use armed forces overseas for diversionary purposes. It just may not be the type of high profile, confrontational military force we typically envision. It is often armed force deployed over low politics issues like humanitarian suffering. Making this simple distinction between the types of armed force states use abroad may go some way toward uniting extant empirical research on diversion and perhaps even producing more cumulative research in the future.

#### Target states will strategically avoid conflict – solves the impact

Fordham 5 – Professor of Political Science at Binghamton University (Benjamin O., February, “Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary Use of Force,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 132-153, JSTOR)

A realistic model of strategic conflict avoidance entails several considerations. Not all states are likely to exhibit this behavior. Given the many other factors shaping states' conflict behavior, only states that expect to be targeted by a powerful state likely to use force for diversionary purposes should be expected to strategically avoid conflict. For states pursuing this strategy, simply not targeting the potential diverter for a militarized challenge is not enough. Incidents that fall short of the militarized conflicts catalogued in the militarized interstate disputes data must also be avoided, since these could escalate. States seeking to avoid conflict must also tempert heirr esponse to the likely diverter'sh ostile actions, as well as avoiding conflict with third states because these could provide the diverter with an opportunity to intervene. The approach adopted in this article is intended to capture these nuances, providing a more realistic and comprehensive test of the strategic conflict avoidance argument. The empirical evidence presented here suggests that strategic conflict avoidance indeed takes place under these circumstances. The evidence was strongest in models of rival state behavior toward the whole world, rather than those covering only relations with the United States. This suggests that efforts to avoid conflict with the U.S. influence rival state relations with third states as well. High U.S. unemployment was associated with strategic conflict avoidance both in bilateral relations with the United States and in broader rival behavior. Growth and inflation were also associated with strategic conflict, although not as consistently. Overall, nine of the 12 models estimated here produced at least some evidence of strategic conflict avoidance. Given the noisiness of events data, these results constitute solid, if qualified, evidence that states sometimes strategically avoid conflict. These findings about strategic conflict avoidance have several implications for the debate over whether national leaders-especially American presidents-use force for diversionary reasons. First, strategic conflict avoidance needs to be considered in empirical tests of the diversionary use of force. Because likely targets appear to avoid conflict with the United States when the American economy is performing poorly, opportunities for military action are not independent of these domestic conditions. The selection process through which the actions of other states come (or do not come) to the attention of American decision makers could influence estimates of those decision makers' propensity to use force. Clark (2003) offers one promising approach to this problem. Selection models developed to deal with related issues might also prove useful (e.g., Signorino 1999, 2001; Smith 1999). While strategic conflict avoidance should be included in models of the diversionary use of force, it does not rule out the possibility of finding evidence of diversionary behavior. On the contrary, the fact that conditions favoring a diversionary use of force diminish the conflict behavior of rival states suggests that existing models probably understate the propensity of American leaders to use force when domestic conditions are poor. By removing opportunities for the use of force, strategic conflict avoidance makes empirical support of diversionary military action less likely.

#### Econ resilient

Lamy 11(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

The bigger test came with the 2008-2009 Great Recession, the first truly global recession since World War II. When the international economy went into free fall, trade went right along with it. Production and supply are today thoroughly global in nature, with most manufactured products made from parts and materials imported from many other countries. These global value chains have a multiplier effect on trade statistics, which explains why, as the global economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, trade volume shrank by more than 12 percent. This multiplier effect works the other way around as well: **Growth returned** to 4.6 percent and trade volume grew by a record 14.5 percent over the course of 2010. Projections for trade in 2011 are also strong, with WTO economists predicting that trade volume will rise 6.5 percent during the current year. This sharp rebound in trade has proved two essential things: **Markets stayed open despite ever-stronger pressures to close them**, and trade is an indispensible tool for economic recovery, particularly for developing countries, which are more dependent on trade. Shortly after the crisis broke out, we in the WTO began to closely monitor the trade policy response of our member governments. Many were fearful that pressures to impose trade restrictions would prove too powerful for governments to resist. But **this is not what happened**. Instead, the system of rules and disciplines, agreed to over 60 years of negotiations, **held firm**. In **a series of reports** prepared for WTO members and the G-20, we found that governments acted **with great restraint**. At no time did the trade-restrictive measures imposed cover more than 2 percent of world imports. Moreover, **the measures** **used** -- anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and countervailing duties to offset export or production subsidies -- **were those which**, in the right circumstances, **are permissible under WTO rules**. I am not suggesting that every safeguard measure or countervailing duty imposed during those difficult days was in compliance with WTO rules, but responses to trade pressures were generally undertaken within an internationally agreed-upon framework. Countries by and large resisted overtly noncompliant measures, such as breaking legally binding tariff ceilings or imposing import bans or quotas. As **markets stayed open, trade flows began to shift**, **and countries** that shrugged off the impact of the crisis and **continued to grow** -- notably China, India, and Brazil -- became ever-more attractive markets for countries that were struggling, including those in Europe and North America. Trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the developing world, a fact reflected in the far greater trade-to-GDP ratios we see there. In 2010, developing countries' share of world trade expanded to a record 45 percent, and this trend looks set to continue. Decisions made in Brasilia, Beijing, and New Delhi to open their respective economies to trade have been instrumental in enabling these countries to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

#### US not key to the global economy

The Economist 7 (November 23, “America’s Vulnerable Economy”, pg. 13)

The best hope that global growth can stay strong lies instead with emerging economies. A decade ago, the thought that so much depended on these crisis-prone places would have been terrifying. Yet thanks largely to economic reforms, their annual growth rate has surged to around 7%. This year they will contribute half of the globe's GDP growth, measured at market exchange rates, over three times as much as America. In the past, emerging economies have often needed bailing out by the rich world. This time they could be the rescuers. Of course, a recession in America would reduce emerging economies' exports, but they are less vulnerable than they used to be. America's importance as an engine of global growth has been exaggerated. Since 2000 its share of world imports has dropped from 19% to 14%. Its vast current-account deficit has started to shrink, meaning that America is no longer pulling along the rest of the world. Yet growth in emerging economies has quickened, partly thanks to demand at home. In the first half of this year the increase in consumer spending (in actual dollar terms) in China and India added more to global GDP growth than that in America. Most emerging economies are in healthier shape than ever (see article). They are no longer financially dependent on the rest of the world, but have large foreign-exchange reserves—no less than three-quarters of the global total. Though there are some notable exceptions, most of them have small budget deficits (another change from the past), so they can boost spending to offset weaker exports if need be.

#### Diversionary theory is wrong

Deudney 91 (Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society – Princeton University, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April)

Poverty wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil, then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.

## 1NR

### 2NC – Overview

#### Probability- History proves food shortages are the most likely cause of extinction

**Brown ’11** (from World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse, by Lester R. Brown © 2011 Earth Policy Institute

For the Mayans, it was deforestation and soil erosion. As more and more land was cleared for farming to support the expanding empire, soil erosion undermined the productivity of their tropical soils. A team of scientists from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has noted that the extensive land clearing by the Mayans likely also altered the regional climate, reducing rainfall. In effect, the scientists suggest, it was the convergence of several environmental trends, some reinforcing others, that led to the food shortages that brought down the Mayan civilization. 26 Although we live in a highly urbanized, technologically advanced society, we are as dependent on the earth’s natural support systems as the Sumerians and Mayans were. If we continue with business as usual, civilizational collapse is no longer a matter of whether but when. We now have an economy that is destroying its natural support systems, one that has put us on a decline and collapse path. We are dangerously close to the edge. Peter Goldmark, former Rockefeller Foundation president, puts it well: “**The death of our civilization is no longer a theory** or an academic possibility; it is the road we’re on.” 2 **Judging by the archeological records of earlier civilizations, more often than not food shortages appear to have precipitated their decline and collapse**. Given the advances of modern agriculture, I had long rejected the idea that food could be the weak link in our twenty-first century civilization. **Today I think not only that it could be the weak link but that it is the weak link.**

**Magnitude- food shortages mean extinction**

**Takacs ‘96** (David, The Idea Of Diversity: Philosophies Of Paradise, 1996, p. 200-1.)

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion , loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well­stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can­cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.

#### Turns econ

Ojeda 12 (Raul Hinojosa, “The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform”) http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/1/cj32n1-12.pdf

The benefits of additional U.S. GDP growth under the comprehensive immigration reform scenario are spread very broadly throughout the U.S. economy, with virtually every sector expanding. Particularly large increases occur in immigrant-heavy industries such as textiles, ferrous metals, transportation equipment, electronic equipment, motor vehicles and parts, nonelectric machinery and equipment, capital goods, mineral products, and construction. In comparison, every sector experiences significantly smaller gains 32739\_Ch12\_Hinojosa\_19016\_Cato 12/29/11 2:13 PM Page 190191 Comprehensive Immigration Reform under the temporary worker scenario, while every sector contracts under the mass deportation scenario.

### 2NC – Mexico Relations

#### Immigration reform is key to US-Mexico relations

Shifter 12/27/12 (Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?”)

Changes in immigration laws would reflect little about the foreign policy direction of the Obama administration. Rather, they should be interpreted as expressions of demographic transformations and political interests in the US. But meaningful immigration reform would be welcomed throughout Latin America, and particularly in Mexico (Mexicans make up some 60 percent of unauthorized migrants in the US), where the issue has long been a source of tension in the bilateral relationship.

#### Mexican relations through immigration key to global democracy

**Castaneda ‘3** (Castañeda, Jorge G. Source: Foreign Affairs; May/Jun2003, Vol. 82 Issue 3, p67-81, 15p, 4 Black and White Photographs

Dealing with Mexico is in many ways the most important regional task facing the Bush administration. The matter can be summed up simply: President Vicente Fox's consolidation of Mexico's first democratic transfer of power must be-and be seen to be-a success. There is nothing more important to the United States than a stable Mexico, and today a stable Mexico means a democratic one. And the United States has a huge role in making Mexico's transition to democracy a success, or in contributing to its failure. The success or failure of this experiment will be judged in Mexico ultimately in the light of the country's economic performance-which has not been impressive these past two years. But Mexicans will also judge the state of their country's relations with the United States. They will look to see whether Presidents Fox and Bush deliver on the ambitious bilateral agenda they sketched out at their historic February 2001 meeting at Fox's ranch in Guanajuato, Mexico. On issues of trade, drug enforcement, the border, building a North American Economic Community, energy, and, most significant, immigration, the two countries set out a bold series of goals to meet by the end of Bush's first term, if not sooner. Indeed, in the first eight months of their respective presidencies, Bush and Fox achieved a fundamental breakthrough on immigration. By the time of the Guanajuato meeting, both sides had identified the core policies needed to tackle undocumented migration flows from Mexico to the United States: an expanded temporary-worker program; increased transition of undocumented Mexicans already in the United States to legal status; a higher U.S. visa quota for Mexicans; enhanced border security and stronger action against migrant traffickers; and more investment in those regions of Mexico that supplied the most migrants. The speed with which both governments carried out these negotiations certainly captured the political imagination of both societies. Fox's resounding state visit to Washington on the eve of the September 11 terrorist attacks further lifted the new initiatives and underscored both leaders' commitment to them. But the symmetry ends there: Fox staked much more on this partnership than Bush did. And since the Mexican president has little to show for his gamble, he has paid a high domestic political price for his willingness to bring about a sea change in Mexico's relations with the United States and the rest of the world. Indeed, this change has been on the order of what President Carlos Salinas did with Mexico's economy or what President Ernesto Zedillo did with the nation's political system. Hence the centrality of immigration in the bilateral relationship today: both Bush and Fox stated dramatic goals and raised expectations enormously. The United States understandably was forced to put the issue on hold for a time. But what was initially portrayed as a brief interlude will now probably stretch through Bush's entire first term. It will be almost impossible to point to success in the bilateral relationship without a deal on immigration. And unless there is such a breakthrough, Fox's six-year term in office, nearly half over, may well be seen in Mexico as an exercise in high expectations but disappointing results. To avoid a breakdown in relations, Bush must make a state visit to Mexico City this year. He should take with him sufficient progress on key issues-immigration; trade concerns relating to sugar, tuna, trucking, and the North American Free Trade Agreement's agricultural chapter; and funding for heightened security and the expedited passage of people and cargo at the border-to show that Mexico remains a top priority for his administration. Bush must also show that he is willing to spend political capital to ensure the success of Fox's push for true Mexican democracy. Washington may have so far missed an opportunity to present its relationship with Mexico City as a model for the rest of the hemisphere and, indeed, for the rest of the developing world-an example of how a rich and powerful neighbor and a still relatively poor and weak one can get along and contribute to each other's success. But the window of opportunity has not been shut. In the aftermath of the current conflict with Iraq, the United States would benefit hugely by demonstrating that it can construct alliances beyond its traditional circle of friends.

#### Extinction

**Diamond ’95** (Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

### 2NC – China

#### CIR solves Latin American Relations

**Coates ’10** (Posted by David Coates at 1:38 pm August 25, 2010 1 COMMENT Immigration and the Problem of the Two-Legged Stool (co-authored with Peter Siavelis) David Coates holds the Worrell Chair in Anglo-American Studies. Born in the United Kingdom and educated at the universities of York and Oxford, he came to Wake Forest University in 1999, having previously held personal chairs at the universities of Leeds (in contemporary political economy) and Manchester (in labor studies). He has written extensively on UK labor politics, contemporary political economy and US public policy.

The diplomatic case for comprehensive immigration reform needs also to be factored in. The lack of comprehensive immigration reform imperils U.S. diplomacy in Latin America, undermining U.S. interests in the region and beyond. The U.S.’s immigration model has historically provided the best and brightest immigrants and students the chance to succeed, reinforcing the notion internationally of the U.S. as the land of opportunity. Workers who stay in the U.S. provide living proof of this reality and international students take back a positive image of the U.S. to their home countries. Tighter immigration has undermined both of these processes, and hurt the reputation of the United States internationally, as visitors become increasingly frustrated with the hostility and suspicion in the visa process. In more concrete terms, the lack of immigration reform has poisoned the well of U.S.-Latin American relations, and particularly U.S.-Mexican relations. Mexico is the U.S.’s second largest trading partner after Canada and an important gateway to markets farther south. The inability to achieve reform interferes with the deepening of mutually beneficial economic relations and complicates joint efforts at progress toward a solution to the scourge of narco-trafficking. The scathing condemnation of Arizona’s immigration law by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and a group of Cuban parliamentarians provides ample evidence of how the immigration impasse also provides negative diplomatic ammunition to avowed enemies of the U.S.

#### Solves proliferation

Shifter 12. [Michael, President of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum Intern-American Dialogue, "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America" Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report -- April -- www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to ¶ pursue more robust ties .¶ Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and ¶ expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources . Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market ¶ and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin ¶ America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance . For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become ¶ more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future .The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean ¶ would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters ¶ as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human ¶ rights . With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 ¶ million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and ¶ Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis ¶ for hemispheric partnership. Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between ¶ the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the ¶ current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild ¶ vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both ¶ from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean

#### Latin American relations solves Amazon deforestation

**Zedillo et al ‘8** (Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission The Brookings Institution November 2008 Ernesto Zedillo Commission co-chair; Former President of Mexico Thomas R. Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Memb e r s o f the Par t n e r s h i p for t h e Ame r i cas Commi ssi o n Mauricio Cárdenas Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Director of the Commission; Political Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the world’s climate is now well established, and the consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human activity remains unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including declines in agricultural yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent and destructive storms in the Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation to Central America, the Caribbean, and the southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and material toll. As we know from recent storms, the costs of replacing homes, businesses, and infrastructure—along with the higher costs of energy if refineries and offshore rigs are damaged—will be vast. Hemispheric Solutions Addressing the challenge of energy security will require making energy consumption more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge of climate change will require finding ways to control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbon-intensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing ecosystems. Potential solutions to these problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a sustained hemispheric partnership. Latin America has enormous potential to help meet the world’s growing thirst for energy, both in terms of hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazil’s oil reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great potential in solar energy generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the hemisphere’s energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production 13 (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners. In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC region’s future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the world’s three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.

**Extinction**

**Takacs ‘96** (David, The Idea Of Diversity: Philosophies Of Paradise, 1996, p. 200-1.)

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion , loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well­stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can­cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.

#### US-Latin America relations are key to stop Chinese expansion in the region

Lovelace 7 (Douglas, Ph.D., Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, FOREWORD: CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,” Strategic Studies Institute, Septebmer, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=806)

 The U.S. Government is waking up to China's growing presence in Latin AMerica. For the last several years as U.S. policymakers' attention and resources, largely diverted from Latin America, have been focused on the Middle East, China has pursued a policy of economic engagment with the region. Sino-Latin American trade has sky-rocketed, and Chinese investment in the region is picking up. In this monograph, Ms. Janie Hulse, a Latin American specialist based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, argues that increased Chinese investment in regional telecommunications and space industries has implications for U.S. national security. She believes that globalization, advances in information technology and China's growing capacity and interest in information warfare make the United States particularly vulnerable. Ms. Hulse details China's expansion into the U.S. withdrawal from these intelligence-related industries in Argentina and highlights associated risks for the United States. The author calls for the U.S. government to react to this current trend by increasing its engagement in regional strategic industries and bettering relations with its southern neighbors.

#### Regional influence is key to prevent a Chinese ASATs attack

Hulse 7 (Janie Hulse, Master’s degree in Politics of Development of Latin America from the London School of Economics, is an independent contractor based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, who provides communica-tions and research services to private and public sector organizations “CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,” Strategic Studies Institute, September, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=806> )

Chinese presence in Western Hemisphere space creates particular vulnerabilities for the United States. Latin America?s geographical proximity makes for convenient satellite observance of the United States. Access to space tracking facilities in the region also could give China the ability to attack U.S. satellites. Moreover, Chinese space cooperation with Latin American governments that have historically collaborated with the United States provides the Chinese an opportunity to study U.S. space technologies and practices up close. As is the case with the telecommunications industry, there is increasing competition in the international space markets. If the United States fails to maintain its preeminence in these markets, it will lose the ability to secure this extremely strategic industry. While China is not currently building a significant military presence in Latin America, the human and commercial infrastructure that it is building in the region increasingly gives China a powerful lever for disrupting and distracting the United States in the Western Hemisphere, should Sino-U.S. relations turn sour. The United States should work to counter China?s growing influence to mitigate future threats. To do so requires improving U.S. relations with Latin American countries and making U.S. companies more competitive in the region?especially in strategic markets where U.S. security is at stake. The most effective way for the United States to improve its standing and influence in Argentina and the Latin American region as a whole is to help these countries succeed economically through increased aid, trade, and investments. Aid should be expanded in a creative, cost-effective manner and should include middle-income countries in South America, which traditionally do not qualify for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance. Free trade should continue to be promoted, but in a more generous way. The U.S. Government should promote investment by bolstering the U.S. Commercial Service and assisting U.S. companies in gaining a foothold in the strategic telecommunications and space industries. It also behooves the U.S. Government to increase assistance to and cooperation with Latin American militaries to maintain friendships throughout the region. It is not too late for the United States to take remedial action to increase its presence in Latin America?s telecommunications and space sectors. Commercial and aid efforts should be complemented by a heavy dose of improved public diplomacy? especially in countries similar to Argentina where U.S. popularity is low and where China has made substantial inroads.

### Will Pass

#### Immigration will pass now – the Aff evidence is a straw person argument – PARAGRAPH ABOVE YOUR CARD

#### Workpermit.com 12/31/12 (Workpermit is a specialist visa consultancy with nearly twenty-five years of experience dealing with visa applications. We are OISC registered. We can help with a wide range of visa applications to the UK or your country of choice. Please feel free to contact us for further details, "White House to campaign for immigration reform in 2013" [http://www.workpermit.com/immigration-video.htm-http://www.workpermit.com/immigration-video.htm)](http://www.workpermit.com/immigration-video.htm-http%3A/www.workpermit.com/immigration-video.htm%29)

There is reason for optimism. Some Republicans have said that they want reform. Republican Senator Lindsay Graham of North Carolina has already introduced a bill with New York Democrat Charles Schumer which would reform the system. A group of eight Democrats and Republicans known as The Gang of Eight is meeting in Washington to discuss the details of any comprehensive reform. Insiders say that the broad principles of the reform have been agreed. Most proposed reform legislation in recent years has involved proposals to strengthen border security, particularly along the Mexican border, the introduction of a visa stream for low paid, low skill immigrant workers and the establishment of a 'path to citizenship' for some of those who are already in the US illegally. The principles are clear but no doubt, negotiation over the details will be fierce. Even Paul Ryan, the vice-presidential nominee for the Republicans in the recent presidential election, has said that he now wants reform. The Republicans campaigned on an anti-immigration platform at the election. This explains, pollsters say, why Mr Ryan and the Republicans' presidential candidate Mitt Romney polled less than 30% of votes among Latino voters. Democrat representative Luis Gutierrez claims that Mr Ryan has approached him and asked to cooperate on immigration reform. 'Mr Gutierrez said that Mr Ryan told him 'I want to do it because it's the right thing to do.' Recently, former president George W Bush spoke out in praise of immigrants.

#### … Kentucky’s card starts…

Many Republican Party strategists say that, if the Republicans adopt an anti-immigration stance, they will find it increasingly difficult to win elections as the demographic makeup of the US changes. Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans and African Americans already make up 34% of the US population and they all vote overwhelmingly for the Democrats. As the Republicans have become more anti-immigrant, so their share of the Latino vote has gone down. George W Bush received over 40% of the Latino vote in 2000 and 2004. Mitt Romney received about 29% in 2013.

#### Immigration reform is coming now – legislation is being formed

Peterson 1/3/13 (Hayley, Globe and Mail Online, “Obama Will Introuce Broad Immigration Reform as Early As January”)

President Barack Obama will introduce immigration reform as early as this month, according to the [Huffington Post](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform_n_2398507.html). The president is expected to propose a broad set of measures that would strengthen border security and provide a path to citizenship for the 11 million immigrants estimated to be in the U.S. illegally. The proposal is also expected to include increased penalties for employers who hire illegal immigrants and a way to make it easier for companies to bring in foreign workers under special visas.

#### The GOP will get in line

Foley and Stein 1/2/13 (Elise and Sam, “Obama’s Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month”) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2398507.html

Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said. Advocates have vowed to keep pushing for reform. As part of their efforts, they plan to remind Republican members of Congress about their presidential nominee's defeat among Latino and Asian voters, a majority of whom support a fix to the immigration system. "They can procrastinate as long as they want, but they're going to have a serious day of reckoning next election cycle," said Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy and advocacy at the Center for American Progress. "We're going to have a lot of near-death experiences with this issue, but I'm pretty confident it's never going to go completely to a flatline." Good news for immigration advocates may have come Tuesday night, when Boehner[broke the so-called "Hastert Rule"](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/02/the-end-of-the-hastert-rule.html) and allowed the fiscal cliff bill to come for a vote without support from a majority of his Republican conference. Given opposition to immigration reform by many Tea Party Republicans, the proof that Boehner is willing to bypass them on major legislation is a good sign, the Democratic aide said. "If something is of such importance that the GOP establishment [is] telling Boehner, 'You must do this. You need to get this off the table soon,'" the Democratic aide said, the speaker could break the Hastert Rule again. "He already did it with this fiscal issue, so I would not be surprised if when it came down to it he puts up a bill that he just allows to go through with a combination of Democratic and Republican votes, without worrying about a majority of the majority," the aide continued.

### AT: Gun Thumper

#### Obama is pushing CIR – it’s the top priority

Volsky 12/30/12 (Igor, Think Progress Online, “Obama to Introduce Immigration Reform Bill in 2013”)

President Obama reiterated his call for comprehensive immigration reform during an interview on Meet The Press, claiming that the effort will be a top goal in his second term. “Fixing our broken immigration is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in the first year to get that done,” Obama said. Administration officials have hinted that Obama will “begin [an all-out drive](http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/12/08/1305581/obama-to-begin-an-all-out-drive-for-comprehensive-immigration-reform-in-january/) for comprehensive immigration reform, including seeking a path to citizenship” for 11 million undocumented immigrants, after Congress addresses the fiscal cliff. The Obama administration’s “social media blitz” will start in January and is expected “to tap the same organizations and unions that helped get a record number of Latino voters to reelect the president.” Cabinet secretaries and lawmakers from both parties are already holding initial meetings to iron out the details of the proposal and Obama will to push for a broad bill.

#### Immigration is at the top of the agenda – top priority and Obama is pushing

Weber 1/1/13 (Joseph, “Guns Immigration Fiscal Issues Emerge As Top Priorities for Obama, New Congress”)

But in the near term, immigration legislation appears to be high on the docket in the next Congress and second Obama administration term. Washington has tried for years to change the country's immigration policy -- to strengthen border security and stem the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S.; to reform the visa system for the benefit of those legal immigrants following the rules; and figure out how to address the millions of illegal immigrants already here. Legislative efforts by Democrats and Republicans on comprehensive immigration reform had reached a standstill -- until the issue re-emerged during this election cycle when Obama suspended deportation for many young immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally by their parents. Republicans have since signaled their intentions to be the first to introduce and pass more comprehensive legislation to deal with the roughly 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States, especially after Obama won re-election with roughly 71 percent of the Hispanic vote. However, Obama appeared to re-stake his turf Sunday, saying he would introduce legislation next year to fix “our broken immigration system.”

#### Gun control doesn’t thump

Klein 12/30/12 (Philip, Senior Editorial Writer for the Washington Examiner, “Obama Says Gun Control Will be Dictated by Public Opinion”)

President Obama has indicated that he won’t stick his neck out to push for gun control, but instead will let public opinion drive the debate. In an interview with David Gregory on “Meet the Press,” Obama said he would await the recommendations of his gun control task force and present a package of gun control proposals. But he said, “We’re not going to get this done unless the American people decide it’s important and so this is not something that’s going to be a matter of me spending political capital.” He continued, “One of the things that you learn, having now been in this office four years, is the old adage of Abraham Lincoln’s that with public opinion there’s nothing you can’t do, and without public opinion, there’s very little you can get done in this town.”

### Link Debate

#### Opposition to the plan is on the rise – outweighs their turns

Bracewell & Giuliani 12 – legal services business (“U.S. Senate Takes Up CFIUS Reform Legislation Expected to Impact International Acquisitions,” http://m.bracewellgiuliani.com/news-publications/updates/us-senate-takes-cfius-reform-legislation-expected-impact-internat)

Scrutiny of high-profile foreign direct investment in the United States is on the rise. Recent activity such as the Chinese government's $3 billion stake in Blackstone's IPO, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation's purchase of GE's plastics business and Middle East petrodollars chasing investments such as the Dubai International Financial Centre's new stake in Deutsche Bank is fueling the desire of the U.S. Congress to strengthen review of foreign investments. Given the public relations and transactional complications that can arise from the Exon-Florio laws and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") review process, those involved with international acquisitions of U.S. businesses, entities, and properties need to carefully monitor changes to the CFIUS process that are expected to be enacted by Congress in the near future.

#### Huge backlash

Nanto et al 6 (Dick K., James K. Jackson, Wayne M. Morrison, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Lawrence Kumins, Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service, 02/27, “China and the CNOOC Bid for Unocal: Issues for Congress,” http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=460852)

The bid by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire the U.S. energy company Unocal for $18.5 billion raised many issues with U.S. policymakers. Even though CNOOC ultimately withdrew its bid in the face of considerable opposition from some Members of Congress and other commentors, many economic, financial, and security issues are still to be resolved.

### AT: China Lobby Shields

#### China lobby doesn’t shield the GOP, especially on economic issues like the plan

Cathcart 11 – Ph.D., assistant professor of history at Pacific Lutheran University (Adam, 11/23, “Huntsman in Global Times Terrain, and Republican Foreign Policy,” http://adamcathcart.wordpress.com/2011/11/23/what-the-hell/)

Mainly for the hell of it, I recently spent $4 (about 26 RMB) on a big red “Jon Huntsman for President 2012″ bumper sticker. It arrived in my mailbox, and I promptly stuck it on my South Korean automobile, which I park in the guts of an old Japanese bathhouse in Seattle’s Chinatown and mainly drive up and down the I-5. I’m an American, and I can vote for whomever the hell I please, especially in the primaries. Even though I was questioning the shenanigan he pulled at the end of his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to China, I felt just a little more modern in supporting Huntsman’s primary bid: he has a better grasp of East Asia — by leagues — than his Republican counterparts, and he seemed to be setting an intelligent and measured tone, cooling down the “eternal war in the broader Middle East” meme which has been such a present part of our public discourse for so many years. Moreover, he talks about China, regularly, occasionally in Chinese (which, if nobody noticed, is kind of difficult to learn), and seemed to be saying something that was rare in the GOP, the traditional locus of the “China Lobby”: the United States should not take any interest in overthrowing the Chinese state, and that good commercial relations with China were going to help the US economy.

#### Bipartisan resistance to the China lobby

McGregor 12 – reporter for the Financial Times and the publication's former China bureau chief (Richard 08/16, “Ryan labels Obama as China’s ‘doormat’,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf08f696-e7ed-11e1-8686-00144feab49a.html#axzz2GhTfCqgV)

He said that the new emphasis on Asia in US foreign policy and the retooling of the Pentagon’s battle plans for any conflict in the region had been in the making for years and would not be undone in a single election. “Both sides have moved to get tougher on China and that would persist once the election is past,” he said. Another unpredictable factor is the elevation of a new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, around the time of the presidential election, who also may feel he needs to take a tougher line with the US.

#### Anti-China lobby outweighs – ideology first

Brown 10 – satellite journalist from Maine USA (Peter J., 07/16, “Asia takes stock of new US space policy,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\_Asia/LG16Df02.html)

However, ideology and not the threat of industrial espionage in space is the key driver here. "The most concern I have heard voiced has been by those who do not want to work with a communist government," said Johnson-Freese. This explains why no meaningful export reforms with respect to high technology items in general and so-called dual-use space hardware exports to China in particular have materialized despite promises made during Obama's presidential campaign. "The strong anti-China lobby in Congress, which includes [Speaker of the US House of Representatives] Nancy Pelosi as well as conservative Republicans and Democrats will continue to oppose, for example, satellite launches by China," said Ghoshroy. Opening the door to greater cooperation with China in space - a move that is supported by the Russians and Europeans - will require Japan's nod of approval, too, and thus far Tokyo has not given it.

### AT: Votes Ideological

#### Not a card that makes this argument—be skeptical of late breaking 1AR cards

#### Ideological voting means political capital is MORE important

**Beckmann and McGann ‘8** (http://jtp.sagepub.com Journal of Theoretical Politics DOI: 10.1177/0951629807085818 2008; 20; 201 Journal of Theoretical Politics Matthew N. Beckmann and Anthony J. McGann Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States, MATTHEW N. BECKMANN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. He is currently working on a book-length project that explains and tests a new theory of presidents’ inﬂuence on Capitol Hill, 1953–2004. ANTHONY J. MCGANN is Associate Professor of Political Science at theUni- versity of California, Irvine and Reader in Government at the University of Essex.)

We can generalize these ﬁndings to the case where the president needs to target more than one vote, as would be the case in this example if a super-majority was required. If the president needs n votes to pass measure o1 and C(o, si Þ is linear, then he will need to pay 2n times the cost of a median senator. In this case it is not clear that it is cheaper for the president to get his measure passed in the polarized case; it depends on the number of votes he has to buy. In the polarized case each vote is relatively expensive, so if the president has to buy many votes, it may be more expensive than in a more homogenous case. Polarization’s advantage to the president, after all, was **that it allowed him to concentrate his resources on the few senators who will have a very signiﬁcant effect**. Therefore, polarization generally works to the president’s advantage pro- vided the president is in a situation where winning over a few voters can signiﬁ- cantly change the outcome (i.e. the polarization is distributed around the pivotal voter). If many members are clustered at the pivot point, any additional polariza- tion will limit presidential inﬂuence, produce policy stalemate, and reinforce legislative gridlock. Discussion By all indications, **the partisan and ideological polarization that has come to characterize ofﬁcials in Washington shows no signs of abating.** If anything, it appears that the schism between liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, will only continue to grow. The simple but important question that many have asked is, so what? How does polarization affect the policymaking process and the outcomes that result? While Mayhew’s initial study proved important laws continue to prevail even in the face of divided government and polarization, subsequent research has indicated that partisan and ideological polarization does encourage legislative gridlock, which, in turn, privileges the status quo. This happens partly by germinating partisanship and posturing over negotiation and compromise, and partly by leaving ideologically distant pivotal voters unable to ﬁnd an alternative they prefer even when they seek compromise and negotiate sincerely. By contrast, we theorize that polarization’s impact on US lawmaking **is conditional**. Instead of hypothesizing gridlock monotonically increases with polari- zation, our model predicts polarization’s policymaking impact depends on three elements: the default preference of the pivotal voter, the extent of polarization around the pivotal voter, and the president’s willingness (and ability) to spend his capital to win. Depending on the particular constellation of these factors, predictions range from the familiar one of gridlock on through to a president who not only avoids stalemate, but actually signs into law bills that are closer to his preference than we would otherwise expect. Drawing from this model, then, a more nuanced view of presidential inﬂu- ence emerges. Assuming today’s White House ofﬁcials are eager to promote the president’s legislative agenda, we can now see when **those efforts are likely to pay off – namely, when the president enjoys ample political capital** and confronts a polarized legislature (i.e. one where there are few legislators sitting between the pivotal voter and some point much closer to the president). Con- versely**,** when the president does not get involved or lacks political capital when he does, **all the conventional wisdom about pivotal voters and gridlock holds**. Also, any president promoting his agenda before a homogenous Senate (say, one characterized by a normal distribution of preferences) is highly constrained by its predispositions. Therefore, as future researchers revisit presidents’ potential inﬂuence in Congress, accounting for its conditional nature should provide more discriminating results and permit more judicious inferences.

#### Not true with immigration – capital is key

Dallas News 1/2/13 (“Editorial: Actions Must Match Obama’s Immigration Pledge”) http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130102-editorial-actions-must-match-obamas-immigration-pledge.ece

President Barack Obama said all the right things Sunday about immigration reform. The president told NBC’s Meet the Press that he is serious about getting Congress to overhaul the laws governing immigrants. He even declared that he will introduce an immigration bill this year. This newspaper welcomes that announcement. Texans particularly understand the unique challenges that an outdated immigration system presents. Even though the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. has subsided in the last few years, the many holes in the system leave families, schools, businesses and law enforcement struggling. And those are just some of the constituents challenged by flawed immigration laws. The president’s words to NBC’s David Gregory are only that — words. What will really matter is whether he puts his muscle into the task this year. We suggest that Obama start by looking at the example of former President George W. Bush. Back in 2006 and 2007, the Republican and his administration constantly worked Capitol Hill to pass a comprehensive plan. They failed, largely because Senate Republicans balked. But the opposition didn’t stop the Bush White House from fully engaging Congress, including recalcitrant Republicans. Obama may have a similar problem with his own party. The dirty little secret in the 2006 and 2007 immigration battles was that some Democrats were content to let Senate Republicans kill the effort. Labor-friendly Democrats didn’t want a bill, either. And they may not want one this year. That reluctance is a major reason the president needs to invest in this fight. He must figure out how to bring enough Democrats along, while also reaching out to Republicans. In short, the nation doesn’t need a repeat of the process through which the 2010 health care legislation was passed. Very few Republicans bought into the president’s plan, leaving the Affordable Care Act open to partisan sniping throughout last year’s election. If the nation is going to create a saner immigration system, both parties need to support substantial parts of an answer. The new system must include a guest worker program for future immigrants and a way for illegal immigrants already living here to legalize their status over time. Some House Republicans will object to one or both of those reforms, so Speaker John Boehner must be persuasive about the need for a wholesale change. But the leadership that matters most will come from the White House. The president has staked out the right position. Now he needs to present a bill and fight this year for a comprehensive solution. Nothing but action will count.

# Neg Round 5 vs Northwestern LV

## 1NC

### T – Incentive

**For is a term of exclusion – requiring direct action upon**

US CUSTOMS COURT 39 AMERICAN COLORTYPE CO. v. UNITED STATES C. D. 107, Protest 912094-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT, THIRD DIVISION 2 Cust. Ct. 132; 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 35 The same reasons used by the appellate court may be adopted in construing the language of the statute herein involved. If the words "for industrial use" mean no more than the words "articles of utility," there could be no reason for inserting the additional words "for industrial use" in the paragraph. Therefore, it must be held that the [\*135] new language "for industrial use" was intended to have a different meaning from the words "articles of utility," as construed in the case of Progressive Fine Arts Co. v. United States, [\*\*8] supra. Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word "industrial" as follows: Industrial. 1. Relating to industry or labor as an economic factor, or to a branch or the branches of industry; of the nature of, or constituting, an industry or industries \* \* \* . The transferring of the scenes on an oil painting to a printed copy is a branch of industry under the definition above quoted. Some of the meanings of the preposition "for" signify intent, as shown by the following definition in the same dictionary: For. 2. Indicating the end with reference to which anything is, acts, serves, or is done; as: a. As a preparation for; with the object of; in order to be, become, or act as; conducive to. \* \* \*. d. Intending, or in order, to go to or in the direction of. Therefore, the words "articles for industrial use" in paragraph 1807 imply that Congress intended to exclude from that provision articles either purchased or imported with the intention to use the same in industry for manufacturing purposes.

**B. Violation – They violate the terms FOR and FINANCIAL INCENTIVES - the affirmative does not increase FINANCIAL incentives FOR energy production they increase indirect incentives –**

Dyson et al, 3 - International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Megan, Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows, p. 67-68) Understanding of the term ‘incentives’ varies and economists have produced numerous typologies. A brief characterization of incentives is therefore warranted. First, the term is understood by economists as incorporating both positive and negative aspects, for example a tax that leads a consumer to give up an activity that is an incentive, not a disincentive or negative incentive. Second, although incentives are also construed purely in economic terms, incentives refer to more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are the “positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context.”80 Third, it is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect incentives, with direct incentives referring to financial or other inducements and indirect incentives referring to both variable and enabling incentives.81 Finally, incentives of any kind may be called ‘perverse’ where they work against their purported aims or have significant adverse side effects. Direct incentives lead people, groups and organisations to take particular action or inaction. In the case of environmental flows these are the same as the net gains and losses that different stakeholders experience. The key challenge is to ensure that the incentives are consistent with the achievement of environmental flows. This implies the need to compensate those that incur additional costs by providing them with the appropriate payment or other compensation. Thus, farmers asked to give up irrigation water to which they have an established property or use right are likely to require a payment for ceding this right. The question, of course, is how to obtain the financing necessary to cover the costs of developing such transactions and the transaction itself. Variable incentives are policy instruments that affect the relative costs and benefits of different economic activities. As such, they can be manipulated to affect the behaviour of the producer or consumer. For example, a government subsidy on farm inputs will increase the relative profitability of agricultural products, hence probably increasing the demand for irrigation water. Variable incentives therefore have the ability to greatly increase or reduce the demand for out-of-stream, as well as in-stream, uses of water. The number of these incentives within the realm of economic and fiscal policy is practically limitless.

**Financial incentives include funding and loan guarantees; procurement and trade preference is a non-financial incentive**

Czinkota et al, 9 - Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books) Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. Fiscal incentives are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Nonfinancial incentives include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

**C. Prefer our interpretation**

**1. Limits - Broad definitions could include 40 different mechanisms**

Moran, 86 **-** non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development and holds the Marcus Wallenberg Chair at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University(Theodore, Investing in Development: New Roles for Private Capital?, p. 29 - googlebooks) Guisinger finds that if “incentives” are broadly defined to include tariffs and trade controls along with tax holidays, subsidized loans, cash grants, and other fiscal measures, they comprise more than forty separate kinds of measures. Moreover, the author emphasizes, the value of an incentive package is just one of several means that governments use to lure foreign investors. Other methods—for example, promotional activities (advertising, representative offices) and subsidized government services—also influence investors’ location decisions. The author points out that empirical research so far has been unable to distinguish the relative importance of fundamental economic factors and of government policies in decisions concerning the location of foreign investment—let alone to determine the effectiveness of individual government instruments.

2. **Ground – They do not spend federal money, this eliminates key ground on spending, politics, and trade-off debates – it also allows them to have highly specific evidence about their mechanism – they acquire additional solvency.**

**D. Topicality is a voting issue – if it were not the affirmative could run the same case year after year or unbeatable truths like sexual discrimination is harmful.**

### Saudi

#### Saudi would flood the market in response to the plan and crash oil prices

HULBERT ’12 - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review; Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations; Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “OPEC's Pending Bloodbath”. June 10, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/06/10/opecs-pending-bloodbath/)

That’s unlikely to happen, precisely because Riyadh can bring further pricing pressures to bear if it wants to get its way in the cartel. The Kingdom’s policy space has admittedly tightened over the past couple of years, but they remain the only producer capable of significantly increasing or reducing production at will. Initial tanker data from Europe suggests Riyadh may have started reigning in production that was running around 6% over OPEC quota. It’s also raised July benchmarks for Arab Light grades in Asia. But Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria will want restraint to come far faster and far deeper to firm prices. The line being spun from the ‘free lunch’ brigade is that storage should easily cover any Iranian spikes when EU sanctions come into full effect 1st July, while OPEC quotas should be pared down to 29.5mb/d (or less). Cheap words from petro-hawks, not least because they’ll all continue to cheat on quotas to squeeze out every last drop they have. Riyadh knows that of course; hawks want a price floor to be set at $100/b to sustain political regimes, but to do so entirely at Saudi expense. Russia is no different outside the cartel: free riding 101. Saudi Arabia (and its GCC partners) might be willing to play ball given ongoing concerns from the Arab Awakening, but with some budgetary tweaks and counter-cyclical cash to burn, they could all easily survive at $85/b making Iran et al sweat. Tehran might decide to rip up formal quotas as it did in June 2011, but that would be a costly mistake. If the Saudis let prices fall, political outages across smaller producer states could help to set a floor for them anyway. Iran would have no say in the matter. Given such ‘pricing perils’, Saudi Arabia holds all the aces to settle institutional issues, not to mention giving the global economy more breathing space (and Washington greater leeway over Iranian sanctions). But the real reason to let prices fall a little further isn’t just to make very clear to OPEC states where the ultimate volume and pricing power rests, but to fight Riyadh’s bigger battle over the next decade: Retaining 40% of OPEC market share in the midst of supposedly huge non-OPEC supply growth. It didn’t go unnoticed that despite Saudi production averaging 31 year highs and prices hitting $128/b in March 2012, the forward curve for 2018 was trading at $30/b discounts relative to spot. You’d think with the cartel maxed out and proximate demand side problems looking bleak, five year curves would be exactly the other way, in sharp contango (i.e. far above prompt prices) once the global economy and demand side fundamentals were fixed. The fact they weren’t is principally because the market thinks vast swathes of unconventional production will come online, not just in North America where production is back above 6mb/d, but in Canada, Brazil and even Arctic extremes. At $100/b that was a fair bet to place, but once benchmark prices drop back to two figures, the 6.4 trillion barrels of unconventional reserves sitting in the Americas look a far less certain prospect. Canadian tar distinctly sticky; Brazilian pre-salt horribly deep; Russian Arctic plays simply impossible. So when OPEC meets in Vienna expect Saudi Arabia to call the shots. The new Secretary General will either be a Saudi national, or a compromise candidate Riyadh can live with. Quotas will stay close to 30mb/d with minor reductions possible. Thinly veiled threats of sustained (or increased) production will be made if Iran doesn’t play ball. Yet the long term price point to watch isn’t just one that keeps OPEC in business and Riyadh in control, but where the al-Saud can maintain secular market share. Letting prices informally slide to $85-90/b might be the kind of warning shot Riyadh wants to send to scrub unconventional plays off global balance sheets. Its OPEC colleagues will see that as sailing far too close to the political wind, but a Saudi bloodbath now, might be just the medicine OPEC requires to sustain its long term health, not unless the cartel is absolutely determined to keep pricing itself out of existence.

#### Oil prices are key to Russian military modernization

BENNETT ‘12 – MA from the University of Chicago; Emory University School of Law (John T. “Oil Prices Fueling Russia's Disruption of U.S. Foreign Policy”. April 04, 2012. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/04/03/oil-prices-fueling-russias-disruption-of-us-foreign-policy)

Russia's return to the fore as a check against America's global whims has escalated in recent months, as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was elected as President, and is setting his agenda for a third term. U.S.-Russian relations returned to the front pages last week after Obama urged outgoing Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to "give me space" on several issues, including a European missile defense shield that Moscow opposes. Likely GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney soon after called Russia America's "top geopolitical enemy." "Putin still aspires for Russia to be a superpower," says Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. "There are only two ways for Russia to achieve that: nuclear weapons, and oil and natural gas sales." The price of a barrel of oil was nearly $105 at midday Tuesday, steadily climbing from a 52-week low of $76.35 per barrel in October. Oil prices began to rise in late 2010, peaking at $113 per barrel in May 2011, before dipping last summer and then rising again. Russia is the world's second-largest oil exporter at 5 million barrels a day, and its the ninth-leading natural gas exporter at 38.2 billion cubic meters a year, according to the CIA World Factbook. Russia rakes in nearly $500 billion annually in exports, with the CIA listing petroleum and natural gas as its top two commodities. Frances Burwell, vice president of the Atlantic Council, says Russia's oil revenues "give it a comfort zone" from which its leaders feel they have the global cache to make things tough for Washington. Burwell says she "places more weight" for Russia's recent global muscularity on "Putin's re-emergence." The Russian once-and-soon-again president "clearly sees playing the national card as the strong guy internationally benefits him," she says. But, make no mistake, bloated national coffers from high oil and gas prices underwrite Putin's muscle-flexing, experts say. Putin made a number of big domestic promises during the presidential race, including plans to usher in sweeping pension and wage hikes. He also put forth "a rather ambitious military modernization program," Pifer says. "If oil prices remain high, he might be able to do all of those things," Pifer says. "If prices come down, however, Putin will have some very tough decisions to make at home ... between guns versus butter." Should oil and gas prices tumble, experts say Putin would likely pick butter. "In 2007 when oil was doing well, Putin [as president] could have modernized the Russian military," says Pifer. Instead, Putin made a number of economic moves, such as the creation of a rainy day fund that was used during the recent global financial crisis," Pifer notes. What's more, Putin returns to power with his sharp eyes locked on his opposition, which is composed of the country's urban, middle-class populations. Experts agree that Putin would be hard-pressed to break his pension and wage promises in favor of a few more missiles. But even an economically weaker Russia would likely pick its spots to block Washington's desires.

#### Impact is Russian nuclear preemption—modernization key to lower nuclear reliance and Russian threat perception

RENZ AND THORNTON 12 – lectures on international security in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nottingham (Bettina., Rod. “Russian Military Modernization Cause, Course, and Consequences” Problems of Post-Communism Volume 59, Number 1 / January / February 2012. P 52-54)

The perceived weakness of this triad means that the Kremlin was pleased with the START agreement of March 2010. The treaty limits favor Moscow in that it does not have to cut any of its own nuclear warheads or delivery systems—the numbers of ICBMs and warheads in its own triad are actually below the negotiated caps. Only the United States has had to bring its numbers down.58 Normally, in the arranging of such international security treaties, negotiating from a position of military weakness—as Russia was—is not conducive to the ability to drive a hard bargain. Moscow has been lucky, however, in that Washington seems not to be too interested in the shape of Russia’s current and future nuclear arsenal. Rather, in terms of perceived security threats, Washington has its eye more on the terrorist ball than on the Russian one. Additionally, under START, Russia does not have to reduce the number of its tactical nuclear weapons. It has more of these than the United States. These are prized and important assets to Moscow, and they have become even more prized and important as Russia’s conventional military has become weaker. They are seen more and more as the fallback option if Russia one day faces some sort of defeat in a conventional conflict—against the likes of Georgia or China. In the largest Russian military exercise held since the end of the cold war—conducted recently in the Russian Far East—tactical nuclear weapons (i.e., mines) were notionally “exploded” as part of the exercise play.59 This fact alone seems to confirm that Russia’s conventional military weakness has led to a reduction in its nuclear-use threshold. Conclusion The current modernization in the Russian military is long overdue. Because it is long overdue, it has to be completed in a rushed, haphazard fashion and against a backdrop of a military–industrial complex unable to fulfill its role in the process. Traditionally, military modernization is not achieved lightly, given the bureaucratic inertia and cultural norms that are always present. When, as in the current situation in Russia, such barriers to change are aided and abetted by any number of additional problems (not to mention the rampant corruption that is endemic across all levels of Russian state institutions, including the military), then it must be expected that Russia’s armed forces will be striving for some time to become truly “modern.”60 In essence, what should have been accomplished as an evolution over many years, and should have begun during the Yeltsin era, is now being attempted as a revolution in the post–Georgian war era. As with any revolutionary change, a good deal of disruption and disaffection has been created. Moreover, the current Russian military is a weakened military. The psychology of the tsarist/Soviet/Russian military has always been that numbers counted, that mass would prevail. Numbers inspired confidence, and numbers could deter. But the current Russian military is losing numbers while not making up for them by creating smaller, more professional forces equipped with the requisite technologies. Quality is not replacing quantity. The military is in a state of flux. Russian politicians and military figures both now lack a genuine confidence in the armed forces’ ability to deter. This can have two consequences. Either Russia takes large steps to avoid the possibility of military confrontation by stressing diplomatic solutions to possible threat scenarios (as the tsarist government did in 1914), or it goes the opposite way, fearing that if any state is threatening military action against Russia then the hair trigger comes into operation (Israeli-style). That is, the mentality of the first, preemptive strike becomes paramount—taking advantage of surprise—and using what assets Russia now has. The alternative is to take the risk of waiting to be attacked and maybe “losing.” What is clear is that, with its armed forces currently weakened by the process of change, the sense of vulnerability generated has led Russia, in classic confirmation of the security dilemma concept, to magnify the threats it faces, or thinks it faces. Conscious of its vulnerability to threats, real or imagined, Moscow may begin to look more and more toward the inflexible tool of its tactical nuclear weapons as its principal defense mechanism. While no one really supposes that such weapons will be used in any confrontation with the West, the same cannot be said of any possible conflict with the Chinese. Ironically, Beijing’s military still relies on mass. The best modern military counter to mass is to employ either PGMs or tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian military has hardly any of the former but plenty of the latter. Hair triggers and tactical nuclear weapons are not comfortable bedfellows.

### Energy K

#### Nuclear power centralizes energy – becomes a counter-weight to democratic forces and an instrument of political control

**Montague 7 (**Peter, executive director of Environmental Research Foundation, Ph.D in History and Specializes in Environmental Justice History and Research “Why is Uncle Sam so committed to reviving nuclear power?”, http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/9/30/81452/0397, )

 So why is Uncle Sam hell-bent on reviving nuclear power? I don't have a firm answer and can only speculate. Perhaps from the viewpoint of both Washington and Wall Street, nuclear power is preferable to renewable-energy alternatives because it isextremely capital-intensive and the people who provide the capital get to control the machine and the energy **it provides. It provide a rationale for a** large centralized bureaucracy and tight military and police security **to thwart terrorists**. This kind of **central control can act as a powerful counterweight to excessive democratic tendencies** in any country that buys into nuclear power. **Particularly if they sign a contract with the U.S. or one of its close allies for delivery of fuel and removal of radioactive wastes, political control becomes a powerful** (though unstated) **part of the bargain**. If you are dependent on nuclear power for electricity and you are dependent on us for reactor fuel, **you are in our pocket**. On the other hand, solar, wind and other renewable energy alternatives lend themselves to **small-scale, independent installations under the control of local communities or even households.** Who knows where that could lead?

#### Energy centralization makes extinction inevitable – exacerbates structural violence – Tech Optimism makes the aff epistemologically suspect

Byrne and Toley 6 (John – Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy – It’s a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy – John is also a Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware – 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Toley – Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs - Selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013 - expertise includes issues related to urban and environmental politics, global cities, and public policy, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse,” p. 1-32)

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss, the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dila that also accompanies this system’s operations: invented over a century ago, electric light **remains an experience only for the** socially privileged. Two billion human beings—almost one-third of the planet’s population—experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact—and sometimes exacerbated—social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smil, 2003: 370 - 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war. 3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction**,** modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector’s performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of “energy futures” that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices. 4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power 12 Transforming Power who, early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg, 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, cited in the New York Times 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the “magical fire” or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize “inherently safe reactors” (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in “sustainable energy alternatives” that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, “green” energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy “haves” and “havenots.” 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291), “today’s nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people” as “micropower meets village power.” Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a “solar global economy... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world’s cultural diversity” (Scheer, 2002: 34). 6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its **historical consistency** with a **nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment** extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now **powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet’s climate** is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime’s operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. 02Chapter1.pmd 2 1/6/2006, 2:56 PMEnergy as a Social Project 3 By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a **lifeharming dead end** (1961: 263, 248): ...**an orgy of uncontrolled production and** equally uncontrolled **reproduction**: machine fodder and cannon fodder: **surplus values and surplus populations**... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity—here are the enemies. The living organism demands a life-sustaining environment. Modernity’s formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity’s supporters would seek to **derail present-tense evaluations** of the era’s social and ecological performance with **forecasts of a bountiful future in which**, finally, the **perennial social conflicts** over resources **would end**. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the “democratic- authoritarian bargain” (1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce “**every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority”** on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values.

#### Vote neg - methodological investigation is a prior question to the aff – strict policy focus creates a myth of objectivity that sustains a violent business-as-usual approach

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

The way in which **energy policy is “framed**” refers to the **underlying assumptions policy is based on** and the ways in which **policy debates ‘construct’, emphasise and link particular issues**. For example energy ‘security of supply’ is often emphasised in arguments favouring nuclear-generated electricity. A more limited framing effect operates on individuals in opinion polls and public referendums: here the way in which questions are posed has a strong influence on responses. The bigger, **social framing** effect referred to here **colours societies’ thinking** about whole areas of public life, in this case energy use and its environmental impacts. A key element of the proposed reframing advanced by commentators concerned with decarbonising energy use (see, for example, [Scrase and MacKerron, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib25)) is to cease treating energy as just commercial units of fuel and electricity, and instead to focus on the energy ‘services’ people need (warmth, lighting, mobility and so on). This paper helps to explain why any such reframing, however logical and appealing, is politically very challenging if it goes against the perceived interests of powerful groups, particularly when these interests are aligned with certain imperatives which governments must fulfil if they are to avoid electoral defeat. There is a **dominant conception** of **policy-making as an objective, linear process**. In essence the process is portrayed as proceeding in a series of steps from facts to analysis, and then to solutions (for a detailed critique of this linear view see [Fischer, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib11)). In reality, policy-making is usually messy and political, rife with the exercise of **interests and power**. **The veneer of objective, rational policy-making**, that the dominant, linear model of policy-making supports is therefore cause for concern. It effectively sustains energy policy ‘business as usual’ and excludes many relevant voices that might be effective in opening up space to reframe energy policy problems and move towards more sustainable solutions (see, for example, [Ockwell, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib21)). This echoes concerns with **what counts as knowledge** and whose voices are heard in policy debates that have characterised strands of several literatures in recent decades, including science and technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, and various strands of the political science and development literatures, particularly in the context of knowledge, discourse and democracy. An alternative to the linear model is provided by a ‘discourse’ perspective. This draws on political scientists’ observations of ways in which politics and policy-making proceed through the use of language, and the expression of values and the assumptions therein. Discourse can be understood as: ‘… a **shared way of apprehending the world**. **Embedded in language** it enables subscribers to **interpret bits of information** and put them together into **coherent stories** or accounts. Each discourse **rests on assumptions**, judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements…’ [Dryzek (1997, p.8)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib5). A discursive approach rejects the widely held assumption that policy language is a **neutral medium** through which ideas and an objective world are represented and discussed ([Darcy, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib4)). Discourse analysts examine and explain language use in a way that helps to **reveal the underlying interests, value judgements and beliefs** that are often **disguised by policy actors’** factual claims and the arguments that these are used to support. For example UK energy policy review documents issued in 2006–2007 are criticised below for presenting information in ways that subtly but consistently favoured new nuclear power while purporting to be undecided on the issue. People (including scientific and policy experts) **base their understanding of problems and solutions on their knowledge, experiences, interpretations and value judgements**. These are **coloured and shaped** by social interactions, for example by what is considered an ‘appropriate’ perspective in one's work life within certain institutions. Policy actors therefore expend considerable effort on influencing the design and evolution of institutions in order to ensure problems and solutions are framed in ways they favour. Thus discourse is fundamental to the way that institutions are created, but in the short-term institutions also have a constraining or structuring effect. At a more fundamental level there are even more rigid constraints, which can be identified as a set of core imperatives, such as sustained economic growth and national security, which states and their governments, with very few exceptions, must fulfil in order to ensure their survival ([Dryzek et al., 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib6)—these are explored in detail further below).

### Microgrids

#### Text: The Department of Defense should

#### -Add a stipulation to the regulations of the Environmental Conservation Investment Program requiring microgrids receive special consideration for funding

#### -Expand the expected lifespan of microgrids from 10 to 20 years

#### -Allow base commanders to enter into alternative financing agreements for microgrids

#### -Budget a substantial increase in dedicated fuel accounts for the military

#### The counterplan procures microgrids at no cost

Sater 11 (Daniel, Research Fellow at Global Green USA's Security and Sustainability Office, "Military Energy Security: Current Efforts and Future Solutions," Global Green, globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf)

Option 2: Make changes to DOD regulations including project rules for the ECIP A no-cost solution for the DOD to increase the number of microgrid projects would be to change the regulations of the Environmental Conservation Investment Program (ECIP). The DOD could add a stipulation to the program’s rules that microgrids should receive special consideration for funding, similar to the regulation that gives additional consideration to renewable energy projects. Another possible change would be to increase the expected lifespan of microgrids from 10 to 20 years. By increasing the expected lifespan, the savings-to-investment ratio would increase, thereby making these projects more appealing. Most project categories in the ECIP already have an expected lifespan of 15 or 20 years. EMCS projects are currently the lowest at 10 years. Finally, the DOD could allow base commanders to enter into special contracts with microgrid developers to build the grid at no upfront cost and pay the developer over time with the money saved from increased efficiency. The GAO labels these contracts as alternative financing agreements, and they already exist for the development of renewable energy projects. 76 Avoiding upfront costs circumvents the appropriations process and could allow installations to deploy microgrids more rapidly.

#### The counterplan performs the same exact functions as Smart Grids without requiring Congressional appropriations

Sater 11 (Daniel, Research Fellow at Global Green USA's Security and Sustainability Office, "Military Energy Security: Current Efforts and Future Solutions," Global Green, globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf)

A Microgrid is a small localized version of the Smart Grid. It increases energy efficiency by regulating demand and allows for better incorporation of renewable energy sources. During a power outage, a microgrid will disconnect itself from the civilian power grid and turn on an installation’s generators to ensure electricity availability to a base’s critical loads. By prioritizing loads during an emergency, a microgrid will drastically decrease the need for fuel resupplies during a civilian power grid failure. Microgrids also have the potential for deployment in war zones where power supplies are even less secure.Despite the benefits of microgrids, the DOD, as well as legislation and executive orders, has focused on less efficient energy alternatives. The Environmental Conservation Investment Program, one of the principle funding mechanisms to fund conservation efforts in the DOD, rarely invests in microgrids and focuses too much on less cost efficient projects. Further, the DOD’s Net Zero Energy Installation Initiative does little to increase energy assurance at military installations. By focusing too much on renewable energy generation, legislation and executive orders have decreased the available funds for microgrids, which if installed before a renewable energy project, can increase its viability. The Defense Science Board (DSB) has published two reports urging the DOD to decrease its energy costs and better secure its energy supply to bases. However, the development of microgrids, despite their cost effectiveness and impact on energy assurance, remains slow and infrequent. To increase national security and decrease the department’s energy expenditures, the DOD should enact changes to its investment programs to give more consideration to microgrids and pursue special appropriations from Congress for the widespread deployment of microgrids. The benefit of this two-pronged approach is that it allows the DOD to follow a short-term zero cost solution while it waits for the necessary appropriation from Congress to solve the Defense Department’s energy problems.

### CIR

#### Immigration reform will pass – Obama is pushing, GOP on board, top of the agenda.

CSM 12-28. [Christian Science Monitor "Immigration reform likely to be at the top of Congress’ agenda in 2013" -- www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/12/28/immigration-reform-likely-to-be-at-the-top-of-congress-agenda-in-2013/]

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely.¶ The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal.¶ The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high.¶ The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform.¶ Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.¶ "It has to be in 2013," says Rep. Raúl Labrador (R) of Idaho, an immigration lawyer who thundered into Congress in the tea party wave of 2010. "If we wait until 2014, it's going to be election time. And you know how efficient we are here during election time."¶ Recent weeks have seen a flurry of activity on Capitol Hill. In the Senate, a "Gang of Eight" – led by longtime immigration reformers Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York and Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina – has added freshman Sens. Michael Bennett (D) of Colorado and Mike Lee (R) of Utah, while potential 2016 presidential aspirant Sen. Marco Rubio (R) of Florida leads his own initiative.¶ Members of the House have seen movement, too. "One thing clearly has changed," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) of Illinois, the lawmaker who co-wrote a 2005 comprehensive immigration reform measure with now Sen.-elect Jeff Flake (R) of Arizona. "Nobody is talking about self-deportation. Nobody is talking about how [Arizona's controversial immigration law] should be the standard applied across the land. Nobody is talking about vetoing the DREAM Act," which offers a path to citizenship for some young undocumented immigrants.¶ "We are having wonderful conversations," Representative Gutierrez says.¶ That more moderate tone from the GOP is what the November election has wrought.¶ In a postelection analysis and poll of Latino voters, Republican polling group Resurgent Republic offered a searing critique of the GOP's political strategy of pumping up turnout among white voters, often by championing hard-line policies on immigration issues that turn off key Asian and Hispanic voters.¶ "Republicans have run out of persuadable white voters," wrote conservative pollster Whit Ayres and Jennifer Korn, the head of the right-leaning Hispanic Leadership Network, in a recent research memo. "Trying to win a national election by gaining a larger and larger share of a smaller and smaller portion of the electorate is a losing political proposition."¶ Between 2008 and 2012, white voters shrank two percentage points to 72 percent of the electorate, while Asian and Latino voters expanded a percentage point each to 3 percent and 10 percent, respectively.¶ While GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney won 60 percent of white voters, 71 percent of Latinos and 73 percent of Asian-Americans backed Mr. Obama – up four percentage points and 11 percentage points from 2008, respectively.¶ And those numbers of minority voters are only going to grow. For the next two decades, 50,000 Latino voters will turn 18 every month, adding an additional New Hampshire of voters to the US each year into the 2030s.¶ While Resurgent Republic's poll showed that Hispanics aren't singularly focused on immigration issues, Republican politicians who favor immigration reform see the issue as primary: The GOP's message of conservative family values, entrepreneurship, and individual freedom won't reach Latino voters unless the immigration question is solved.¶ "This is like a wall that stops the other issues from getting through," says Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R) of Florida, a longtime immigration reform advocate. "And while that wall is there, the Republican Party has a serious problem."¶ House Speaker John Boehner (R) of Ohio signaled a shift when he told ABC News a day after the election that "a comprehensive approach [to immigration] is long overdue, and I'm confident that the president, myself, others, can find the common ground to take care of this issue once and for all."¶ That's a departure from previous immigration-reform attempts, in which the GOP brass wasn't on board.¶ Perhaps just as important, though, is that several leading lawmakers with near-pristine conservative credentials are also involved.¶ Two tea party superstars – Senators Rubio and Lee, both of whom knocked out establishment Republican figures to win their seats – are going to be key players in any reform.¶ In the House, the involvement of House Judiciary chairman Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R) of Virginia and Representative Labrador of Idaho can provide cover to conservative lawmakers from the party's right flank.¶ "The fact that you're going to have strong conservative voices helping lead this debate is going to be critical to solving it instead of using it as a political wedge," says Rep. Steve Scalise (R) of Louisiana, incoming chairman of the Republican Study Committee, the largest and most conservative caucus in the House.¶ It's notable that both Labrador and Rubio believe in, one way or another, a path to citizenship for some illegal immigrants, even while they leave open just who can get on that path.¶ Some conservatives say any form of citizenship given to illegal immigrants – no matter the conditions attached to it – constitutes an "amnesty," which is a guarantee only of more illegal immigration unless the nation's borders are firmly secured and stringent workplace verification systems are put in place.¶ But a recent poll by George Washington University and Politico found 62 percent of Americans support a proposal that would allow illegal immigrants to earn citizenship over a period of several years, with 40 percent strongly supporting such a measure. Only 35 percent opposed it.¶ Some Democrats on the Hill are extending a friendly hand to the GOP. When the Congressional Hispanic Caucus – which is entirely Democratic – offered its vision for immigration reform, for example, it served up principles rather than a specific bill, a move received by Republicans as attempting to maximize common ground.¶ But Democrats also know they are in a position of power.¶ "You've got a realization on the part of GOP leadership not just in the House but in the Republican Party writ large that if they don't do something about it, they aren't going to win the presidency again," says Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D) of California, a leading immigration reform advocate.¶ For that reason, she says, Republicans "aren't going to get the credit" for pushing immigration through, but they "can still get the blame if they block" it.¶ Latino advocacy groups and labor unions, emboldened by the community's growing electoral power, vow to take the fight to those who stand in immigration reform's way in 2013.¶ "This comprehensive immigration reform for the Latino community is personal. The fact that we've come out in record numbers in 2012 was personal. And that's a calculation that members of Congress don't understand," says Maria Teresa Kumar, executive director of Voto Latino. "If they are not with us, 2014 may not look pretty with them."¶ The president, too, has political pressure to pursue immigration reform. He has already come up short once on immigration-reform promises: In 2009, he said that a comprehensive immigration solution would be a top priority.¶ Yet his first term also saw record numbers of undocumented immigrants deported. Only this summer, after he directed immigration officials to defer deportation of some young illegal immigrants, was he seen as making good on promises to the Latino community.¶ "The president says that his biggest failure in the first term was not moving forward with immigration reform," says Hector Sanchez, executive director of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement. "The Latino community decided to give him a second chance."¶ Obama has publicly vowed to make immigration reform an immediate priority in his second term, which could begin just on the other side of the "fiscal cliff" negotiations.¶ "He's the one who has the mandate on this subject; he's the guy who got the voters who care most intensely about this," says Bruce Morrison, a former Democratic congressman from Connecticut who was involved in immigration reform efforts in the 1980s and early '90s.

#### SMRs unpopular – opposition due to fear of waste, contamination and terror targets.

Smith ’10 (Rebecca, Contributor, “Small Reactors Generate Big Hopes”, The Wall Street Journal, 2-18-10,

<http://www.generatorsystems.com/pdf/Small%20Reactors%20Generate%20Big%20Hopes%20WSJ%2002-18-2010.pdf>, accessed 8-1-12)

"We see significant benefits from the new, modular technology," said Donald Moul, vice president of nuclear support for First Energy, an Ohio-based utility company. He said First Energy, which operates four reactors at three sites in Ohio and Pennsylvania, has made no decision to build any new reactor and noted there's "a lot of heavy lifting to do to get this reactor certified" by the NRC for U.S. use. Indeed, the smaller reactors still could incite major opposition. They face the same unresolved issues of where to put the waste and public fear of contamination, in the event of an accident. They could also raise alarms about creating possible terrorism targets in populated areas. Still, the sudden interest in small reactors illustrates a growing unease with the route that nuclear power has taken for half a century. What many regard as the first commercial reactor built in the U.S., in 1957 at Shippingport, Pa., was only about 60 megawatts in size. By the time construction petered out three decades later, reactors had grown progressively bigger, ending up at about 1,000 megawatts of capacity.

#### Capital is critical to get a deal

Shifter 12/27/12 (Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?”)

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear. There is also a chance that something unexpected could happen that would put off consideration of immigration reform. Following the horrific massacre at a Connecticut elementary school on December 14, for example, public pressure understandably mounted for gun control, at least the ban of assault weapons. But a decision to pursue that measure -- though desperately needed -- would take away energy and time from other priorities like immigration.

#### Comprehensive reform is key to food security

**ACIR ‘7** (December 4, 2007 THE AGRICULTURE COALITION FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM

Dear Member of Congress: The Agriculture Coalition for Immigration Reform (ACIR) is deeply concerned with pending immigration enforcement legislation known as the ‘Secure America Through Verification and Enforcement Act of 2007' or ‘SAVE Act’ (H.R.4088 and S.2368). While these bills seek to address the worthy goal of stricter immigration law enforcement, they fail to take a comprehensive approach to solving the immigration problem. History shows that a one dimensional approach to the nation’s immigration problem is doomed to fail. Enforcement alone, without providing a viable means to obtain a legal workforce to sustain economic growth is a formula for disaster. Agriculture best illustrates this point. Agricultural industries that need considerable labor in order to function include the fruit and vegetable, dairy and livestock, nursery, greenhouse, and Christmas tree sectors. Localized labor shortages have resulted in actual crop loss in various parts of the country. More broadly, producers are making decisions to scale back production, limit expansion, and leave many critical tasks unfulfilled. Continued labor shortages could force more producers to shift production out of the U.S., thus stressing already taxed food and import safety systems. Farm lenders are becoming increasingly concerned about the stability of affected industries. This problem is aggravated by the nearly universal acknowledgement that the current H-2A agricultural guest worker program does not work. Based on government statistics and other evidence, roughly 80 percent of the farm labor force in the United States is foreign born, and a significant majority of that labor force is believed to be improperly authorized. The bills’ imposition of mandatory electronic employment eligibility verification will screen out the farm labor force without providing access to legal workers. Careful study of farm labor force demographics and trends indicates that there is not a replacement domestic workforce available to fill these jobs. This feature alone will result in chaos unless combined with labor-stabilizing reforms. Continued failure by Congress to act to address this situation in a comprehensive fashion is placing in jeopardy U.S. food security and global competitiveness. Furthermore, congressional inaction threatens the livelihoods of millions of Americans whose jobs exist because laborintensive agricultural production is occurring in America. If production is forced to move, most of the upstream and downstream jobs will disappear as well. The Coalition cannot defend of the broken status quo. We support well-managed borders and a rational legal system. We have worked for years to develop popular bipartisan legislation that would stabilize the existing experienced farm workforce and provide an orderly transition to wider reliance on a legal agricultural worker program that provides a fair balance of employer and employee rights and protections. We respectfully urge you to oppose S.2368, H.R.4088, or any other bills that would impose employment-based immigration enforcement in isolation from equally important reforms that would provide for a stable and legal farm labor force.

#### Food insecurity sparks World War 3

**Calvin ’98** (William, Theoretical Neurophysiologist – U Washington, Atlantic Monthly, January, Vol 281, No. 1, p. 47-64)

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands -- if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem -- and could lead to a Third World War -- but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

### Solvency

#### Solvency takes decades

Dylan Ryan 11, Masters in Mechanical Engineering, expertise in energy, sustainability, Computer Aided Engineering, renewables technology; Ph.D. in solar energy systems, 2011, “Part 10 – Small modular reactors and mass production options,” <http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-10-smallreactors-mass-prod/>

So there are a host of practical factors in favour smaller reactors. But what’s the down side? Firstly, economies of scale. With a small reactor, we have all the excess baggage that comes with each power station, all the fixed costs and a much smaller pay-off. As I noted earlier, even thought many smaller reactors are a lot safer than large LWR’s (even a small LWR is somewhat safer!) you would still need to put them under a containment dome. It’s this process of concrete pouring that is often a bottle neck in nuclear reactor construction. We could get around the problem by clustering reactors together, i.e putting 2 or 4 reactors not only on the same site but under the same containment dome. The one downside here is that if one reactor has a problem, it will likely spread to its neighbours. How much of a showstopper this fact is depends on which type of reactors we are discussing. Also, in the shorter term small reactors would be **slower to build**, especially many of those we’ve been discussing, given that they are often made out of non-standard materials. **Only a few facilities in the world** could build them as the **entire nuclear manufacturing industry** is currently geared towards large LWR’s. Turning that juggernaut around would take decades. So by opting for small reactors while we’d get safer more flexible reactors, we be paying for it, as these reactors would be slower to build (initially anyway) and probably more expensive too.

#### Military SMRs fail – not cost-competitive with big reactors

Matthew Baker 12, Adjunct Junior Fellow at the American Security Project, 1/22/12, “Do Small Modular Reactors Present a Serious Option for the Military’s Energy Needs?,” http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/do-small-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/

Unfortunately all the hype surrounding SMRs seems to have made the proponents of SMR technology oblivious to some of its huge flaws. Firstly like large reactors, one of the biggest qualms that the public has to nuclear is problems associated with nuclear waste. A more decentralized production of nuclear waste inevitably resulting from an increase in SMRs production was not even discussed. The danger of transporting gas into some military bases in the Middle East is already extremely volatile; dangers of an attack on the transit of nuclear waste would be devastating. Secondly, SMRs pose many of the same problems that regular nuclear facilities face, **sometimes to a larger degree**. Because SMRs are smaller than conventional reactors and can be installed underground, they can be **more difficult to access** should an emergency occur. There are also reports that because the upfront costs of nuclear reactors **go up as surface area per kilowatt of capacity decreases**, SMRs will in fact be more expensive than conventional reactors.

#### The NRC is not distributing SMR licenses – zero solvency

Tucker 11 (William, energy writer for the American Spectator, "America’s Last Nuclear Hope," March 2011, http://0101.nccdn.net/1\_5/28c/010/2c9/America-s-Last-Nuclear-Hope-Tucker-TAS.pdf-http://0101.nccdn.net/1\_5/28c/010/2c9/America-s-Last-Nuclear-Hope-Tucker-TAS.pdf)

So why isn't there more coordination between the civilian and military efforts? In fact there is some. The first commercial reactor built at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, in 1957 was actually a submarine reactor "beached" by Admiral Rickover's Navy. Since then hundreds of nuclear technicians trained in the Navy have gone on to find jobs in the nuclear industry. One reason most new reactors are now being planned in the South is the large presence of Navy veterans. But beyond that, the Navy's long experience with nuclear does not seem to build anyone's confidence that the technology can be handled in the civilian field. Instead, the great impediment to all this is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the gargantuan Washington bureaucracy that regularly wins awards as the "best place to work in the federal government" yet seems unable to deliver on its main purpose, which is to issue licenses for nuclear reactors. The NRC last issued a license for a nuclear reactor in 1976. No one knows if it will ever issue one again. One utility, Southern Electric, has received permission to begin site clearance at the Vogtle plants 3 and 4 in Georgia. But the Vogtle plants will be Westinghouse AP1000s, a model for which the NRC has not yet issued design approval, let alone permission to build particular projects. Four AP1000s are already well under construction in China, with the first scheduled to begin operation in 2013. Yet here the NRC is still trying to figure out how to protect the reactor from airplanes. Even though the containment structure is strong enough to withstand a direct hit from a commercial jet, the NRC asked Westinghouse to put up a concrete shield to protect adjacent buildings. Then after Westinghouse had completed the revision, the NRC decided the shield might fall down in an earthquake. Further revisions are still pending. When Hyperion first approached the NRC about design approval for its small modular reactor in 2006, the NRC essentially told it to go away -- it didn't have time for such small potatoes. Since then the NRC has relented and sat down for discussions with Hyperion last fall. Whether the approval process can be accelerated is still up for grabs, but at least there has been a response from the bureaucracy. OR COURSE, the NRC is only responding to the lamentations and lawsuits from environmentalists and nuclear opponents who have never reconciled themselves to the technology, even though nuclear's carbon-free electricity is the only reliable source of power that promises to reduce carbon emissions. If a new reactor project does ever make it out of the NRC, it will be contested in court for years, with environmental groups challenging the dotting of every i and crossing of every t in the decision-making. It will be a miracle if any proposal ever makes it through the process.

#### Waste Management Act makes giving out licenses illegal

Smith and Tracy ’12 (Rebecca Smith and Ryan Tracy, “U.S. Regulator Halts Nuclear-Plant Licensing”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443517104577575561397701568.html>, August 7, 2012)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said it would stop issuing licenses for nuclear plants until it addresses problems with its nuclear-waste policy that were raised by a recent federal appeals court decision. The move, while not expected to affect any nuclear plants right away, shows how the standstill in finding a permanent American nuclear waste dump could undermine the expansion of nuclear power, which is already facing a challenge from cheaper natural gas. License Freeze U.S. reactors with pending license renewal applications In June, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said the NRC's approach to managing nuclear waste was inconsistent with federal environmental standards. Until the ruling, the NRC had relied on what is known as the Waste Confidence Decision when issuing new licenses for proposed plants and extending the licenses of existing plants. Under that doctrine, the NRC said it could issue licenses because it had confidence that the U.S. eventually would create a permanent repository. But the Obama administration's elimination of funding for a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada made that assertion less believable. The appeals court struck down the NRC's finding that there was "reasonable assurance" a permanent waste site would be created "when needed." It also rejected the NRC's finding that spent fuel could likely be stored safely for as long as 60 years beyond a plant's licensed life, either in pools or giant casks. Even if the NRC thinks pool leaks have been harmless so far, the court said, the NRC must still assess the probability and consequence of bigger leaks and other accidents. The NRC's move on Tuesday could delay licensing decisions for a year or more, depending on how long it takes the agency to fix the problems identified by the court. No such decisions were expected this year. Even a multiyear delay would not cause existing reactors to shut down. They can continue to operate so long as they sought extensions at least five years before their licenses expired. Environmentalists responded positively to the NRC decision, the first major step by incoming Chairwoman Allison Macfarlane, who is a nuclear waste expert. Richard Webster of the Public Justice environmental group said the courts wouldn't allow the NRC to operate under the "illusion" that the existing system of waste storage is sufficient. Diane Curran, an environmental attorney who represented several citizens' groups on the issue, said the NRC has "a lot of homework" and "it is hard for me to see how [the agency's response] could be finished in a year." Ellen Ginsberg, general counsel for the Nuclear Energy Institute, a trade organization for nuclear operators, said the NRC's decision was unavoidable given the court's decision. She said the federal government "has not met its statutory obligation" to relieve utilities of nuclear waste. An NRC spokesman said that within weeks, the agency's staff would send the five-member commission a series of options for dealing with the court decision. Nuclear operators have said they are willing to beef up on-site storage of nuclear waste to ensure that the waste can be safe for longer periods. If the NRC chooses that route, they say they hope that the agency would apply standards to the industry as a whole. Also, if regulators impose additional requirements, Ms. Ginsberg said, "the federal government will be further obligated to reimburse utilities and their ratepayers for those additional costs." Environmentalists are worried about leaking spent fuel pools and the risk of fires if something happens that allows water to boil off or drain away. That fear became more acute in the aftermath of the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, which suffered explosions in the vicinity of spent fuel pools. One option for the U.S. is requiring operators to move spent fuel more quickly to dry storage casks.

#### DOD won’t pursue NRC exemptions – Solvency takes a decade at best

Marcus King et al 11, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, et al., March 2011, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

The most basic licensing issue relates to whether NRC will have jurisdiction over potential nuclear reactor sites or whether DoD could be self-regulating. Our conversations with NRC indicate it is the only possible licensing authority for reactors that supply power to the commercial grid. However, DOE and DoD are authorized to regulate mission critical nuclear facilities under Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act. There is some historical precedent for DoD exercising this authority. For example, the Army Nuclear Program was granted exception under this rule with regard to the reactor that operated aboard the Sturgis barge in the 1960s and 1970s [44]. It seems **unlikely** that DoD would **pursue exemption** under Section 91b in the future. 10 Regulating power plants is a function that lies **beyond DoD's core mission**. The Department and the military services are unlikely to have personnel with sufficient expertise to act as regulators for nuclear power plants, and it could take considerable time and resources to develop such expertise. **Without NRC oversight DoD would bear all associated risks.** The time required to obtain design certification, license, and build the next generation of nuclear plants is about 9 to 10 years. After the first plants are built it may be possible to reduce the time required for licensing and construction to approximately 6 years [45].

### Grid

#### Multipolarity inevitable. Engagement leads to violent war-filled transition

Layne 2006 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) “The Peace of Illusions” p 190

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

#### Heg unsustainable – domestic issues

Cohen 2012 (Michael, ow at the Century Foundation, February 21, "Rotting from the Inside Out", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting\_from\_the\_inside\_out?page=full)jn

There is, however, one serious problem with this analysis. Any discussion of American national security that focuses solely on the issue of U.S. power vis-à-vis other countries -- and ignores domestic inputs -- is decidedly incomplete. In Kagan's New Republic article, for example, he has little to say about the country's domestic challenges except to obliquely argue that to focus on "nation-building" at home while ignoring the importance of maintaining U.S. power abroad would be a mistake. In fact, in a recent FP debate with the Financial Times' Gideon Rachman on the issue of American decline, Kagan diagnoses what he, and many other political analysts, appear to believe is the country's most serious problem: "enormous fiscal deficits driven by entitlements." Why is this bad? It makes it harder, says Kagan, for the United States to "continue playing its vital role in the world" and will lead to significant cutbacks in defense spending. However, a focus on U.S. global dominance or suasion that doesn't factor in those elements that constitute American power at home ignores substantial and worsening signs of decline. Indeed, by virtually any measure, a closer look at the state of the United States today tells a sobering tale of rapid and unchecked decay and deterioration in a host of areas. While not all of them are generally considered elements of national security, perhaps they should be. Let's start with education, which almost any observer would agree is a key factor in national competitiveness. The data is not good. According to the most recent OECD report on global education standards, the United States is an average country in how it educates its children -- 12th in reading skills, 17th in science, and 26th in math. The World Economic Forum ranks the United States 48th in the quality of its mathematics and science education, even though we spend more money per student than almost any country in the world. America's high school graduation rate is lower today that it was in the late 1960s and "kids are now less likely to graduate from high school than their parents," according to an analysis released last year by the Editorial Projects in Education Research Center. In fact, not only is the graduation rate worse than many Western countries, the United States is now the only developed country where a higher percentage of 55 to 64-year-olds have a high school diploma than 25 to 34-year-olds. While the United States still maintains the world's finest university system, college graduation rates are slipping. Among 25 to 34-year-olds, America trails Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in its percentage of college graduates. This speaks, in some measure, to the disparities that are endemic in the U.S. education system. If you are poor in America, chances are you attend a school that underperforms, are taught by teachers that are not as effective, and have test scores that lag far behind your more affluent counterparts (the same is true if you are black or Hispanic -- you lag behind your white counterparts). Can a country be a great global power if its education system is fundamentally unequal and is getting steadily worse? What about national infrastructure -- another key element of national economic power and global competitiveness? First, the nation's broadband penetration rates remain in the middle of the global pack and there is growing divide in the United States between digital haves and have nots. Overall, its transportation networks are mediocre compared to similarly wealthy countries and according to the World Economic Forum, the United States ranks 23rd in the OECD for infrastructure quality -- a ranking that has steadily declined over the past decade. American commuters spend more time in traffic than Western Europeans, the country's train system and high-speed rail lines in general pale next to that of other developed nations, and even the number of people killed on American highways is 60 percent higher than the OECD average. Part of the problem is that the amount of money the U.S. government spends on infrastructure has steadily declined for decades and now trails far behind other Western nations. In time, such infrastructure disadvantages have the potential to undermine the U.S. economy, hamstring productivity and competitiveness, and put the lives of more Americans at risk -- and this appears to be happening already. Finally, a closer look at the U.S. health care system is enough to make one ill. Even after the passage of Obama's 2010 health care reform bill (which every Republican presidential candidate wants to repeal) the United States is far from having a health care system that meets the needs of its citizens. According to a July 2011 report by the Commonwealth Fund, "the U.S. has fewer hospital beds and physicians, and sees fewer hospital and physician visits, than in most other countries" even though it spends far more on health care per capita than any other country in the world. In addition, "prescription drug utilization, prices, and spending all appear to be highest in the U.S., as does the supply, utilization, and price of diagnostic imaging." Long story short, the United States spends more for less on health care than pretty much any other developed nation in the world. That might also explain why life expectancy in America trails far behind most OECD countries. The United States also has the unique distinction of having one of the highest rates of income inequality in the world, on par with such global powerhouses as Cameroon, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ecuador. It has the fourth worst child poverty rate and trails only Mexico and Turkey in overall poverty rate among OECD countries. And when it comes to infant mortality, the U.S. rate is one of the worst in the developing world. But not to fear, the United States still maintains some advantages. For example, it is one of the fattest countries in the world, with approximately one-third of the country considered obese (including one out of every six children). In addition, the United States has, by far, the largest prison population -- more than China, Iran, and Cuba -- one of the highest homicide rates in the world, and one of the highest rates of death from child abuse and neglect. This steady stream of woe is certainly dispiriting, but the more optimistic might be inclined to respond that America had has problems before and has always found a way to right the ship. Certainly, this is a legitimate counter-point. The problem is that anyone looking to Washington today would have a hard time imagining that Congress and the White House will lock arms anytime soon and fix these various national crises. And this political gridlock is the biggest reason to be concerned about decline. Perhaps at no point in recent American history has the country's politics been less capable of dealing with serious challenges. Certainly, when one party basically rejects any role for the federal government in providing health care, improving educational opportunity, or strengthening the social safety net, the chances for compromise appear even slimmer. As Harold Pollack, a professor at the University of Chicago, said to me, "What future president, witnessing Barack Obama's difficulties over health reform, will make an equivalent political investment regarding climate change or another great national concern? I fear that we are headed for a kind of legislative Vietnam syndrome in which our leaders will shy away from the large things that must be done."

**Eminent credibility – eminent military power makes our threats non-credible – a world of parity is the only way to access credible military power**

**Monteiro 10** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. His research and teach­ing focuses on international relations theory and security studies. He is currently writing a book on the causes of conflict in a unipolar world. Professor Monteiro received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009 [http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105216monteiro.pdf, Spring Summer 2010, “Why U.S. Does Not Deter Challenges”]

Well into the Obama presidency, the broadest foreign policy challenge facing the United States remains unmentioned. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

#### Heg cause prolif – multipolarity will solve it

Weber et al 07 Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley (Steven with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,)

Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power. SHARING GLOBALIZATION'S BURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn't matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn't seek nuclear weapons. It didn't need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea's founder, Kim II Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim's son rules the country with an iron fist. America's conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein's great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state 'with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden.

#### Proliferation leads to nuclear war

Utgoff 02, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses., Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102 “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

#### Heg causes terror – 9/11 proves

Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University, 2006, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 190-191)

The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would be if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoff­man says, is “about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change.”56 If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives.87 As Clausewitz observed, “War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.”88 September 11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s geopolitical—and cultural—hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.89 U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic funda­mentalism, which is a form of “blowback” against America’s preponderance and its world role.

#### Extinction

Gordon 2002 [Harvey Gordon, Visiting Lecturer, Forensic Psychiatry, Tel Aviv University, Psychiatric Bulletin, v. 26, 2k2, p. 285-287, online: http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/26/8/285.]

Although terrorism throughout human history has been tragic, until relatively recently it has been more of an irritant than any major hazard. However, the existence of weapons of mass destruction now renders terrorism a potential threat to the very existence of human life (Hoge & Rose, 2001). Such potential global destruction, or globicide as one might call it, supersedes even that of genocide in its lethality. Although religious factors are not the only determinant of ‘suicide’ bombers, the revival of religious fundamentalism towards the end of the 20th century renders the phenomenon a major global threat. Even though religion can be a force for good, it can equally be abused as a force for evil. Ultimately, the parallel traits in human nature of good and evil may perhaps be the most durable of all the characteristics of the human species. There is no need to apply a psychiatric analysis to the ‘suicide’ bomber because the phenomenon can be explained in political terms. Most participants in terrorism are not usually mentally disordered and their behaviour can be construed more in terms of group dynamics (Colvard, 2002). On the other hand, perhaps psychiatric terminology is as yet deficient in not having the depth to encompass the emotions and behaviour of groups of people whose levels of hate, low self-esteem, humiliation and alienation are such that it is felt that they can be remedied by the mass destruction of life, including their own.

#### Regional threats ensure balancing behavior – even if the U.S. does not scare states into military buildup, its security guarantee can never be strong enough to dissuade it in all instances.

Layne 2006 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) “The Peace of Illusions” p 151

Up until now, other states have foregone overt counterbalancing because they benefit from American hegemony. However, Washington's ability to provide other major states with collective goods—in both the security and economic spheres—is a wasting asset. Although other states have relied on U.S. security guarantees to protect them against regional rivals and instability, the credibility of America's extended deterrence commitments is increasingly problematic. As other major states experience growing doubts about whether they can count on the United States to protect them, they will move—and, indeed, in some cases already have--to acquire military capabilities so that, if necessary, they can defend themselves without U.S. assistance.67 When other major states build up militarily as a hedge against abandonment by the United States, they open a second avenue to multipolarity. Regardless of how multipolarity comes about—as the result of balancing against the United States, or as a result of others arming themselves as a hedge against regional rivals—the consequences for America's hegemonic grand strategy are the same. Precisely because multipolarity is antithetical to the Open Door world that the United States seeks, the aim of American grand strategy is to prevent the other major powers—even U.S. allies—from gaining autonomy in the realm of security.

#### American withdrawal would be coupled with cooperation with new regional powers – this makes the transition smooth and avoids great power wars – sooner is better than later.

Kupchan 2003 (Charles A., Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier )

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of **a concert-like directorate** of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the **strongest incentives** to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

#### Multiple solutions fill-in for U.S. leadership – regional cooperation, spheres of influence, and balance of power arrangements – solves their offense.

Barbara Conry (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute) 2/5/1997 "U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman" CATO INSTITUTE <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1126>

A more critical issue is the evolution of the international system after U.S. hegemony. Washington can exert considerable influence (though not full control) over the development of that system. Although a number of different scenarios may be acceptable to the United States, Washington should make certain that any global system that succeeds American hegemony has two important characteristics. First, international power and responsibility must be decentralized; the transfer of U.S. global influence and responsibilities to another state, alliance, or global organization such as the United Nations should not be permitted. It is as unrealistic to base the international system on the illusion that some other country or international organization can effectively lead the world as it is to depend on U.S. global leadership. Second, the international system must include a means of checking aspiring hegemons. Regional Security Organizations Such a system could take several forms. One possibility is the strengthening of regional security organizations, such as the Western European Union. Regional security organizations are an effective way of keeping order among member states and can also take care of contingencies in their general areas. Had the European countries not been so dependent on NATO, for example, the WEU should have been able to subdue the crisis in the former Yugoslavia if the conflict had been perceived as a wider threat to Europe. Regional organizations could also serve as potential partners to the United States in the event of a serious threat to their mutual interests elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, regional security organizations require a high degree of cohesion among member states and therefore are not possible in many parts of the world. The WEU is probably the only such organization that is viable in the near future, although effective regional security organizations encompassing some Latin American and Asian countries are not inconceivable. In much of the rest of the world, however, there is little evidence of the cohesion and common interest that would be a precondition for a functioning regional security organization. Spheres of Influence An alternative to regional security organizations is the creation of spheres of influence. The notion of spheres of influence has in the past carried a rather sinister connotation and could still be troublesome if a dominant regional power sought to subvert its neighbors, especially if it subsequently aspired to challenge other major powers. But as long as dominant powers restrict their activities to typical "great power" behavior--which would generally mean shoring up security and prestige but not expansionism--there is nothing inherently evil about spheres of influence. Several prominent foreign policy scholars have pointed out the feasibility of spheres of influence. Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California has written, Regional disturbances that do not threaten the world power balance should be dealt with by the major powers of the region, ideally with the endorsement of the international community. Instead of seeking an ephemeral global security, we should, as Charles William Maynes has argued in Foreign Policy, encourage a policy of "regional self-reliance [that] would recognize that certain powerful states in each area will inevitably play a special security role." In other words, we must accept the reality of the longstanding tradition of spheres of influence--a tradition that we scrupulously insist upon in the Western Hemisphere under our unilaterally imposed Monroe Doctrine. [61] Spheres of influence make sense because the world's major powers have an interest in, and usually the ability to maintain a degree of order in, their regions. There is always some risk that the leading power in a particular sphere of influence may abuse its position or develop expansionist ambitions. The decentralization of international power, however, should ensure that the United States, other major powers, or regional security organizations--acting alone or in concert--could check unacceptable behavior on the part of a dominant regional power. Balance of Power Yet another alternative is the establishment of regional balance-of-power arrangements, which may be appropriate in the Middle East, for example. There are serious obstacles to the creation of a viable regional security organization in that area--as demonstrated by the problems the Gulf Cooperation Council has faced--and there is no clear dominant power around which a sphere of influence is likely to develop. Instead, the locus of power tends to shift among the larger states. The United States has in the past sought to manipulate the balance of power by bolstering certain countries as a means of checking others. That risky strategy had disastrous consequences with respect to Iran and Iraq, and, given the unpopularity of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and those regimes' close identification with Washington, it may well backfire again. Allowing the balance of power in the region to evolve without U.S. interference would help shield the United States from the consequences of violent and sudden shifts in the balance but could still be expected to prevent a regional hegemon from rising. As University of Chicago political scientist Stephen M. Walt pointed out in The Origins of Alliances, Compared with the other hypotheses examined in this book, the general hypothesis that states choose allies in order to balance against the most serious threat was the clear winner. Its merits were shown in two important ways. First, balancing was far more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially weak and isolated states. Second, the importance of ideological distinction declined as the level of threat increased; ideological solidarity was most powerful when security was high or when ideological factors and security considerations reinforced each other. [62] The tendency of states to balance against a prospective hegemon, instead of "bandwagoning," has been evident in the Middle East. As Walt observed, "Despite the fact that the Middle East lacks an established tradition of balance of power statecraft . . . , the advantages of seeking allies in order to balance against threats have obviously been apparent to the various actors in the Middle East. . . . the ascendancy of ambitious regional powers (such as Iraq under Nuri al-Said and Egypt under Nasser) consistently led other regional actors to join forces . . . to resist the attempt." [63] The strategic environment of the Middle East of the 1990s remains conducive to balancing, as an assortment of similarly sized powers--Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran--continue to share an interest in preventing the rise of any single power to primacy. The United States may have to tolerate a degree of instability as power shifts among those states, but American vital interests should be reasonably safe as long as power remains diffused throughout the region. If a hegemon were to arise, especially if it were clearly hostile to U.S. interests, the United States would still have the option of acting alone or joining forces with European and other powers to deal with that problem.

**No impact to the transition**

IKENBERRY ‘8 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

#### Status quo solves islanding---the military figured out their advantage and fixed it

Michael Aimone 9-12, Director, Business Enterprise Integration, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 9/12/12, Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also **focused heavily on grid security** in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk.1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can **continue mission critical activities on base** largely **through** its fleet of **on-site power generation equipment**. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has **standby generators** in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are **primed and ready to work**, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a **strategic stockpile of electrical power generators** and support equipment that is kept in **operational readiness**. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### Zero impact to grid failures, even ones caused by cyber attacks

Douglas Birch 10-1, former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy, 10/1/12, “Forget Revolution,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full

Government officials sometimes describe a kind of Hieronymus Bosch landscape when warning of the possibility of a cyber attack on the electric grid. Imagine, if you will, that the United States is blindsided by an epic hack that interrupts power for much of the Midwest and mid-Atlantic for more than a week, switching off the lights, traffic signals, computers, water pumps, and air conditioners in millions of homes, businesses, and government offices. Americans swelter in the dark. Chaos reigns! Here's another nightmare scenario: An electric grid that serves two-thirds of a billion people suddenly fails in a developing, nuclear-armed country with a rich history of ethnic and religious conflict. Rail transportation is shut down, cutting off travel to large swathes of the country, while many miners are trapped underground. Blackouts on this scale conjure images of civil unrest, overwhelmed police, crippled hospitals, darkened military bases, the gravely injured in the back of ambulances stuck in traffic jams. The specter of what Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called a "digital Pearl Harbor" led to the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, which is tasked with developing both offensive and defensive cyber warfare capabilities, and prompted FBI Director Robert Mueller to warn in March that cyber attacks would soon be "the number one threat to our country." Similar concerns inspired both the Democrats and Republicans to sound the alarm about the cyber threat in their party platforms. But are cyber attacks really a clear and present danger to society's critical life support systems, capable of inflicting thousands of casualties? Or has fear of full-blown cybergeddon at the hands of America's enemies become just another feverish national obsession -- another of the long, dark shadows of the 9/11 attacks? Worries about a large-scale, devastating cyber attack on the United States date back several decades, but escalatedfollowing attacks on Estonian government and media websites during a diplomatic conflict with Russia in 2007. That digital ambush was followed by a cyber attack on Georgian websites a year later in the run-up to the brief shooting war between Tbilisi and Moscow, as well as allegations of a colossal, ongoing cyber espionage campaign against the United States by hackers linked to the Chinese army. Much of the concern has focused on potential attacks on the U.S. electrical grid. "If I were an attacker and I wanted to do strategic damage to the United States...I probably would sack electric power on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt to cause a cascading effect," retired Admiral Mike McConnell said in a 2010 interview with CBS's 60 Minutes. But the scenarios sketched out above are not solely the realm of fantasy. This summer, the United States and India were hit by **two massive electrical outages** -- caused not by ninja cyber assault teams but by force majeure. And, for most people anyway, the results were **less terrifying than imagined.** First, the freak "derecho" storm that barreled across a heavily-populated swath of the eastern United States on the afternoon of June 29 knocked down trees that crushed cars, bashed holes in roofs, blocked roads, and sliced through power lines. According to an August report by the U.S. Department of Energy, 4.2 million homes and businesses lost power as a result of the storm, with the blackout stretching across 11 states and the District of Columbia. More than 1 million customers were still without power five days later, and in some areas power wasn't restored for 10 days. Reuters put the death tollat 23 people as of July 5, all killed by storms or heat stroke. The second incident occurred in late July, when 670 million people in northern India, or about 10 percent of the world's population, lost power in the largest blackout in history. The failure of this huge chunk of India's electric grid was attributed to higher-than-normal demand due to late monsoon rains, which led farmers to use more electricity in order to draw water from wells. Indian officials told the media there were no reports of deaths directly linked to the blackouts. But this cataclysmic event **didn't cause widespread chaos** in India -- indeed, for some, it didn't even interrupt their daily routine. "[M]any people in major cities barely noticed the disruption because localized blackouts are so common that many businesses, hospitals, offices and middle-class homes have backup diesel generators," the New York Timesreported. The most important thing about both events is what didn't happen. Planes didn't fall out of the sky. **Governments didn't collapse**. Thousands of people weren't killed. Despite disruption and delay, harried public officials, emergency workers, and beleaguered publics mostly muddled through. The summer's blackouts strongly suggest that a cyber weapon that took down an electric grid even for several days could turn out to be little more than a weapon of mass **inconvenience**. That doesn't mean the United States can relax. James Lewis, director of the technology program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes that hackers threaten the security of U.S. utilities and industries, and recently penned an op-ed for the New York Times calling the United States "defenseless" to a cyber-assault. But he told Foreign Policy the recent derecho showed that even a large-scale blackout **would not** necessarily **have catastrophic consequences.**

**Empirically denied – Their ev says**

“The electric grid suffered numerous power outages every year”

**No grid attacks and safeguards check**

**Condliffe ’12 (2-21**-12 [Jamie, freelance writer and editor with a focus on science, technology, Contributing Editor at gizmodo.com, “NSA: Anonymous Could Cause Power Outages Through Cyberattacks,” <http://gizmodo.com/5886805/nsa-anonymous-could-cause-power-outages-through-cyberattacks>]

While up to now Anonymous has largely been in the habit of embarrassing large corporations—though it has done for a law firm—federal officials worry that the organization only wants to become more disruptive. Indeed, **Anonymous has mentioned a plan to shut down the internet on March 31, which it refers to as Operation Global Blackout. That is extremely unlikely. Similarly, widespread power outages as a result of attacking the power gird would be difficult to orchestrate, and instead any such attack would likely be isolated and limited in size. Fortunately, the power sector is bracing itself for such problems. "The industry is engaged and stepping up widely to respond to emerging cyber threats**," one electric-industry official told the WSJ.

#### No Pakistani collapse

AP 10 (“Pakistan's stability, leadership under spotlight after floods and double dealing accusations,” August 6th, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/08/06/pakistans-stability-leadership-spotlight-floods-double-dealing-accusations/>, EMM)

Not for the first time, Pakistan appears to be teetering on the edge with a government unable to cope. Floods are ravaging a country at war with al-Qaida and the Taliban. Riots, slayings and arson are gripping the largest city. Suggestions are flying that the intelligence agency is aiding Afghan insurgents. The crises raise questions about a nation crucial to U.S. hopes of success in Afghanistan and to the global campaign against Islamist militancy. Despite the recent headlines, few here see Pakistan in danger of collapse or being overrun by militants — a fear that had been expressed before the army fought back against insurgents advancing from their base in the Swat Valley early last year. From its birth in 1947, Pakistan has been dogged by military coups, corrupt and inefficient leaders, natural disasters, assassinations and civil unrest. Through it all, Pakistan has not prospered — but it survives. “There is plenty to be worried about, but also indications that when push comes to shove the state is able to respond," said Mosharraf Zaidi, an analyst and writer who has advised foreign governments on aid missions to Pakistan. "The military has many weaknesses, but it has done a reasonable job in relief efforts. There have been gaps in the response. But this is a developing a country, right?" The recent flooding came at a sensitive time for Pakistan, with Western doubts over its loyalty heightened by the leaking of U.S. military documents that strengthened suspicions the security establishment was supporting Afghan insurgents while receiving billions in Western aid. With few easy choices, the United States has made it clear it intends to stick with Pakistan. Indeed, it has used the floods to demonstrate its commitment to the country, rushing emergency assistance and dispatching helicopters to ferry the goods. The Pakistani government's response to the floods has been sharply criticized at home, especially since President Asif Ali Zardari departed for a European tour. With so many Pakistanis suffering, the trip has left the already weak and unpopular leader even more vulnerable politically. The flooding was triggered by what meteorologists said were "once-in-a-century" rains. The worst affected area is the northwest, a stronghold for Islamist militants. Parts of the northwest have seen army offensives over the last two years. Unless the people are helped quickly and the region is rebuilt, anger at the government could translate into support for the militants. At least one charity with suspected links to a militant outfit has established relief camps there. The extremism threat was highlighted by a suicide bombing in the main northwestern town of Peshawar on Wednesday. The bomber killed the head of the Frontier Constabulary, a paramilitary force in the northwest at the forefront of the terror fight. With authorities concentrating on flood relief, some officials have expressed concern that militants could regroup. The city of Karachi has seen militant violence and is rumored to be a hiding place for top Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. It has also been plagued by regular bouts of political and ethnic bloodletting since the 1980s, though it has been calmer in recent years. The latest violence erupted after the assassination of a leading member of the city's ruling party. More than 70 people have been killed in revenge attacks since then, paralyzing parts of the city of 16 million people. While serious, the unrest does not yet pose an immediate threat to the stability of the country. Although the U.S. is unpopular, there is little public support for the hardline Islamist rule espoused by the Taliban and their allies. Their small movement has been unable to control any Pakistani territory beyond the northwest, home to only about 20 million of the country's 175 million people.

#### No caribbean impact --- Binding international agreements solve

USDS 1 (United States Department of State, “Argentina and Chile Bring Into Force The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear in Latin America and the Caribbean (The Treaty of Tlatelolco)”, Fact sheet for the Bureau of Nonproliferation in DC)

On January 18, 1994, Argentina and Chile, and on May 30, 1994, Brazil, brought into force the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco for their national territories. These actions greatly expand the land area for which the Latin American nuclear weapons-free zone is in legal effect, and constitute a significant step toward the full incorporation of the zone throughout the region. Argentina, Chile, and Brazil have now assumed a binding international commitment not to acquire, manufacture, test, use, or station a nuclear explosive device in their sovereign territory.

#### Ensures no escalation

Langmore and Kutt 8 (John, Former Director at the UN, Now a Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne and National President of the UN Association of Australia, Morits, Intern Working with the International Compaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 1-14)

There are a number of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) covering parts of the southern hemisphere. The Treaty of Tlatelolco sets up a NWFZ in Latin America. The resolution L.10 “Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)” calls again upon the states in Latin America to ratify this treaty and was adopted by consensus. However a vote was taken on Resolution L.19 “Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)” with 174 states favouring the resolution, one voting against (USA) and five abstaining. With the resolution L.27 “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” Brazil and New Zealand called the states in the southern hemisphere to connect the NWFZs to make the whole hemisphere a [Nuclear Weapons Free Zone] NWFZ. Besides the NWFZs mentioned above, the NWFZ of South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga) and the Antarctic Treaty are referred to in the resolution. It also welcomes other approaches like the negotiation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and the NWFZ in central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty). A vote was called, with 169 in favour, three against (UK, US and France) and eight abstentions. Australia voted in favour of this resolution.

### 1NC – De-Sal

#### Status quo solves water scarcity and nuclear desalination is ineffective

Gar Smith 11, Editor Emeritus of Earth Island Journal, a former editor of Common Ground magazine, a Project Censored Award-winning journalist, and co-founder of Environmentalists Against War, "NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE CASE AGAINST A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE," June, International Forum on Globalization series focused on False Solutions, http://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear\_Roulette\_book.pdf

By 2025, 3.5 billion people will face severe fresh-water shortages. Nuclear proponents groping for justifications to expand nuclear power have argued that the waste heat from power plants can provide a “cheap and clean” solution to the inherently costly process of removing salt from seawater. Desalination plants (there are 13,080 worldwide, mostly oil- and gas-fired and mostly in wealthy desert nations) already produce more than 12 billion gallons of drinkable water a day. 153 The first nuclear desalinator was installed in Japan in the late 1970s and scores of reactor-heated desalination plants are operating around the world today.¶ But nuclear desalination is another False Solution. The problem with atomic water-purifiers is that using heat to treat seawater is an obsolete 20 th -century technology. Thermal desalination has given way to new reverse osmosis systems that are less energy intensive and 33 times cheaper to operate. 154 Nuclear desalination advocates claim that wind, solar, and wave power aren’t up to the task while new low-temperature evaporation technology may be able to produce high purity water at temperatures as low as 122° Fahrenheit. 155 Promoting reactors as a solution to the world’s water shortage is especially ludicrous since nuclear power plants consume more water than any other energy source. 156¶ Even proponents admit there is a potential risk that running seawater through a radioactive environment might contaminate the drinking water produced. 157 Undeterred, scientists in Russia and India have proposed anchoring small atom-powered water-plants offshore near densely populated coastal cities. But this would provide no relief for the billions of people living inland in water-starved regions of North Africa and Asia.¶ Desalination is merely a way of giving a marginal new purpose to existing reactors whose balance sheets would be improved if they were retrofitted with desalination chambers. As with power generation, so with desalination: efficiency in water use (better irrigation technology, crop selection, eliminating transit losses, etc.) beats new production.¶ A real solution to the growing global water shortage needs to address the increasing amount of water diverted to wasteful agricultural and industrial practices and concentrate on preventing the water from being contaminated in the first place—by, among other things, capping the size of local populations to match locally available water supplies.

#### 1 – Turn - Conservation

#### Higher price in desal now will cause shift to conservation

Boals 9

(Connor Boals Infographics by Hannah Nester Circle of BlueDrinking From The Sea, <http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/drinking-from-the-sea-demand-for-desalination-plants-increases-worldwide/>, June 29)

“The most reliable, most cost effective and most environmentally friendly source of water is conservation, increased efficiency and waste prevention,” Scow said. “We have so many opportunities to save water. Those needs need to be addressed first.” Many in the industry see a silver lining in the higher pricing of desalinated water: people will be thriftier and use less. “Yes, the price is obscenely high, but what’s the alternative if you don’t have any water?” Pankratz said. “Until we look at water differently and start valuing it for what its real cost is, we won’t have a good picture, and people won’t be conserving water like they should.” Palmer said that the pricing of water in Australia has always been too cheap. “We are the driest continent, and our prices for municipal water are about half of what people charge in Europe, where there is admittedly more water,” he said. “[Desalinated] water is three times more expensive, therefore you don’t want to waste it,” he said. “So water authorities have to charge accordingly, and people will use less water and waste less water.”

#### Conservation alone can solve the world’s water problems

Bouguerra 8

(Environmental and economic challenges of water desalination [Mohamed Larbi BOUGUERRA](http://base.d-p-h.info/fr/corpus_auteur/fiche-auteur-839.html) 02 / 2008 <http://base.d-p-h.info/fr/fiches/dph/fiche-dph-7355.html>, Author’s lecture during the roundtable on « Natural resources and security » during the seminar on « Natural resources » organized on the 18th of January 2008 by the French Embassy in Amman and the Institut Français du Proche-Orient.)

For some analysts, water desalination may appear as a technological fix to the water needs of our modern societies or, sometimes, as a political trick as in the case of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Natural resources such as water are of course limited and finite. Desalination is deceiving. It’s a fool paradise rubbing that fact. Illimited abundance in any field or realm is a hoax. Rather, one must take into account of all the techniques aiming at a wise water use, to conserving of the resource and processes intented to save water. One must manage water in order to eliminate leakages which amount up to 20-30% on average worldwide (NAFW not accounted for water). According to recent studies, it appears that conservation measures may meet the new water needs for a cost which is 10 to 25% of incurred expenses of water desalination. In that regard, water efficiency must be improved. Leakages and wastings must be eliminated. According to the Washington based Worldwatch Institute, we can avoid thus desalination and its negative effects on the environment and the atmosphere. Finally one must point to the fact that desalinated water quality must be carefully monitored for bromate, a suspected carcinogen. According to international regulations, bromate levels may not exceed 10 ppb on average over a year in a reservoir.

#### Turn – Trade-off - Desal stops better water-saving options – and it causes unsustainable urban development

Dickie 7

MAKING WATERDesalination: option or distraction for a thirsty world? This report was prepared for WWF’s Global Freshwater Programme by Phil Dickie (www.melaleucamedia.com) June 2007 <http://waterwebster.org/documents/desalinationreportjune2007.pdf>

All of the areas where seawater desalination is rapidly assuming a more prominent water supply role had more cost effective and less potentially environmentally damaging alternatives available. This is particularly true of demand management, water conservation and water efficiency measures, where many of even the more advanced economies such as Australia do not uniformly require easily achievable water and energy efficiency standards in new buildings. The extent to which a furore in favour of desalination is associated with unsustainable urban development, excess water intensive tourism development for arid areas, and unsustainable arid area export agriculture is also disturbing. Many of these relatively dry or drying areas have high levels of water consumption. Many of the areas where there is most intensive desalination activity also have a history of damaging or degrading natural water resources, particularly groundwater. What such societies need is a new attitude to water not a new water supply. It is in this sense that desalination, which fits a familiar supply paradigm, caters to the edifice complex of institutions and politicians, and offers up opportunities of a new stream of contracts to the infrastructure industry, is essentially a distraction to the need to use all water wisely for the maintenance of both human societies and the natural systems on which they depend. The World Bank, in conducting a study of desalination in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, sounded a strong and similar note of caution about desalination. “A key conclusion of the study is that desalination alone cannot deliver the promise of improved water supply. The ability to make the best use of desalination is subject to a series of wider water sector related conditions. In some countries weak water utilities, politically determined low water tariffs, high water losses and poor sector policies mean that desalinated water, just like any other new source of bulk water, may not be used wisely or that desalination plants are at risk of falling into disrepair. Under these conditions, there is a risk that substantial amounts of money are used inefficiently, and that desalination cannot alleviate water scarcity nor contribute to the achievement of the MDGs. It may be preferable not to engage in desalination on a large scale unless the underlying weaknesses of the water sector are seriously addressed. A programme to address these weaknesses should include a reduction of non-revenue water; appropriate cost recovery; limited use of targeted subsidies; sound investment planning; integrated water resources management; proper environmental impact assessments; and capacity building in desalination as well as in water resources management and utility management. In any case, desalination should remain the last resort, and should only be applied after cheaper alternatives in terms of supply and demand management have carefully been considered. (emphasis added) A second conclusion is that the private sector can play a useful and important role in funding and operating desalination plants, but only if the above conditions are met. If these conditions are absent, there is a risk that excessive investments in desalination become a drain to the national budget, either directly under public financing or indirectly through implicit or explicit guarantees under private financing." 72

#### 3 - Turn – Coastal Growth – Desal causes it – results in water shortages, ag runoff destroying natural sources of water

Cooley 6

Heather Cooley, holds a B.S. in Molecular Environmental Biology and an M.S. in Energy and Resources from the University of California at Berkeley. Peter H. Gleick, co-founder and President of the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security in Oakland, California, . and Gary Wolff, Ph.D., is Principal Economist and Engineer. Dr. Wolff received his B.S. in Renewable Energy Engineering Technology from Jordan College in 1982, his M.S. in Civil and Environmental Engineering from Stanford University in 1984, and his Ph.D. in Resource Economics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1997. DESALINATION, WITH A GRAIN OF SALT, Pacific Institute. June 2006 <http://www.pacinst.org/reports/desalination/desalination_report.pdf> accessed July 24, 2007

In addition to affecting the coastal environment through water intake and discharge, desalination can also affect the coast through impacts on developments, land use, and local growth, which are often controversial and contentious topics. Rapid, unplanned growth can damage local environmental resources as well as the social fabric of a community anywhere. For example, building new homes and businesses without investing in infrastructure can cause overcrowded schools, traffic, and water shortages. Urban and agricultural runoff and increases in wastewater flows create water-quality problems in local rivers, streams, and/or the ocean. Coastal developments are often particularly divisive. Some developments can change the nature of views, beach access, and other environmental amenities.

#### 4. Efficiency outweighs desal – only way to stop ag overuse – makes up 70%

Kaldany 12

(Africa: The Water Crisis is Now, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207050683.html>, Rashad, July 4, Rashad Kaldany is vice president of global industries at the International Finance Corporation)

One promising conclusion of the group's work is that investments in efficiency can make a huge difference at a reasonable cost. In some countries the greatest room for increased efficiency is in the industrial sector. In China, for example, it takes almost 3000 litres of water to produce one cotton shirt, so water savings here could have dramatic effects. However, most countries should focus first on the agricultural sector, since it uses 70 percent of water worldwide - with half of it wasted. Investment in more efficient irrigation makes a big difference. The Indian company Jain Irrigation, the second largest drip irrigation company in the world, is a good example. IFC has helped it expand its operations in India, where its micro-irrigation products have resulted in water savings equal to the annual consumption of about 15m households. Jain is now expanding to Africa, a promising initiative in South-South cooperation. This is only one of many examples of innovations that can help contain the water crisis. Investors, governments, and international organisations can and must work together, and they must do so now. Since water is a common good, its use and conservation require common solutions.

## 2NC

### Turns

#### Efficiency outweighs desal – only way to stop ag overuse – makes up 70%

Kaldany 12

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#### Desal causes overuse in the ME, raises energy prices and stops Conservation efforts necessary

Barton 12

(Alexandra, <http://thewaterproject.org/water-in-crisis-middle-east.php>, “Water in Crisis – Middle East)

Desalination plants are an overuse of water resources in the Middle East. [Seventy percent](http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/drinkseawater.html) of desalination plants in the world are located in this area, found mostly in [Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain](http://www.worldwater.org/data20062007/Table21.pdf). While the plants produce water needed for the arid region, they can manufacture problems for health and the environment. The seawater used most in desalination plants has high amounts of boron and bromide, and the process can also remove essential minerals like calcium. Also, the concentrated salt is often dumped back into oceans where the [increased salinity](http://www.greenofficeprojects.org/blog/images/desalination.jpg) affects the ocean's environment. The plants harm local wildlife and add pollutants to the region's climate. In addition, desalination is the most energy-costing water resource. The [Pacific Institute](http://www.pacinst.org/reports/desalination/desalination_report.pdf) explains that the high use of energy results in raised energy prices and higher prices on water produced, hurting the consumer. The water produced can be beneficial towards substituting any lack of freshwater, but these areas have tendencies towards overuse of their natural resources. Concerns with the large amount of desalination plants in the Middle East focus on the improper dependency they will cause, instead of encouraging alternate forms of water and energy and conserving freshwater. The Middle East has numerous struggles with its current water resources, and the region needs more than one solution to generate an optimistic environmental position for the future.

#### Intentional oil spills will destroy desal plants

Lovell 98

(<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA398768>, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY THE THREAT OF INTENTIONAL OIL SPILLS TO DESALINATION PLANTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST A U.S. SECURITY THREAT by James E. Lovell, Maj, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements Advisor: Major Robert L. Fant Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 1998)

The New York Times articles discussed in chapter one best indicate the growing awareness of the vulnerability of desalination plants to oil. However, there are some other interesting indications that should be noted. Perhaps most dramatic are recent statements by former deputy assistant secretary for energy emergencies and the U.S. Department of Energy, Edward Badolato. He said the “U.S. government ‘is doing nothing’ to anticipate sabotage of pumping stations, treatment plants, pipelines, or dams in the Middle East.” 1 When commenting on U.S. plans to defend international water facilities, Baldolato said, “We’re not equipped to deal with it. We haven’t focused on the water problem. We’re barely capable of focusing on oil.” 2 John Bullock and Adel Darwish, in their book Water Wars, are also very clear about how vulnerable they see desalination facilities. Every desalination plant built is a hostage to fortune; they are easily sabotaged; they can be attacked from the air or by shelling from off-shore; and their intake ports have to be kept clear, giving another simple way of preventing their operation. 3 Why is Oil a Threat? Oil is a threat for two primary reasons. First, it contains pollutants not normally found in sea water that the desalination facilities do not normally have to remove. For instance, benzene is a human carcinogen contained in oil that can not exceed 5 parts per billion in potable water. 4 Continued operation of desalination plants with even a small amount of processed benzene could pose a threat to public health. Second and perhaps the most obvious reason oil threatens desalination plants is the damage it can do to sea water intake filters and heat exchangers. Oil in sea water can take the form of the well recognized slick, but it can also form large tarballs and “sunken oil globs” that can be drawn into intake filters. 5 Obviously, the oil can then foul the filters limiting the amount of water intake as well as foul internal membranes disrupting the reverse osmosis process if affecting a reverse osmosis facility. The required clean-up and problems caused by oil affecting a multi-stage flash facility are no less troublesome. “If oil enters a (multi-stage flash) desalination plant it may be necessary to first use a solvent to loosen the oil particles. Next, the plant should be flushed with soap and water and finally it should be flushed with fresh water. Oil clings to heat transfer surfaces, disrupting the heat transfer process.” 6 Proximity Concerns The Middle East is the one place in the world uniquely positioned to have the highest concentration of both desalination and oil facilities, thus providing many opportunities21 for the terrorist scenario suggested by this paper. The Central Intelligence Agency’s “Middle East Area Oil and Gas Map” shows a stunning concentration of oil facilities in the region. The Persian Gulf has 29 major tanker ports and 16 major shore-based refineries. 7 Kuwait alone accounts for 4 tanker ports and 4 coastal refineries 8 while the International Desalination Association’s plant inventory indicates Kuwait had 23 major desalination facilities operational by 1997. 9 Considering its north/south coastline is only approximately 100 miles long, Kuwait clearly has a concentration of facilities that makes another Gulf War spill scenario very possible. The United Arab Emirates is another example of how concentrated the desalination and oil facilities are. Ten tanker ports and three coastal refineries 10 share approximately 300 miles of coastline with 40 major desalination plants. 11 Other Middle East countries share a similar story, so the point to be made here is an obvious one; many desalination plants share limited coastal areas with many oil facilities. Thus, proximity alone presents another threat to desalination plants in the Middle East.

#### Problem in Pakistan is WATER MANAGEMENT and USE – increasing supply or desal will not solve the problem

Shiekh 12

(No Doubt Pakistan’s Water Crisis Is Predominantly Manmade – OpEd, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/23012012-no-doubt-pakistan%E2%80%99s-water-crisis-is-predominantly-manmade-oped/>, Naseem, Eurasia Review)

There is no doubt Pakistan’s water crisis is predominantly a (hu)manmade (SIC) problem. Pakistan’s climate is not particularly dry in fact semi arid to arid, nor is it lacking in rivers and groundwater. Extremely poor management, unclear laws, government corruption, and industrial and human waste have caused this water supply crunch and rendered what water is available practically useless due to the huge quantity of pollution. According to World Bank report of 2006 Pakistan was fast moving from being a water-stressed country to a water-scarce country, primarily because of its high population growth, over-exploitation of ground water, pollution, poor repair in water infrastructures and financially no sustainability of water management system. Interestingly, the country’s large parts have good soil, sunshine and excellent farmers and these can get much more value from the existing flows. The most water-rich country in terms of the run-off from rain-fall to population is Iceland, with more than 500,000 cubic meters per person per year; the most water- poor are Egypt, with just 0.02 cubic meters. Water is absolutely essential for plant life. It is pertinent to mention here that the major source of drinking water in Pakistan is groundwater, so water availability is the second most serious issue. Future water demand will be affected by many factors, including population growth, wealth and sharing. Globally, it is estimated that between half a billion and almost two billion people are already under high water stress, and this number is expected to increase significantly by 2025, due primarily to population growth and increasing to climate change. We live in an agricultural region water is key for survival, water lost through mismanagement mainly. A big investment in the repair of existing dams and the large scale construction of new water storage is simple solution of problem. In managing water resources, the Pakistani government must balance competing demands between urban and rural, rich and poor, the economy and the environment. However, because people have triggered this crisis, by changing their actions they have the power to prevent water scarcity from devastating Pakistan’s population, agriculture, and economy.

#### Saudi Arabia will use solar desal now – ensures low cost water in that country for the long-term

Picow 10

(<http://www.greenprophet.com/2010/02/saudi-arabia-desalination-solar/>, [Saudi Arabia to Replace Oil with Sun Power for Desalination Plants](http://www.greenprophet.com/2010/02/saudi-arabia-desalination-solar/), Maurice, February 1st, writes feature articles for the The Jerusalem Post as well as being a regular contributor to Green Prophet. He has also written a non-fiction study on Islam)

You would imagine that a desert country like Saudi Arabia would have to rely a lot on desalination for a good part of the fresh water it uses. For example, a previous Green Prophet article told about the[Kingdom building what they say is the world’s largest desalination plant in the Al Jubail Industrial Zone](http://www.greenprophet.com/2009/05/14/8981/saudi-arabia-desalination/)on the shores of the Persian Gulf. Up to now, the more than 28 desalination plants scattered around the Kingdom have had to rely of fossil fuel, most notably fuel oil, to provide to power to run the equipment used to extract salt and other minerals from sea water. Much of this may be changing, however, as Saudi Arabia is now interested in using solar energy to provide the power needed, instead of oil. According to an article on the [UAE Top News media site](http://topnews.ae/content/21324-saudi-arabia-build-solar-energy-based-desalination-plants), the Kingdom is now planning to build solar energy based desalination plants in order to save on energy costs, as well as be in tune with new environmental polices. This might be to secure membership in the [International Renewable Energy Agency,](http://www.greenprophet.com/2010/01/28/16556/saudi-arabia-iren/) otherwise known as IRENA. Saudi Finance Minister Ibrahim Al Assaf said “desalination is our strategic choice to supply an adequate supply of drinking water to people across the Kingdom.” He added that by using solar energy instead of oil, it will focus more on using renewable energy and even become an exporter of this clean form of energy as it has been doing with oil. A tremendous amount of oil is currently being used to provide power for the country’s desalination plants; around 1.5 million barrels per day. This has caused the price of desalinated water to rise as oil prices have risen. The use of solar energy to power desalination plants is just one of several projects in the Kingdom that are more environmentally friendly. The Kingdom is also embarking of projects to improve its inland transport systems including building a [high speed train network](http://www.greenprophet.com/2009/05/03/8692/saudi-arabia-hajj-train/) to carry pilgrims to and from the annual Hajj pilgrimage in the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The new rail network, when completed, will be able to large numbers of people, and help to eliminate many of the thousands of buses which are currently used. In addition to desalination, solar energy will also be supplying energy to a country which has been[historically known as being a world supplier of oil](http://www.greenprophet.com/2009/10/07/12498/oil-good/), especially to countries like the US. Solar energy will eventually enable to Saudis to not only have a renewable energy source to supply their own energy needs but will significantly reduce the cost of fresh water, as well as being able to export renewable energy, as well as oil.

### Uniqueness

#### Short term scarcity in the squo key to high water prices

Standard and Poors 12

(<http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/swf/water/data/document.pdf>, March 7, 2012, Is The U.S. Water Sector Approaching A Tipping Point?)

Water scarcity can force a utility to spend more on expensive marginal sources of drinking water (such as desalination and wastewater reuse) or reduce the volume available to customers, which means utilities must raise the price per unit of water sold so total revenues will cover fixed costs.

#### High water prices cause tech innovations, water reuse and recycling

Standard and Poors 12

(<http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/swf/water/data/document.pdf>, March 7, 2012, Is The U.S. Water Sector Approaching A Tipping Point?)

Yet, evidence is mounting that water stress is increasing, and water prices in the U.S. will inevitably have to rise. Over time, as stress turns into scarcity and regulators face requests for significant rate increases, economic decisions will have to be depoliticized. Still, we believe that as prices rise, so will incentives for technological innovations, ways to reduce demand and opportunities to recycle and reuse this commodity. Innovations will also occur in the financial markets and in the structure adopted by sponsoring entities. For example, the introduction of public/private partnerships such as leases and concession contracts can introduce competition and provide greater flexibility for privatesector providers to meet the needs of municipally owned water utilities.

### Link Turn

#### Desal causes massive emissions –

Rosenfeld 11 (David, “Conservationists Push Back Against Desalination in California”) http://www.dcbureau.org/20110303169/natural-resources-news-service/conservationists-push-back-against-desalination-in-california.html

There are problems too with desalination’s byproduct, the heavy concentrates of salt and the remains of other chemicals that could be dumped into the ocean. Desalination also has a massive carbon footprint. For the most common type of ocean desalination method called reverse osmosis, which pushes water through membranes, some 40 percent of the operating cost is electricity to power the plant. The $700 million proposed plant in Carlsbad by investor-owned Poseidon Resources expects to satisfy around 8 percent of San Diego County’s water supply while at the same time consuming as much electricity as 45,000 homes. Greenhouse gas emissions would total about 200 million pounds a year, according to the project’s environmental impact assessment. Advocates say the technology is becoming more efficient by re-capturing energy and using renewable resources as much as possible. But it is a lot to overcome.

#### Makes water scarcity worse

Nicholas **Stern**—Head of the British Government Economic Service—**2007** (Former Head Economist for the World Bank, I.G. Patel Chair at the London School of Economics and Political Science, “The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review”, The report of a team commissioned by the British Government to study the economics of climate change led by Siobhan Peters, Head of G8 and International Climate Change Policy Unit, Cambridge University Press, p. 62-63)

People will feel the impact of climate change most strongly through changes in the distribution of water around the world and its seasonal and annual variability. Water is an essential resource for all life and a requirement for good health and sanitation. It is a critical input for almost all production and essential for sustainable growth and poverty reduction. 12 The location of water around the world is a critical determinant of livelihoods. Globally, around 70% of all freshwater supply is used for irrigating crops and providing food. 22% is used for manufacturing and energy (cooling power stations and producing hydro-electric power), while only 8% is used directly by households and businesses for drinking, sanitation, and recreation. 13 Climate change will alter patterns of water availability by intensifying the water cycle. 14 Droughts and floods will become more severe in many areas. There will be more rain at high latitudes, less rain in the dry subtropics, and uncertain but probably substantial changes in tropical areas.15 Hotter land surface temperatures induce more powerful evaporation and hence more intense rainfall, with increased risk of flash flooding. Differences in water availability between regions will become increasingly pronounced. Areas that are already relatively dry, such as the Mediterranean basin and parts of Southern Africa and South America, are likely to experience further decreases in water availability, for example several (but not all) climate models predict up to 30% decrease in annual runoff in these regions for a 2°C global temperature rise (Figure 3.2) and 40 – 50% for 4°C. 16 In contrast, South Asia and parts of Northern Europe and Russia are likely to experience increases in water availability (runoff), for example a 10 – 20% increase for a 2°C temperature rise and slightly greater increases for 4°C, according to several climate models. These changes in the annual volume of water each region receives mask another critical element of climate change – its impact on year-to-year and seasonal variability. An increase in annual river flows is not necessarily beneficial, particularly in highly seasonal climates, because: (1) there may not be sufficient storage to hold the extra water for use during the dry season, 17 and (2) rivers may flood more frequently.18 In dry regions, where runoff one-year-in-ten can be less than 20% of the average annual amount, understanding the impacts of climate change on variability of water supplies is perhaps even more crucial. One recent study from the Hadley Centre predicts that the proportion of land area experiencing severe droughts at any one time will increase from around 10% today to 40% for a warming of 3 to 4°C, and the proportion of land area experiencing extreme droughts will increase from 3% to 30%.19 In Southern Europe, serious droughts may occur every 10 years with a 3°C rise in global temperatures instead of every 100 years if today’s climate persisted .20 As the water cycle intensifies, billions of people will lose or gain water. Some risk becoming newly or further water stressed, while others see increases in water availability. Seasonal and annual variability in water supply will determine the consequences for people through floods or droughts. Around one-third of today’s global population live in countries experiencing moderate to high water stress, and 1.1 billion people lack access to safe water (Box 3.3 for an explanation of water stress). Water stress is a useful indicator of water availability but does not necessarily reflect access to safe water. Even without climate change, population growth by itself may result in several billion more people living in areas of more limited water availability. The effects of rising temperatures against a background of a growing population are likely to cause changes in the water status of billions of people. According to one study, temperature rises of 2°C will result in 1 – 4 billion people experiencing growing water shortages, predominantly in Africa, the Middle East, Southern Europe, and parts of South and Central America (Figure 3.3).21 In these regions, water management is already crucial for their growth and development. Considerably more effort and expense will be required on top of existing practices to meet people’s demand for water. At the same time, 1 – 5 billion people, mostly in South and East Asia, may receive more water. 22 However, much of the extra water will come during the wet season and will only be useful for alleviating shortages in the dry season if storage could be created (at a cost). The additional water could also give rise to more serious flooding during the wet season.

### Misc

#### Turn - Plankton

#### Desal destroys plankton and marine species

Matthews 11

(Richard Matthews is a consultant, eco-entrepreneur, green investor and author of numerous articles on sustainable positioning, enviro-politics and eco-economics. He is the owner of THE [GREEN MARKET](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_market), a leading sustainable business blog and one of the Web’s most comprehensive resources on the business of the environment., <http://globalwarmingisreal.com/2011/03/23/are-desalination-technologies-the-answer-to-the-world-water-crisis/>, Are Desalination Technologies the Answer to the World Water Crisis?)

In addition to its high cost, desalination technologies are harmful to the environment. Removing salt from seawater produces brine, which contains twice the salt of seawater; they also contain contaminants that can affect marine life when dumped back to the sea. If brine is disposed on land, it could seep through the soil and pollute water reserves underground. The US [Environmental Protection Agency](http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html) found that desalination plants kill at least 3.4 billion fish and other marine life annually. This represents a $212.5 million loss to commercial fisheries. Desalination plants can also destroy up to 90 percent of plankton and fish eggs in the surrounding water.

#### Plankton key to all life on earth

IBMEC 12

(Island Bay Marine Education Center, <http://www.octopus.org.nz/Plankton.html>, The Marine Education Centre is a not for profit charitable organisation, focussed on conservation through education, promoting the on-going care and sustainable use of Our Ocean, <http://www.octopus.org.nz/Plankton.html>)

WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT PLANKTON? Plankton are the basis of all life in the ocean and food for larger marine animals from shellfish to large fish and even whales. The largest fish in the world, the Whale Shark, is a plankton feeder and "krill", one of the ocean's smallest animals, is dinner for its largest, the blue whale! Studying plankton can tell scientists about water quality and the amount of nutrients in different areas of the oceans, and how many fish there are likely to be in future years. Almost 70% of the oxygen we breathe comes from the oceans and is made by phytoplankton. Without phytoplankton, there would be no life in the oceans or on Earth!! Plankton also absorbs most of the carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere (caused by cutting down forests and burning fossil fuels) by converting it to oxygen (O2) or by sinking it to the bottom of the sea where it canÕt escape. Land plants are really important too, but the health of the oceans is even more important. Plankton are the most abundant life form on Earth, except for bacteria. In fact, all the plankton in the oceans weigh more than all the dolphins, fish and whales put together! Plankton may be microscopic in size, but they play a giant role in the Earth's ecosystems!! Plankton is very important for all life on this planet. Without it both the ocean and the land would become a desert. Where there's lots of sunlight, phytoplankton grows quickly, mopping up carbon dioxide, releasing oxygen and providing food for zooplankton and the rest of the ocean food web including whales. When plankton die they fall to the bottom of the ocean and break down like compost and help fertilise new plankton growth.. But not all dead plankton breaks down quickly. Some of it gets buried in layers of sand and mud which builds up over time crushing and heating the plankton and causing chemical changes.

#### Turn – Endocrine Disruption

#### Desalination causes boron pollution – resulting in mass endocrine disruption

Food and Water Watch 9

(<http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Desal-Feb2009.pdf>, “Desalination an Ocean of Problems” Food & Water Watch is a nonprofit consumer organization that works to ensure clean water and safe food.)

Environmental damage is not the only danger from ocean desalination. Desalted water also puts the drinking water supply at risk because both seawater and brackish water can contain chemicals that freshwater does not. These contaminants include chemicals such as endocrine disruptors, pharmaceuticals, personal care products and toxins from marine algae. 85 Some of these contaminants may not be adequately removed in the reverse osmosis process. Poseidon Resources, inc. After masterminding the failed Tampa Bay venture, Poseidon Resources, Inc. is trying its hand at ocean desalination a second time. Its proposed plant in Carlsbad, California, would be the largest ocean desalination plant in the western hemisphere — twice as large as the Tampa Bay plant. Poseidon Resources has been trying to get its plan approved for the last 10 years. The company has been relentless in its marketing, however, and is now promising that its plant will be carbon neutral. This claim is misleading. Poseidon’s calculation assumes that the amount of energy used by the desalination plant will be mostly offset by the energy that would have been required to import the same amount of water. However, there is insufficient evidence that desalinated water will actually replace imported water in the California water supply. 70 Unfortunately, the Coastal Commission, the governmental body charged with protecting the state’s coast, approved a permit for the plant in August 2008. 71 This sets a dangerous precedent. If the plant is built without proper consideration for social and environmental impacts, it may become the first in a long line of polluting, damaging plants along the California coast. Two conservation groups have filed a lawsuit against the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, charging that the board did not adequately study how the plant would harm marine life. 72 In December 2008, the San Diego County Water Authority requested $175 million from the federal government as part of its economic stimulus package to subsidize the $300 million project, which it would give to Poseidon in exchange for the company reducing its rates for the agencies buying the water. 73 The company has yet to secure financing for the movement of the water from the project, despite the fact that it is scheduled for construction in 2009. The federal taxpayer dollars would enable the company to realize a profit faster, while ratepayers will still be paying more than market price for desalinated water. 74 Food & Water Watch 9 Boron is a chemical of particular concern because much higher levels are found in seawater than freshwater. However, membranes can remove only between 50 and 70 percent of this element. The rest is concentrated in the product water, which enters the drinking water system. 86 While it is possible to remove more boron with a second process, existing plants don’t because it is too costly. 87 This is a major problem for the drinking water system because boron is known to cause reproductive and developmental problems in experimental animals and irritation of the human digestive tract. 88 Moreover, the world’s largest ocean desalination plant in Ashkelon, Israel found that the boron in the desalted water acted as an herbicide when applied to crops. 89 Current drinking water regulations do not protect the public from boron. Recently, EPA made the preliminary determination that it would not regulate the element as a primary contaminant under the Safe Drinking Water Act because of its low occurrence in traditional sources of drinking water. 90 However, the studies that EPA used to make this decision did not take into account the hike in boron levels that would occur if desalted water was to be added to the system.

#### Endocrine disruption causes extinction

NRDC 2003

(Natural Resources Defense Council, “Toxic Chemicals And Health”,<http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/bendrep.asp>, accessed 9-12)

Experiments in lab animals indicate that while high doses of PCBs can be toxic, lower doses can cause hypo-or hyper-activity, impaired performance on tests of learning, balance, reaction time, and impaired hearing.The doses of exposure that result in behavioral abnormalities, sex hormone abnormalities, and enzymeabnormalities are close to the current exposure levels in humans. We are concerned about endocrine disruption because this is a means by which subtle effects from human actions can have species- and population-extinction outcomes. Small, but critical, changes in the chemical makeup of an environment are enough to trigger outcomes that could lead to population decline and loss of biodiversity.

### Heg A2 Effectiveness

#### Shock means US will cede willingly

Charles A. *Kupchan* Fall *1999* World Policy Journal "Life after pax Americana"

The bad news is that the global stability that unipolarity has engendered will be jeopardized as power becomes more equally distributed in the international system. The good news is that this structural change will occur through different mechanisms than in the past, and therefore may be easier to manage peacefully. The rising challenger is Europe, not a unitary state with hegemonic ambitions. Europe's aspirations will be moderated by the self-checking mechanisms inherent in the EU and by cultural and linguistic barriers to centralization. In addition, the United Statesis likely to react to a more independent Europe by stepping back and making room for an EU that appears ready to be more self-reliant and more muscular. Unlike reigning hegemons in the past, the United States will not fight to the finish to maintain its primacy and prevent its eclipse by a rising challenger. On the contrary, **the United States will cede leadership willingly** as its economy slows and it grows weary of being the security guarantor of last resort. The prospect is thus not one of clashing titans, but of no titans at all. Regions long accustomed to relying on American resourcesand leadership to preserve the peace may well be left to fend for themselves. These are the main reasons that the challenge for American grand strategy as the next century opens will be to wean Europe and East Asia of their dependence on the United States andput in place arrangements that will prevent the return of competitive balancing and regional rivalries in the wake of an American retrenchment.

#### A. Our evidence is comparative -

MacDonald and Parent 2011(Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring, "Graceful Decline?", International Security, Volume 35, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 7-44)jn

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

#### B. It’s empirical -

MacDonald and Parent 2011(Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring, "Graceful Decline?", International Security, Volume 35, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 7-44)jn

Wars, preventive or otherwise, do not appear to be a common fate for declining states, and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases, and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank.60 In addition, in six of fifteen cases, declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound, eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. Further, even if retrenchment was not successful, this does not prove that a preferable policy existed.61 In many cases of decline, there are few restorative solutions available; politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. Short of a miracle, it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain, France, or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft, even with the benefit of hindsight.

### 2NC – Grid – AT: Cyberattacks

#### We don’t have to prove that a cyber attack is impossible, just that high costs will cause enemies to seek alternatives

Rid, reader in war studies – King's College London, and McBurney, professor – Agents and Intelligent Systems Group – Department of Informatics @ King's College, ‘12

(Thomas and Peter, “Cyber-Weapons,” *The RUSI Journal* Volume 157, Issue 1, p. 6-13)

A thorough conceptual analysis and a detailed examination of **the empirical record corroborates our hypothesis**: developing and deploying potentially destructive cyber-weapons against hardened targets will require significant resources, hard-to-get and highly specific target intelligence, and time to prepare, launch and execute an attack. Attacking secured targets would probably require the resources or the support of a state actor; terrorists are unlikely culprits of an equally unlikely cyber-9/11. The scant empirical record also suggests that the greatest benefit of cyber-weapons may be using them in conjunction with conventional or covert military strikes, as Israel did when it blinded the Syrian air defence in 2007. This leads to a second conclusion: the cost-benefit payoff of weaponised instruments of cyber-conflict may be far more questionable than generally assumed: target configurations are likely to be so specific that a powerful cyber-weapon may only be capable of hitting and acting on one single target, or very few targets at best. The equivalent would be a HARM missile that can only destroy one unique emitter, not a set of targets emitting at the same frequency. But in contrast to the missile – where only the seeker needs to be specifically reprogrammed and the general aviation and propulsion systems remain functional – the majority of modular components of a potent cyber-weapon, generic and specific, would have a rather short shelf-life after discovery. Two findings contravene the debate's received wisdom. One insight concerns the dominance of the offence. Most weapons may be used defensively and offensively. But the information age, the argument goes since at least 1996, has ‘offence-dominant attributes’.37 A 2011 Pentagon report on cyberspace again stressed ‘the advantage currently enjoyed by the offense in cyberwarfare’.38 But when it comes to cyber-weapons, the offence has higher costs, a shorter shelf-life than the defence, and a very limited target set.39 All this **drastically reduces the coercive utility of cyber-attacks.** Any threat relies on the offender's credibility to attack, or to repeat a successful attack. Even if a potent cyber-weapon could be launched successfully once, it would be highly questionable if an attack, or even a salvo, could be repeated in order to achieve a political goal. At closer inspection cyber-weapons do not seem to favour the offence. A second insight concerns the risk of electronic arms markets. One concern is that sophisticated malicious actors could resort to asymmetric methods, such as employing the services of criminal groups, rousing patriotic hackers, and potentially redeploying generic elements of known attack tools. Worse, more complex malware is likely to be structured in a modular fashion. Modular design could open up new business models for malware developers. In the car industry, for instance,40 modularity translates into a possibility of a more sophisticated division of labour. Competitors can work simultaneously on different parts of a more complex system. Modules could be sold on underground markets. But if our analysis is correct, potential arms markets pose a more limited risk: the highly specific target information and programming design needed for potent weapons is unlikely to be traded generically. To go back to our imperfect analogy: paintball pistols will continue to be commercially available, but probably not pre-programmed warheads of smart missiles.

#### Their authors conflate threats

Clark 12 MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/

(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

This increased focus on cyber-security has led to concern that the perceived risk is greater than the actual risk, a situation that has resulted in an imbalance between security and privacy and civil liberties (American Civil Liberties Union 2012). In 1993 a Rand Corporation paper predicted that “cyberwar is coming” and **twenty years later the prediction is the same** and critics argue that cyber-war is “more hype than hazard” (Rid 2012). A review of high profile cyberattacks shows that, with the exception of Stuxnet and the limited Israeli disruption of Syrian air defense networks, **most cyber-attacks are** categorized as **information theft,** network compromise, **or website defacement** (Lewis 2012). Even the high profile threat of an “Electronic Pearl Harbor” (Bronk 2009), despite being repeated by senior government officials like U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta (Rid 2012) , has been found to be only a slight possibility (Wilson 2005). There is no doubt that cyber-security is important. Businesses recognize this importance and spent more than $80 billion on computer network security in 2011 (Johnson 2012) and the federal government is expected to be spending $10.5 billion per year by 2015 (Brito and Watkins 2012). This response is appropriate when data shows that the vast majority of cyber-attacks are focused on espionage and the theft of intellectual property. It is not clear why senior government officials and corporate executives focus on high-impact low-probability events and engage in “alarmist rhetoric” (Brito and Watkins 2011) that skews the public perception of risk and creates an atmosphere of fear. The danger of an inappropriate response in reaction to an inflated threat and prevalence of misinformation is exemplified by the politicized intelligence that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Brito and Watkins 2011). Understanding how information on the risk posed by cyber-attacks is poorly communicated and the public reaction to an increased perception of risk – fear – is important in identifying when the perceived risk is greater than the actual risk; when risk is more hype than threat. Critics of current cyber-security policy believe that **threats are being conflated**; this results in a threat appearing larger than it is (Brito and Watkins 2012). In essence, a wide variety of cyber-activity – political and social activity, criminal activity for profit, espionage, and offensive cyber-attack – are treated as presenting the same level of threat. There is a wide divide between easily mounted and easily defended denial of service attacks on public websites and high-potential cyber-weapons capable of severely disrupting or destroying critical infrastructure (Rid and McBurney 2012). The rise of automated tools that allow for low-level cyber-attacks to be easily mounted has caused a significant increase in the number of cyber-attacks, **a statistic often cited as proof of increased risk**, but qualified cyber-security organizations have discarded the number of cyber-attacks as a metric and consider it to be meaningless as a method of assessing the scope and effects of cyber-attacks (Wilson 2005). Without differentiating between generic malicious software and highly specialized and targeted offensive cyber-attacks, the risk of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure systems like the electrical grid **cannot be properly assessed.**

### Pakistan

#### Empirics prove

Chari, 5/2 (PR, Visiting Professor @ IPCS, “Pakistan’s Strategic Stability – Analysis,” 2011, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/pakistans-strategic-stability-analysis-02052011/>, EMM)

The seeds of Pakistan’s demise were sown at its birth. The ‘truncated and moth-eaten’ Pakistan, which emerged after the Partition of British India in 1947, was a geo-political monstrosity with its two ethnically disparate wings being separated by India. Additionally, there were four other factors inherent within the Pakistani polity that portended its future instability, which have continued to fester. First, Pakistan’s governance continues to vacillate between civilian and military rule. No doubt, its citizens tried to shrug off military rule twice in the recent years. For instance, Bhutto came to power in 1971 and the discredited Pakistani Army returned to its barracks after losing East Bengal (Bangladesh). Thereafter, a popular lawyers-civil society movement overthrew President (General) Musharraf in 2008 when he sought to gag the judiciary. The tragedy is that on both these occasions the civilian leaders revealed such remarkable incompetence, disunity and malfeasance that Pakistani citizens welcomed back military rule in 1971 and the current Zardari-Geelani combine teeters on the brink of ouster. Second, Pakistan remains unable to decide what kind of a state it wishes to be. Its dilemma of choosing between a state pursuing moderate Islam with its South Asian characteristics and a state adhering to the Wahabi code of Islamic orthodoxy linked to external Saudi roots continues unresolved. Indeed, this contention has worsened with Pakistan becoming the target for bomb attacks by radicalized Islamic militants, suicide bombers and other extremists equally along with the NATO and American forces in Afghanistan. Third, Pakistan has essentially become a closed society; its governing elites comprise the land-owning classes, large business houses, armed forces and civilian bureaucracy with no space for entry by aspirants from the middle classes. The result is an atrophied feudal society, ill-equipped to deal with its problems in a rapidly changing international system. This is clearly reflected in the rentier Pakistani economy, which is permanently dependent on external assistance. In consequence, Pakistan’s foreign policy choices have become hostage to its need for external sustenance, which translates into ‘cleverness’ substituting for either principle or consistency. Fourth, Pakistan’s foreign and defence policy have also become hostage to the Pakistan Army – the real ruler of Pakistan – which ensures it relevance by casting India in the permanent role of an adversary. This in turn guarantees the Pakistan Army preemptive access to large budgetary allocations, despite the parlous state of the national economy. Further on, the evocative Kashmir issue is being kept alive by the Pakistan Army to continue its hostility towards India, and ensure its preeminence in the national polity.

### Caribbean

#### Alt Causes to political instability and disease spread

**Schneider 2002**. (Mark, “The Destabilizing Impacts of HIV/AIDS.” http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5DWGVF/$file/csis-aids-may02.pdf?openelement)

Thus far, HIV/AIDS has inflicted considerable harm on societies outside subSaharan Africa but has not ravaged them in the same comprehensive way. Most experts suggest that the combination of extreme poverty, malnutrition, inadequate infrastructure, and the failure of political institutions and leadership has made Africa most immediately vulnerable. There is mounting evidence, however, that a similar combination of some or all of these factors (albeit in less virulent form) is raising the prospect of full-blown pandemics in critical parts of Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the Caribbean.

#### Your evidence is all hype - there’s a 1 in 3.5 billion chance of a terrorist strike

Schneidmiller 9 (Chris, GSN Writer, Citing John Mueller of Ohio State, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism,” January 13th, <http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090113_7105.php>)

There is an "almost vanishingly small" likelihood that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 [and a half] 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said.

## 1NR

### Overview

#### And, structural violence outweighs the Aff—it psychologically biases us towards escalation

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

**These wars of resource conquest are likely and empirically proven—uranium’s role in nuclear weaponization makes militarization of its insecurity inevitable**

**Meierding ’11**

(Emily, “Energy Security and Sub-Saharan Africa”, International Review of Politics and Development (translated from French), 2011, http://poldev.revues.org/744)

However, the economic ease of raw material access is only one aspect of international uranium security concerns. **Given uranium’s role in nuclear weapons technology, resource control is also regarded as a military security issue**. These concerns can be overblown; raw uranium poses little military threat. In order to ‘weaponise’ the material, it must be mined, milled to create yellowcake, converted into a gas, then enriched to increase its percentage of U-235, the fissile isotope. Usually, only the first two of these steps occur in less developed, uranium-endowed countries. Since enrichment is extremely costly, few states have developed domestic facilities, especially for enriching up to the 90 per cent U-235 threshold required to fuel research reactors and create nuclear weapons. Most enriched uranium is currently produced by only three companies, namely Russia’s Rosatom, Europe’s Enrichment Technology Company and the United States Enrichment Corporation.7 Thus, there is usually a geographic disconnect between suppliers of raw uranium resources and sites of potential military insecurity. **Nonetheless, even limited insecurity in uranium-endowed states can have broad political repercussions**; in 2003 American officials used reports of the transmission of yellowcake from Niger into Iraq to reinforce their claims that Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to international security prior to the US invasion (Hersh, 2003).

#### That insecuritization is the only way nuclear war happens

**Konstantiov 12 –** professor of math at Moscow State and member of numerous scientific/geological councils

(Mihail Konstantiov, Professor of Mathematics with the University of Architecture, Civil Engineering and Geodesy (UACEG), Bulgaria, Vice-Chancellor of UACEG (1999-2003), Member of scientific councils and commissions, Member of the Board of IICREST. He has authored 30 books and over 500 scientific papers. He has participated in international scientific projects of EU and NATO and realized research and lecturing visits in British, German and French universities. Prof. Konstantinov has been Member and Vice Chair of the Central Election Commission of Bulgaria and Voting coordinator of OSCE (1997-) as well as the Bulgarian representative at the Council of Europe on electronic voting. In addition to his scientific publications, he has authored more than 300 articles in Bulgarian editions devoted to social and political issues with emphasis on election practice and legislation., “Uranium time bomb ticking”, Europost, 2-11-2012, http://www.europost.bg/article?id=3763)

In 1945, the US had three nucle­ar bombs - two plu­to­ni­um-based devi­ces and a ura­ni­um-based one. The first one was det­o­nat­ed on a test site in New Mex­i­co, and the sec­ond and third ones over Jap­a­nese ter­ri­to­ry. On 6 August 1945, the then-only ura­ni­um-based bomb was thrown over the Jap­a­nese city of Hiro­shi­ma. What hap­pened is well known and I will not re-tell it. More­over, this sto­ry deals with nucle­ar weap­ons but they are not the main char­ac­ters. Almost 20 years ago, an agree­ment was inked under which the US under­took to help dis­man­tle Rus­sian nucle­ar war­heads and con­vert the ura­ni­um from them into fuel for nucle­ar reac­tors. The rea­son is sim­ple - the pro­ce­dure is expen­sive, Rus­sia was weak and poor at the time, and in addi­tion, Amer­i­can tech­nol­o­gy back then was sig­nif­i­cant­ly ahead of the Rus­sian one. The amounts of con­vert­ed ura­ni­um are mas­sive - more than 500 ton­nes. Thus Rus­sian ura­ni­um turns into fuel for US nucle­ar pow­er plants. At present, this fuel is used to pro­duce 10% of the elec­tri­cal pow­er in the US. This is more than the ener­gy pro­duced from renew­a­ble sour­ces, such as sun, wind and water, there. This idyll, how­e­ver, is com­ing to its end. First, the US-Rus­sia agree­ment for Rus­sian war­heads con­ver­sion expires next year and Rus­sia is high­ly unlike­ly to extend it. More­over, Rus­sians now have good tech­nol­o­gy for that pur­pose and will prob­a­bly want to leave their ura­ni­um for them­selves. And sec­ond, if the agree­ment is extend­ed, the amounts of war­heads sub­ject to dis­man­tling will soon be exhaust­ed any­way as the agreed lim­its are reached. Glob­al mar­kets have already start­ed sus­pect­ing what is going to hap­pen with the expir­ing US-Rus­sia agree­ment for war­head ura­ni­um. And not only with it. Indeed, ura­ni­um oxide pri­ces have gone wild sur­ging to almost $70/lb (1lb is 454 gr.) in Jan­u­ary this year from $40/lb in Sep­tem­ber 2011. Such a 70% ral­ly in ura­ni­um price over just 3-4- months is not sus­tain­a­ble and even a cer­tain edg­ing down can be expect­ed. Still, the trend is clear - ura­ni­um dearth is loom­ing, as well as dearth of oth­er stra­te­gic nat­u­ral resour­ces. We have repeat­ed­ly stat­ed this but let us under­score it again. The glob­al cri­sis is most of all a resource cri­sis. It is finan­cial inso­far as it has became clear that the sys­tem allow­ing some peo­ple to print mon­ey while oth­ers work and bring them oil and oth­er goods will not last for good. The antic­i­pat­ed ura­ni­um short­age in the com­ing dec­ade is tru­ly strik­ing and is esti­mat­ed at 500m lb! One of the rea­sons is the fast devel­op­ing econ­o­mies of Chi­na and India, along with oth­er coun­tries like Bra­zil and Tur­key. It is where the bulk of the 147 reac­tors expect­ed to become oper­a­tion­al in these 10 years will be locat­ed. A major con­sum­er of ura­ni­um, the US cur­rent­ly has a demand for 60m lb a year but pro­du­ces only 3m lb. Still, this is the way things are at present. And what will hap­pen aft­er the US Nucle­ar Reg­u­la­to­ry Com­mis­sion reviews and poten­tial­ly approves new nucle­ar reac­tor pro­pos­als? They are 26 or so. And more are in the pipe­line. The sit­u­a­tion in India is even more dra­mat­ic - an increase in the share of nucle­ar ener­gy in elec­tric­i­ty pro­duc­tion is expect­ed from 2.5% at present to 25%. In oth­er words, India will need 10 times as much ura­ni­um as it does now if the far-reach­ing plan is put to prac­tice. Chi­na has more hum­ble aspi­ra­tions and is gear­ing to raise the share of nucle­ar facil­i­ties in elec­tric­i­ty pro­duc­tion only ...three times. And Chi­na, much like the US, does not have suf­fi­cient domes­tic sup­ply. We can con­tin­ue with sta­tis­tics, but things are evi­dent any­way. A war is around the cor­ner. In the best-case sce­nar­io, this will be a price war over ura­ni­um and in par­tic­u­lar ura­ni­um oxide. Pri­ces in the order of $100 or even $200/lb no longer seem far-fetched. Price lev­els of $500-$1000-$2000/lb have even been men­tioned and this will have its swift and dras­tic impli­ca­tions. Still, if a reac­tor costs $4bn, why not pay $1000/lb of ura­ni­um? Or else, the 4-bil­lion invest­ment will go down the drain. Anoth­er explod­ing glob­al mar­ket is the one for rare earth ele­ments with hard-to-pro­nounce Lat­in names such as Neo­dym­i­um, Ceri­um, Lan­tha­num, Gal­li­um, Gado­lin­i­um, Thu­li­um… If we have a look at Men­de­leev's peri­od­ic table, they are squeezed some­where at the bot­tom. But then, all the elec­tron­ics around us, all com­put­ers, fibre optics, all sat­el­lites and in gen­er­al every­thing under­ly­ing our high-tech civ­il­i­za­tion would be utter­ly impos­si­ble but for these exot­ic hard-to-extract ele­ments. The price of each of them has dou­bled and tri­pled in a year alone. And the pri­ces of some of them have soared six­fold in the same peri­od. Com­pared with rare earth ele­ments, gold and plat­i­num are like a tame kit­ten. It nat­u­ral­ly eats and swells but at a rate of only up to 40% a year. And what about the lith­i­um under­ly­ing the idea of elec­tric vehi­cles stag­ing a mass entrance into our dai­ly life and econ­o­my if and when oil is exhaust­ed? But it is in rare ele­ments where the secret of future skir­mish­es over resour­ces lies. Because across the world, they are real­ly hard to extract but Chi­na holds 97% of their glob­al pro­duc­tion! No mis­take, Chi­na pro­du­ces 33 times as much rare met­als as the rest of the world. This may as well be changed some day as cur­rent­ly huge efforts and mon­ey are put into look­ing for rare met­als around the globe. Hypo­thet­i­cal­ly, only a third of the res­erves is in Chi­na with the oth­er two thirds lying some­where else. Too bad it is any­one's guess where, although Cana­da, South Afri­ca and some Afri­can coun­tries are con­sid­ered prom­is­ing in this regard. Still, for the time being this is how things are: Chi­na has almost every­thing and the rest of the world hard­ly any­thing. Does any­one have any doubts why Chi­na has the ambi­tion to become the top dog? Of course, the world is by no means tread­ing water in one oth­er respect: sub­sti­tute tech­nol­o­gies are sought for that would not be so crit­i­cal­ly depend­ent on rare earth ele­ments, yet, more in the long rath­er than short run. By the way, why are we dis­cuss­ing ura­ni­um pri­ces along with all oth­er sorts of pri­ces in US dol­lars? The answer is clear: because the dol­lar is the glob­al reserve cur­ren­cy. The rea­son for this, though, is more com­pli­cat­ed. True, the US is the larg­est econ­o­my for the time being. But it is also among the most indebt­ed coun­tries in the world. And its debt is increas­ing­ly sur­ging. Still, this is not the most impor­tant. The most impor­tant thing is that the US has the most pow­er­ful, most mobile and one of the most effect­ive armies in the world. Lit­tle like­ly is it for some­one to reject the US dol­lar as a reserve cur­ren­cy while the 82nd Air­borne Divi­sion of the US Army, based at Fort Bragg North Car­o­li­na, is the holy ter­ror it is at the moment. And there is much more to it than the 82nd Divi­sion. So the time bomb of ura­ni­um and rare earth ele­ments dearth is tick­ing. And lit­tle idea do we have of the time it is set for. Or wheth­er, when it final­ly goes off, some­body might remem­ber the first mas­sive appli­ca­tion of ura­ni­um, which turned thou­sands into ash­es some 67 years ago. **And be temp­ted to use it again**. For 67 years now, we have been show­ing rea­son and sur­viv­ing. Let us hope fierce defi­cien­cy of nat­u­ral resour­ces, food and water that is loom­ing will not take it away from us.

#### Nuclear waste is obscured by technological optimism is tainted by the military industry complex that obscures our approaches to nuclear power and ensures violence against the periphery

**Kuletz** lecturer in American studies at the University of Canterbury **1998** Valerie, The Tainted Desert p 15

The United States has paid a **high price** for “winning” the Cold War and for its use of nuclear energy in the pursuit of global **economic and military superiority**. But the actual price of the Cold War, and of “national competitiveness,” hasn’t even begun to be tallied. An exploration of the nuclear waste crisis reveal the **inequitable distribution of payment**, weighing most **heavily on the disenfranchised**, and thus contributes to a more accurate assessment of what “**collateral” damage** has been inflicted in the pursuit of **capitalist political hegemony.** The so-called “price” for “freedom” is paid for by those with the least power, the least chance to benefit from U.S. control of global order and the wealth it brings. If we look beneath the rhetoric of progress so common in the postwar twentieth century – a rhetoric that equates nuclear technology with unlimited clean power – we find a familiar triad: the military, science, and industry. These comprise the institutions that have most benefited from nuclearism and whose interlocking desires have resulted in, among other things, the emergence of a nuclear wasteland in the interdesert region populated by communities with **far less prestige, privilege, and power.**

The plans acceleration of nuclear production is environmental racism – it’s a toxic genocide on the periphery and indigenous lands globally

Endres 9 (Danielle, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Utah, “From wasteland to waste site: the role of discourse in nuclear power’s environmental injustices,” Local Environment Vol. 14, No. 10, November 2009, 917–937)

As mentioned above, **nuclear colonialism** describes how the nuclear production process – including both nuclear weapons production and nuclear power – **disproportionately harms indigenous people worldwide**.3 The Indigenous Environmental Network (2002) wrote: The nuclear industry has waged an **undeclared war** against our Indigenous peoples and Pacific Islanders that has poisoned our communities worldwide. For more than 50 years, the legacy of the nuclear chain, from exploration to the dumping of radioactive waste has been proven, through documentation, to be **genocide and ethnocide** and a deadly enemy of Indigenous peoples. . . United States federal law and nuclear policy has not protected Indigenous peoples, and in fact has been created to allow the nuclear industry to **continue operations** at the **expense** of our land, territory, health and traditional ways of life. . . . This disproportionate toxic burden – called environmental racism – has culminated in the current attempts to dump much of the nation’s nuclear waste in the homelands of the Indigenous peoples of the Great Basin region of the United States. Examples of nuclear colonialism in the United States include Uranium mining and milling on reservation lands in the Black Hills and Four Corners regions, nuclear testing on land claimed under the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley by the Western Shoshone, and HLWstorage sites con- sidered on Western Shoshone, Southern Paiute, and Skull Valley Band of Goshute lands (Nelkin 1981, Grinde and Johansen 1995, Kuletz 1998, La Duke 1999, Hoffman 2001). The phenomenon of nuclear colonialism is empirically documented. The book Nuclear Wastelands, edited by Makhijani et al. (1995), reveals that indigenous people in the USA and globally are disproportionately burdened by the production of nuclear weapons. Further, Hooks and Smith (2004, p. 572) demonstrate that US military sites are dispropor- tionately located on or near Native American lands. While these studies focus primarily on military applications of nuclear technologies, there is also evidence to suggest that Uranium mining for nuclear power production and HLW storage also fall within the pattern of **nuclear colonialism** (Nelkin 1981, Hoffman 2001). Hoffman (2001, p. 462) details the “extraordinary unequal distribution of benefits and burdens at each stage of the [nuclear fuel] cycle” imposed upon Native American nations in the USA, particularly by Uranium mining and HLW disposal. Nuclear colonialism is a type of environmental injustice. In part, nuclear colonialism is environmental racism. According to Bullard (1999, p. 6), “**environmental racism** combines with public policies and industry practices to **provide benefits for whites while shifting costs to people of color**”. Yet, nuclear colonialism is also a form of colonialism. Native Americans, unlike other marginalised racial groups in the USA, are members of over 150 distinct sovereign tribal nations and each holds a unique legal relationship with the federal government. As Suagee (2002, p. 227) notes, “Although Indian people have suffered much discriminatory treatment from people who apparently define Indian identity in primar- ily racial–ethnic terms, the fact that Native American governments are sovereign govern- ments is a significant distinction between them and other kinds of minorities”. Although Native Americans in the USA are sovereign governments, they are still faced with a system of colonialism. Gedicks (1993, p. 13) argues that Native Americans are **embedded within a system of resource colonialism** under which “native peoples are **under assault on every continent** because their lands contain a wide variety of valuable resources needed for industrial development”. Nuclear colonialism is a form of resource colonialism that faces Native Americans in the USA and other indigenous peoples worldwide.4

### Framework

#### Interrogating dominant policy frameworks creates space for new ways of approaching energy policy – our role as energy policy researchers should be to interrogating the framing of our policies

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

This paper has provided several examples where central elements of energy policy have been discursively constructed so as to speak directly to core government priorities, such as economic growth and national security. This has served to **maintain the dominance of the current framing of energy policy** and to **promote certain political interests**. This is a challenging observation if one argues that energy policy needs to be **reframed**. The transition to a low carbon economy may be a good idea. Indeed, it is one that is increasingly central in policy discourses in both developed and developing countries. This does not, however, necessarily mean that this discursive shift will have any specific material impact on energy policy. The institutional constraints on discursive developments here still exist and must be **confronted** (or conformed to) **before new policy ideas are likely to gain** any **influence**. Having an impact on the core of energy policy requires **confronting the** dominance, or ‘**discursive hegemony’** of the existing way in which policy is framed – within the context of the constraints that have shaped and **f**acilitated this existing framing. This is almost a ‘Catch-22’ situation if one wants to see urgent action to tackle climate change: to be radical but excluded (and potentially right only with hindsight), or gradualist and engaged in a process that may move too slowly to avert disaster. This argument suggests that reframing energy policy is only likely to be successful if the arguments that support it are discursively constructed in such a way as to speak to core government imperatives. If climate change is one of the central reasons behind needing to reframe energy policy, then the fact that the environment sits outside of the core imperatives that governments have to deliver against to ensure their survival implies that this could be very challenging indeed. It is, of course, possible that future events might transpire to alter this. As mentioned above, catastrophic climate impacts might well mean that protecting the environment becomes a core government imperative. But by this point it may well be too late for any reframing of energy policy to be effective in tackling climate change. Of course there is the possibility in the shorter term that the government imperative to sustain representative legitimacy will put tackling climate on an equal footing with security or economic growth. For this to happen in a relevant timeframe, however, will require extraordinary popular pressure and institutional changes. Ideas serving expansion of fossil fuel markets are strongly embedded in today's predominantly technocratic and nationalistic energy policy discourses. We hope that this article has served to provide an accessible introduction to the ways in which discourse and linguistic framing effects might be playing a role in sustaining **energy policy frameworks** that are **resistant to** the many insightful **changes** often advocated in the pages of Energy Policy. If the influence of such framing effects is accepted, we begin to see how the process of effecting changes in energy policy is not just a technical or economic task, but also a political task. Moreover, this highlights an urgent need for civil society to engage directly with the existing framing of energy policy and the problems it seeks to address in an effort to reframe it around more sustainable, low carbon principles and concerns. The demonstration of the value of a **discourse analytic approach** in this paper, together with other emerging contributions in this field (cited above), also serves to highlight some **important considerations for energy policy researchers**. Moving away from the traditional linear understanding of the policy process **requires researchers to critically reflect** on the interplay of values, beliefs, entrenched interests and institutional structures that serve to **facilitate or constrain the policy traction** of certain framings of **energy policy problems and solutions**. Further than this, it also highlights the **role** in this process that we ourselves play as **researchers**, and the extent to which our own values, beliefs and interests influence the **framing of our research practice and communication**. This has important and far reaching implications, both methodological and normative, raising considerations that are likely to continue to **gain traction** as researchers and policy makers alike increasingly appreciate the need for reflexivity in our approach to **framing**, interpreting and implementing **energy policy** in the decades to come.[2](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#fn2)

### AT: Owen

#### Theory driven approaches to IR are key to prioritizing structural violence in impact calculus – their political imagination crowds out alternative narratives of marginalized perspectives

Jeong 99 (Ho-Won, associate professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Epistemological Foundations for Peace Research, [classweb.gmu.edu/hwjeong/epistemological.htm](http://classweb.gmu.edu/hwjeong/epistemological.htm))

**Ignoring normative questions would not help find alternative visions.** Conditions for building peace are not dealt with in behavioral research traditions. Statistical data and empirical findings are themselves do not offer strategies for creating a peaceful world. The uncertainty of politics would not be removed by pure scientific analysis of human behavior. According to some observers in peace studies, the efforts to find regularities have been pursued "to the point of **eliminating individual creativity and responsibility may well mire us in cyclic determinism**."(Forcey, 1989:13) Critics of the positivist paradigm attribute the **reductionist** character of contemporary thought to the drive for control of nature. The critique of behavioral sciences coincides with a "critique of conscience" in the academic community. Conscience dictates feelings, moral stances, and a concern for truth and justice. The desire for value explicit inquiry stems from the fact that human behavior would not be investigated without references to social collectivity in historical contexts. Overall, the normative starting point of peace research has to be anchored in the agreement that peace is the object of the quest.(Broadhead, 1997:2) The utility of any research methods could be evaluated in terms of the way they are compatible with the general goal of a disciplinary focus. Holistic Approaches Some researchers suggest that peace studies should start from **holism as the framework**.(Smoker and Groff, 1996) Knowledge about general human experiences of conflict helps interpret specific events. Given their abstract nature, however, theories may not correspond with the facts and events which they seek to explain. The meanings of events are set up within a context of wholes. The intellectual transformation is necessary for developing a paradigm of peace. The achievement of peace should be a holistic goal of research. Holistic versions of theories project the flow of **alternative images of reality**. **There are different theoretical explanations about how and why to go to war**. The plurality of theories ought not to be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will eventually lead to one true grand theory. Universally applicable knowledge is not produced by piecemeal theory building efforts. There seems to be consensus that peace research must not be limited to conventional empirical methods. Extended historical perspectives illustrate what is important in understanding conditions for peace. The evaluation of research findings needs a yardstick for examining their relevance. The incorporation of emancipatory cognitive interest would help suggest theories for a peaceful world. More holistic approaches can be encouraged by hermeneutic philosophy of science. Reasoning needs to be combined with experiences in understanding the holistic pictures of social relations. The outcome in the real world is not easily deduced from abstractly modeled relationships. In considering difficulties for justification of inducing wholes from parts, the ultimate validity of the big pictures is elusive. Theories which can be positively verifiable does not necessarily mean that they are true. Realities in peace and conflict do not last long enough to be subject to comprehensive, systematic and effective empirical assaults on them. Explanation can be based on intuitive understanding of long and varied experiences. There are various ways to observe the world, including historical interpretations. Different perceptions of social relationships result from the process of formation and transformation of images and symbols. Peace studies may belong to the same category as history and critical sociology in terms of its methods to study an object. In contrast with economics, many factors related to structural violence such as political repression and economic exploitation cannot be easily understood without socio-historical contexts**.** Distinctions between independent and dependent variables are artificial. Understanding the outcome of an event would be enhanced by clarifying the specific goals of actors

### Perm—Do Both

#### Permutation co-opts the alt – reaffirms the discoursive hegemony of the 1AC and prevents critical interrogaton of failed methods

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

This perspective begins by seeing politics as a struggle for ‘**discursive hegemony’** in which actors seek to achieve ‘discursive closure’ by securing support for their definition of reality ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)). The notion of ‘**story-lines’** is useful here. These **narratives employ symbolic references that imply** a **common understanding of an issue** ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14); [Rydin, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib24)). Essentially, the assumption is that actors do not draw on a comprehensive discursive system; instead this is **evoked through story-lines**. By uttering a specific word or phrase, for example, ‘global warming’, **a whole story-line is in effect re-invoked**; one that is subtly different, for example, to that of the ‘anthropogenic greenhouse effect’ or ‘climate change’. ‘Global warming’ implies a story-line where the whole earth will get hotter in the future; ‘climate change’ suggests something less certain and uniform (see [Whitmarsh, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib33)); ‘anthropogenic greenhouse effect’ is perhaps the most technically correct term, and it directly attributes the warming effect to human activity. Story-lines are therefore much more than simply ‘arguments’. The meanings and connotations of familiar story-lines are often recognised at an almost **subconscious level**. They can thus act to **define policy problems while obscuring underpinning interests, values and beliefs.** They can add credibility to the claims of certain groups and render those of other groups less credible. They therefore act to create social order within a given domain by serving as devices through which actors are positioned and ideas defined and linked together. Institutional arrangements are important in structuring discourses, forming routine understandings. Complex research findings or logical arguments are often reduced to an eye-catching visual representation or memorable one-liners. These gloss over real complexities and uncertainties, and entail significant loss of meaning. This allows considerable flexibility in interpretation, which helps recruit people with differing views into a ‘discourse coalition’. It also avoids confrontation or even the necessity for direct social contact between coalition members ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)). In this view, to shape policy, **a new discourse** must **dominate** in public and policy discussions, **and penetrate the routines of policy practice** through institutionalisation within laws, regulations and organisations ([Hajer, 1993](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib13); [Nossiff, 1998](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib19); [Healey, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib16)). In terms of policy change then, **promoting a new story-line** is a difficult task, involving **dismantling** those promoted by those actors who were able to achieve prominence for their claims and viewpoint originally ([Rydin, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib24)) and which may have become **embedded in institutions**. For example, it took over a decade for the issue of acid rain to impact on UK air pollution policy. A discourse coalition formed around the issue that promoted a story-line highlighting the negative international environmental impacts of emissions from coal-fired power stations, particularly trees dying in Scandinavian countries, and the related need for tighter pollution controls in Europe. In the UK the acid rain discourse coalition first had to confront the institutionally entrenched British discourse on air pollution. This was dominated by local and national concerns with urban air pollution and health effects, which left little room for the consideration of new ideas related to the international environmental impacts of industrial emissions ([Hajer, 1995, p. 268](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)).

#### That forces the alt to take a backseat to dominant ways of expressing energy knowledge

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

All too often, however, the subjective roles of specialist knowledge, ideas, values, beliefs, and **underlying interests** are **ignored in policy discussions**. As [Adams et al. (2003, p.1915)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib1) put it: ‘…policy debates are often **flawed** because of the **assumption** that the **actors involved share an understanding of the problem that is being discussed**. They tend to ignore the fact that the assumptions, knowledge, and understandings that **underlie** the definition of [policy] problems are frequently uncertain and contested.’ In this way the ideas of certain actors are often **dismissed** as they fail to fit with **dominant ways of expressing knowledge claims within institutional contexts**. For example, in the aftermath of Chernobyl, Cumbrian sheep farmers’ knowledge about the physical properties of the soil in the Lake District was ignored by government scientists. This led to an ill-informed and ineffective policy response, while creating antagonism and fostering distrust of officials and experts ([Wynne, 1996](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib34)). Recognising the ways in which values, beliefs and ideas are shaped and drawn upon in the construction of policy problems and solutions makes it possible to reach a **better understanding** of the policy process. It is an arena that involves the interplay of different and often competing ‘knowledge claims’ of various actors. Sometimes these conflicts are between the different types of knowledge (‘knowledges’) of lay or local actors and those of experts, but they can equally constitute contests within local or specialist communities.

# Neg Round 2 v Emory PS

## 1NC

### T – regs/incentive

#### Financial incentives must disburse federal funds for energy production—mandates and regulations are indirect incentive—that crushes limits

Webb, sessional lecture – Faculty of Law @ University of Ottawa, ‘93

(Kernaghan, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501)

One of the obstacles to intelligent discussion of this topic is the tremendous potential for confusion about what is meant by several of the key terms involved. In the hopes of contributing to the development of a consistent and precise vocabulary applying to this important but understudied area of regulatory activity, various terms are defined below. In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements**18** of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.**19** Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

 "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Vote Neg—plethora of bidirectional mechanisms impact energy markets in ways that could increase production—only direct financial disbursements for increased production create a predictable and manageable topic—prerequisite to negative ground and preparation

EIA, Energy Information Administration, Office of Energy Markets and End Use, U.S. DOE, ‘92

(“Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect Interventions in Energy Markets,” ftp://tonto.eia.doe.gov/service/emeu9202.pdf)

In some sense, most Federal policies have the potential to affect energy markets. Policies supporting economic stability or economic growth have energy market consequences; so also do Government policies supporting highway development or affordable housing. The interaction between any of these policies and energy market outcomes may be worthy of study. However, energy impacts of such policies would be incidental to their primary purpose and are not examined here. Instead, this report focuses on Government actions whose prima facie purpose is to affect energy market outcomes, whether through financial incentives, regulation, public enterprise, or research and development.

### xo

#### Obama should create a special category for Central Appalachia wind power in the United States Department of Agriculture’s Rural Energy for America Program.

#### Solves 100% of case

Mayer 1 [Kenneth, Professor of Political Science @ University of Wisconsin – Madison, *With the Stroke of a Pen]*

These chronicles of presidential decisiveness and unilateral action are at odds with the prevailing scholarly view of presidential power. Among political scientists the conventional wisdom is that the president is weak, hobbled by the separation of powers and the short reach of his formal legal authority. Presidential power, far from being a matter of prerogative or legal rule, “is the power to persuade,” wrote Richard Neustadt in the single most influential statement about the office in the past fifty years.6 Yet throughout U.S. history presidents have relied on their executive authority to make unilateral policy without interference from either Congress or the courts. In this book, I investigate how presidents have used a tool of executive power—the executive order—to wield their inherent legal authority. Executive orders are, loosely speaking, presidential directives that require or authorize some action within the executive branch (though they often extend far beyond the government).**They are presidential edicts, legal instruments that create or modify laws, procedures, and policy by fiat**. Working from their position as chief executive and commander in chief, presidents have used executive orders to make momentous policy choices, creating and abolishing executive branch agencies, reorganizing administrative and regulatory processes, determining how legislation is implemented, and taking whatever action is permitted within the boundaries of their constitutional or statutory authority. Even within the confines of their executive powers, presidents have been able to “legislate” in the sense of making policy that goes well beyond simple administrative activity. Y ale Law School professor E. Donald Elliot has argued that many of the thousands of executive orders “plainly ‘make law’ in every sense,”7 and Louis Fisher finds that despite the fact that the Constitution unambiguously vests the legislative function in Congress, “the President’s lawmaking role is substantial, persistent, and in many cases disturbing.”8

#### Obama is consolidating domestic executive authority to regulate the environment – congressional deadlock is key

International Business Times 6-23-12 (“Executive Power Shift: How Obama Is Remaking His Presidency To Ignore Congressional Gridlock,” http://www.ibtimes.com/executive-power-shift-how-obama-remaking-his-presidency-ignore-congressional-gridlock-704062)

It's the right of the executive branch to have a certain policy and to interpret the laws in the general way it believes is correct, so you would expect a Democratic administration to interpret the laws regarding, say, clean air, more seriously than a Republican one, said Harvey Mansfield, a professor of government at Harvard University. That's why you vote for one party's president over another. I don't think the executive should just be carrying out, in an errand boy sense, the legislative will. That imperative may be stronger in an era marked by intense, often paralyzing partisanship in Congress. Thomas Mann, a congressional scholar at the Brookings Institution who recently completed a book on the topic, said Obama had few options outside of flexing his executive muscle. Obama's increasing use of executive authority is an inevitable consequence of the unified, relentless opposition he has faced from Republicans in Congress from the beginning of his administration, Mann wrote in an email. With Republicans controlling the House and unwilling to compromise on anything of consequence, he has no alternative. The list of initiatives he has taken is growing long -- and it will get longer before the election. That may be true. But it raises the risk of a self-sustaining pattern, one in which the two parties become more deeply entrenched in their ideological positions and the president, as a result, becomes more assertive. There's a possibility here for a vicious cycle, said Michael Gerhardt, a constitutional law professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. And unless or until Congress is able to act consistently and address these issues on its own, it makes it easier for the president to act unilaterally or act based on statutes that Congress has not yet revised.

#### K2 solve extinction – universal democratic equality exceeds the carrying capacity

Beeson 2010 – Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Western

Australia (Mark, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics

Vol. 19, No. 2, March 2010, 276–294)

While evidence about the implications of environmental degradation and even global warming are increasingly uncontroversial, their possible political consequences are more contentious. Although some of the preceding analysis is necessarily speculative and inferential, the experiences of China and Southeast Asia highlight issues of unambiguously global significance. The central question that emerges from this discussion is whether democracy can be sustained in the region – or anywhere else for that matter – given the unprecedented and unforgiving nature of the challenges we collectively face. Indeed, such is the urgency of the environmental crisis that some have argued – alarmingly persuasively – that ‘humanity will have to trade its liberty to live as it wishes in favour of a system where survival is paramount’ (Shearman and Smith 2007, p. 4). In such circumstances, forms of ‘good’ authoritarianism, in which environmentally unsustainable forms of behaviour are simply forbidden, may become not only justifiable, but essential for the survival of humanity in anything approaching a civilised form. Such ideas are difficult to accept, especially for societies steeped in traditions of liberalism, individualism, freedom of choice and personal advancement. The US is, of course, such a country, where an entire national consciousness and way of life is predicated upon liberal values – values which some consider profoundly inimical to environmental sustainability (Ophuls 1997). It is also the country that has done most to contribute to global environmental problems like climate change, but which has until now seemed incapable of addressing them politically (Stephens 2007). In China, by contrast, an authoritarian regime has arguably done more to mitigate environmental problems than any other government on earth: without the one-child policy instigated in the 1970s, it is estimated that there would already be another 400 million Chinese (Dickie 2008) and China’s environmental problems (and everyone else’s) would be that much worse. Luckily for the world’s non-Chinese population, China does not enjoy the same living standards as the US, and it is impossible to imagine that the vast majority of its citizens ever will. There are, it seems, fundamental, implacable constraints on the carrying capacity of the planet (Cohen 1995). The real tragedy about China’s development is not the failure to democratise rapidly, but that at the very moment that human beings seem to have figured out how to generate economic development on a massive scale, it is becoming apparent that it cannot be sustained, at least not by 6 billion people living Western lifestyles, and certainly not by the 9–12 billion or so that some think will mark the extent of human expansion.6

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#### Immigration reform will pass – Obama is pushing, GOP on board, top of the agenda.

CSM 12-28. [Christian Science Monitor "Immigration reform likely to be at the top of Congress’ agenda in 2013" -- www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/12/28/immigration-reform-likely-to-be-at-the-top-of-congress-agenda-in-2013/]

The momentum of President Obama's resounding victory in November's election – with a big push from Latinos and other minority groups – has catapulted immigration policy to the top of Washington's 2013 agenda, making reform not only possible but also likely.¶ The shift in the political conversation has been so dramatic that even a pathway to citizenship for some of the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States – long rejected out of hand by most Republicans and some Democrats – could be part of the deal.¶ The task is momentous. It involves weighing the wishes of industries from agriculture to high-tech, as well as the sensitivities of opening the door to immigrant workers at a time when unemployment remains high.¶ The past only reinforces the potential difficulties ahead. In 1986, Republicans felt betrayed when Democrats stripped the enforcement provisions from a bill that offered citizenship to some 3 million illegal immigrants. By 2005, the issue had become so politically toxic to conservatives that they blocked President George W. Bush's push for a new round of immigration reform.¶ Yet with Election 2012 highlighting the electoral consequences of America's changing demographics, the next year appears to be ripe for compromise. How reforms might take shape could be a major point of contention between the parties, but lawmakers on both sides suddenly see an opportunity for what could be their most expansive achievement of 2013.¶ "It has to be in 2013," says Rep. Raúl Labrador (R) of Idaho, an immigration lawyer who thundered into Congress in the tea party wave of 2010. "If we wait until 2014, it's going to be election time. And you know how efficient we are here during election time."¶ Recent weeks have seen a flurry of activity on Capitol Hill. In the Senate, a "Gang of Eight" – led by longtime immigration reformers Sen. Chuck Schumer (D) of New York and Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina – has added freshman Sens. Michael Bennett (D) of Colorado and Mike Lee (R) of Utah, while potential 2016 presidential aspirant Sen. Marco Rubio (R) of Florida leads his own initiative.¶ Members of the House have seen movement, too. "One thing clearly has changed," says Rep. Luis Gutierrez (D) of Illinois, the lawmaker who co-wrote a 2005 comprehensive immigration reform measure with now Sen.-elect Jeff Flake (R) of Arizona. "Nobody is talking about self-deportation. Nobody is talking about how [Arizona's controversial immigration law] should be the standard applied across the land. Nobody is talking about vetoing the DREAM Act," which offers a path to citizenship for some young undocumented immigrants.¶ "We are having wonderful conversations," Representative Gutierrez says.¶ That more moderate tone from the GOP is what the November election has wrought.¶ In a postelection analysis and poll of Latino voters, Republican polling group Resurgent Republic offered a searing critique of the GOP's political strategy of pumping up turnout among white voters, often by championing hard-line policies on immigration issues that turn off key Asian and Hispanic voters.¶ "Republicans have run out of persuadable white voters," wrote conservative pollster Whit Ayres and Jennifer Korn, the head of the right-leaning Hispanic Leadership Network, in a recent research memo. "Trying to win a national election by gaining a larger and larger share of a smaller and smaller portion of the electorate is a losing political proposition."¶ Between 2008 and 2012, white voters shrank two percentage points to 72 percent of the electorate, while Asian and Latino voters expanded a percentage point each to 3 percent and 10 percent, respectively.¶ While GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney won 60 percent of white voters, 71 percent of Latinos and 73 percent of Asian-Americans backed Mr. Obama – up four percentage points and 11 percentage points from 2008, respectively.¶ And those numbers of minority voters are only going to grow. For the next two decades, 50,000 Latino voters will turn 18 every month, adding an additional New Hampshire of voters to the US each year into the 2030s.¶ While Resurgent Republic's poll showed that Hispanics aren't singularly focused on immigration issues, Republican politicians who favor immigration reform see the issue as primary: The GOP's message of conservative family values, entrepreneurship, and individual freedom won't reach Latino voters unless the immigration question is solved.¶ "This is like a wall that stops the other issues from getting through," says Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R) of Florida, a longtime immigration reform advocate. "And while that wall is there, the Republican Party has a serious problem."¶ House Speaker John Boehner (R) of Ohio signaled a shift when he told ABC News a day after the election that "a comprehensive approach [to immigration] is long overdue, and I'm confident that the president, myself, others, can find the common ground to take care of this issue once and for all."¶ That's a departure from previous immigration-reform attempts, in which the GOP brass wasn't on board.¶ Perhaps just as important, though, is that several leading lawmakers with near-pristine conservative credentials are also involved.¶ Two tea party superstars – Senators Rubio and Lee, both of whom knocked out establishment Republican figures to win their seats – are going to be key players in any reform.¶ In the House, the involvement of House Judiciary chairman Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R) of Virginia and Representative Labrador of Idaho can provide cover to conservative lawmakers from the party's right flank.¶ "The fact that you're going to have strong conservative voices helping lead this debate is going to be critical to solving it instead of using it as a political wedge," says Rep. Steve Scalise (R) of Louisiana, incoming chairman of the Republican Study Committee, the largest and most conservative caucus in the House.¶ It's notable that both Labrador and Rubio believe in, one way or another, a path to citizenship for some illegal immigrants, even while they leave open just who can get on that path.¶ Some conservatives say any form of citizenship given to illegal immigrants – no matter the conditions attached to it – constitutes an "amnesty," which is a guarantee only of more illegal immigration unless the nation's borders are firmly secured and stringent workplace verification systems are put in place.¶ But a recent poll by George Washington University and Politico found 62 percent of Americans support a proposal that would allow illegal immigrants to earn citizenship over a period of several years, with 40 percent strongly supporting such a measure. Only 35 percent opposed it.¶ Some Democrats on the Hill are extending a friendly hand to the GOP. When the Congressional Hispanic Caucus – which is entirely Democratic – offered its vision for immigration reform, for example, it served up principles rather than a specific bill, a move received by Republicans as attempting to maximize common ground.¶ But Democrats also know they are in a position of power.¶ "You've got a realization on the part of GOP leadership not just in the House but in the Republican Party writ large that if they don't do something about it, they aren't going to win the presidency again," says Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D) of California, a leading immigration reform advocate.¶ For that reason, she says, Republicans "aren't going to get the credit" for pushing immigration through, but they "can still get the blame if they block" it.¶ Latino advocacy groups and labor unions, emboldened by the community's growing electoral power, vow to take the fight to those who stand in immigration reform's way in 2013.¶ "This comprehensive immigration reform for the Latino community is personal. The fact that we've come out in record numbers in 2012 was personal. And that's a calculation that members of Congress don't understand," says Maria Teresa Kumar, executive director of Voto Latino. "If they are not with us, 2014 may not look pretty with them."¶ The president, too, has political pressure to pursue immigration reform. He has already come up short once on immigration-reform promises: In 2009, he said that a comprehensive immigration solution would be a top priority.¶ Yet his first term also saw record numbers of undocumented immigrants deported. Only this summer, after he directed immigration officials to defer deportation of some young illegal immigrants, was he seen as making good on promises to the Latino community.¶ "The president says that his biggest failure in the first term was not moving forward with immigration reform," says Hector Sanchez, executive director of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement. "The Latino community decided to give him a second chance."¶ Obama has publicly vowed to make immigration reform an immediate priority in his second term, which could begin just on the other side of the "fiscal cliff" negotiations.¶ "He's the one who has the mandate on this subject; he's the guy who got the voters who care most intensely about this," says Bruce Morrison, a former Democratic congressman from Connecticut who was involved in immigration reform efforts in the 1980s and early '90s.

#### It’s empirical – energy policy is NEVER a win for Obama

Eisler 4/2/12 (Matthew, Research Fellow at the Center for Contemporary History and Policy at the Chemical Heritage Foundation”)

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the [Keystone XL pipeline](http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/21/obama-angers-both-environmentalists-and-energy-companies-by-supporting-keystone-pipelines-south-leg/) and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by[forces](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/politics/obama-to-promote-energy-policy-on-4-state-trip.html?_r=2&hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1332342006-6OFWK5chxZ+cEgBTM7CcQw) beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the [fear premium](http://www.slate.com/articles/business/project_syndicate/2012/03/the_iran_israel_conflict_could_cause_another_global_recession_here_s_how_.html) through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President Obama has accrued no political capital from his energy policy from either the left or the right by the end of his first term.

#### Capital is critical to get a deal

Shifter 12/27/12 (Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?”)

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear. There is also a chance that something unexpected could happen that would put off consideration of immigration reform. Following the horrific massacre at a Connecticut elementary school on December 14, for example, public pressure understandably mounted for gun control, at least the ban of assault weapons. But a decision to pursue that measure -- though desperately needed -- would take away energy and time from other priorities like immigration.

#### Immigration reform is critical to US-Latin American relations

Barshefsky and Hill April 12 (Charlene and James T., Chairs Council on Foreign Relations, US-Latin America Relations: A New Direction For a New Reality”)

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation . The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue . Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

#### Comprehensive reform is key to food security

**ACIR ‘7** (December 4, 2007 THE AGRICULTURE COALITION FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM

Dear Member of Congress: The Agriculture Coalition for Immigration Reform (ACIR) is deeply concerned with pending immigration enforcement legislation known as the ‘Secure America Through Verification and Enforcement Act of 2007' or ‘SAVE Act’ (H.R.4088 and S.2368). While these bills seek to address the worthy goal of stricter immigration law enforcement, they fail to take a comprehensive approach to solving the immigration problem. History shows that a one dimensional approach to the nation’s immigration problem is doomed to fail. Enforcement alone, without providing a viable means to obtain a legal workforce to sustain economic growth is a formula for disaster. Agriculture best illustrates this point. Agricultural industries that need considerable labor in order to function include the fruit and vegetable, dairy and livestock, nursery, greenhouse, and Christmas tree sectors. Localized labor shortages have resulted in actual crop loss in various parts of the country. More broadly, producers are making decisions to scale back production, limit expansion, and leave many critical tasks unfulfilled. Continued labor shortages could force more producers to shift production out of the U.S., thus stressing already taxed food and import safety systems. Farm lenders are becoming increasingly concerned about the stability of affected industries. This problem is aggravated by the nearly universal acknowledgement that the current H-2A agricultural guest worker program does not work. Based on government statistics and other evidence, roughly 80 percent of the farm labor force in the United States is foreign born, and a significant majority of that labor force is believed to be improperly authorized. The bills’ imposition of mandatory electronic employment eligibility verification will screen out the farm labor force without providing access to legal workers. Careful study of farm labor force demographics and trends indicates that there is not a replacement domestic workforce available to fill these jobs. This feature alone will result in chaos unless combined with labor-stabilizing reforms. Continued failure by Congress to act to address this situation in a comprehensive fashion is placing in jeopardy U.S. food security and global competitiveness. Furthermore, congressional inaction threatens the livelihoods of millions of Americans whose jobs exist because laborintensive agricultural production is occurring in America. If production is forced to move, most of the upstream and downstream jobs will disappear as well. The Coalition cannot defend of the broken status quo. We support well-managed borders and a rational legal system. We have worked for years to develop popular bipartisan legislation that would stabilize the existing experienced farm workforce and provide an orderly transition to wider reliance on a legal agricultural worker program that provides a fair balance of employer and employee rights and protections. We respectfully urge you to oppose S.2368, H.R.4088, or any other bills that would impose employment-based immigration enforcement in isolation from equally important reforms that would provide for a stable and legal farm labor force.

#### Food insecurity sparks World War 3

**Calvin ’98** (William, Theoretical Neurophysiologist – U Washington, Atlantic Monthly, January, Vol 281, No. 1, p. 47-64)

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands -- if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem -- and could lead to a Third World War -- but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

### Solvency

#### Multiple alt causalities to solvency they don’t resolve – Emory’s highlighting is yellow

**MACED 10** [Mountain Association for Community Economic Development, “Economic Transition in Central Appalachia: Ideas for the Appalachian Regional Development Initiative” April 8, 2010

Recommendations: Provide grant funding and financing for community-scale renewable energy demonstrations in the areas of wind, solar, low-impact woody biomass and low impact hydro. Community-scale renewable energy production that is locally owned has the potential to maximize the economic benefits of energy production for local communities. In addition, community-scale projects can be high-efficiency, reusing waste heat in the case of biomass projects and minimizing line loss. A program to create local demonstrations across the region, including at public buildings and institutions like hospitals, in small town main street areas, and at a county scale could go a long way in leveraging new beneficial energy activity. A proposal from East Kentucky Biodiesel to create a pilot pyrolysis/gasification facility utilizing biomass grown on former surface mine land, explained on page 19, has the potential to be the first stage of a regional network of community-scale bioenergy production. A wide range of USDA and DOE programs promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency projects could be set aside or repurposed for efforts of this kind. Expand USDA Rural Utility Service (RUS) financing for renewable energy production (and energy efficiency) to utilities located in Central Appalachia. President Obama’s 2011 budget proposes additional funds to USDA “to help transition fossil fuel-dependent utilities to renewable energy.”18 Central Appalachian utilities are among the most fossil fuel dependent in the country, reliant on coal in aging power plants for well over 90 percent of their electricity. A 2009 study by the Ochs Center for Metropolitan Studies showed that East Kentucky Power Cooperative, a major provider of electricity in the Appalachian Kentucky, could create 8,750 jobs and inject $1.7 billion into the regional economy through a program of energy efficiency investments and expanded renewable energy capacity.19 A combination of grants and loans through RUS (and similar USDA programs like REDLG) to Central Appalachian utilities could help them begin to make this transition and create new jobs and economic opportunities in the process. One potential step forward in this direction is the new Rural Energy Savings Program legislation filed by in the House by Rep. James Clyburn and in the Senate by Sen. Jeff Merkley.20 It would create a pool of RUS funds for rural electric coops to create on-bill financing programs. Create a special category and set-aside of USDA Rural Energy for America (REAP) grants and guaranteed loans for renewable energy **and energy efficiency** projects in Central Appalachia. The USDA REAP program provides valuable, much needed funds for small businesses, farmers and others to pursue renewable energy projects and energy efficiency improvements. Even with expanded funding for this program, however, valuable projects including ones MACED has helped support are being denied funding. Those projects that are receiving REAP grants are creating important models in the region. Organizations like MACED and the Natural Capital Investment Fund in West Virginia can also provide financing to small businesses that can be packaged with REAP grants, which will help leverage federal dollars and increase impact. Fund community-based wind monitoring efforts to help communities assess the feasibility of wind power. Wind power along the ridgelines of Central Appalachia is widely recognized as an important regional opportunity. However, there is a lack of site-specific data for communities to understand the actual opportunities for wind development in the region, holding back project development. A program of grants and equipment loans could help communities better assess these opportunities. Support the establishment of renewable energy component manufacturing in the coalfields of Central Appalachia. Manufacturing of component parts for the wind and solar supply chain offer some of the greatest economic opportunities for the nation as a whole. However, the lack of manufacturing infrastructure in the heart of Central Appalachia threatens to leave the region out of these opportunities. An initiative should be developed with the goal of establishing at least one significant supply chain manufacturer in the coalfields of Central Appalachia. This initiative should include research to identify if there are any opportunities with existing manufacturers in the region. If no such opportunities arise, the focus should be on the feasibility of establishing a new facility. New approaches like the Cleveland model of community-based, worker-owned companies in new green industries are promising ways to create jobs that help low-income workers accrue long-term wealth.21 A project to establish a model facility in a coalfield community could go a long way in creating good opportunities and promoting a needed discussion about the region’s energy future. Provide competitive grants for school-based renewable energy projects eligible for schools in Central Appalachia. A number of potential models exist for renewable energy production at the school level, which can save schools money and create important opportunities for student and community learning. The model of Russell High School in Greenup County, Kentucky, is one example of the use of wind and solar demonstrations to save money and provide training for vocational students. Opportunities also exist to fund fuels-for-schools initiatives (like those in the western U. S.) utilizing local, sustainably harvested woody biomass as a building heat source. Support workforce training and enterprise development in the new renewable energy industries. MACED and other entrepreneurial development organizations like the Natural Capital Investment Fund have worked with a number of entrepreneurs in the region interested in starting new companies in wind, biomass, or solar. These folks lack access to training that would deepen their understanding of the technologies, and often lack the business management skills to make their fledgling enterprises survive. In Kentucky, for example, state tax credits were recently enacted for renewable energy installations like solar panels, but included requirements that installers be North American Board of Certified Energy Practitioner (NABCEP) certified. Only a handful of people in tfhe entirestate have that certification. Federal workforce and business services dollars could support targeted scholarship, training, and technical assistance programs that could help more renewable energy businesses get off the ground. As mentioned in the energy efficiency section above, the Department of Labor green jobs training programs such as the Green Capacity Building program, Energy Training Partnerships, and Pathways out of Poverty program could be allocated for such investments. Pg. 8-11

### Tea Party

#### Domestic issues make supremacy unsustainable

Cohen 2012 (Michael, ow at the Century Foundation, February 21, "Rotting from the Inside Out", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting\_from\_the\_inside\_out?page=full)jn

There is, however, one serious problem with this analysis. Any discussion of American national security that focuses solely on the issue of U.S. power vis-à-vis other countries -- and ignores domestic inputs -- is decidedly incomplete. In Kagan's New Republic article, for example, he has little to say about the country's domestic challenges except to obliquely argue that to focus on "nation-building" at home while ignoring the importance of maintaining U.S. power abroad would be a mistake. In fact, in a recent FP debate with the Financial Times' Gideon Rachman on the issue of American decline, Kagan diagnoses what he, and many other political analysts, appear to believe is the country's most serious problem: "enormous fiscal deficits driven by entitlements." Why is this bad? It makes it harder, says Kagan, for the United States to "continue playing its vital role in the world" and will lead to significant cutbacks in defense spending. However, a focus on U.S. global dominance or suasion that doesn't factor in those elements that constitute American power at home ignores substantial and worsening signs of decline. Indeed, by virtually any measure, a closer look at the state of the United States today tells a sobering tale of rapid and unchecked decay and deterioration in a host of areas. While not all of them are generally considered elements of national security, perhaps they should be. Let's start with education, which almost any observer would agree is a key factor in national competitiveness. The data is not good. According to the most recent OECD report on global education standards, the United States is an average country in how it educates its children -- 12th in reading skills, 17th in science, and 26th in math. The World Economic Forum ranks the United States 48th in the quality of its mathematics and science education, even though we spend more money per student than almost any country in the world. America's high school graduation rate is lower today that it was in the late 1960s and "kids are now less likely to graduate from high school than their parents," according to an analysis released last year by the Editorial Projects in Education Research Center. In fact, not only is the graduation rate worse than many Western countries, the United States is now the only developed country where a higher percentage of 55 to 64-year-olds have a high school diploma than 25 to 34-year-olds. While the United States still maintains the world's finest university system, college graduation rates are slipping. Among 25 to 34-year-olds, America trails Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in its percentage of college graduates. This speaks, in some measure, to the disparities that are endemic in the U.S. education system. If you are poor in America, chances are you attend a school that underperforms, are taught by teachers that are not as effective, and have test scores that lag far behind your more affluent counterparts (the same is true if you are black or Hispanic -- you lag behind your white counterparts). Can a country be a great global power if its education system is fundamentally unequal and is getting steadily worse? What about national infrastructure -- another key element of national economic power and global competitiveness? First, the nation's broadband penetration rates remain in the middle of the global pack and there is growing divide in the United States between digital haves and have nots. Overall, its transportation networks are mediocre compared to similarly wealthy countries and according to the World Economic Forum, the United States ranks 23rd in the OECD for infrastructure quality -- a ranking that has steadily declined over the past decade. American commuters spend more time in traffic than Western Europeans, the country's train system and high-speed rail lines in general pale next to that of other developed nations, and even the number of people killed on American highways is 60 percent higher than the OECD average. Part of the problem is that the amount of money the U.S. government spends on infrastructure has steadily declined for decades and now trails far behind other Western nations. In time, such infrastructure disadvantages have the potential to undermine the U.S. economy, hamstring productivity and competitiveness, and put the lives of more Americans at risk -- and this appears to be happening already. Finally, a closer look at the U.S. health care system is enough to make one ill. Even after the passage of Obama's 2010 health care reform bill (which every Republican presidential candidate wants to repeal) the United States is far from having a health care system that meets the needs of its citizens. According to a July 2011 report by the Commonwealth Fund, "the U.S. has fewer hospital beds and physicians, and sees fewer hospital and physician visits, than in most other countries" even though it spends far more on health care per capita than any other country in the world. In addition, "prescription drug utilization, prices, and spending all appear to be highest in the U.S., as does the supply, utilization, and price of diagnostic imaging." Long story short, the United States spends more for less on health care than pretty much any other developed nation in the world. That might also explain why life expectancy in America trails far behind most OECD countries. The United States also has the unique distinction of having one of the highest rates of income inequality in the world, on par with such global powerhouses as Cameroon, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ecuador. It has the fourth worst child poverty rate and trails only Mexico and Turkey in overall poverty rate among OECD countries. And when it comes to infant mortality, the U.S. rate is one of the worst in the developing world. But not to fear, the United States still maintains some advantages. For example, it is one of the fattest countries in the world, with approximately one-third of the country considered obese (including one out of every six children). In addition, the United States has, by far, the largest prison population -- more than China, Iran, and Cuba -- one of the highest homicide rates in the world, and one of the highest rates of death from child abuse and neglect. This steady stream of woe is certainly dispiriting, but the more optimistic might be inclined to respond that America had has problems before and has always found a way to right the ship. Certainly, this is a legitimate counter-point. The problem is that anyone looking to Washington today would have a hard time imagining that Congress and the White House will lock arms anytime soon and fix these various national crises. And this political gridlock is the biggest reason to be concerned about decline. Perhaps at no point in recent American history has the country's politics been less capable of dealing with serious challenges. Certainly, when one party basically rejects any role for the federal government in providing health care, improving educational opportunity, or strengthening the social safety net, the chances for compromise appear even slimmer. As Harold Pollack, a professor at the University of Chicago, said to me, "What future president, witnessing Barack Obama's difficulties over health reform, will make an equivalent political investment regarding climate change or another great national concern? I fear that we are headed for a kind of legislative Vietnam syndrome in which our leaders will shy away from the large things that must be done."

#### Europe and BRIC nations counterbalancing

#### Brooks 2012(Rosa, professor of law at Georgetown, fellow at the New America Foundation, February 1, "America's waning influence", http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/01/opinion/la-oe-brooks-decline-20120201)

American influence is waning for two reasons, the first of which should potentially be a source of comfort, not despair. While we continue to have the world's most formidable military, America's power in the world is declining simply because once-weak states are growing stronger. Europe, despite its current woes, is an economic and diplomatic force to be reckoned with. China, India and Brazil are emerging as regional powerhouses with increasingly global reach. As a result of "the rise of the rest," U.S. power is declining in a relative sense. In the last decade, for instance, our share of global output dropped from 23.5% to 19.1%. And this is a trend that began decades ago. In his 1987 National Security Strategy, President Reagan noted, "The United States no longer ha[s] an overwhelming economic position vis-a-vis Western Europe and the East Asia rimland." In 1990,President George H.W. Bush echoed this theme in his National Security Strategy: "It was inevitable that our overwhelming economic predominance after the war would be reduced." If Reagan were alive today, conservatives would excoriate him as a declinist. But as Reagan recognized, a decline in relative American power is a good thing, not a bad thing — if we can turn rising states into solid allies. Remember "Gulliver's Travels"? True, it wasn't much fun for Gulliver to be the little guy in the land of Brobdingnagian giants, but it was even less fun to be a giant among the Lilliputians. Like Gulliver, America will prosper most if we can surround ourselves with friendly peer and near-peer states. They give us larger markets and improve burden-sharing; none of the global problems that bedevil us can be solved by the United States alone.

####  In light of the economic crisis – the US superpower status is no longer affordable

Layne 11 (Christopher, Prof and Chair of the Robert M. Gates National Security @ Texas A&M” Bye bye, Miss American Pie”)

U.S. decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDPratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone forever. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. If so, the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end.

#### No impact to the transition

IKENBERRY ‘8 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

FETTWEIS 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

## 2NC

### Sust

#### No population crunch – we adapt

Goklany 10, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Indur, Part IV – There Are No PAT Answers, or Why Neo-Malthusians Get It Wrong”, April 26, http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iv-there-are-no-pat-answers-or-why-neo-malthusians-get-it-wrong/)

Moreover, fears that the world’s population would continue to increase exponentially have failed to materialize. The world’s population growth rate peaked in the late 1960s. Population increased by 10.6% from 1965–70, but only 6.0% from 2000–05. Many countries are now concerned that fewer young people means that their social security systems are unsustainable. Projections now suggest that the world’s population may peak at around 9 billion around mid-century (see here). The slowdown in the population growth rate, unanticipated by Neo-Malthusians, can be attributed to the fact that population (P) is dependent on affluence (or the desire for affluence) and technology (A and T in the IPAT equation). Empirical data show that as people get wealthier or desire greater wealth for themselves or their offspring, they tend to have fewer children. Cross-country data shows that the total fertility rate (TFR), which measures the number of children per women of child-bearing age, drops as affluence (measured by GDP per capita) increases (see Figure 1). Moreover, for any given level of affluence, TFR has generally dropped over time because of changes in technology, and societal attitudes shaped by the desire for economic development (see here). Most importantly, it is not, contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, doomed to rise inexorably, absent coercive policies. Neo-Malthusians also overlook the fact that, in general, affluence, technology and human well-being *reinforce* each other in a Cycle of Progress (Goklany 2007a, pp. 79-97). If existing technologies are unable to reduce impacts or otherwise improve the quality of life, wealth and human capital can be harnessed to improve existing technologies or create new ones that will. HIV/AIDS is a case in point. The world was unprepared to deal with HIV/AIDS when it first appeared. For practical purposes, it was a death sentence for anyone who got it. It took the wealth of the most developed countries to harness the human capital to develop an understanding of the disease and devise therapies. From 1995 to 2004, age-adjusted death rates due to HIV declined by over 70 percent in the US (USBC 2008). Rich countries now cope with it, and developing countries are benefiting from the technologies that the former developed through the application of economic and human resources, and institutions at their disposal. Moreover, both technology and affluence are necessary because while technology provides the methods to reduce problems afflicting humanity, including environmental problems, affluence provides the means to research, develop and afford the necessary technologies. Not surprisingly, access to HIV therapies is greater in developed countries than in developing countries. And in many developing countries access would be even lower but for wealthy charities and governments from rich countries (Goklany 2007a, pp. 79–97). Because technology is largely based on accretion of knowledge, it ought to advance with time, independent of affluence — provided society is open to scientific and technological inquiry and does not squelch technological change for whatever reason. Consequently, indicators of human well-being improve not only with affluence but also with time (a surrogate for technology). This is evident in Figure 1, which shows TFR dropping with time for any specific level of GDP per capita. It is also illustrated in Figure 2 for life expectancy, which shows that wealthier societies have higher average life expectancies, and that the entire life expectancy curve has been raised upward with the passage of time, a surrogate for technological change (broadly defined). Other indicators of human well-being — e.g., crop yield, food supplies per capita, access to safe water and sanitation, literacy, mortality — also improve with affluence and, separately, with time/technology (see here and here). This indicates that secular technological change and economic development, rather than making matters worse, have actually enhanced society’s ability to solve its problems and advanced its quality of life. Moreover, population is not just a factor in consumption. It is the basis for “human capital.” No humans, no human capital. Humans are not just mouths, but also hands and brains. As famously noted by Julian Simon, they are the Ultimate Resource. This is something Neo-Malthusians have difficulty in comprehending. Notably, a World Bank study, Where is the Wealth of Nations?, indicated that “human capital and the value of institutions … constitute the largest share of wealth in virtually all countries.” A population that is poor, with low human capital, low affluence, and lacking in technological knowhow is more likely to have higher mortality rates, and lower life expectancy than a population that is well educated, affluent and technologically sophisticated, no matter what its size. These factors — human capital, affluence and technology — acting in concert over the long haul, have enabled technology for the most part to improve matters *faster* than any deterioration due to population, affluence (GDP per person) or their product (GDP). This has helped keep environmental damage in check, (e.g., for cropland, a measure of habitat converted to human uses) or even reverse it (e.g., for water pollution, and indoor and traditional outdoor air pollution), particularly in the richer countries. Note that since the product of population (P) and affluence (A or GDP per capita) is equivalent to the GDP then according to the IPAT identity, which specifies that I = P x A x T, the technology term (T) is by definition the impact (I) per GDP (see Part II in this series of posts). I’ll call this the impact intensity. If the impact is specified in terms of emissions, then the technology term is equivalent to the emissions intensity, that is, emissions per GDP. Therefore the change in impact intensity (or emissions intensity) over a specified period is a measure of technological change over that period. Since matters improve if impact/emissions intensity drops, a negative sign in front of the change in impact intensity denotes that technological change has reduced the impact. Table 1 shows estimates of the changes in impacts intensity, or technological change, over the long term for a sample of environmental indicators for various time periods and geographical aggregations. Additional results regarding technological change over different time periods and countries are available from the original source (here). These results indicate that in the long run, technological change has, more often than not, reduced impacts. The reduction in many cases is by an order of magnitude or more! Thus, notwithstanding plausible Neo-Malthusian arguments that technological change would eventually increase environmental impacts, historical data suggest that, in fact, technological change ultimately reduces impacts, provided technology is not rejected through an inappropriate exercise of the precautionary principle or compromised via subsidies (which usually flow from the general public to politically favored elements of society). To summarize, although population, affluence and technology can create some problems for humanity and the planet, they are also the agents for solving these very problems. In the IPAT equation, the dependence of the I term on the P, A and T terms is not fixed. It evolves over time. And the Neo-Malthusian mistake has been to assume that the relationship is fixed, or if it is not, then it changes for the worse. A corollary to this is that projections of future impacts spanning a few decades but which do not account for technological change as a function of time and affluence, more likely than not, will overestimate impacts, perhaps by orders of magnitude. In fact, this is one reason why many estimates of the future impacts of climate change are suspect, because most do not account for changes in adaptive capacity either due to secular technological change or increases in economic development (see here and here). Famously, Yogi Berra is supposed to have said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Most analysts recognize this. They know that just because one can explain and hindcast the past, it does not guarantee that one can forecast the future. Neo-Malthusians, by contrast, cannot hindcast the past but are confident they can forecast the future. Finally, had the solutions they espouse been put into effect a couple of centuries ago, most of us alive today would be dead and those who were not would be living poorer, shorter, and unhealthier lives, constantly subject to the vagaries of nature, surviving from harvest to harvest, spending more of our time in darkness because lighting would be a luxury, and our days in the drudgery of menial tasks because under their skewed application of the precautionary principle (see here, here and here) fossil fuel consumption would be severely curtailed, if not banned. Nor would the rest of nature necessarily be better off. First, lower reliance on fossil fuels would mean greater demand for fuelwood, and the forests would be denuded. Second, less fossil fuels also means less fertilizer and pesticides and, therefore, lower agricultural productivity. To compensate for lost productivity,, more habitat would need to be converted to agricultural uses. But habitat conversion (including deforestation) — not climate change — is already the greatest threat to biodiversity!

#### No population crunch – prefer our data

Goklany 10, policy analyst for the Department of the Interior – phd from MSU, “Population, Consumption, Carbon Emissions, and Human Well-Being in the Age of Industrialization (Indur, Part IV – There Are No PAT Answers, or Why Neo-Malthusians Get It Wrong”, April 26, <http://www.masterresource.org/2010/04/population-consumption-carbon-emissions-and-human-well-being-in-the-age-of-industrialization-part-iv-there-are-no-pat-answers-or-why-neo-malthusians-get-it-wrong/>)

Neo-Malthusians believe that humanity is doomed unless it reins in population, affluence and technological change, and the associated consumption of materials, energy and chemicals. But, as shown in the previous posts and elsewhere, empirical data on virtually *every* objective indicator of human well-being indicates that the state of humanity has never been better, despite unprecedented levels of population, economic development, and new technologies. In fact, human beings have never been longer lived, healthier, wealthier, more educated, freer, and more equal than they are today. Why does the Neo-Malthusian worldview fail the reality check? The fundamental reasons why their projections fail are because they assume that population, affluence and technology — the three terms on the right hand side of the IPAT equation — are independent of each other. Equally importantly, they have misunderstood the nature of each of these terms, and the nature of the misunderstanding is essentially the same, namely, that contrary to their claims, each of these factors instead of making matters progressively worse is, in the long run, necessary for solving whatever problems plague humanity. Compounding these misunderstandings, environmentalists and Neo-Malthusians frequently conflate human well-being with environmental well-being. While the latter influences the former, the two aren’t the same. Few inside, and even fewer outside, rich countries would rank environmental indicators among the most important indicators of human well-being except, possibly, access to safe water and sanitation. These two environmental indicators also double as indicators of human well-being because they have a large and direct bearing on human health. In any case, they are subsumed within life expectancy, which, as noted, is the single most important indicator of human well-being. The UNDP’s Human Development Index, for instance, uses three indicators — life expectancy, per capita income and some combined measure of education and literacy. None of these three are related to the environment. The disconnect between environmental indicators and indicators of human well-being is further evidenced by the fact that over the last century, the most critical indicators of human well-being — life expectancy, mortality rates, prevalence of hunger and malnutrition, literacy, education, child labor, or poverty — generally improved regardless of whether environmental indicators (e.g., levels of air and water pollution, loss of biodiversity) fluctuated up or down (see, e.g., the previous post and here).

#### No resource wars – our case studies are the best

Dalby 6 -Dept. Of Geography, Carleton University (Simon, "Security and environment linkages revisited" in Globalisation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century, www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/SSIS/SSIS001.pdf)

In parallel with the focus on human security as a necessity in the face of both natural and artificial forms of vulnerability, recent literature has emphasised the opportunities that environmental management presents for political cooperation between states and other political actors, on both largescale infrastructure projects as well as more traditional matters of wildlife and new concerns with biodiversity preservation (Matthew/Halle/Switzer 2002). Simultaneously, the discussion on water wars, and in particular the key finding the shared resources frequently stimulate cooperation rather than conflict, shifted focus from conflict to the possibilities of environmental action as a mode of peacemaking. Both at the international level in terms of environmental diplomacy and institution building, there is considerable evidence of cooperative action on the part of many states (Conca/Dabelko 2002). Case studies from many parts of the world suggest that cooperation and diplomatic arrangements can facilitate peaceful responses to the environmental difficulties in contrast to the pessimism of the 1990’s where the focus was on the potential for conflicts. One recent example of the attempts to resolve difficulties in the case of Lake Victoria suggests a dramatic alternative to the resource war scenarios. The need to curtail over-fishing in the lake and the importance of remediation has encouraged cooperation; scarcities leading to conflict arguments have not been common in the region, and they have not influenced policy prescriptions (Canter/Ndegwa 2002). Many conflicts over the allocations of water use rights continue around the world but most of them are within states and international disputes simply do not have a history of leading to wars.

### Heg

#### And domestic issues outweigh pure conceptions of power

Cohen 2012(Michael, ow at the Century Foundation, February 21, "Rotting from the Inside Out", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting\_from\_the\_inside\_out?page=full)jn

The fact is, discussions of U.S. power that only take into account America's global standing in relation to other countries are not only misleading -- they're largely irrelevant. Sure, America has a bigger and better military than practically every other nation combined. Sure, it has a better global image than Russia or China or any other potential global rival. Sure, America's economy is bigger than any other nation's (though this is a [debatable point](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-14/china-tops-u-s-as-biggest-economy-by-purchasing-power-update1-.html)). But if its students aren't being well educated, if huge disparities exist in technological adoption, if social mobility remains stagnant if the country's health care system is poorly functioning, and if its government is hopelessly gridlocked, what good is all the global power that transfixes Kagan and others? The even more urgent question is how the United States can hope to maintain that power if it's built on a shaky foundation at home.

#### These issues guarantee decline

Brooks 2012(Rosa, professor of law at Georgetown, fellow at the New America Foundation, February 1, "America's waning influence", http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/01/opinion/la-oe-brooks-decline-20120201)jn

But there's another reason American influence is declining, one that should cause us far more concern. Obama put his finger on it during the State of the Union speech, when he asked whether we wanted to settle for being "a country where a shrinking number of people do really well, while a growing number of Americans barely get by." By many measures, we've hollowed out the American dream: American life expectancy ranks well below that of other industrialized democracies, and the same is true for infant mortality rates and elementary school enrollment rates. We have the highest documented per capita incarceration rate in the world. And as the Occupy Wall Street movement has helped point out, we have greater income inequality in this country than in any other state in the developed world — and most states in the developing world. Denying this decline is beyond foolish. We can't remain a leader on the world stage if we accept domestic conditions that are moving perilously toward those of many Third World countries. And we can't have an honest discussion about needed reforms if our heads are stuck in the sand.

#### The majority of Americans want to restrict our overseas roll.

Cohen 6/14/11 (Michael, Senior Fellow @ the American Security Project, “The Non-Return of American Isolationism”)

After ten years of foreign wars that have cost the country trillions of dollars, resulted in thousands of American deaths, and provided minimal benefit to larger U.S. security interests, it's hardly surprising that polls show a majority of Americans agree with these arguments. The Chicago Council of Foreign Relations annual survey of foreign policy attitudes suggest that most Americans would prefer the U.S. adopt a smaller overseas military footprint and share the burden of global leadership more equally with its allies. In fact, less than one in ten of those polled believe that the U.S. should "continue to be the world's preeminent world leader" and 71 percent believe it should work together with other countries to solve global problems. Recent polling also suggests that a [large majority of Americans](http://pollingreport.com/libya.htm) believe the U.S. should not be involved in fighting a war in Libya. A striking 8 in 10 support the president's plan to begin a more rapid withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It's hard to imagine that many of these voters would consider themselves to be isolationists.

#### Great power war is a myth – nuclear deterrence and liberal democracies ensure NO conflict is likely to erupt -

Ikenberry 11 (G. John, “A World of our Making” <http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all>)

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system.

### Iran

### Overview

**Iran nukes spillover over globally, cause miscalc, and nuclear war—outweighs short-term risks**

**Kroenig, ’12** (Matthew is a Stanton Nuclear Security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Time to Strike Iran”, Jan/Feb 2012, *Foreign Affairs,* Proquest)

 For several years now, starting long before this episode, American pundits and policymakers have been debating whether the United States should attack Iran and attempt to eliminate its nuclear facilities. Proponents of a strike have argued that the only thing worse than military action against Iran would be an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Critics, meanwhile, have warned that such a raid would likely fail and, even if it succeeded, would spark a full-fledged war and a global economic crisis. They have urged the United States to rely on nonmilitary options, such as diplomacy, sanctions, and covert operations, to prevent Iran from acquiring a bomb. Fearing the costs of a bombing campaign, most critics maintain that if these other tactics fail to impede Tehran's progress, the United States should simply learn to live with a nuclear Iran. But skeptics of military action fail to appreciate the true danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond. And their grim forecasts assume that the cure would be worse than the disease-that is, that the consequences of a U.S. assault on Iran would be as bad as or worse than those of Iran achieving its nuclear ambitions. But that is a faulty assumption. The truth is that a military strike intended to destroy Iran's nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term national security of the United States.

DANGERS OF DETERRENCE

Years of international pressure have failed to halt Iran's attempt to build a nuclear program. The Stuxnet computer worm, which attacked control systems in Iranian nuclear facilities, temporarily disrupted Tehran's enrichment effort, but a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency this past May revealed that the targeted plants have fully recovered from the assault. And the latest iaea findings on Iran, released in November, provided the most compelling evidence yet that the Islamic Republic has weathered sanctions and sabotage, allegedly testing nuclear triggering devices and redesigning its missiles to carry nuclear payloads. The Institute for Science and International Security, a nonprofit research institution, estimates that Iran could now produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so. Tehran's plans to move sensitive nuclear operations into more secure facilities over the course of the coming year could reduce the window for effective military action even further. If Iran expels iaea inspectors, begins enriching its stockpiles of uranium to weapons-grade levels of 90 percent, or installs advanced centrifuges at its uranium-enrichment facility in Qom, the United States must strike immediately or forfeit its last opportunity to prevent Iran from joining the nuclear club. Some states in the region are doubting U.S. resolve to stop the program and are shifting their allegiances to Tehran. Others have begun to discuss launching their own nuclear initiatives to counter a possible Iranian bomb. For those nations and the United States itself, the threat will only continue to grow as Tehran moves closer to its goal. A nuclear-armed Iran would immediately limit U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East. With atomic power behind it, Iran could threaten any U.S. political or military initiative in the Middle East with nuclear war, forcing Washington to think twice before acting in the region. Iran's regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia, would likely decide to acquire their own nuclear arsenals, sparking an arms race. To constrain its geopolitical rivals, Iran could choose to spur proliferation by transferring nuclear technology to its allies- other countries and terrorist groups alike. Having the bomb would give Iran greater cover for conventional aggression and coercive diplomacy, and the battles between its terrorist proxies and Israel, for example, could escalate. And Iran and Israel lack nearly all the safeguards that helped the United States and the Soviet Union avoid a nuclear exchange during the Cold War-secure secondstrike capabilities, clear lines of communication, long flight times for ballistic missiles from one country to the other, and experience managing nuclear arsenals. To be sure, a nuclear-armed Iran would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. But the volatile nuclear balance between Iran and Israel could easily spiral out of control as a crisis unfolds, resulting in a nuclear exchange between the two countries that could draw the United States in, as well. These security threats would require Washington to contain Tehran. Yet deterrence would come at a heavy price. To keep the Iranian threat at bay, the United States would need to deploy naval and ground units and potentially nuclear weapons across the Middle East, keeping a large force in the area for decades to come. Alongside those troops, the United States would have to permanently deploy significant intelligence assets to monitor any attempts by Iran to transfer its nuclear technology. And it would also need to devote perhaps billions of dollars to improving its allies' capability to defend themselves. This might include helping Israel construct submarine-launched ballistic missiles and hardened ballistic missile silos to ensure that it can maintain a secure second-strike capability. Most of all, to make containment credible, the United States would need to extend its nuclear umbrella to its partners in the region, pledging to defend them with military force should Iran launch an attack. In other words, to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States would need to make a substantial investment of political and military capital to the Middle East in the midst of an economic crisis and at a time when it is attempting to shift its forces out of the region. Deterrence would come with enormous economic and geopolitical costs and would have to remain in place as long as Iran remained hostile to U.S. interests, which could mean decades or longer. Given the instability of the region, this effort might still fail, resulting in a war far more costly and destructive than the one that critics of a preemptive strike on Iran now hope to avoid.

### Effective

#### Retaliation would be minimal

**Kroenig, ’12** (Matthew is a Stanton Nuclear Security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1/24/11, “Five reasons to attack Iran”, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0124/Five-reasons-to-attack-Iran/A-strike-is-the-least-bad-option)

4. The consequences of a strike are manageable While serious, the consequences of a US strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be less grave than many people fear. The US could also put in place a strategy to mitigate the worst-case outcomes. Some have speculated, for example, that a US strike would lead to a full-scale war. But, while Iran would certainly retaliate, it wouldn’t want to commit national suicide. It knows that a major conflict with the United States could lead to the destruction of its regime. It would almost certainly, therefore, aim for a calibrated response that allows it to save face, but that stops short of risking the regime’s survival. America can play on Iran’s fears by clearly communicating the red lines that, if crossed, would provoke a devastating US response. One such red line would be Iran closing the strategic oil shipping gateway, the Strait of Hormuz. OPINION: Obama's worst nightmare: an election-year nuclear ploy by Iran By promising to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat, Washington should be able to get agreement from regional allies including Israel to stay out of the fight even if they become the victims of Iranian retaliation. And while the White House might feel political pressure to respond to Iranian provocations, the US should be content to trade Iran’s nuclear program for a round of retaliation, which would likely include missile and terror attacks against US and allied interests in the region.

Heg is a framing issue

Etzioni June 10professor of international relations at George Washington University and author of Security First: For a Muscular Moral Foreign Policy (Amitai, May-June 2010, Military Review, p.125)MH

Critics of a military strike fear that Iran will retaliate by unleashing Hezbollah and Hamas, making our lives more difficult in Iraq and Afghanistan and disrupting the supply of oil to us and to our allies. These concerns do not apply to the decision of which military mode is the proper one, but to the question of whether a military option should be considered in the first place. In response, I suggest that a nation that holds that it cannot cope with such countermeasures should not only forego its claim to the status of a superpower, but also cease to see itself as much of an international player.

The international community would support strikes

Y Net News 6/18(Israeli news service, Yitzhak Benhorin, 6/18/10 “Poll: Globe backs Iran strike”, http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3907260,00.html)MH

WASHINGTON – United global front against Iran? The residents of several Arab countries, headed by Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, support tough sanctions against Iran as well as a military effort to curb Iranian nukes, a new poll says. The Pew Research Center poll encompassed 25,000 respondents in 22 states. The only country in the region where residents said military action should not be taken to hinder Tehran's nuclear aspirations was Turkey. According to the poll, the attitude to Iran and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is negative in 18 of the 22 states included in the survey, including many Muslims ones. In 16 states, respondents said that as a last resort the nuclear threat should be addressed militarily. The attitude to Iran is negative among Germans (86%), the French (81%), and Spaniards (73%), among other nationalities. Elsewhere, 63% of Jordanian respondents and 60% of Lebanese respondents also expressed negative sentiments towards Tehran. Iran does enjoy favorable sentiments in Pakistan (72%) and in Indonesia (62%). Unique Lebanese case Meanwhile, the objection to a nuclear Iran encompasses the residents of 21 of the 22 states included in the survey. The only exception was Pakistan. Elsewhere, 98% of Germans, 96% of Japanese, 90% of Brits, 81% of Russians, and 65% of Chinese respondents object to a nuclear Iran. The same picture emerged in Muslim states, where 66% of Egyptians, 64% of Lebanese, 63% of Turks, and 53% of Jordanians also said they oppose a nuclear Iran. In Lebanon, while 91% of Shiites support a nuclear Iran, 88% of Sunnis and Christians object to it. Finally, in 16 of the 22 states included in the survey, respondents said they prefer a military strike over the prospect with a nuclear Iran. In the US, for example, 66% of respondents said they prefer a military strike compared to only 24% who objected to it. In Egypt, 55% respondents supported a military strike on Iran, compared to 16% who objected to it. In Jordan, the figures in favor of an Iran strike are 53-20% respectively. Only in Turkey, more people said they would accept a nuclear Iran that respondents who preferred military action.

**The international community would support strikes- any evidence about public quotes from countries should be discounted**

**Ghitis 7/22** national affairs writer for Miami Herald (Freda, 7/22/10, “Arabs fear nuclear Iran”, <http://www.mercedsunstar.com/2010/07/22/1503454/arabs-fear-nuclear-iran.html>) MH

One of the open secrets surrounding the Iranian nuclear program is that Tehran's Arab neighbors dread the prospect of a Persian bomb more than anyone else does. For years Arab leaders quietly told foreign visitors that they cannot accept a nuclear-armed Iran; that it would prove catastrophic for them and for the region. In public, however, they always spoke in conciliatory terms, calling for negotiations, telegraphing to Tehran that they want only a peaceful solution. That is now changing as Arabs become increasingly concerned about facing a future with Tehran in possession of nuclear weapons. In a stunning departure from the Arab diplomatic script, the ambassador from the United Arab Emirates to Washington revealed - in public and before microphones - that he wants the United States to use force to stop Iran. Speaking at the Aspen Ideas Festival, Ambassador Yousef al-Otaiba conceded that a U.S. attack against Iranian facilities would trigger a backlash of riots and protests. But, he explained, "If you are asking me, 'Am I willing to live with that versus living with a nuclear Iran?' my answer is still the same: We cannot live with a nuclear Iran**."** Otaiba, whose country lies less than 100 miles from Iran's coast, noted that Iran is much more of a threat to the UAE than to the United States. If countries "lack the assurance that the U.S. is willing to confront Iran, they will start running for cover towards Iran." Otaiba subtly removed another line from the traditional script, the part that suggests Israel is also a threat. "There's no other threat," he declared, "There's no country in the region that is a threat to the UAE." The idea of containing Iran, he said, makes him "very nervous." If Iran's behavior cannot be contained now, he pointed out, why think "that once they have a nuclear program we're going to be more successful in containing them?" Nobody has spoken as bluntly as Otaiba, but we have heard veiled hints about this before. When the Saudi Foreign Minister visited Washington in February, he uttered the usual support for a diplomatic process. But he warned that history shows when a weapon is introduced in the Middle East, it ends up being used. Then he noted that sanctions are a long-term approach and "we need immediate resolutions rather than gradual resolution." The UAE foreign ministry denied the report of Otaiba's statements, calling them "inaccurate and taken out of context" but the ambassador's words were recorded for all to hear. Iran responded with fury, warning of a "teeth-breaking" response. Another curious denial came last month after the Times of London revealed that Saudi Arabia has granted Israeli fighter planes access to a corridor leading to Iran. The Saudis, of course, would deny facilitating an attack on a fellow Muslim nation. And yet, the belief that Iran is more of a threat to the Arabs, their historic rivals, than to anyone else, is becoming widespread. In a recent article, the popular Saudi cleric Aidh al-Qarni wrote a column entitled Oh Arabs, Iran is Coming, saying the West would not prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, which Tehran would then aim at Arabs, not Israelis. In its earliest days the revolutionary Islamic Republic stoked animosity between Persians and Arabs and has urged the people to turn against their governments. Thirty years ago, the Ayatollah Khomeini declared that "Mecca is now in the hand of a group of infidels." Saudis shot back that Iran was in the hands of a "corrupt bunch of thieves," who had created a "slaughterhouse." Tension between Arab leaders and Iran is increasing. But Tehran looks confident and defiant, while the Arabs look nervous. A Kuwaiti paper revealed authorities uncovered an Iranian spy ring in Kuwait. To calm the situation, the government banned reporting on the matter. The respected Arab commentator Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed wrote in the daily Asharq al-Awsat that "Obama and his refusal to use the threat of force in a genuine manner has made everybody - not just Tehran - believe that nothing will stop the Iranian project." Time is clearly growing short for Obama's strategy to produce results. Before long, the most dangerous region in the world could become far, far more unstable.

### Now Key

Now is the time for strikes- diplomacy and sanctions failed, the planning has made quantum leaps, and there would be international support- this card is hot!

Klein 6/15member of Council on Foreign Relations (Joe, 6/15/10, “An Attack on Iran: Back on the Table”, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2003921,00.html) MH

In late 2006, George W. Bush met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon and asked if military action against Iran's nuclear program was feasible. The unanimous answer was no. Air strikes could take out some of Iran's nuclear facilities, but there was no way to eliminate all of them. Some of the nuclear labs were located in heavily populated areas; others were deep underground. And Iran's ability to strike back by unconventional means, especially through its Hizballah terrorist network, was formidable. The military option was never officially taken off the table. At least, that's what U.S. officials always said. But the emphasis was on the implausibility of a military strike. "Another war in the Middle East is the last thing we need," Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in 2008. It would be "disastrous on a number of levels." (See pictures of President Bush in the Middle East.) Gates is sounding more belligerent these days. "I don't think we're prepared to even talk about containing a nuclear Iran," he told Fox News on June 20. "We do not accept the idea of Iran having nuclear weapons." In fact, Gates was reflecting a new reality in the military and intelligence communities. Diplomacy and economic pressure remain the preferred means to force Iran to negotiate a nuclear deal, but there isn't much hope that's going to happen. "Will [sanctions] deter them from their ambitions with regards to nuclear capability?" CIA Director Leon Panetta told ABC News on June 27. "Probably not." So the military option is very much back on the table. What has changed? "I started to rethink this last November," a recently retired U.S. official with extensive knowledge of the issue told me. "We offered the Iranians a really generous deal, which their negotiators accepted," he went on, referring to the offer to exchange Iran's 1.2 tons of low-enriched uranium (3.5% pure) for higher-enriched (20%) uranium for medical research and use. "When the leadership shot that down, I began to think, Well, we made the good-faith effort to engage. What do we do now?" (See pictures of terror in Tehran.) Other intelligence sources say that the U.S. Army's Central Command, which is in charge of organizing military operations in the Middle East, has made some real progress in planning targeted air strikes — aided, in large part, by the vastly improved human-intelligence operations in the region. "There really wasn't a military option a year ago," an Israeli military source told me. "But they've gotten serious about the planning, and the option is real now." Israel has been brought into the planning process, I'm told, because U.S. officials are frightened by the possibility that the right-wing Netanyahu government might go rogue and try to whack the Iranians on its own. (Comment on this story.) One other factor has brought the military option to a low boil: Iran's Sunni neighbors really want the U.S. to do it. When United Arab Emirates Ambassador Yousef al-Otaiba said on July 6 that he favored a military strike against Iran despite the economic and military consequences to his country, he was reflecting an increasingly adamant attitude in the region. Senior American officials who travel to the Gulf frequently say the Saudis, in particular, raise the issue with surprising ardor. Everyone from the Turks to the Egyptians to the Jordanians are threatening to go nuclear if Iran does. That is seen as a real problem in the most volatile region in the world: What happens, for example, if Saudi Arabia gets a bomb, and the deathless monarchy there is overthrown by Islamist radicals? For the moment, the White House remains as skeptical as ever about a military strike. Most senior military leaders also believe Gates got it right the first time — even a targeted attack on Iran would be "disastrous on a number of levels." It would unify the Iranian people against the latest in a long series of foreign interventions. It would also unify much of the world — including countries like Russia and China that we've worked hard to cultivate — against a recowboyfied U.S. There would certainly be an Iranian reaction — in Iraq, in Afghanistan, by Lebanese Hizballah against Israel and by the Hizballah network against the U.S. and Saudi homelands. A catastrophic regional war is not impossible. (See who's who in Barack Obama's White House.) Of course, it is also possible that this low-key saber-rattling is simply a message the U.S. is trying to send the Iranians: it's time to deal. There have been rumblings from Tehran about resuming negotiations, although the regime has very little credibility right now. The assumption — shared even by some of Iran's former friends, like the Russians — is that any Iranian offer to talk is really an offer to stall. A specific, plausible Iranian concession may be needed to get the process back on track. But it is also possible that the saber-rattling is not a bluff, that the U.S. really won't tolerate a nuclear Iran and is prepared to do something awful to stop it.

NOW IS THE TIME! Iran can develop nuclear weapons by 2015

Daily Mail 4/12(4/12/10, “Iran will be able to produce a nuclear bomb ‘within three years”, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1265915/Iran-able-produce-nuclear-bomb-years.html)MH

Iran won't be capable of producing nuclear weapons for at least 12 months but will probably be able to do so within three-to-five years, U.S. officials said yesterday. The timeframe comes as President Barack Obama presses a reluctant China to back swift sanctions on Iran and U.S. intelligence agencies try to finish a classified report assessing how Tehran's nuclear program is progressing. Jane Harman, chairwoman of the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, told Reuters on Tuesday that a revised U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran was 'essentially complete' but that it was unclear if any of it would be made public after going to the president. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: U.S. officials believe Iran will be capable of producing nuclear weapons within three-to-five years Western powers fear Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons under the cover of a civilian atomic program. Tehran says its program is intended only for peaceful power generation. U.S. General David Petraeus, who as head of Central Command overseas wars in Iraq and Afghanistan bordering Iran, said Tehran's nuclear ambitions have sent ripples across the region, and that the United States was 'quietly' beefing up the 'defensive preparations' of key allies there. He told a Washington conference that while a lack of progress settling the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been cited by Arab leaders as their biggest concern, 'Iran, I think, is now edging that issue out.' Opinions within the U.S. intelligence community vary on the extent to which Iran's nuclear capabilities have changed since the release in November 2007 of a declassified summary of the previous NIE on Iran by then-President George W. Bush. That 2007 document judged with 'moderate confidence' that Iran would 'probably' be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon sometime in the 2010-2015 time frame. The current view within the intelligence community is that Iran would be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the 'next few years', closer to 2015 than 2010, though officials cautioned that such timetable have been proven unreliable. To explain the delay, U.S. officials in recent months have pointed to what they have described as technical 'problems' at Iran's enrichment plant at Natanz in operating thousands of the centrifuges that have been installed. Asked about reported comments that Iran might be able to join the nuclear club in months, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said: 'I don't believe it.' 'I think that most estimates that I've seen, haven't changed since the last time we talked about it, which is probably at least a year, and maybe more,' he added. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, continues to hold that Iran will have a capability to build a weapon in one to three years, according to aides. Israel, which is believed to have the Middle East's only nuclear arsenal, sees an Iranian warhead by 2014 and believes a prototype may only be 'months away'. U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said final touches on a revised National Intelligence Estimate could take weeks or months, and voiced doubt that President Barack Obama would release a declassified version as then-President George W. Bush did in 2007. The office of the Director of National Intelligence would neither confirm nor deny that an NIE was being prepared. Harman said intelligence suggesting that Iran's nuclear development may be delayed was no reason for the international community to hold back on tough sanctions. 'There are two coordinates - one is their intention and one is their capability - and both of them have to be assessed. Our operating assumption should be that debilitating sanctions need to be pursued now,' he said.

### ME

Nuclear Iran Deters Us Action Destroying Middle East Stability

Efraim Inbar**,** Professor at the BESA center, THE IMPERATIVE TO USE FORCE AGAINST IRANIAN NUCLEARIZATION, December 2005, p. http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/perspectives12.html

The Nature of the Threat T he Islamic Republic of Iran is the greatest and most urgent threat to the new regional order in the Middle East and to American hegemony in world affairs. Iran actively supports the insurgency in Iraq against the establishment of a pro-American regime that is clearly more liberal than that of Saddam Hussein. Teheran encourages the radical Shiite elements in Iraq in order to promote the establishment of another Islamic republic. It opposes a more liberal regime that could potentially serve as a catalyst for democratization in the area. Moreover, Iran is allied with Syria, another radical state with an anti-American predisposition, and seeks to create a radical corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean. Iran also lends critical support to terrorist organizations such as Hizbullah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Indeed, the Iranian nuclear program is primarily designed to provide a strategic response to American hegemony in world affairs. Teheran wants to be able to continue to oppose American policies and to deter possible American action against the radical Islamic regime. At the same time, its nuclear program threatens regional stability in the Middle East.

Middle East War Goes Nuclear

John Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, ISRAELI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A THREAT TO PEACE, March 2002, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability." and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional." Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familiar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."

### Econ

Nuclear Iran Causes Oil Prices To Skyrocket

Hanson, History Professor, Stanford, IRAN’S NUCLEAR SCORPION, June 8, 2006, p. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/06/irans\_nuclear\_scorpion.html]

With a few nuclear missiles, Iran knows it could dictate the strategic landscape of the Persian Gulf - bullying Gulf sheikdoms over border disputes and petroleum output and claiming the forefront in the Islamist struggle against Israel. A "Persian bomb" wins national prestige and quells dissidents at home, while ensuring enough unpredictability to keep oil prices sky-high.

Spike Causes Global Depression

Richard Doutwaith, No Date given OIL AND THE IRISH ECONOMY, p. http://www.constructireland.ie/articles/0210douthwaite.php

In April, the merchant bank Goldman Sachs warned that a ‘super-spike’ in oil prices might drive the cost of a barrel of crude up to $105, twice what they are at the time I’m writing this in early June. $105 would also be six times the average price between 1987 and 2000. The bank referred to a ‘spike’ because prices could not stay at the $100 level for more than a few months without causing the collapse of the world economy. This would happen because we would all be spending so much more to buy our oil that we would be unable to carry on buying other things at the rate we do at present, particularly as the prices of other fuels would rise in step with that of oil. As a result of the diversion of our spending, factories around the world would find they had spare capacity. They would lay off staff and cancel expansion projects and, as construction work is so energy intensive, its cessation would cause oil demand to fall rapidly. This is exactly what happened the last time its price went significantly above the $20 level in 1972 money. Millions of people would become unemployed and cut their spending to the bare minimum, causing other people to lose their jobs too. A global depression could develop in which the lack of activity in the world economy could cause the price of oil in today’s money to plummet from $100 back to around $15 a barrel again

Economic collapse leads to nuclear war

The Baltimore Examiner 9 [“Will this recession lead to World War II,” 2/26, <http://www.examiner.com/x-3108-Baltimore-Republican-Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this-recession-lead-to-World-War-III>]

Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the t**errifying possibility** of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself

# NEg Round v ASU/ISU

## 2nc

## 1nr

#### Fair roleplaying is critical to building and testing decision-making skills

Hanghoj 8

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>

\*\*\*modified gender language

While Dewey focused on the imaginative and creative aspects of play in relation to the school curriculum, his close friend and pragmatist colleague, Mead, concentrated on the social and intersubjective aspects of play and games (Joas, 1996). In this way, Mead developed a comprehensive theory of the *social self*, which assumed that the development of the self was deeply related with social interaction through play, games, language and other forms of communication (Mead, 1934: 150-164). Thus, Mead provides a valuable starting point when trying to understand the social interaction of educational gaming. For Mead, the basic requirement of any form of play is the ability to “take the role of another”, as when children get together to “play Indian” (Mead, 1934: 150). The situation is somewhat different in more organised games, as the participants “must be ready to take the attitude of all the others involved in the game, and that these different roles must have a definite relationship to each other” (Mead, 1934: 151). The point being that the others should not so much be seen as specific individuals, but as other team members or participants in the game. Furthermore, the attitudes of the other players “organize a sort of unit, and it is that organization which controls the response of the individual” (Mead, 1934: 154). This organisation is exemplified in the game of baseball, where all players must coordinate their acts in *response* to the *assumed acts* of the other players. Mead then introduces his famous concept of the generalised other, which describes “the unity of self” given to the individual by his social membership in a community, i.e. on a baseball team (Mead, 1934: 154). Thus, when playing baseball, the participants must be able to take the attitude and perspective of the abstract other of the social group of their baseball team: “The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community” (Mead, 1934: 154). Thus, the generalised other is the general notion that a person has of the common expectations that others have about actions and thoughts within a particular society. This means that any time actors try to imagine what is expected of them in relation to a wider social group or community, they are taking on the perspective of the generalised other. Similarly, the generalised other can also be described as “a stage beyond the processes of ‘taking the role of the other’ where the other is another identifiable individual or set of individuals” (Holdsworth & Morgan, 2007: 402). In addition to baseball, Mead offers another interesting example of how an individual can be related to “the generalised other”, which is highly relevant to this study: In politics, for example, the individual identifies himself with an entire political party and takes the organized attitudes of that entire party toward the rest of the given social community and toward the problems which confront the party within the given social situation; and he consequently reacts or responds in terms of the organized attitudes of the party as a whole (Mead, 1934: 156). In this way, Mead’s concept can be used to contextualise the empirical analysis of The Power Game sessions as the students were asked to take on the roles as politicians and thereby identify themselves with the “generalised” relationship between real-life politicians and their political parties.

#### Independent impact outside of Aff solvency—necessary to resolve existential threats. Linear risk, educational illiteracy is increasing

Lundberg 10

(Lundberg, Christian O., professor of communications at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “ The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina”, Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry’s capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988, 63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modern articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid.). Larkin’s study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so. . . . These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate]. . . . These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students’ self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing . . . the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin’s study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack’s (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack’s framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today’s student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, research and information-processing skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

#### That’s specifically true with government energy policy discussions

**Kuzemko 12**

[Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>]

Both Hay (2007) and Flinders and Buller (2006) suggest that there are other forms that depoliticisation can take, or in the terminology of Flinders and Buller ‘tactics’ which politicians can pursue in order to move a policy field to a more indirect governing relationship (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). For the purposes of understanding the depoliticisation of UK energy policy, however, two of Colin Hay’s forms of depoliticisation are most useful: the ‘… offloading of areas of formal political responsibility to the market…’ and the passing of policymaking responsibility to quasipublic, or independent, authorities (Hay 2007: 82-3). 1 What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which they can serve, over time, to reduce political capacity by removing processes of deliberation and contestation, thereby reducing the ability for informed agency and choice. In that politics can be understood as being inclusive of processes of deliberation, contestation, informed agency and collective choice the lack of deliberation and capacity for informed agency would result in sub-optimal politics (Hay 2007: 67; cf. Gamble 2000; Wood 2011; Jenkins 2011). There seems little doubt that, with regard to energy as a policy area, the principal of establishing a more indirect governing system had become accepted by UK political elites. One of the very few close observers of UK energy policy from the 1980s to early 2000s claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity market. Competition and 1 "These"forms"are"referred"to"elsewhere"by"the"author"as"‘marketised’"and"‘technocratic’"depoliticisation"(Kuzemko" 2012b:").liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the political agenda…. (Helm 2003: 386) 2 As already suggested this paper considers the intention to depoliticise energy to have been reasonably successful. By the early 2000s the Energy Ministry had been disbanded, there was little or no formal Parliamentary debate, energy was not represented at Cabinet level, responsibility for the supply of energy had been passed to the markets, it was regulated by an independent body, and the (cf. Kuzemko 2012b). Furthermore, the newly formed Energy Directorate within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which now had responsibility for energy policy, had no specific energy mandates but instead mandates regarding encouraging the right conditions for business with an emphasis on competition (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 107). As feared by various analysts who write about depoliticisation as a sub-optimal form of politics, these processes of depoliticisation had arguably resulted in a lack of deliberation about energy and its governance outside of narrow technocratic elite circles. Within these circles energy systems were modelled, language was specific and often unintelligible to others, including generalist politicians or wider publics, and this did, indeed, further encourage a high degree of disengagement with the subject (cf. Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2012b; Stern 1987). Technical language and hiring practices that emphasised certain forms of economic education further isolated elite technocratic circles from political contestation and other forms of knowledge about energy. Arguably, by placing those actors who have been elected to represent the national collective interest at one remove from processes of energy governance the result was a lack of formal political capacity in this policy field. It is worth, briefly, at this point reiterating the paradoxical nature of depoliticisation. Whilst decisions to depoliticise are deeply political, political capacity to deliberate, contest and act in an issue area can be reduced through these processes. Depoliticisation has been an ongoing form of governing throughout the 20 th century it may (Burnham 2001: 464), however, be particularly powerful and more difficult to reverse when underpinned by increasingly dominant ideas about how best to govern. For example Hay, in looking for the domestic sources of depoliticisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggests that these processes were firmly underpinned by neoliberal and public choice ideas not only about the role of the state but also about the ability for political actors to make sound decisions relating, in particular, to economic governance (Hay 2007: 95-99). Given the degree to which such ideas were held increasingly to be legitimate over this time period depoliticisation was, arguably, genuinely understood by many as a process that would result in better governance (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15 cf. Hay 2007: 94; Kern 2010). This to a certain extent makes decisions to depoliticise appear both less instrumental but also harder to reverse given the degree to which such ideas become further entrenched via processes of depoliticisation (cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 61-66; Wood 2011: 7).

# Neg Round v Emory CM

## 1NC

### 1

US Energy Information Administration defines energy production as amount refined

EIA 12 (“Definitions, Sources and Explanatory Notes”, <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/TblDefs/pet_sum_sndw_tbldef2.asp>) Production - Petroleum products produced at a refinery, natural gas processing plant, or blending plant. Published production equals production minus input. Negative production will occur when the amount of a product produced during the reporting period is less than the amount of that same product that is reprocessed (input) or reclassified to become another product during the same reporting period.

**Production is distinct from development**

Conservation Measures Partnership 10(<http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/3-energy-production-mining>, “3.1 Oil & Gas Drilling”) Definition: Exploring for, developing, and producing petroleum and other liquid hydrocarbons Exposition**:** Oil and gas pipelines go into [4.2 Utility & Service Lines](http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/4-transportation-service-corridors). Oil spills that occur at the drill site should be placed here; those that come from oil tankers or pipelines should go in [4. Transportation & Service Corridors](http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/4-transportation-service-corridors) or in [9.2 Industrial & Military Effluents](http://www.conservationmeasures.org/initiatives/threats-actions-taxonomies/threats-taxonomy/9-pollution), depending on your perspective. **Examples:** oil wells deep sea natural gas drilling

EOR is oil field development and only a supplement to production

Teledyne 2012 (“Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR),” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&ved=0CH0QFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.isco.com%2FWebProductFiles%2FApplications%2F105%2FApplication\_Notes%2FEnhanced\_Oil\_Recovery.pdf&ei=\_EzsULmrC-3RiAKBr4GACA&usg=AFQjCNGGKGqVZSpmojn6zHMg4U0in4bBAQ&sig2=oXOJxUNWsrMlnGq08v2Qcw&bvm=bv.1357316858,d.cGE)

The life of an oil well goes through three distinct phases where various techniques are employed to maintain crude oil production at maximum levels. The primary importance of these techniques is to force oil into the wellhead where it can be pumped to the surface. Techniques employed at the third phase, commonly known as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), can substantially improve extraction efficiency. Laboratory development of these techniques involves setups that duplicate well and reservoir conditions. Core Flooding Pumps or Core Analysis Pumps, such as Teledyne Isco Syringe Pumps, are used in laboratory testing of these Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) techniques. The Three Stages of Oil Field Development Primary Recovery — In Primary Recovery, oil is forced out by pressure generated from gas present in the oil. Secondary Recovery — In Secondary Recovery, the reservoir is subjected to water flooding or gas injection to maintain a pressure that continues to move oil to the surface. Tertiary Recovery — Tertiary Recovery, also known as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), introduces fluids that reduce viscosity and improve flow. These fluids could consist of gases that are miscible with oil (typically carbon dioxide), steam, air or oxygen, polymer solutions, gels, surfactant-polymer formulations, alkaline-surfactant-polymer formulations, or microorganism formulations.

**B. Violation - the affirmative increases the financial incentives for oil development not oil production**

**C. Prefer our interpretation**

**1 - Ground - modifying how oil is developed is distinct from increasing production - they can spike out of our oil production DA by claiming that they don't affect prices. Any we meet is FX**

**2 - Limits - they allow for any aff to drill in any place OR through any particular method. Fracking, shale, horizontal , different chemical mixtures in drilling could all be promoted - they also allow drilling in any state, county, river and could claim local advantages.**

**3 - Extra topicality – the affirmative does not simply extract - they also inject and then claim advantages off of it.**

**D. Topicality is a voting issue – necessary to tell the negative what they should and should not be prepared to debate**

### 2

#### Text: The USFG should assume liability for up to the first 40 GW of power of first mover CO2-EOR programs. These first movers must agree to work alongside the DOE and other regulatory agencies. In these first mover projects, the EPA will recognize EOR as providing storage, subject to verification and the DOE will provide data on permanence of storage, develop tools for end-to-end systems analysis, provide analytic frameworks for value proposition for EOR infrastructure, and examine infrastructure projects.

#### The counterplan uses a go slow approach that ensures all regulations are in place without MASSIVE tax credits distorting the industry.

Moniz and Tinker 10 (Ernest J. Moniz Scott W. Tinker Director, MIT Energy Initiative Director, Bureau of Economic Geology Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics Allday Endowed Chair in the Jackson and Engineering Systems School of Geosciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Texas at Austin “Role of Enhanced Oil Recovery in Accelerating the Deployment of Carbon Capture and Sequestration” <http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/110510_EOR_Report_1.pdf>, MIT Energy Initiative and Bureau of Economic Geology at UT Austin Symposium | July 23, 2010)

Multiple regulatory issues need to be faced, some of which have been alluded to already. Liability is a key issue. There was considerable disagreement among symposium participants about the extent to which government should assume long-term liability for CO2 storage and/or is compensated for assuming that liability. This discussion mirrors that for CO2 sequestration quite independent of the EOR possibility. Our view is that a phased approach is called for, testing out the scalability of anthropogenic CO2 -EOR while answering the scientific, verification, infrastructure, and business questions. In this context, some combination of state and federal governments should assume long-term liability for a small set of first-mover projects while the regulatory regime is proposed, debated, and evolved based on the first-mover experience. Clearly, historical liabilities associated with the site history or with a possible “orphan” site future are not acceptable. This assumption of liability can be negotiated into the terms for monetizing the stored CO2 in these first few projects. The alternative is further delay in establishing the CCS option and deferral of the domestic oil production opportunity. A second set of issues deals with ownership of pore space. Conventional approaches to mineral extraction rights are inappropriate for CO2 storage rights. An essential step is that the EPA recognizes EOR as providing storage, subject to verification. Unitizing — legal agreements that enable oil reservoirs to be operated as a single system even if different landowners are affected — needs to be carried over to CO2 storage in order to facilitate monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) needed for monetizing stored CO2 . 5. Recommended actions Anthropogenic CO2 capture, transportation, and use for EOR has the potential to be a significant contributor to domestic oil production and, if increased several-fold from today’s injected volumes, to accommodate anticipated sequestration needs for at least a couple of decades, quite possibly more. The high cost of integrated CCS projects has slowed down the implementation of CCS demonstrations, and the economic benefits of EOR, especially with continuing high oil prices, can provide a major stimulus for advancing such projects. Several DOE projects already target EOR, but there has not been a commitment to this option as a key part of the overall CCS program design. We strongly urge that the DOE develop and implement a comprehensive RD&D program that: • Provides data on permanence of CO2 storage in EOR; • Develops the tools for end-to-end systems analysis of CO2 capture at power plants, transportation infrastructure, and stacked storage; • Provides an analytical framework for the value proposition for power plant, pipeline, and EOR operators and for the government; • Puts forward principles for resolving regulatory issues, such as pipeline siting and access, long-term liability, and pore rights; • Explores the potential for EOR in ROZs; and • Maps out a phased implementation program for CO2 -EOR, including build-out of transportation infrastructure.

#### Safety regulations on EOR not ready yet

Moniz and Tinker 10 (Ernest J. Moniz Scott W. Tinker Director, MIT Energy Initiative Director, Bureau of Economic Geology Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics Allday Endowed Chair in the Jackson and Engineering Systems School of Geosciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Texas at Austin “Role of Enhanced Oil Recovery in Accelerating the Deployment of Carbon Capture and Sequestration” <http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/110510_EOR_Report_1.pdf>, MIT Energy Initiative and Bureau of Economic Geology at UT Austin Symposium | July 23, 2010fROM the RappORteuRs’ RepORt On the syMpOsIuM

Another key issue addressed by the participants was the framework that would be needed to transform current CO2 -EOR operations into a viable CCS option. Participants noted that current EOR operations were designed to maximize oil production rather than permanently store CO2 , and that data, research, and analysis to support regulations on the permanency and safety of CO2 injected into hydrocarbon pore space are not complete or comprehensive.

#### One accident destroys the entire industry

Biello 9 (Enhanced Oil Recovery: How to Make Money from Carbon Capture and Storage Today

<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=enhanced-oil-recovery>, SCIENTiFIC AMERICAN, April 9)

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under the terms of the Safe Drinking [Water](http://www.scientificamerican.com/topic.cfm?id=water) Act of 1974, is currently crafting [new measures to regulate wells for CO2 injection](http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/wells_sequestration.html)—final rules are set to be adopted by 2011 to protect groundwater sources from CO2 in the subsurface, according to Stephen Heare, director of the EPA's drinking water protection division. "There are 800,000 wells out there injecting almost everything imaginable," Heare says. "We think the technology is there and we can move ahead safely." Nevertheless, "the first CCS project that is done badly is the last CCS project that will be done," warns Mark Brownstein, New York-based managing director of business partnerships in the climate and air program at the Environmental Defense Fund. "In this respect, it is very similar to [nuclear power](http://www.sciam.com/report.cfm?id=nuclear-future)."

### 3

#### Energy production policy is grounded within a global system of inequality and militarism – Enables continued reactionary violence and environmental destruction in the name of continued economic growth

**Byrne and Toly ‘6** (“Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse” John Byrne and Noah Toly, pp 1-32, Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict 2006 Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Established in 1980 at the University of Delaware, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy. CEEP is led by Dr. John Byrne, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University. For his contributions to Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, he shares the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors. Dr. Toly’s chief interests are in urban and global environmental governance. He has co-edited three books and has authored numerous other publications on topics such as global cities, environmental issues, and religion. He is editor of the Routledge series, Cities and Global Governance and was selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013. His expertise includes issues related to urban and environmental politics, global cities, and public policy. Dr. Toly directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs.

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss, the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system’s operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings—almost one-third of the planet’s population—experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact—and sometimes exacerbated—social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smil, 2003: 370 - 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war. 3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector’s performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be *a captive* of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of “energy futures” that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices. 4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power 12 Transforming Power who, early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg, 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, cited in the New York Times 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the “magical fire” or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize “inherently safe reactors” (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in “sustainable energy alternatives” that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, “green” energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy “haves” and “havenots.” 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291), “today’s nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people” as “micropower meets village power.” Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a “solar global economy... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world’s cultural diversity” (Scheer, 2002: 34). 6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet’s climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime’s operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. 02Chapter1.pmd 2 1/6/2006, 2:56 PMEnergy as a Social Project 3 By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ...an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity—here are the enemies. The living organism demands a life-sustaining environment. Modernity’s formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity’s supporters would seek to derail present-tense 7 evaluations of the era’s social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the “democratic-authoritarian bargain” (1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce “every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority” on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford’s work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### The impact is Extinction – The K turns and solves the root cause of their impacts – the aff causes error replication

**Ahmed 12** Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the **unsustainable** depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global financial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply **interwoven manifestations** of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is **embedded**. In this context, orthodox IR's flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, **reifying** the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘**Otherisation’** of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a **wider** epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes**.** In 2009, the UK government's chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action 'drivers' of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a 'perfect storm' of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030.1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics. While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, 'most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or **failed** to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.\*" Underlying this problem is the **lack** of a **holistic systems approach** to **thinking** about not only global crises, but their causal **origins** in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be 'secured\* and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing **systemic and structural obstacles** to the implementation of desired reforms. In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an **empirically-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration** of the **best** available **data** on four major global crises — climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability — illustrating the **systemic interconnections** between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and **holistically** in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are 'securitised\* as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously **exacerbates** the danger of **reactionary violence**, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource 'shortages\* or 'abundance\* causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in **violent conflict**.

#### VOTE NEG – Interrogating dominant policy frameworks creates space for new ways of approaching energy policy – our role as energy policy researchers should be to interrogating the framing of our policies

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

The way in which **energy policy is “framed**” refers to the **underlying assumptions policy is based on** and the ways in which **policy debates ‘construct’, emphasise and link particular issues**. For example energy ‘security of supply’ is often emphasised in arguments favouring nuclear-generated electricity. A more limited framing effect operates on individuals in opinion polls and public referendums: here the way in which questions are posed has a strong influence on responses. The bigger, **social framing** effect referred to here **colours societies’ thinking** about whole areas of public life, in this case energy use and its environmental impacts. A key element of the proposed reframing advanced by commentators concerned with decarbonising energy use (see, for example, [Scrase and MacKerron, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib25)) is to cease treating energy as just commercial units of fuel and electricity, and instead to focus on the energy ‘services’ people need (warmth, lighting, mobility and so on). This paper helps to explain why any such reframing, however logical and appealing, is politically very challenging if it goes against the perceived interests of powerful groups, particularly when these interests are aligned with certain imperatives which governments must fulfil if they are to avoid electoral defeat. There is a **dominant conception** of **policy-making as an objective, linear process**. In essence the process is portrayed as proceeding in a series of steps from facts to analysis, and then to solutions (for a detailed critique of this linear view see [Fischer, 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib11)). In reality, policy-making is usually messy and political, rife with the exercise of **interests and power**. **The veneer of objective, rational policy-making**, that the dominant, linear model of policy-making supports is therefore cause for concern. It effectively sustains energy policy ‘business as usual’ and excludes many relevant voices that might be effective in opening up space to reframe energy policy problems and move towards more sustainable solutions (see, for example, [Ockwell, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib21)). This echoes concerns with **what counts as knowledge** and whose voices are heard in policy debates that have characterised strands of several literatures in recent decades, including science and technology studies, sociology of scientific knowledge, and various strands of the political science and development literatures, particularly in the context of knowledge, discourse and democracy. An alternative to the linear model is provided by a ‘discourse’ perspective. This draws on political scientists’ observations of ways in which politics and policy-making proceed through the use of language, and the expression of values and the assumptions therein. Discourse can be understood as: ‘… a **shared way of apprehending the world**. **Embedded in language** it enables subscribers to **interpret bits of information** and put them together into **coherent stories** or accounts. Each discourse **rests on assumptions**, judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, agreements and disagreements…’ [Dryzek (1997, p.8)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib5). A discursive approach rejects the widely held assumption that policy language is a **neutral medium** through which ideas and an objective world are represented and discussed ([Darcy, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib4)). Discourse analysts examine and explain language use in a way that helps to **reveal the underlying interests, value judgements and beliefs** that are often **disguised by policy actors’** factual claims and the arguments that these are used to support. For example UK energy policy review documents issued in 2006–2007 are criticised below for presenting information in ways that subtly but consistently favoured new nuclear power while purporting to be undecided on the issue. People (including scientific and policy experts) **base their understanding of problems and solutions on their knowledge, experiences, interpretations and value judgements**. These are **coloured and shaped** by social interactions, for example by what is considered an ‘appropriate’ perspective in one's work life within certain institutions. Policy actors therefore expend considerable effort on influencing the design and evolution of institutions in order to ensure problems and solutions are framed in ways they favour. Thus discourse is fundamental to the way that institutions are created, but in the short-term institutions also have a constraining or structuring effect. At a more fundamental level there are even more rigid constraints, which can be identified as a set of core imperatives, such as sustained economic growth and national security, which states and their governments, with very few exceptions, must fulfil in order to ensure their survival ([Dryzek et al., 2003](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib6)—these are explored in detail further below).

### 4

#### Saudi would flood the market in response to the plan and crash oil prices

HULBERT ’12 - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review; Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations; Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “OPEC's Pending Bloodbath”. June 10, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/06/10/opecs-pending-bloodbath/)

That’s unlikely to happen, precisely because Riyadh can bring further pricing pressures to bear if it wants to get its way in the cartel. The Kingdom’s policy space has admittedly tightened over the past couple of years, but they remain the only producer capable of significantly increasing or reducing production at will. Initial tanker data from Europe suggests Riyadh may have started reigning in production that was running around 6% over OPEC quota. It’s also raised July benchmarks for Arab Light grades in Asia. But Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria will want restraint to come far faster and far deeper to firm prices. The line being spun from the ‘free lunch’ brigade is that storage should easily cover any Iranian spikes when EU sanctions come into full effect 1st July, while OPEC quotas should be pared down to 29.5mb/d (or less). Cheap words from petro-hawks, not least because they’ll all continue to cheat on quotas to squeeze out every last drop they have. Riyadh knows that of course; hawks want a price floor to be set at $100/b to sustain political regimes, but to do so entirely at Saudi expense. Russia is no different outside the cartel: free riding 101. Saudi Arabia (and its GCC partners) might be willing to play ball given ongoing concerns from the Arab Awakening, but with some budgetary tweaks and counter-cyclical cash to burn, they could all easily survive at $85/b making Iran et al sweat. Tehran might decide to rip up formal quotas as it did in June 2011, but that would be a costly mistake. If the Saudis let prices fall, political outages across smaller producer states could help to set a floor for them anyway. Iran would have no say in the matter. Given such ‘pricing perils’, Saudi Arabia holds all the aces to settle institutional issues, not to mention giving the global economy more breathing space (and Washington greater leeway over Iranian sanctions). But the real reason to let prices fall a little further isn’t just to make very clear to OPEC states where the ultimate volume and pricing power rests, but to fight Riyadh’s bigger battle over the next decade: Retaining 40% of OPEC market share in the midst of supposedly huge non-OPEC supply growth. It didn’t go unnoticed that despite Saudi production averaging 31 year highs and prices hitting $128/b in March 2012, the forward curve for 2018 was trading at $30/b discounts relative to spot. You’d think with the cartel maxed out and proximate demand side problems looking bleak, five year curves would be exactly the other way, in sharp contango (i.e. far above prompt prices) once the global economy and demand side fundamentals were fixed. The fact they weren’t is principally because the market thinks vast swathes of unconventional production will come online, not just in North America where production is back above 6mb/d, but in Canada, Brazil and even Arctic extremes. At $100/b that was a fair bet to place, but once benchmark prices drop back to two figures, the 6.4 trillion barrels of unconventional reserves sitting in the Americas look a far less certain prospect. Canadian tar distinctly sticky; Brazilian pre-salt horribly deep; Russian Arctic plays simply impossible. So when OPEC meets in Vienna expect Saudi Arabia to call the shots. The new Secretary General will either be a Saudi national, or a compromise candidate Riyadh can live with. Quotas will stay close to 30mb/d with minor reductions possible. Thinly veiled threats of sustained (or increased) production will be made if Iran doesn’t play ball. Yet the long term price point to watch isn’t just one that keeps OPEC in business and Riyadh in control, but where the al-Saud can maintain secular market share. Letting prices informally slide to $85-90/b might be the kind of warning shot Riyadh wants to send to scrub unconventional plays off global balance sheets. Its OPEC colleagues will see that as sailing far too close to the political wind, but a Saudi bloodbath now, might be just the medicine OPEC requires to sustain its long term health, not unless the cartel is absolutely determined to keep pricing itself out of existence.

#### Oil prices are key to Russian military modernization

BENNETT ‘12 – MA from the University of Chicago; Emory University School of Law (John T. “Oil Prices Fueling Russia's Disruption of U.S. Foreign Policy”. April 04, 2012. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/04/03/oil-prices-fueling-russias-disruption-of-us-foreign-policy)

Russia's return to the fore as a check against America's global whims has escalated in recent months, as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was elected as President, and is setting his agenda for a third term. U.S.-Russian relations returned to the front pages last week after Obama urged outgoing Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to "give me space" on several issues, including a European missile defense shield that Moscow opposes. Likely GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney soon after called Russia America's "top geopolitical enemy." "Putin still aspires for Russia to be a superpower," says Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. "There are only two ways for Russia to achieve that: nuclear weapons, and oil and natural gas sales." The price of a barrel of oil was nearly $105 at midday Tuesday, steadily climbing from a 52-week low of $76.35 per barrel in October. Oil prices began to rise in late 2010, peaking at $113 per barrel in May 2011, before dipping last summer and then rising again. Russia is the world's second-largest oil exporter at 5 million barrels a day, and its the ninth-leading natural gas exporter at 38.2 billion cubic meters a year, according to the CIA World Factbook. Russia rakes in nearly $500 billion annually in exports, with the CIA listing petroleum and natural gas as its top two commodities. Frances Burwell, vice president of the Atlantic Council, says Russia's oil revenues "give it a comfort zone" from which its leaders feel they have the global cache to make things tough for Washington. Burwell says she "places more weight" for Russia's recent global muscularity on "Putin's re-emergence." The Russian once-and-soon-again president "clearly sees playing the national card as the strong guy internationally benefits him," she says. But, make no mistake, bloated national coffers from high oil and gas prices underwrite Putin's muscle-flexing, experts say. Putin made a number of big domestic promises during the presidential race, including plans to usher in sweeping pension and wage hikes. He also put forth "a rather ambitious military modernization program," Pifer says. "If oil prices remain high, he might be able to do all of those things," Pifer says. "If prices come down, however, Putin will have some very tough decisions to make at home ... between guns versus butter." Should oil and gas prices tumble, experts say Putin would likely pick butter. "In 2007 when oil was doing well, Putin [as president] could have modernized the Russian military," says Pifer. Instead, Putin made a number of economic moves, such as the creation of a rainy day fund that was used during the recent global financial crisis," Pifer notes. What's more, Putin returns to power with his sharp eyes locked on his opposition, which is composed of the country's urban, middle-class populations. Experts agree that Putin would be hard-pressed to break his pension and wage promises in favor of a few more missiles. But even an economically weaker Russia would likely pick its spots to block Washington's desires.

#### Impact is Russian nuclear preemption—modernization key to lower nuclear reliance and Russian threat perception

RENZ AND THORNTON 12 – lectures on international security in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nottingham (Bettina., Rod. “Russian Military Modernization Cause, Course, and Consequences” Problems of Post-Communism Volume 59, Number 1 / January / February 2012. P 52-54)

The perceived weakness of this triad means that the Kremlin was pleased with the START agreement of March 2010. The treaty limits favor Moscow in that it does not have to cut any of its own nuclear warheads or delivery systems—the numbers of ICBMs and warheads in its own triad are actually below the negotiated caps. Only the United States has had to bring its numbers down.58 Normally, in the arranging of such international security treaties, negotiating from a position of military weakness—as Russia was—is not conducive to the ability to drive a hard bargain. Moscow has been lucky, however, in that Washington seems not to be too interested in the shape of Russia’s current and future nuclear arsenal. Rather, in terms of perceived security threats, Washington has its eye more on the terrorist ball than on the Russian one. Additionally, under START, Russia does not have to reduce the number of its tactical nuclear weapons. It has more of these than the United States. These are prized and important assets to Moscow, and they have become even more prized and important as Russia’s conventional military has become weaker. They are seen more and more as the fallback option if Russia one day faces some sort of defeat in a conventional conflict—against the likes of Georgia or China. In the largest Russian military exercise held since the end of the cold war—conducted recently in the Russian Far East—tactical nuclear weapons (i.e., mines) were notionally “exploded” as part of the exercise play.59 This fact alone seems to confirm that Russia’s conventional military weakness has led to a reduction in its nuclear-use threshold. Conclusion The current modernization in the Russian military is long overdue. Because it is long overdue, it has to be completed in a rushed, haphazard fashion and against a backdrop of a military–industrial complex unable to fulfill its role in the process. Traditionally, military modernization is not achieved lightly, given the bureaucratic inertia and cultural norms that are always present. When, as in the current situation in Russia, such barriers to change are aided and abetted by any number of additional problems (not to mention the rampant corruption that is endemic across all levels of Russian state institutions, including the military), then it must be expected that Russia’s armed forces will be striving for some time to become truly “modern.”60 In essence, what should have been accomplished as an evolution over many years, and should have begun during the Yeltsin era, is now being attempted as a revolution in the post–Georgian war era. As with any revolutionary change, a good deal of disruption and disaffection has been created. Moreover, the current Russian military is a weakened military. The psychology of the tsarist/Soviet/Russian military has always been that numbers counted, that mass would prevail. Numbers inspired confidence, and numbers could deter. But the current Russian military is losing numbers while not making up for them by creating smaller, more professional forces equipped with the requisite technologies. Quality is not replacing quantity. The military is in a state of flux. Russian politicians and military figures both now lack a genuine confidence in the armed forces’ ability to deter. This can have two consequences. Either Russia takes large steps to avoid the possibility of military confrontation by stressing diplomatic solutions to possible threat scenarios (as the tsarist government did in 1914), or it goes the opposite way, fearing that if any state is threatening military action against Russia then the hair trigger comes into operation (Israeli-style). That is, the mentality of the first, preemptive strike becomes paramount—taking advantage of surprise—and using what assets Russia now has. The alternative is to take the risk of waiting to be attacked and maybe “losing.” What is clear is that, with its armed forces currently weakened by the process of change, the sense of vulnerability generated has led Russia, in classic confirmation of the security dilemma concept, to magnify the threats it faces, or thinks it faces. Conscious of its vulnerability to threats, real or imagined, Moscow may begin to look more and more toward the inflexible tool of its tactical nuclear weapons as its principal defense mechanism. While no one really supposes that such weapons will be used in any confrontation with the West, the same cannot be said of any possible conflict with the Chinese. Ironically, Beijing’s military still relies on mass. The best modern military counter to mass is to employ either PGMs or tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian military has hardly any of the former but plenty of the latter. Hair triggers and tactical nuclear weapons are not comfortable bedfellows.

### 5

#### Immigration reform will pass – top of the agenda.

Greenwood 1-6. [Billie, reporter, "113th Congress: Powers align around immigration reform right from the start" All Voices www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/13747972-113th-congress-powers-align-around-immigration-reform-right-from-the-start]

Immigration reform moves to center stage as the 113th Congress opened session this week. Several early political developments foreshadow the likelihood that this Congress will engage the long-postponed federal action on the current dysfunctional system of immigration law.¶ Plans from the White House set the stage for an immediate push for immigration reform, beginning this month, according to the Huffington Post’s report from an official who spoke anonymously. Legislative aides reportedly indicated that a bipartisan bill on immigration may take several months to develop but could perhaps be ready for a June vote.¶ A bipartisan group, informally known as the “Gang of Eight,” has already begun the effort to hammer out a proposal, according to Politico. The involvement of Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), John McCain (R-Ariz.), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Mike Lee (R-Utah) and Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) lend credence to the surmise that addressing immigration reform will be a legislative priority of the 113th Congress.

#### Plan costs capital – spurs massive ideological divides

**Mills ‘11** [Robin, MSc in Geological Sciences at Cambridge, “Capturing Carbon: The New Weapon in the War Against Climate Change,” Google Book]

CCS already labours under something of a public relations disadvan­tage, due to its association with the unpopular petroleum, coal and electricity industries. It needs only to attract support from politicians, lawyers and real-estate agents to be completely condemned. CCS might suffer from its promotion by the Bush-era initiative on the 'Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate', widely (and rather accurately) perceived as a literal and metaphorical smokescreen for pol­luting countries and industries to escape mandatory carbon curbs8 and dismissed as 'a nice little PR ploy' by none other than former presiden­tial candidate John McCain.9 The debate is further clouded by 'clean coal', a term trotted out by industry groups such as the American Coa­lition for Clean Coal Electricity. Indeed, coal has become vastly cleaner in recent years in terms of non-greenhouse pollutants such as sulphur dioxide. But to be meaningful at all, 'clean coal' has to include carbon capture on at least 85-95% of its emissions. Otherwise, as in Joel and Ethan Coen's satirical adverts,10 'clean coal' becomes a byword for hype, empty spin and evading environmental responsibility. Such bad press leads the public to be suspicious of carbon capture's environmental and safety credentials. There is a natural cynicism when industry proposes a solution so convenient to itself, however solid the scientific arguments. Scrutiny is intensified when the oil and coal indus­tries take the lead in campaigning against climate change bills, as dur­ing August 2009,n and score PR own-goals such as forging letters opposing environmental legislation. Part of this lobbying is a reaction to elements of the proposed legislation, rather than to the idea of limit­ing carbon dioxide emissions per se, but the subtlety of this message can easily be lost. Carbon capture may come to be seen—indeed, is sometimes already seen—as just one more tactic from the energy industry to delay or avoid taking real action on climate change.12 The major elements of the fossil fuel industry, particularly in the USA, were so slow to acknowledge the reality of climate change, denied the science at every turn, and still continue to spread doubt and misinformation, even allegedly generating fraudulent grass-roots campaigns.1" By doing so, they set themselves up to be the villains of the piece. To some extent, the global debate over carbon capture (and, indeed, over climate change legislation) is now being held hostage by the ideological clash in the USA between left and right. In Europe, a few mavericks apart, business and environmentalism agree much more closely than they might realise on the science of climate change, and the key solutions. Such public opposition can lead to lengthy delays, lawsuits, planning inquiries, permitting challenges and direct protests, against new CCS power plants, carbon dioxide pipelines and storage sites. A backlash from taxpayers or electricity consumers might be caused by percep­tions that heavy subsidies or rising power prices are being used to sup­port carbon capture. The substantial government aid being given to renewable energy in many developed countries may be more popular. Government programmes, as with America's FutureGen, may be more vulnerable to cuts amid the fickle winds of political fortune than those led by companies planning for their future. Recovery from the financial crisis will, at some point, have to be paid for by spending cuts and tax increases, and this may crimp funding for new technologies, however environmentally vital.

#### Capital is critical to get a deal

Shifter 12/27/12 (Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?”)

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear. There is also a chance that something unexpected could happen that would put off consideration of immigration reform. Following the horrific massacre at a Connecticut elementary school on December 14, for example, public pressure understandably mounted for gun control, at least the ban of assault weapons. But a decision to pursue that measure -- though desperately needed -- would take away energy and time from other priorities like immigration.

#### Immigration reform is critical to US-Latin American relations

Barshefsky and Hill April 12 (Charlene and James T., Chairs Council on Foreign Relations, US-Latin America Relations: A New Direction For a New Reality”)

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation . The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue . Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

#### Spills over to broader relations – solves warming, prolif, and democracy.

Shifter 12. [Michael, President of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum Intern-American Dialogue, "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America" Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report -- April -- www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to ¶ pursue more robust ties .¶ Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and ¶ expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources . Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market ¶ and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin ¶ America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance . For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become ¶ more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future .The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean ¶ would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters ¶ as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human ¶ rights . With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 ¶ million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and ¶ Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis ¶ for hemispheric partnership. Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between ¶ the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the ¶ current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild ¶ vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both ¶ from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean

**Democracy solves extinction**

**Diamond ’95** (Larry, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

#### Prolif causes extinction

Utgoff 02

Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, Fall,2002, p. 87-90

First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons falling into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Increased prospects for the occasional nuclear shootout Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.' These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain's efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a 'victory or destruction' policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.' And Japan's war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested 'Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?" If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states .6 Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. 'These people are not willing to die for this interest'. 'No sane person would actually use such weapons'. 'Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons'. 'If I don't hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed'. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.' Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.' Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us t0 impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

### Solvency

#### No spillover of Oil EOR to broader CCS

#### COST – it’s 1.5 billion to convert a coal plant

Wynn 9/20

(Nuclear phase-out risks carbon emissions increase, Gerard, <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/nuclear-phaseout-risks-carbon-emissions-increase-20120920-267nt.html>)

The European Commission said last December that all fossil fuel power plants should be fitted with expensive CCS from around 2030, if the European Union is to slash emissions by the middle of the century. "CCS contributes significantly towards decarbonisation in most scenarios, with the highest penetration in case with nuclear constraints," it said in its "Energy Roadmap 2050". CCS is meant to trap carbon emissions from fossil fuel flue gases and pipe them underground, but is still untested at a commercial scale on power plants partly because it adds at least $1.5 billion to the upfront capital cost per gigawatt of electricity generating capacity. The alternatives are either to eliminate fossil fuels except as back-up for renewable energy, or else to relax medium-term carbon emissions targets, most of which are only aspirational and therefore politically feasible to downgrade.

#### Regulatory Barriers

Dooley Et al 10 (CO2-driven Enhanced Oil Recovery as a Stepping Stone to What? JJ Dooley RT Dahowski CL Davidson July 2010, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, <http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/110510_EOR_Report_1.pdf> Joint Global Change Research Institute, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)

This paper draws heavily on the authors’ previously published research to explore the extent to which near term carbon dioxide-driven enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR) can be “a stepping stone to a long term sequestration program of a scale to be material in climate change risk mitigation.” The paper examines the historical evolution of CO2-EOR in the United States and concludes that estimates of the cost of CO2-EOR production or the extent of CO2 pipeline networks based upon this energy security-driven promotion of CO2-EOR do not provide a robust platform for spurring the commercial deployment of carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies (CCS) as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The paper notes that the evolving regulatory framework for CCS makes a clear distinction between CO2-EOR and CCS and the authors examine arguments in the technical literature about the ability for CO2-EOR to generate offsetting revenue to accelerate the commercial deployment of CCS systems in the electric power and industrial sectors of the economy. The authors conclude that the past 35 years of CO2-EOR in the U.S. have been important for boosting domestic oil production and delivering proven system components for future CCS systems. However, though there is no reason to suggest that CO2-EOR will cease to deliver these benefits, there is also little to suggest that CO2-EOR is a necessary or significantly beneficial step towards the commercial deployment of CCS as a means of addressing climate change.

#### Can’t solve offshore now – need developments

Haszeldine 9 – Scottish Power Professor of Carbon Capture & Storage at the University of Edinburgh School of GeoSciences (R. Stuart, 9/25/09, “Carbon Capture and Storage: How Green Can Black Be?” Science, Volume 325, Number 5948, pp. 1647-1652, http://www.roberts.cmc.edu/159/2010/2010pdfs/5.%20Feb%204%202010.pdf)

Injection into depleted oil fields can also be difficult because in many fields, water injected to undertake secondary oil recovery partially fills the space formerly occupied by oil. To take advantage of the oil field containment structure, it may be necessary to empty it by producing extra oil. In this EOR process, injection of fluid CO2 reduces oil viscosity and pushes oil toward production boreholes (26). CO2-EOR is established and viable onshore in several countries. The American Recovery and Re-investment Bill 2009 provides $3.4 billion for CCS demonstration and reduced-tax incentives for CO2- EOR already existing in several U.S. states. An assessment of EOR in the U.S. optimistically calculated that 88 billion barrels of oil could be recovered from 330 billion remaining, even though in 2004, CO2-EOR production was only 75 million barrels per year (27). Although CO2- EOR is plausible onshore, it has not been shown to be viable offshore. Since 2000, several fields evaluated in the North Sea by Shell, British Petroleum, Norsk-Hydro, and Statoil have failed commercial hurdles as a result of unreliable CO2 supply, very large refit costs of offshore platforms, long times until positive cash flow, and much cheaper methods of additional oil production by drilling targeted and deviated boreholes. A sustained oil price of at least $100 per barrel plus guaranteed availability of CO2 are requirements for North Sea EOR viability (18).

#### Government guarantees create moral hazards- creates risky market structures --- investments get misallocated

Gerdin ’11 (Erik Gerding, Associate Professor at University of Colorado Law School. His research interests include securities, banking law, financial regulation generally, and corporate governance, “The Inherent, Ineluctable Instability of Financial Institution Regulation”, <http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/09/the-inherent-ineluctable-instability-of-financial-institution-regulation.html>, September 12, 2011)

Here is my second contribution to the Faculty Lounge Online Forum on the legislative and regulatory process of financial reform. Check out the posts by the other contributors including, Kim Krawiec (Duke), Christie Ford (Univ. British Columbia), Brett McDonnell (Minnesota), Saule Omarova (North Carolina), and Dan Schwarz (Minnesota). In my last post, I concluded that the presence of government subsidies – particularly guarantees explicit (deposit insurance) and implicit (Too-Big-To-Fail) – makes the political economy of financial institution regulation different from other areas of the regulatory state. In this post, I argue that these government subsidies and moreover, the underlying reason for government subsidies, contributes to the inherent instability of financial institution regulation. The presence of government guarantees – explicit or implicit – creates strong incentives for financial firms to externalize the cost of their risk taking onto taxpayers. But there is more to government guarantees than moral hazard. Consider the following: Market distortion: When the government subsidizes some financial firms but not others, it distorts the market. A lower cost of capital allows the subsidized firms to undercut their competition. This can drive competitors either out of business or, if risk is being mispriced because of an asset boom, into riskier market segments (a phenomena I explored in a symposium piece). Cheaper debt and leverage: Government guarantees also. make debt cheaper than equity This supercharges the incentives of financial firms to increase leverage. Higher leverage of financial institutions, in turn, works to increase the effective supply of money. More money can fuel asset price bubbles and mask the mispricing of risk (phenomena explored by Margaret Blair in this paper, as well as by me in a forthcoming symposium piece in the Berkeley Business Law Journal.) Cheaper debt and regulatory capital arbitrage: Cheaper debt also supercharges financial firm incentives to game regulatory capital requirements (something I am writing about in the context of the shadow banking system. See also Jones; Acharya & Schnabl; Acharya & Richardson. Bailouts and correlated risk: Governments face pressure to bail out firms when their risk taking is highly correlated (because multiple firms will fail at the same time). On the flip side, this creates a strong incentive for financial firms to take on correlated risk. (See, e.g., Acharya et al.). Correlated risk taking reinforces the kind of herding that behavioral finance scholars have analyzed in the context of asset price bubbles. So feedback loops abound. What to do, then, about government subsidies? “Stop us before we bail out again” One approach is to erect barriers to the government providing subsidies and bailouts. Dodd-Frank is chock full o’ provisions that aim to do just this. But legal scholars need to give policymakers a dose of reality about the ability of law to hardwire “no bailouts, no subsidies.” I just came back from a conference last week in which a number of economists kept saying that this hardwiring was exactly what law needed to contribute to financial reform. Here is how some of the law professors in the room (including your friend and mine Anna Gelpern) responded: 1. Legal rules are by nature incomplete and, under pressure, firms and regulators will seek ways around rules. 2. It ain’t so easy for a sovereign to bind itself. In the end, what is the remedy and who will enforce it? 3. There is nothing to stop Congress from amending the law. Legislatures can’t entrench laws against amendments by future legislatures (although the government must honor contractual obligations – for a discussion of these issues, see U.S. v. Winstar) True, Dodd-Frank’s prohibitions on bailouts and governments are not just pieces of paper. Law does constrain government behavior to a degree and can promote political accountability. However, we should not expect “law” to work like a wind-up toy that is self-executing without worrying about issues of interpretation, compliance, incentives, and the norms of government actors. I restrained myself at the conference from delivering a little legal koan: “the law will bind government officials, if they believe it binds them.” As an aside: it strikes me that the legal academy has to do a much better job of educating economists, policy makers and the public about what is “law” and how it operates. We have to do this in an accessible manner and without undermining important norms of legal compliance. Financial reform proposals are replete with calls for more “automatic regulations” – whether to counter capture or political pressure to spike the economic punch when the party gets startin’. (For example, economists have proposed the very sensible policy of counter-cyclical capital buffers) But fetishizing automatic regulations can pervert financial regulation. Over-reliance on automatic regulation: Ignores the fact that regulators and lawmakers must interpret laws; and Discounts the likelihood or regulatory arbitrage or regulatory evasion. In short, we need to have a much richer discussion of what the “law in action” means. Letting it Burn: Confusing Bailouts with Other Externalities of Financial Institution Risk-Taking What if restrictions on bailouts and government guarantees work too well? There is a rationale for government interventions like deposit insurance, lender-of-last resort, and bailouts. They are not just about “capture.” Financial institution failure can impose significant negative externalities (which is a fairly antiseptic description of the social costs of financial crises). Counterparty and market discipline don’t force firms to internalize all of these externalities. I respect the intellectual consistency and fervor of those who believe that bailouts and government interventions are the root of all financial regulatory problems. But I wouldn’t trust them in any position of responsibility. Deposit insurance and bailouts aren’t the only ways governments distort markets when they act to avoid crises. Lender-of-last resort actions and even interest rates changes can create a type of moral hazard (see “Put, Greenspan”). It is a lot harder for central banks to calibrate liquidity responses to market seizures than armchair critics think. Countering Subsidies So if some government subsidization of the financial firms is inevitable, it is critical that the government counter these subsidies -- whether by limiting firm risk-taking or charging firms for the subsidy. Absent attempts to counter subsidies, we are right back where this post started – moral hazard, distortion, cheap debt --> leverage and capital arbitrage.

#### And government financial intervention causes corruption- generates dependency

Loris and Spencer ’11 (Nicolas Loris and Jack Spencer, Nicolas D. Loris is a Policy Analyst and Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “Obama's Department of Energy Should Not Be the Green Banker”, <http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=52893pageid=16pagename=Opinion>, October 11th 2011)

On July 14, 2011, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee marked up the Clean Energy Financing Act of 2011 (S. 1510). The bill would establish a federally owned, nonprofit Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA) in the Department of Energy (DOE) to support the deployment of politically defined clean technologies. CEDA, also known as a “green bank,” is an outgrowth of the loan guarantee programs of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the 2009 stimulus package. It would provide government-backed low-interest loans, credit enhancements, loan guarantees, and other financial mechanisms for certain energy and automotive projects that Washington deems worthy. President Barack Obama included a similar proposal for green projects in the infrastructure bank section of his American Jobs Act. However, while proponents call this “innovative financing,” in reality it is a substantial and costly subsidy that invites unjustified government intervention into the private energy marketplace. The Department of Energy has no business playing banker. CEDA would redirect capital inefficiently and create a massive taxpayer liability. CEDA: A Permanent Loan Guarantee Expansion When the federal government provides a loan guarantee, it enters into a contract with private creditors to assume the debt if the borrower defaults. According to the DOE, the purpose is to “allow the Federal Government to share some of the financial risks of projects that employ new technologies that are not yet supported in the commercial marketplace or where private tinvestment has been inhibited.” If a company defaults on a federally backed loan guarantee, the taxpayer is on the hook. This is not an appropriate role for the federal government. Two existing federal loan guarantee programs are of dubious value and have questionable objectives. Under Section 1703 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, DOE has provided billions of dollars in loan guarantees for technologies that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.” Section 1705 of the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, more commonly known as the stimulus bill, added $8 billion to support additional loan guarantees, including funding for the scandalous Solyndra project. CEDA would permanently extend these misguided policies by granting DOE unlimited authority to authorize loans without limiting the number of loans it can issue. The initial capitalization or expenditure would be $10 billion, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects CEDA to cost an additional $1.1 billion over the next five years. Picking Losers Although the status of many loan guarantees is either conditional or recently closed, the first loans granted by DOE illustrate some of the problems with the program. The solar company Solyndra received one of the first stimulus loan guarantees—a $535 million loan. During a visit to the plant in 2010, President Obama said, “Companies like Solyndra are leading the way toward a brighter and more prosperous future.” In 2010, Solyndra closed one of its facilities and canceled its initial public offering. In August 2011Solyndra filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and laid off its 1,100 workers. The company is now under criminal and congressional investigations into how it secured the loan guarantee, and Solyndra owes the taxpayers $527 million. Solyndra is not the only “green” company having financial troubles. First Wind Holdings, another loan guarantee recipient, withdrew its initial public offering. In these instances, the reason for providing financing was unclear because they were not economically viable endeavors. When the government makes decisions best left to the market, it increases the opportunity for and likelihood of crony capitalism, corruption, and waste. Loan guarantees artificially make even dubious projects appear more attractive and lower the risk of private investment. For instance, private investors sunk $1.1 billion into Solyndra. Much of the private financing came after the Department of Energy announced Solyndra was one of 16 companies eligible for a loan guarantee in 2007. Private investors look at loan guarantees as a way to substantially reduce their risk. Even if a project seems to be a loser but has a huge upside (especially if complemented with other policies like a federal clean energy standard), private companies can invest a smaller amount if the government will back the loan. If the project fails, they still lose money, but the risk was worth it. Without the loan guarantee, these projects would probably not have been pursued, and that is why they fail. Subsidizing Winners In other cases, private financing was available so there was no need for preferential financing. For instance, Nordic Windpower received private funding in 2007, two years before the company received its loan guarantee. Google invested $100 million in Shepherds Flat Wind Farm. Although that investment was made after the loan guarantee, Google determined it to be a worthwhile investment. If that is the case, then the project should not need a loan guarantee. Even if a project with a federally backed loan is successful, attributing the project’s success to the loan guarantee is a huge assumption. Venture capitalists and other investors, who have much more expertise and knowledge than government bureaucrats in making investment decisions, are in a better position to determine which ideas and businesses have the most potential. Without the loan guarantee, projects with the least promise would either not attract investment or simply fail, freeing capital for risky, but more promising ventures. In contrast, a government loan guarantee program ensures that the public pays for the failures while the private sector reaps the benefits of any successes. Loan Guarantees Distort the Market Proponents of loan guarantees who argue that these programs come at minimal cost and are not subsidies ignore the fact that CEDA loans cause the same harm as direct government subsidies by distorting normal market forces and encouraging dependence on the government. By subsidizing a portion of the actual cost of a project through a loan guarantee, the government is allocating resources away from more-valued uses to less-valued uses. In essence, these guarantees and loans direct labor and capital away from more competitive projects. A loan guarantee program signals to the energy producer that the project does not need to be competitive. Rather, the green bank simply has to like it. This reduces the incentive for the energy investor or business to manage risk, innovate, and increase efficiency, and it crowds out other innovative energy projects that do not receive loan guarantees. While a loan guarantee or a below-market loan may be good for the near-term interests of the individual recipient, it is not good for taxpayers or long-term competitiveness. Loan guarantees also encourage more government dependence. If the government moves to more actively subsidizing clean energy technology through CEDA, investors will wait to determine who the government winners will be before they spend more of their own money on innovative ideas, expanding their businesses, or hiring more employees. As Darryl Siry, former head of marketing at Tesla Motors (a loan guarantee recipient), said, “The existence of an 800-pound gorilla putting massive capital behind select start-ups is sucking the air away from the rest of the venture-capital ecosystem…. Being anointed by DOE has become everything for companies looking to move ahead.” Reshaping,

### Warming

#### No warming- Newest peer review studies prove

**Taylor ’11** (7/27- senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute (2011, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism,” Forbes, http://blogs.forbes.com/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/)

**NASA satellite data** from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “**There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts** that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and **should dramatically alter the** global **warming debate**. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but **real-world data have** long **shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing** as much **atmospheric humidity** and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict. **When objective NASA satellite data, reported in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, show a “huge discrepancy” between alarmist climate models and real-world facts, climate scientists**, the media and our elected officials **would be wise to take notice**. Whether or not they do so will tell us a great deal about how honest the purveyors of global warming alarmism truly are.

#### No impact to sea level rises

**Singer ‘7** (Singer, distinguished research professor at George Mason and Avery, director of the Center for Global Food Issues at the Hudson Institute, 2007 (S. Fred, Dennis T, “Unstoppable Global Warming: Every 1,500 Years” Pages 120-124)

Global warming advocates seem to assume a huge increase in sea level is immediate and inevitable if the planet continues to warm. Sea level rise is a product of conflicting forces, however. Warmer temperatures expand the volume of the water. Warmer temperatures melt more glacier ice. But warmer temperatures also evaporate more water from the oceans and lakes. When the clouds deposit the increased moisture from that rapid evaporation on polar ice caps and glaciers around the world, the ice caps and glaciers will actually grow unless the local temperatures are warm enough to increase local melting. Time is also a critical factor. Ice melts slowly. Glaciers and ice caps can take thousands of years to melt completely because their surfaces reflect away so much of the sun's heat. That's why the West Antarctic ice sheet, at least 10,000 years past its last ice age, still has another 7,000 years worth of ice to melt, according to John Stone of the University of Washington.'? Stone and his team analyzed the chemical composition of the rocks left behind on the mountains of Antarctica's Ford Range when the ice began to retreat. Given the Earth's highly variable climate history, another cooling period is almost certain to intervene before the West Antarctic Ice Sheet disappears. Walter Munk of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography reports that glacial melting due to higher twentieth-century temperatures can account for only four inches of sea level rise or fall per century. Essentially, we do not know why sea levels in recent decades have sometimes risen at double that ratebut the average is six inches per century. I I The tectonically stable coastline of the Chukchi Sea in northwest Alaska shows sea levels there have risen only about a quarter of a millimeter per year over the past 6,000 years. However, there have been several periods of both slower and more rapid increases.12 The world's longest set of sea-level observations has been faithfully recorded for more than a thousand years at Stockholm, Sweden. According to M. Ekman, they tell us that "sea level changes due to northern hemisphere climate variations since A.D. 800 have probably always kept within -1.5 and +1.5 mmlyr, with an average fairly close to zero."13 This result comes about because land surfaces there are rising, thus offsetting the rise in ocean levels. The reason is the rebounding of the land as it adjusts to the removal of the loads from the ice sheets that had covered it earlier. Niels Reeh of the University of Denmark has reported a "broad consensus" among sea level experts that another I degree Celsius of warming would create only a tiny change in global sea levels. He says the melting of Greenland's ice sheet would increase sea level by only 0.3 to 0.77 mm per year. Meanwhile, Antarctica would subtract 0.2 to 0.7 mm per year as increased precipitation added to its ice cap .14

#### Warming doesn't cause extinction

**Lomborg ‘8** (Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated”, The Guardian, 8/15, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange>

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren’t for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a “catastrophe” and the beginning of the “extinction” of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners’ scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres – Tickell [he] is simply exaggerating by a factor ofup to400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale – this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland’s ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world’s coastal infrastructure and much of the world’s farmland – “undoubtedly” causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years’ time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell’s claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further**, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.**

#### Natural variability makes the impact inevitable and means that oceans will adapt—their studies don’t assume this

Hofmann, Professor of Ecology, Evolution and Marine Biology – University of California Santa Barbara et al., ‘11

(Gretchen E., “High-Frequency Dynamics of Ocean pH: A Multi-Ecosystem Comparison,” *PLoS ONE* Vol. 6, No. 12)

Since the publication of two reports in 2005–2006 [1], [2], the drive to forecast the effects of anthropogenic ocean acidification (OA) on marine ecosystems and their resident calcifying marine organisms has resulted in a growing body of research. Numerous laboratory studies testing the effects of altered seawater chemistry (low pH, altered pCO2, and undersaturation states - Ω - for calcium carbonate polymorphs) on biogenic calcification, growth, metabolism, and development have demonstrated a range of responses in marine organisms (for reviews see [3]–[8]). However, the emerging picture of biological consequences of OA – from data gathered largely from laboratory experiments – is not currently matched by equally available environmental data that describe present-day pH exposures or the natural variation in the carbonate system experienced by most marine organisms. Although researchers have documented variability in seawater carbonate chemistry on several occasions in different marine ecosystems (e.g., [9]–[15]), this variation has been under-appreciated in these early stages of OA research.Recently, a deeper consideration of ecosystem-specific variation in seawater chemistry has emerged (e.g., [16]–[18]), one that is pertinent to the study of biological consequences of OA. Specifically, assessments of environmental heterogeneity present a nuanced complement to current laboratory experiments. The dynamics of specific natural carbonate chemistry on local scales provide critical context because outcomes of experiments on single species are used in meta-analyses to project the overall biological consequences of OA [7], [19], to forecast ecosystem-level outcomes [20], and ultimately to contribute to policy decisions [21] and the management of fisheries [22], [23]. As noted earlier [24], natural variability in pH is seldom considered when effects of ocean acidification are considered. Natural variability may occur at rates much higher than the rate at which carbon dioxide is decreasing ocean pH, about −0.0017 pH/year [25], [26]. This ambient fluctuation in pH may have a large impact on the development of resilience in marine populations, or it may combine with the steady effects of acidification to produce extreme events with large impacts [24]. In either case, understanding the environmental variability in ocean pH is essential. Although data on the natural variation in the seawater CO2 system are emerging, nearly all high-resolution (e.g. hourly) time series are based on pCO2 sensors, with comparatively few pH time series found in the literature. From a research perspective, the absence of information regarding natural pH dynamics is a critical data gap for the biological and ecological arm of the multidisciplinary investigation of OA. Our ability to understand processes ranging from physiological tolerances to local adaptation is compromised. Specifically, laboratory experiments to test tolerances are often not designed to encompass the actual habitat exposure of the organisms under study, a critical design criterion in organismal physiology that also applies to global change biology [27]–[29]. It is noted that neither pH nor pCO2 alone provide the information sufficient to fully constrain the CO2 system, and while it is preferred to measure both, the preference for measuring one over the other is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and is often dictated by the equipment available. In this light, data that reveal present-day pH dynamics in marine environments and therefore ground pH levels in CO2 perturbation experiments in an environmental context are valuable to the OA research community in two major ways. First, estimates of organismal resilience are greatly facilitated. Empiricists can contextualize lab experiments with actual environmental data, thereby improving them. Notably, the majority of manipulative laboratory experiments in OA research (including our own) have been parameterized using pCO2 levels as per the IPCC emission scenario predictions [30]. One consequence of this practice is that organisms are potentially tested outside of the current exposure across their biogeographic range, and tolerances are not bracketed appropriately. This situation may not be a lethal issue (i.e. negating all past observations in experiments where environmental context was not known); however, the lack of information about the ‘pH seascape’ may be translated through these organismal experiments in a manner that clouds the perspective of vulnerability of marine ecosystems. For example, recent data on the heterogeneity of pH in coastal waters of the Northeastern Pacific [31], [32] that are characterized by episodic upwelling has caused biologists to re-examine the physiological tolerances of organisms that live there. Specifically, resident calcifying marine invertebrates and algae are acclimatized to existing spatial and temporal heterogeneity [17], [18], and further, populations are likely adapted to local to regional differences in upwelling patterns [33]. Secondly, in addition to improving laboratory experiments, data regarding the nature of the pH seascape also facilitate hypothesis-generating science. Specifically, heterogeneity in the environment with regard to pH and pCO2 exposure may result in populations that are acclimatized to variable pH or extremes in pH. Although this process has been highlighted in thermal biology of marine invertebrates [34], such insight is not available with regard to gradients of seawater chemistry that occur on biogeographic scales. With that said, recent field studies have demonstrated that natural variation in seawater chemistry does influence organismal abundance and distribution [16], [35], [36]. With our newfound access to pH time series data, we can begin to explore the biophysical link between environmental seawater chemistry and resilience to baseline shifts in pH regimes, to identify at-risk populations as well as tolerant ones. Additionally, the use of sensors in the field can identify hidden patterns in the CO2 system, revealing areas that are refugia to acidification or carbonate undersaturation; such knowledge could enable protection, management, and remediation of critical marine habitats and populations in the future. The recent development of sensors for in situ measurements of seawater pH [37], [38] has resulted in the ability to record pH more readily in the field in a manner that can support biological and ecological research. Since 2009, the Martz lab (SIO) has constructed 52 “SeaFET” pH sensors for 13 different collaborators (see http://martzlab.ucsd.edu) working in a broad range of settings. Using subsamples of data from many of these sensors, here we examine signatures of pH heterogeneity, presenting time series snapshots of sea-surface pH (upper 10 m) at 15 locations, spanning various overlapping habitat classifications including polar, temperate, tropical, open ocean, coastal, upwelling, estuarine, kelp forest, coral reef, pelagic, benthic, and extreme. Naturally, at many sites, multiple habitat classifications will apply. Characteristic patterns observed in the 30-day snapshots provide biome-specific pH signatures. This comparative dataset highlights the heterogeneity of present-day pH among marine ecosystems and underscores that contemporary marine organisms are currently exposed to different pH regimes in seawater that are not predicted until 2100. Results Overall, the patterns of pH recorded at each of the 15 deployment sites (shown in Figure 1, Table 1) were strikingly different. Figure 2 presents the temporal pattern of pH variation at each of these sites, and, for the sake of comparison, these are presented as 30-day time series “snapshots.” Note that all deployments generated >30 days of data except for sensors 3, 4, and 13, where the sensors were deliberately removed due to time constraints at the study sites. Though the patterns observed among the various marine ecosystems are driven by a variety of oceanographic forcing such as temperature, mixing, and biological activity, we do not provide a separate analysis of controlling factors on pH at each location. Each time series was accompanied by a different set of ancillary data, some rich with several co-located sensors, others devoid of co-located sensors. Given these differences in data collection across sites, here we focus on the comparative pH sensor data as a means to highlight observed pH variability and ecosystem-level differences between sites. For purposes of comparison, the metrics of variability presented here are pH minima, maxima, range, standard deviation, and rate of change (see Table 2). The rate presented in Table 2 and Figure 3 represents a mean instantaneous rate of change in pH hr−1, where a rate was calculated for each discrete time step as the absolute value of pH difference divided by the length of time between two adjacent data points. In terms of general patterns amongst the comparative datasets, the open ocean sites (CCE1 and Kingman Reef) and the Antarctic sites (Cape Evans and Cindercones) displayed the least variation in pH over the 30-day deployment period. For example, pH range fluctuated between 0.024 to 0.096 at CCE1, Kingman Reef, Cape Evans, and Cindercones (Figure 2A, B and Table 2). In distinct contrast to the stability of the open ocean and Antarctic sites, sensors at the other five site classifications (upwelling, estuarine/near-shore, coral reef, kelp forest, and extreme) captured much greater variability (pH fluctuations ranging between 0.121 to 1.430) and may provide insight towards ecosystem-specific patterns. The sites in upwelling regions (Pt. Conception and Pt. Ano Nuevo, Figure 2C), the two locations in Monterey Bay, CA (Figure 2D), and the kelp forest sites (La Jolla and Santa Barbara Mohawk Reef, Figure 2F) all exhibited large fluctuations in pH conditions (pH changes>0.25). Additionally, at these 6 sites, pH oscillated in semi-diurnal patterns, the most apparent at the estuarine sites. The pH recorded in coral reef ecosystems exhibited a distinct diel pattern characterized by relatively consistent, moderate fluctuations (0.1<pH change<0.25; Figure 2E). At the Palmyra fore reef site, pH maxima occurred in the early evening (~5:00 pm), and pH minima were recorded immediately pre-dawn (~6:30 am). On a fringing reef site in Moorea, French Polynesia, a similar diel pattern was observed, with pH maxima occurring shortly after sunset (~7:30 pm) and pH minima several hours after dawn (~10:00 am). Finally, the greatest transitions in pH over time were observed at locations termed our “Extreme” sites - a CO2 venting site in Italy (site S2 in ref. [36]) and a submarine spring site in Mexico. For these sites, the patterns were extremely variable and lacked a detectable periodicity (Figure 2G). The sites examined in this study do not comprehensively represent pH variability in coastal ecosystems, partly because we focused on surface epipelagic and shallow benthic pH variability. Many organisms that may be impacted by pH variability and ocean acidification reside at intermediate (>10 m) to abyssal depths. Notable regimes missing from Figure 2 include seasonally stratified open ocean locations that exhibit intense spring blooms; the equatorial upwelling zone; other temperate (and highly productive) Eastern Continental Boundary upwelling areas; subsurface oxygen minimum zones and seasonal dead zones; and a wide variety of unique estuarine, salt marsh, and tide pool environments. Spring bloom locations exhibit a marked increase in diel pCO2 variability during the peak bloom with a coincident drawdown similar in magnitude but opposite in sign to the upwelling signals shown in Figure 2 [39]. Equatorial upwelling locations undergo significant stochastic variability, as observed by pCO2 sensors in the TAO array (data viewable at http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/). Intertidal vegetated and tide pool habitats may exhibit major pH fluctuations due to macrophyte or animal respiratory cycles [15], while CO2 production in oxygen minimum zones can reduce pH to a limit of about 7.4 [40]. Due to local temperature differences, variable total alkalinity, and seasonal differences between deployment dates at each site, a comparison of average pH across the datasets would be somewhat misleading. However, some information can be gleaned from an examination of the averages: the overall binned average of all 15 mean values in Table 1 is 8.02±0.1. This pH value is generally in agreement with the global open ocean mean for 2010 of 8.07, a value generated by combining climatology data for temperature, salinity, phosphate, silicate [41]–[43], total alkalinity [44], and pCO2 [45] for the year 2000, corrected to 2010 using the average global rise of 1.5 µatm pCO2 yr−1. Rather than make a point-by-point comparison of the mean pH of each dataset, we focus instead on the differences in observed variability amongst the sites. For this analysis, summary statistics of the comparative datasets were ranked in order to examine the range of variability across all 15 sites (Fig. 3). Discussion Collected by 15 individual SeaFET sensors in seven types of marine habitats, data presented here highlight natural variability in seawater pH. Based on Figure 3, it is evident that regions of the ocean exhibit a continuum of pH variability. At sites in the open ocean (CCE-1), Antarctica, and Kingman reef (a coastal region in the permanently stratified open Pacific Ocean with very low residence times, and thus representative of the surrounding open ocean water), pH was very stable (SD<0.01 pH over 30 days). Elsewhere, pH was highly variable across a range of ecosystems where sensors were deployed. The salient conclusions from this comparative dataset are two-fold: (1) most non-open ocean sites are indeed characterized by natural variation in seawater chemistry that can now be revealed through continuous monitoring by autonomous instrumentation, and (2) in some cases, seawater in these sites reaches extremes in pH, sometimes daily, that are often considered to only occur in open ocean systems well into the future [46]. Admittedly, pH is only part of the story with regard to the biological impacts of OA on marine organisms. However, continuous long-term observations provided by sensors such as the SeaFET are a great first step in elucidating the biophysical link between natural variation and physiological capacity in resident marine organisms. In the end, knowledge of spatial and temporal variation in seawater chemistry is a critical resource for biological research, for aquaculture, and for management efforts. From a biological perspective, the evolutionary history of the resident organisms will greatly influence the adaptation potential of organisms in marine populations. Thus, present-day natural variation will likely shape capacity for adaptation of resident organisms, influencing the resilience of critical marine ecosystems to future anthropogenic acidification. Below we discuss the comparative SeaFET-collected data and, where applicable, the biological consequences of the temporal heterogeneity that we found in each of the marine ecosystems where sensors were deployed. As the most stable area, the open ocean behaves in a predictable way and generally adheres to global models attempting to predict future CO2 conditions based on equilibration of the surface ocean with a given atmospheric pCO2 (e.g. [47]). This can be shown with longer-term pH records obtained with SeaFET sensors, which are available at the CCE-1 mooring (Fig. 4). The ambient pH values for this open ocean location can be predicted to better than ±0.02 from the CO2-corrected climatology mentioned above; pH has dropped by about 0.015 units since 2000. At CCE-1, the annual carbonate cycle followed the sea surface temperature cycle, and pH was driven mostly by changes in the temperature dependence of CO2 system thermodynamics (Figure 4). SeaFET observations at CCE-1 agree with the climatology to +0.017±0.014 pH units, with episodic excursions from the climatology but a general return to the climatological mean. Although the annual cycle in the open ocean is somewhat predictable, it is notable that even at these seemingly stable locations, climatology-based forecasts consistently underestimate natural variability. Our observations confirm an annual mean variability in pH at CCE-1 of nearly 0.1, suggest an inter-annual variability of ~0.02 pH, and capture episodic changes that deviate from the climatology (Figure 4). Similar underestimates of CO2 variability were observed at nine other open ocean locations, where the Takahashi pCO2 climatology overlaps PMEL moorings with pCO2 sensors (not shown). Thus, on both a monthly (Fig. 2) and annual scale (Fig. 4), even the most stable open ocean sites see pH changes many times larger than the annual rate of acidification. This natural variability has prompted the suggestion that “an appropriate null hypothesis may be, until evidence is obtained to the contrary, that major biogeochemical processes in the oceans other than calcification will not be fundamentally different under future higher CO2/lower pH conditions” [24]. Similarly, the sensors deployed on the benthos in the Antarctic (Cindercones and Cape Evans, Figure 2B) recorded relatively stable pH conditions when compared to other sites in the study. Very few data exist for the Southern Ocean; however, open-water areas in this region experience a strong seasonal shift in seawater pH (~0.3–0.5 units) between austral summer and winter [48], [49] due to a decline in photosynthesis during winter and a disequilibrium of air-sea CO2 exchange due to annual surface sea ice and deep water entrainment [50]. Given the timing of deployment of our sensor in McMurdo Sound (austral spring: October–November), the sensor did not capture the change in seawater chemistry that might have occurred in the austral winter [49]. In general, due to sea ice conditions, observations from the Southern Ocean are limited, with water chemistry data falling into two categories: (1) discrete sampling events during oceanographic cruises (e.g. US Joint Global Ocean Flux Study, http://www1.whoi.edu/) and (2) single-point measurements from locations under sea ice [49], [51], [52]. Biologically speaking, the Southern Ocean is a region expected to experience acidification and undersaturated conditions earlier in time than other parts of the ocean [47], and calcifying Antarctic organisms are thought to be quite vulnerable to anthropogenic OA given the already challenging saturation states that are characteristic of cold polar waters [53]–[56]. Short-term CO2 perturbation experiments have shown that Antarctic calcifying marine invertebrates are sensitive to decreased saturation states [51], [57], although the number of species-level studies and community-level studies are very limited. The Western Antarctic Peninsula and the sub-Antarctic islands will experience pronounced increases in temperature [54] and could consequently undergo more variation and/or undersaturation given the increased potential for biological activity. Importantly, depending on the patterns of seasonally-dependent saturation state that will be revealed with improved observations [58], Antarctic organisms may experience more variation than might be expected, a situation that will influence their resilience to future acidification. Three other types of study sites – the coastal upwelling, kelp forest and estuarine/near-shore sites – all exhibited variability due to a combination of mixing, tidal excursions, biological activity, and variable residence time (Fig. 2). Although these sites are all united by fairly obvious heterogeneity in pH, organisms living in these areas encounter unique complexities in seawater chemistry that will influence their physiological response, resilience, and potential for adaptation. Typically, estuarine environments have riverine input that naturally creates very low saturation states [59]–[61]. Seawater chemistry conditions in these areas often shift dramatically, challenging biogenic calcification by resident organisms. Additionally, these species must also tolerate abiotic factors that interact with pH, such as temperature [62]. Two sensors in the Monterey Bay region, L1 (at the mouth of Elkhorn Slough) and L20 (~2 km seaward and north of L1), recorded rapid changes in pH. However, as opposed to riverine input, the low pH fluctuations observed here are likely due to isopycnal shoaling or low CO2 water that is pulsing up to the near shore on internal tides. These locations may also experience high river run-off in the rainy season, but such conditions were not reflected in the time series shown in Fig. 2. Organisms living in upwelling regions may be acclimatized and adapted to extremes in seawater chemistry; here, deep CO2-enriched waters reach the surface and may shoal onto the benthos on the continental shelf [31], [32]. Data collected from our upwelling sites support the patterns found by cruise-based investigations; pH fluctuations were often sharp, and large transitions of up to ~0.35 pH units occurred over the course of days (Fig. 2). Laboratory studies on calcifying marine invertebrates living in upwelling regions suggest that these organisms maintain function under such stochastic conditions. However, overall performance may be reduced, suggesting that these species are indeed threatened by future acidification [17], [18], [63]. For kelp forests, although there is less influence from riverine inputs, pH variation is quite dynamic at these sites in the coastal California region (Fig 2; [18]). Patterns here are likely driven by fluctuations in coastal upwelling, biological activity, currents, internal tides, seasonally shoaling isopleths, as well as the size of the kelp forest, which may influence residence times via reduced flow. Kelps may respond positively to increased availability of CO2 and HCO3−, which may allow for reduced metabolic costs and increased productivity [64]. Increased kelp production may elevate pH within the forest during periods of photosynthesis, causing wider daily fluctuations in pH, though this is speculative at this time. As a result, kelp forests, particularly those of surface canopy forming species such as Macrocystis pyrifera, may contain a greater level of spatial heterogeneity in terms of the pH environment; vertical gradients in pH may form due to enhanced levels of photosynthesis at shallower depths. Such gradients may increase the risk of low pH exposure for benthic species while buffering those found within the surface canopy. Kelp forests provide habitat to a rich diversity of organisms from a wide range of calcifying and non-calcifying taxa [65]. As with organisms from the other coastal locations (estuarine and upwelling), the biota living within kelp forest environments are most likely acclimatized to this degree of natural variation. However, continued declines in oxygenation and shoaling of hypoxic boundaries observed in recent decades in the southern California bight [66], [67] are likely accompanied by a reduction in pH and saturation state. Thus, pH exposure regimes for the coastal California region's kelp forest biota may be changing over relatively short time scales. Over longer temporal scales as pH and carbonate saturation levels decrease, the relative abundances of these species may change, with community shifts favoring non-calcified species, as exemplified by long-term studies in intertidal communities by Wootton et al. [15]. For all the marine habitats described above, one very important consideration is that the extreme range of environmental variability does not necessarily translate to extreme resistance to future OA. Instead, such a range of variation may mean that the organisms resident in tidal, estuarine, and upwelling regions are already operating at the limits of their physiological tolerances (a la the classic tolerance windows of Fox – see [68]). Thus, future acidification, whether it be atmospheric or from other sources, may drive the physiology of these organisms closer to the edges of their tolerance windows. When environmental change is layered upon their present-day range of environmental exposures, they may thereby be pushed to the “guardrails” of their tolerance [20], [68]. In contrast to more stochastic changes in pH that were observed in some sites, our coral reef locations displayed a strikingly consistent pattern of diel fluctuations over the 30-day recording period. Similar short-term pH time series with lower daily resolution [69], [70] have reported regular diel pH fluctuation correlated to changes in total alkalinity and oxygen levels. These environmental patterns of pH suggest that reef organisms may be acclimatized to consistent but moderate changes in the carbonate system. Coral reefs have been at the center of research regarding the effects of OA on marine ecosystems [71]–[73]. Along with the calcification biology of the dominant scleractinian corals and coralline algae, the biodiversity on coral reefs includes many other calcifying species that will likely be affected [74]–[77]. Across the existing datasets in tropical reef ecosystems, the biological response of calcifying species to variation in seawater chemistry is complex (see [78]) –all corals or calcifying algal species will not respond similarly, in part because these calcifying reef-builders are photo-autotrophs (or mixotrophs), with algal symbionts that complicate the physiological response of the animal to changes in seawater chemistry. Finally, the “Extreme” sites in our comparative dataset are of interest in that the low pH levels observed here represent a natural analogue to OA conditions in the future, demonstrating how the abundance and distribution of calcifying benthic organisms, as well as multi-species assemblages, can vary as a function of seawater chemistry [16], [35], [36], [79]. The variability in seawater pH was higher at both the groundwater springs off the coast of Mexico and the natural CO2 vents off the coast of Italy than at any of the other sensor locations. Offshore of Puerto Morelos, Mexico (and at other sites along the Mesoamerican Reef), natural low-saturation (Ω~0.5, pH 6.70–7.30, due to non-ventilated, high CO2, high alkalinity groundwater) submarine springs have been discharging for millennia. Here, variability in pH is due to long-term respiration driving a low ratio of alkalinity to dissolved inorganic carbon in effluent ground water. These sites provide insight into potential long-term responses of coral backreef ecosystems to low saturation conditions [79]. Unlike Puerto Morelos, the variability of pH at volcanic CO2 vents at Ischia, Italy is almost purely abiotically derived, due entirely to CO2 venting and subsequent mixing. This site in the Mediterranean Sea hosts a benthic assemblage that reflects the impacts of OA on rocky reef communities [16], [36]. Overall, the ‘extreme’ systems provide an opportunity to examine how variability in pH and extreme events (sensu [80]) affects ecological processes. Knowledge of this biophysical link is essential for forecasting ecological responses to acidification in ecosystems with sharp fluctuations in pH, such as upwelling or estuarine environments. Despite reductions in species richness, several calcifying organisms are found in low pH conditions close to the vents [16] and the springs [79]. The persistence of calcifying organisms at these extreme sites, where mean pH values are comparable to those that have reduced organism performance in laboratory experiments (i.e., pHT 7.8; reviewed in [16]), suggest that long exposures to such variability in pH, versus a consistently low-pH environment, could play an important role in regulating organism performance. Variability in pH could potentially promote acclimatization or adaptation to acidification through repeated exposure to low pH conditions [24]; alternatively, transient exposures to high pH conditions could buffer the effects of acidification by relieving physiological stress. Thus, the ecological patterns coupled with the high fluctuations in pH at the extreme sites highlight the need to consider carbonate chemistry variability in experiments and models aimed at understanding the impacts of acidification.

#### Can’t solve fast enough

**Heinberg, 11** (Richard, fellow at the Post-Carbon Institute and renowned author, “Earth’s Limits”, 2/14/11, <http://www.postcarbon.org/article/254838-earth-s-limits-why-growth-won-t-return>)

 Can other energy sources replace fossil fuels? Some alternatives, such as wind, are seeing rapid growth rates, but still account for only a minuscule share of current global energy supplies. Even if they maintain high rates of growth, they are unlikely to become primary energy sources in any but a small handful of nations by 2050. Report coverIn 2009 Post Carbon Institute and the International Forum on Globalization undertook a joint study to analyze 18 energy sources (from oil to tidal power) using 10 criteria (scalability, renewability, energy density, energy returned on energy invested, and so on). While I was the lead author of the ensuing report (Searching for a Miracle: Net Energy Limits and the Fate of Industrial Societies), my job was essentially just to synthesize original research and analysis from many energy experts.[22] It was, to my knowledge, the first time so many energy sources had been examined using so many essential criteria. Our conclusion was that there is no credible scenario in which alternative energy sources can entirely make up for fossil fuels as the latter deplete. The overwhelming likelihood is that, by 2100, global society will have less energy available for economic purposes, not more.[23] Here are some relevant passages from that report: A full replacement of energy currently derived from fossil fuels with energy from alternative sources is probably impossible over the short term; it may be unrealistic to expect it even over longer time frames. . . . [U]nless energy prices drop in an unprecedented and unforeseeable manner, the world’s economy is likely to become increasingly energy-constrained as fossil fuels deplete and are phased out for environmental reasons. It is highly unlikely that the entire world will ever reach an American or even a European level of energy consumption, and even the maintenance of current energy consumption levels will require massive investment. . . . Fossil fuel supplies will almost surely decline faster than alternatives can be developed to replace them. New sources of energy will in many cases have lower net energy profiles than conventional fossil fuels have historically had, and they will require expensive new infrastructure to overcome problems of intermittency.[24] Some other studies have reached different, more sanguine conclusions. We believe that this is because they failed to take into account some of the key criteria on which we focused, including the amount of energy returned on the energy that’s invested in producing energy (EROEI). Energy sources with a low EROEI cannot be counted as potential primary sources for industrial societies.[25] As a result of this analysis, we believe that the world has reached immediate, non-negotiable energy limits to growth.[26]

#### Irreversible – China and developing nations

AP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

#### Irreversible – too late and ocean feedbacks will keep it warm

ANI 10[3-20-2010, <http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html>]

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to **mitigate** the risks of dangerous **climate change**," said Green.

#### Turn – Aff increases warming

#### Earthquakes – Injection of CO2 causes – this results in leaks from sequestration

Ryan 12 (Future of Coal has an Unexpected New Threat: Induced Seismicity, 6/21/12, Margaret, <http://energy.aol.com/2012/06/21/future-of-coal-has-an-unexpected-new-threat-induced-seismicity/>)

The potential for underground injections to cause earthquakes was thought to be a problem for natural gas, but a new[National Research Council](http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/) study [says](http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Induced-Seismicity-Potential-Energy-Technologies/13355) the impacted sector will not be gas. It's a problem for [coal](http://energy.aol.com/tag/Coal/). Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), pulling carbon out of emissions from coal-burning and storing it deep underground, has been prominent in clean energy planning over the last decade as a way to keep taking advantage of coal resources to meet energy demand while tackling [climate change](http://energy.aol.com/2011/08/31/down-to-the-numbers-on-natural-gas-and-climate-change/). But the new study finds the large-scale CCS needed to keep using coal "may have the potential for causing significant induced seismicity," study chair Murray Hitzman, professor at the [Colorado School of Mines](http://energy.aol.com/tag/Colorado%2BSchool%2Bof%2BMines/), told the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee June 19. The study was requested by Committee Chairman Jeff Bingaman in 2010, who wanted a "comprehensive and independent study" of whether energy-related activities could inadvertently cause earthquakes. They Felt the Earth Move He made the request after small earthquakes were felt in areas of Oklahoma, Arkansas and Ohio that don't normally experience quakes. The quakes were allegedly caused in part by clusters of injection wells disposing of wastewater from industrial activities, including natural gas hydraulic fracturing. Fracking opponents have also claimed the process itself poses a seismic risk. Bingaman asked the scientists to look at a range of energy activity, including fracking, geothermal wells, carbon dioxide injection for[enhanced oil recovery](http://energy.aol.com/2012/03/20/extending-the-life-of-oil-fields-using-pulsed-injection/) (EOR), and carbon sequestration and storage (CSS) from coal burning. Hitzman said the key factors for earthquake risk from underground injection are volumes and pressures. Wells drilled for geothermal generation and for fracking turned out to be no problem as long as increases in underground pressures are relatively small and temporary, he said. The same was true for EOR, where the idea is to force out more oil and have pressures return to normal. Susan Petty, President of [Altarock Energy](http://altarockenergy.com/), said geothermal firms had experienced seismic problems in the past when wells were overpressured. Maintaining a pressure balance is key to long-term safe operation of geothermal resources, she told the committee. Under Pressure But CCS involves continuous injection of CO2 under high pressure for a long time and is intended as permanent storage, Hitzman said. So is wastewater injection, but Hitzman said only a few of thousands of wastewater injection wells have been connected with quakes. Those generally involved higher pressures and volumes affecting previously undetected underground faults, he said. "Energy projects with large net volumes of injected or extracted fluids over long periods of time, such as long-term waste water disposal wells and CCS, appear to have a higher potential for larger induced seismic events," he said. [Stanford University](http://energy.aol.com/tag/Stanford%2BUniversity/) Professor Mark Zoback said the oil and gas industry is increasingly avoiding the entire injection issue by recycling much of the water used in fracking. But for CCS, he saw a slightly different problem than the study panel: induced small quakes that wouldn't hurt people but would create cracks allowing CO2 to escape from underground reservoirs, negating their usefulness. He questioned how the world could find safe storage for the 7 to 8 billion tons of CO2 emitted now, let alone the 15 billion tons expected by 2050. "The issue is whether the capacity exists for sufficient volumes of CO2 to be stored in geologic formations for it to have a beneficial effect on climate change," he said, adding CCS "will be an extremely expensive and risky strategy." The witnesses did say more data is needed on baseline conditions, as well as better monitoring of injection effects, to minimize the potential for future energy activity to induce tremors.

#### More oil means more CO2

Dooley Et al 10 (CO2-driven Enhanced Oil Recovery as a Stepping Stone to What? JJ Dooley RT Dahowski CL Davidson July 2010, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, <http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/110510_EOR_Report_1.pdf> Joint Global Change Research Institute, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)

As noted above to many, CO2-EOR looks just like CCS but in fact differs in some fundamental ways. It entails more complexity than is often discussed, and in many cases it is unlikely to appreciably offset the cost of CO2 emissions mitigation. But can it still provide value by decreasing U.S. reliance on imported oil? Again, the answer is more nuanced and less straightforward than typically presented (ARI, 2010; SSEB, 2006; Steelman and Tonachel 2010) . Ample technical literature supports the conclusion that, absent a global commitment to significantly reduce GHG emissions, the world will expand its use of unconventional hydrocarbon resources (e.g., oil shale, tar sands, coal-to-liquids) to replace declining conventional oil production (Dooley et al., 2009b; IPCC, 2007; US Climate Change Science Program, 2007). Given the energy intensity of producing transportation fuels from many of these unconventional hydrocarbon resources (see for example the comprehensive analysis of Brandt and Farrell, 2007), the expansion of unconventional hydrocarbon Page | 22 production in a world without stringent GHG emissions constraints will certainly lead to increased GHG emissions.

#### C) ANY Leak amount is enough—buildup of pressure in the pipelines fractures the rock, allowing CO2 to escape -

Romm 10 – Senior Fellow at American Progress and Ph.D. in physics from MIT (Joe, “New study finds geologic sequestration ‘is not a practical means to provide any substantive reduction in CO2 emissions’” Center for American Progress April 27 2010 <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2010/04/27/205870/ccs-stunner-new-study-finds-geologic-sequestration-is-not-a-practical-means-to-provide-any-substantive-reduction-in-co2-emissions/>) MLR

But any significant amount of leakage would render CCS pointless. The UK Guardian‘s article on the study quotes the coauthor: Previous modelling has hugely underestimated the space needed to store CO2 because it was based on the “totally erroneous” premise that the pressure feeding the carbon into the rock structures would be constant, argues Michael Economides, professor of chemical engineering at Houston, and his co-author Christene Ehlig-Economides, professor of energy engineering at Texas A&M University “It is like putting a bicycle pump up against a wall**.** It would be hard to inject CO2 into a closed system without eventually producing so much pressure that it fractured the rock and allowed the carbon to migrate to other zones and possibly escape to the surface,” Economides said. The paper concludes that CCS “is not a practical means to provide any substantive reduction in CO2 emissions**,** although it has been repeatedly presented as such by others.”

#### CCS won’t work

#### No technology for carbon capture – optimistic evidence points to still over 2 decades away

**Hamilton 10** – Professor of Public Ethics @ ANU

Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics in Australia, 2010, “Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change,” pg 162

As soon as one begins to investigate the issue, one is struck by the yawning gap between the deadlines for action provided by the climate scientists and the time lapse before the technology can deliver. While climate scientists say we must begin to radically reduce emissions in rich countries inside a decade, the best estimates for 'clean coal' indicate it will not be ready for widespread adoption for at least two decades. Independent analysis suggests that full-scale commercial implementation of carbon capture and storage will not occur until 2030 In Australia, economic modelling by the Treasury assumes that 'clean coal' technology will not begin reducing emissions from coal-fired power plants until 2026 at the earliest and more likely 2033.' Yet the International Energy Agency (IEA), long seen to be the captive of the traditional energy industries, estimates that by 2030 the world will need more than 200 power plants fully equipped with CCS if warming is to be limited to 3°C. Three degrees! The IPCC estimates that by 2050 only 30-60 per cent of power generation will be technically suitable for carbon capture and storage, and the IEA's projections show the technology will deliver less than 20 per cent of the emission reductions needed by 2050 in order to stabilise concentrations close to 450 ppm.

#### KYOTO and Economy key get CCS globally

Handwerk 12

(<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/05/120522-carbon-capture-and-storage-economic-hurdles/>, Brian Handwerk For [National Geographic News](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/) Published May 22, 2012)

The current woes of CCS are tied to the world economic crisis, which has made funding tighter. Another problem is the failure of international governments to achieve a global climate treaty to take the place of the expiring Kyoto Protocol. "Up to two-and-a-half years ago industry believed that, after the Kyoto Protocol, national governments would agree on a new international agreement that (would) commit both developed and developing countries to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, and that, as a result, they would force the industry to proceed with CCS," said Stefan Bachu of Alberta's provincially funded research organization, Alberta Innovates Technology Futures (AITF). But international compromise has proven elusive, and no agreement requiring cuts in carbon emissions has been achieved. "You cannot make money out of CCS, it's going to be a cost," said Bachu, who shared in the 2007 Nobel Prize as a member of the [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](http://www.ipcc.ch/). "And, in the present economic climate and in the absence of an international agreement, no government is really asking industry to do anything through mandatory emission reductions, cap and trade, or the dreaded carbon tax. The industry knows that this is coming, if not today, then tomorrow, or in 2020. But why spend money today if you don't have to? That's why lots of projects that have been announced are being delayed or falling by the wayside."

#### CCS fails and don’t need cause renewables solve

**Taylor 12**

(“Carbon Capture and Storage, A failed dream”, <http://antinuclear.net/2012/06/16/carbon-capture-and-storage-a-failed-dream/>, 6/16, published in THE AGE)

”It was never going to be viable,” Greens leader Senator Christine … the fact is it is not going to work … it’s too expensive, it’s last century and we don’t need it because we have got renewables … Why would you stick with the horse and buggy era when you can move on?” Australia will not be able to use carbon capture and storage as planned. That means it will need to rework the assumptions underpinning its crucial carbon tax reform - among them the role of coal-fired electricity generation in Australia, the cost of emission reductions, and the idea that we can be part of a global effort to limit global warming while continuing to export billions of dollars worth of coal. Climate strategy up in smoke, The Age, Lenore Taylor, June 16, 2012 IT WAS the technology that was going to help underpin the nation’s climate change strategy. In 2009, the then prime minister, Kevin Rudd, pledged to ”lead the world” in carbon capture and storage technology, which traps carbon dioxide emissions, permanently storing them deep underground. The Rudd and Gillard governments allocated almost $2.5 billion to push the idea, which would be used to ”clean up” coal-fired power stations in Australia and in the countries to which we will export $44 billion worth of coal this year. But so far there is almost nothing to show for their effort. Instead, the fledgling technology is struggling. Critical assumptions about when it will be available could be wrong, with dire consequences for efforts to slow climate change and for Australia’s revenue base as the world’s largest coal exporter. So far, not one industrial carbon capture and storage project is running in Australia, and even the technology’s most enthusiastic backers say that without big changes to government subsidies and policy there won’t be one for many decades. The only operating project in Australia is at Western Australia’s Gorgon gas fields, where carbon dioxide is injected directly back underground. It is the world’s largest CCS project, generating much international interest. But it is a long way from proving the capture, piping and storage of carbon dioxide from a power station. Meanwhile, everyone appears to be blaming everyone else for the failure. The government says coalminers should be investing more in the technology crucial to the future of their industry. The industry blames the influence of the Greens for blocking crucial subsidies for CCS. The Greens say CCS is a dud, and was only ever advanced as a ”fig leaf” to justify the ridiculous ”obscenity” of the ALP’s policy to reduce greenhouse emissions at home while approving a massive expansion in coal exports. Whatever the reason, the lack of progress means Australia’s climate change policy – and the future of its second largest export industry – is based on an assumption that may prove incorrect. ”It’s the big problem at the centre of the policy, which no one wants to acknowledge,” says Tony Wood, energy program director at the Grattan Institute and a former executive at Origin Energy………. the Greens say carbon capture and storage does not deserve funding because it does not work. They say renewable energy has ”won the race”. ”It was never going to be viable,” Greens leader Senator Christine Milne tells The Saturday Age. ”You are never going to be able to find the areas to store it at scale, nor are you going to be able to afford the pipes to take it from one end of the country to another. So the fact is it is not going to work … it’s too expensive, it’s last century and we don’t need it because we have got renewables … Why would you stick with the horse and buggy era when you can move on?” Asked about the assumptions made in the carbon pricing scheme that carbon capture and storage would be available, Milne says that is Labor’s problem. ”It’s a problem for the government because it is all about legitimising ongoing coalmining and expansion and coal exports overseas … If you admitted in Australia that CCS is a complete failure and is not going to continue, then how can you justify a position which says I am serious about addressing climate change, however, I am digging up coal and I am exporting it in larger and larger amounts to other countries to keep polluting the atmosphere? ”Carbon capture and storage is the fig leaf that covers for the government the complete obscenity of saying, on the one hand, we want to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and … on the other, we want to ratchet up coal exports, have them burnt overseas and make the situation worse.”…… Australia is not alone in its lack of progress

#### Can’t work in time

Hamilton 10 – Professor of Public Ethics @ ANU

Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics in Australia, 2010, “Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change,” pg 162

As soon as one begins to investigate the issue, one is struck by the yawning gap between the deadlines for action provided by the climate scientists and the time lapse before the technology can deliver. While climate scientists say we must begin to radically reduce emissions in rich countries inside a decade, the best estimates for 'clean coal' indicate it will not be ready for widespread adoption for at least two decades. Independent analysis suggests that full-scale commercial implementation of carbon capture and storage will not occur until 2030 In Australia, economic modelling by the Treasury assumes that 'clean coal' technology will not begin reducing emissions from coal-fired power plants until 2026 at the earliest and more likely 2033.' Yet the International Energy Agency (IEA), long seen to be the captive of the traditional energy industries, estimates that by 2030 the world will need more than 200 power plants fully equipped with CCS if warming is to be limited to 3°C. Three degrees! The IPCC estimates that by 2050 only 30-60 per cent of power generation will be technically suitable for carbon capture and storage, and the IEA's projections show the technology will deliver less than 20 per cent of the emission reductions needed by 2050 in order to stabilise concentrations close to 450 ppm.

#### Doesn’t capture enough CO2

**Rochon et al 08** Peer Reviewed, Greenpeace International: Greenpeace is an independent global campaigning organisation that acts to change attitudes and behaviour, to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace, Authors include: Dr Erika Bjureby, Dr Paul Johnston, Robin Oakley, Dr David Santillo, Nina Schulz, Dr Gabriela von Goerne(Emily, May 2008, “False Hope: Why carbon capture and storage won’t save the climate,” [http://www.probeinternational.org/False%20Hope%20--%20Why%20carbon%20capture%20and%20storage%20won%92t%20save%20the%20climate.pdf)//DR](http://www.probeinternational.org/False%20Hope%20--%20Why%20carbon%20capture%20and%20storage%20won%EF%BF%BDt%20save%20the%20climate.pdf%29/DR). H

**Assuming that commercial viability is reached, scenario studies indicate that** by 2050 only 20-40% of global fossil fuel CO2 emissions could be technically suitable for capture**.** This includes 30-60% of emissions from the power sector.66 Therefore, up to 70% of emissions from electricity generation in 2050 may not even be technically suited to CCS**.**

#### Legal issues block

Haszeldine 9 – Scottish Power Professor of Carbon Capture & Storage at the University of Edinburgh School of GeoSciences (R. Stuart, 9/25/09, “Carbon Capture and Storage: How Green Can Black Be?” Science, Volume 325, Number 5948, pp. 1647-1652, <http://www.roberts.cmc.edu/159/2010/2010pdfs/5.%20Feb%204%202010.pdf>)

On the 10-year time scale, it is not technology, but legal permission, business development, and public opinion that will determine whether CCS experiments and demonstration plants are built sufficiently rapidly for CCS to be deployed in 2020. On the 20-year time scale, these initial demonstrations must enable a new CCS industry to be born. Low-cost reliable capture at clusters of CCS power plants must emerge, and national pipe networks must be developed, delivering to aquifer storage capacity that must have been validated. **CCS also needs to be built and operated in developing economies with high national but low per capita emissions.** If CCS is difficult to afford now in Western economies, then it is even more so in India and China. Additional payments for CCS demonstrations will accelerate the above-mentioned actions. **Simply pricing carbon in a market is not enough to encourage CCS or to enforce decarbonization. During peak demand, venting of CO2 will be commercially beneficial. If the price of carbon is set very high to avoid such effects, that taxes the whole economy, not just dirty electricity.** Additional policy levers will be needed to enforce CCS operation. Lessons from previous clean-up technologies applied to power plants— such as SOx and NOx removal from flue gases— show that voluntary codes do not work, but clearly signed and enforced rule changes do.

#### Lack of fresh water

Thomson 9 – Program on Water Issues Munk Centre for International Studies University of Toronto [Graham, September 23, 2009, “Burying Carbon Dioxide in Underground Saline Aquifers: Political Folly or Climate Change Fix?” <http://beta.images.theglobeandmail.com/archive/00242/Munk_Centre_Paper_242701a.pdf>, Page 21-22]

Problem 1: Increased use of freshwater “Energy and water are indeed inextricably linked. Most Americans do not realize that they use more water turning on lights and running appliances each day than they do directly through washing their clothes and watering their lawns.” Carl O. Bauer, Director, National Energy Technology Laboratory, U.S. Dept. of Energy. 52 Thermoelectric power facilities, such as coal-burning plants, need massive amounts of water. Not all the water is consumed; most is withdrawn from a water body and then returned to it, albeit in a different (warmer) condition than originally. In a power plant water is heated to more than 500° C to create steam to turn turbines to generate electricity (25 gallons or 95 litres of water for one kilowatt-hour of power according to the U.S. DOE). The plants also use water to cool the steam back into liquid form to start the steam-turbine-electricity cycle over again – which is why power plants are usually located near lakes or rivers. Only agricultural irrigation is responsible for a greater quantity of freshwater withdrawals. That thirst will grow under CCS. The process required to capture and then compress CO2 at a conventional coal-fired plant will need much more water than the same plant without carbon capture technology because carbon capture technology is energy-intensive. An August 2009 report for Australia’s National Water Commission noted that “coalfired power plants incorporating carbon capture and storage (CCS) could be one-quarter to one-third more water intensive [than conventional plants].” 53 Carl O. Bauer (quoted above) said that “DOE’s National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) projects that, in the absence of successful development of new advanced CO2 capture and water management technologies, implementation of today’s CO2 capture technologies would significantly increase freshwater consumption by fossil-based power plants.” 54 A 2008 report from NETL concluded that by the year 2030, carbon capture could increase water withdrawal in the U.S. “anywhere from 2.7 BGD (billion gallons a day) to 6.0 BGD” and water consumption could increase from 1.9 BGD to 4 BGD. 55 The report points out that will be a problem “particularly in the arid west and southwest, and in the expanding southeast” areas of the U.S. The analogous regions in Canada are Alberta and Saskatchewan, the very provinces where most CCS is expected to take place. In “Heating Up in Alberta: Climate Change, Energy Development and Water,” author Mary Griffiths warns that “the province’s fresh water resources are under pressure. Summer river flows are declining, periods of prolonged drought experienced in the past are likely to return, and climate change is further increasing the uncertainty about future water supplies.” 56 (Just months after the Pembina Institute released Dr. Griffith’s report Alberta suffered its driest spring on record. 57 ) “We can develop all the zero-carbon technologies we want, but without a reliable supply of water, they amount to nothing,” warned Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) in comments made to the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee in March, 2009. 58

#### Not enough storage

Glover 10 – Canada Free Press [Peter, February 25, 2010, “Geologic Carbon Storage Can NEVER Work, says new US study,” <http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/20372>]

If world leaders – still reeling from the fiasco of the Copenhagen Summit in the global war against carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions – were hoping to find technological ‘solace’ on their return, the news could not be worse. Central to hopes for the future management of carbon dioxide emissions are theories associated with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). That is, collecting and storing the carbon emitted from burning fossil fuels underground, mainly beneath the ocean floor. However, a new US study just published exposes the concept of subsea CO2 management as “overwhelming in both physical needs and costs” and the entire strategy for geological sequestration per se as “profoundly non-feasible”. It is the capture of carbon from electric power stations that has long been a subject of “considerable interest” in the war against carbon emissions. While the new report acknowledges the cost of carbon capture “may prove feasible” (though at a higher cost than previously thought), it has been the “common assumption that the cost of carbon sequestration is much less than the cost of capture”. It is this last assumption that the study demolishes. Published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering, the study posits a series of analogies, including how water is currently injected into underground oil basins to maintain pressure and enhance extraction and production. This apparently “reassuring analogy” done through what the authors’ term “steady state” processes – where e.g., oil is produced while another, e.g. water is injected into the reservoir, something in wide use called water-flooding – is highly misleading when applied to CO2 injection for sequestration, an ‘unsteady state’ process. With CO2, says the report, the injected amount can only increase the reservoir pressure in a closed system. It would thus be necessary to maintain CO2 inflow pressure for the entire life of a typical commercial power plant. At just 50MW production that will is all but impossible. “Volume required for CO2 storage has been severely underestimated” Assessing the math and science of previous studies, the report goes on to show how the “volume required for CO2 storage has been severely underestimated.” In short, the sheer size of the underground areas required for storage, if the very real dangers of “pressure build up” and “significant leakage” (as all current CCS experiments have experienced, including the North Sea ‘Sleipner’ project) are to be avoided, are enormous. The report maintains that an average 500MW power station produces around 3 million metric tons of CO2 per year. The study goes on to show that the “extent of the reservoir” space required for a successful process would be “the size of a small US state”. In essence, the prospects for geological sequestration anywhere in the world look to be impossible. “The findings of this work,” the summary concludes, “suggest that it is not a practical means to provide any substantive reduction in CO2 emissions, although it has been repeatedly presented as such by others.”

### China

#### US-China competition is inevitable:

#### China’s encroaching on US markets -

Bremmer 4/1/11 (Ian and Evan, “Watch out foor Rising US-China Competition”) <http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/04/watch_out_for_rising_us-china.html>

Conventional wisdom says that when it comes to U.S.-China relations, commerce plays a stabilizing role, giving both sides a reason to work together. But in the next few years, commercial ties between the two countries will almost certainly become more competitive and could even disrupt the relationship. That's because China wants to become a leader in just the kinds of technology sectors that have traditionally given the U.S. a global edge. The result will be increased competition between the two countries — within China and globally — and a deepening unease on both sides. China has made no secret of its goals. Even though the country emerged from the global crisis stronger than nearly every other major economy, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated last month that its current economic-growth model, based on low-cost manufacturing and overinvestment, is "unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable." Instead, China is set on developing higher-value-added and technology-intensive industries. And its huge capacity to mobilize domestic capital gives it the power to do so. For many U.S. firms, the first battleground will be within China, where there is already significant competition between foreign and local companies for market share. A 2010 survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China found that 38% of U.S. companies feel unwelcome in the Chinese market, up from 23% just two years earlier. And it's a sentiment that extends beyond technology companies, like Google, into the manufacturing sector. Numerous companies now complain about a host of issues, from intellectual property theft to nontariff barriers to aspects of China's regulatory regime. There is fear among U.S. firms that if China can quickly produce substitutable (but cheaper) products, foreign companies in China will be marginalized.

#### SQUO Solves Cooperation –

#### Duke energy agreement

Bloomberg News 3/27/12 (“China Shows US How to Push for Carbon Capture”) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-27/china-shows-u-s-how-to-push-for-carbon-capture.html>

Meanwhile, in China, carbon capture marches steadfastly ahead, as an article in the May issue of Bloomberg Markets magazine reports. A pilot project by [China](http://topics.bloomberg.com/china/) Huaneng Group Corp. has been able to remove carbon from coal-plant exhaust for about $39 per ton of captured CO2, which is a little more than a third of what it costs in the U.S. The work has been so impressive, as John Lippert and Chua Baizhen report, that Duke Energy Corp., the largest U.S. energy company, has signed a research agreement with Huaneng to study its technology. Duke wants to learn how much it would cost to retrofit its largest power plant, in Gibson County, [Indiana](http://topics.bloomberg.com/indiana/), to capture carbon. The Chinese plant filters the smoke through an aqueous amine solution rather than through chilled ammonia, as is commonly done in U.S. [carbon-capture](http://topics.bloomberg.com/carbon-capture/) experiments. Duke would like to find out how much of Huaneng’s cost savings flow from its proprietary technology, and how much is attributable to lower labor and capital costs.

#### Future Gen cooperation

Logan 7 (Logan et al. 07 – Senior associate @ World Resources Institute ~Logan, Joanna Lewis (Senior international fellow at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change), and Michael B. Cummings (JD candidate @ Georgetown University and former Business/Solutions Fellow @ Pew Center on Global Climate Change), "For China, the shift to climate-friendly energy depends on international collaboration," Boston Review, January/February 2007, pg)

Once more, international partnerships can help. A new U.K.-led initiative, part of the China–EU partnership on climate change, aims to accelerate experience with CCS by building a demonstration plant in the next decade. And Huaneng, China’s largest coal-based power-generation company, is one of 12 energy companies participating in the U.S. FutureGen “clean coal” project, attempting to become the world’s first integrated sequestration and hydrogen production research power plant.

#### US-China Clean Energy Research Center

The Energy Lab No Date (“US-China Clean Energy Research Center”) <http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/global/cerc.html>

The U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) is a collaboration between the United States and China to facilitate joint research and development to accelerate clean energy technologies. Established in 2009, the $150 million center further extends the decades of previous science and technology collaboration between the United States and China. The center's funding is split equally between the two countries, and involves participation from academia, research laboratories, and industry. U.S. funds are being used to support work conducted by U.S. institutions and individuals and Chinese funds are supporting work conducted by Chinese institutions and researchers.

#### No risk of conflict in the South China sea

Lai 7 (Hongyi Harry, “China’s Oil Diplomacy: Is It A Global Security Threat” Third World Quarterly, Vol 28 No 3 2007)

Fourth, the security of sea-lanes. It has been feared that China might rapidly develop its capability to safeguard its sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea to China and that it could disrupt US and Japanese sea-lanes in the case of war. However, so far China’s naval capability mainly covers the Taiwan Strait and copes with a possible Taiwanese provocative declaration of independence. Its blue-water navy is still more of a concept than a reality. Its ability to safeguard and/or disrupt sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea have been rather limited. Any disruption of sea-lanes by China would invite strong counter-moves by the other parties and could be highly counterproductive. Therefore most of China’s eﬀorts at securing its oil routes have been to ﬁnd alternative land pipelines or railway links. China also apparently falls back on US protection to ensure the safety of its sea-lanes for oil. 54

#### No war – Japan won’t engage in a conflict

Khan 9/25/12 (Shamshad, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, “Japan’s Nationalistation of Senkaku: Internal and External Determinants”)

It is being argued by China that Japan, in the near future, would deploy troops on these islands closer to China’s maritime boundary to counter the former’s military assertions. Some in China also see it as a move by Japan to “draw Washington into a conflict between Beijing and Tokyo.”[3](http://www.idsa.in/node/10484/6757#footnote3_26y8rtr) However, the overall political mood in Japan does not suggest that it is gearing up to test China’s military strength. The nationalisation of these islands has been driven more by domestic political factors than external factors. The nationalization debate was raked up by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, who announced in April 2012 that the Tokyo metropolitan government is in negotiations with the Saitama-based businessman who owns these islands in order to “protect” these from China.[4](http://www.idsa.in/node/10484/6757#footnote4_z6z9thb) Soon other political parties joined the fray, including the main opposition party—the Liberal Democratic Party—which announced that it would nationalise the Senkaku islands if it were voted back to power. A section in the ruling Democratic Party of Japan also wanted to take political mileage out of it. Amid this internal debate, Hong Kong-based Chinese activists landed on one of the disputed islands, defying the Japanese government’s prohibitory order and asserted Chinese sovereignty. Their brief detention led to a diplomatic diatribe between Tokyo and Beijing. In response, a group of Japanese nationalists also landed on the islands asserting Japanese sovereignty. These developments prompted Japan’s central government to expedite the negotiation process with the private businessman to buy the land. The government offered some ¥ 2.05 billion (about $ 25.95 million) to the owner and clinched the deal.

#### No risk of a war – China doesn’t have the naval power to stretch that far

Park 10/1/12 (Sungtae, Security Policy Studies @ GWU, Also written articles for the CSIS, “Limits of China-Japan Tension Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands”)

There are also logistical reasons why a war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is unlikely. It is generally believed that neither China nor Japan at the moment has the military capability to wage a full-scale conventional war against the other. If China and Japan were to fight a war, the initial fighting would take place on water. The Chinese navy is mainly oriented towards coastal defense and does not have effective naval capabilities to project its power beyond the so-called “first island chain.” The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are part of the first island chain, but the Chinese military would have to stretch its naval capability to the limit in order to fight a war at that point. Even China’s on-going naval modernization is primarily for defensive purposes. The Japanese navy, on the other hand, does have some capability to project its power, but it is very limited. The Japanese military also does not have adequate ground forces to conduct fighting on the Chinese mainland. Even if violence breaks out, such a conflict would be very limited in scope and is highly unlikely that it would turn into a general war or escalate to a nuclear conflict.

#### No risk of draw in – Panetta has mitigated the conflict

Harner 9/23/12 (Stephen, “Is the US Commiteed to Defend the Senkakus? Text of Article 5 of the US-Japan Treaty”)

If–as is implied by the NHK report–Japan thinks that Article 5 can be immediately invoked in dealing with the Senkaku crisis, and that it is thereby standing “shoulder-to-shoulder” with the U.S. against China, I think it is engaging in wishful thinking. During Panetta’s hastily arranged stopover in Tokyo on his way to Beijing, his unsubtle command to Japan was not to further escalate the crisis. China’s silence on Article 5 is a kind of “non-recognition,” a diplomatic approach that would make it easier for the other side (i.e., the U.S.) to back down and effectively abandon implied commitments. Meanwhile, China is showing no signs that it wishes to de-escalate the confrontation, nor should we expect any lessening of pressure in the near term. There are many risks in the Senkaku/Diaoyudao crisis. Particularly great are risks owing to miscalculation of the other side’s intentions. For Japan this means not only the intensions of China, but also the intensions of its ally, the United States.

#### Costs are too high –

Park 10/1/12 (Sungtae, Security Policy Studies @ GWU, Also written articles for the CSIS, “Limits of China-Japan Tension Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands”)

There is a growing fear among many Asia observers and pundits that the on-going territorial dispute could become a spark for a destructive, general war in Asia. The reality, however, is that there are several economic, political, as well as logistical (in military terms) constraints that make a war highly unlikely. In economic terms, trade between the two countries is at historic high levels. A war would have devastating human as well as material costs. While economic interests and interdependence do not necessarily lead to peace, as history has proven with World War I, the current situation is different. Both political and military leaders before World War I believed that a war would be quick with small costs. Each side also believed that it would win. Leaders of both China and Japan today understand that the costs of a war would be astronomical and understand that victory is no certainty.

## 2NC

### Ov

#### Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

### Fw

**Framework links – it’s a performative example of how they bracket out certain perspectives in favor of hegemonic ones – It’s not just about simulating energy debate but who has the best method for making energy debates inclusive and productive**

Sparks 3 (Holloway, asst prof of political science, Penn State, Queens, Teens, and Model Mothers Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform (Paperback) by Sanford F. Schram (Editor), Joe Soss (Editor), Richard C. Fording (Editor))

In spite of the participatory principles embodied in these theories, some deliberative democrats have given **inadequate attention** to the **barriers** to public sphere participation confronted by marginalized citizens. Activists, dissidents,, racial and ethnic minorities, and particularly poor citizens are regularly excluded from both decision making and deliberative venues, but this problem is often **sidestepped** in the mainstream theoretical literature by theorists who **downplay** the effects of social and economic inequality on public participation (see, e.g., Barber 1984; Cohen 1989; Dryzek '99°). The claim that we can effectively bracket inequality in the public sphere, however, has been strongly criticized recently by a group of theorists explicitly concerned with problems of democratic inclusion. These scholars, including James Bohman ('996), Nancy Fraser (r7), Jane Mansbridge (i5ir, 1999), and his Young (1993, 1996, woo), have emphasized the fact that formal political equality **does not guarantee equal authority** in or even **access to the public realm**. Iris Young, for example, has identified two forms of exclusion that prevent citizens from fully participating in democracies. What she calls external exclusion "names the many ways that individuals and groups that ought to be included are purposely or inadvertently left out of fora for discussion and decision making" (zooo, 53 54). External exclusion can be as blatant as deliberately failing to invite certain groups to important meetings, or can take more subtle forms such as the way economic inequalities affect access to political institutions. As Nancy Fraser has noted, in societies like the United States in which the publication and circulation of political views depends on media organizations that are privately owned and operated for profit, those citizens who lack wealth will also generally "lack access to the material means of equal participation". This criticism has obvious salience for families living on welfare budgets. On a more basic level, money and time are also necessary for participation in putatively "free" political institutions. Poor parents with young children, for example, might not have the resources to purchase child care in order to attend a town council meeting at which important political decisions are made.3 Internal exclusions, in contrast, "concern ways that people **lack effective opportunity** **to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to** fora and **procedures of decision making**" (Young 2000, 55; emphasis added). Citizens may find that "others **ignore** or **dismiss** or **patronize** their statements and expressions. Though formally included in forum or process, people may find that their claims are **not taken seriously** and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (fl). Internal exclusion can take the form of public ridicule or face to face inattention (Bickford 5996), but it can also stem from less obvious sources, such as the norms of articulateness, dispassionateness, and orderliness that are often privileged in political discussions (Young 2ooo, 6). As Young observes, In many formal situations the better educated white middle class people often act as though they have a right to speak and that their words carry authority, whereas those of other groups often feel intimidated by the argument requirements and the formality and rules of parliamentary procedure, so they do not speak, or speak only in a way that those in charge find "disruptive." . . . The dominant groups, moreover, often fail entirely to notice this devaluation and silencing, while the less privileged often feel put down or frustrated, either losing confidence in themselves or becoming angry. (5996, 114) Since "unruly" forms of speech tend to be used primarily by women, racial minorities, and working class people, large groups of citizens face the devaluation of their political participation.

#### Interrogating dominant policy frameworks creates space for new ways of approaching energy policy – our role as energy policy researchers should be to interrogating the framing of our policies

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

This paper has provided several examples where central elements of energy policy have been discursively constructed so as to speak directly to core government priorities, such as economic growth and national security. This has served to **maintain the dominance of the current framing of energy policy** and to **promote certain political interests**. This is a challenging observation if one argues that energy policy needs to be **reframed**. The transition to a low carbon economy may be a good idea. Indeed, it is one that is increasingly central in policy discourses in both developed and developing countries. This does not, however, necessarily mean that this discursive shift will have any specific material impact on energy policy. The institutional constraints on discursive developments here still exist and must be **confronted** (or conformed to) **before new policy ideas are likely to gain** any **influence**. Having an impact on the core of energy policy requires **confronting the** dominance, or ‘**discursive hegemony’** of the existing way in which policy is framed – within the context of the constraints that have shaped and **f**acilitated this existing framing. This is almost a ‘Catch-22’ situation if one wants to see urgent action to tackle climate change: to be radical but excluded (and potentially right only with hindsight), or gradualist and engaged in a process that may move too slowly to avert disaster. This argument suggests that reframing energy policy is only likely to be successful if the arguments that support it are discursively constructed in such a way as to speak to core government imperatives. If climate change is one of the central reasons behind needing to reframe energy policy, then the fact that the environment sits outside of the core imperatives that governments have to deliver against to ensure their survival implies that this could be very challenging indeed. It is, of course, possible that future events might transpire to alter this. As mentioned above, catastrophic climate impacts might well mean that protecting the environment becomes a core government imperative. But by this point it may well be too late for any reframing of energy policy to be effective in tackling climate change. Of course there is the possibility in the shorter term that the government imperative to sustain representative legitimacy will put tackling climate on an equal footing with security or economic growth. For this to happen in a relevant timeframe, however, will require extraordinary popular pressure and institutional changes. Ideas serving expansion of fossil fuel markets are strongly embedded in today's predominantly technocratic and nationalistic energy policy discourses. We hope that this article has served to provide an accessible introduction to the ways in which discourse and linguistic framing effects might be playing a role in sustaining **energy policy frameworks** that are **resistant to** the many insightful **changes** often advocated in the pages of Energy Policy. If the influence of such framing effects is accepted, we begin to see how the process of effecting changes in energy policy is not just a technical or economic task, but also a political task. Moreover, this highlights an urgent need for civil society to engage directly with the existing framing of energy policy and the problems it seeks to address in an effort to reframe it around more sustainable, low carbon principles and concerns. The demonstration of the value of a **discourse analytic approach** in this paper, together with other emerging contributions in this field (cited above), also serves to highlight some **important considerations for energy policy researchers**. Moving away from the traditional linear understanding of the policy process **requires researchers to critically reflect** on the interplay of values, beliefs, entrenched interests and institutional structures that serve to **facilitate or constrain the policy traction** of certain framings of **energy policy problems and solutions**. Further than this, it also highlights the **role** in this process that we ourselves play as **researchers**, and the extent to which our own values, beliefs and interests influence the **framing of our research practice and communication**. This has important and far reaching implications, both methodological and normative, raising considerations that are likely to continue to **gain traction** as researchers and policy makers alike increasingly appreciate the need for reflexivity in our approach to **framing**, interpreting and implementing **energy policy** in the decades to come.[2](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#fn2)

**Fossils fuels create ideological path dependency – locks-in energy policy failure – framing is key**

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

The urgency of the climate change problem and the need for the rapid introduction of new, more sustainable approaches to the way in which we produce and use energy are familiar issues to readers of Energy Policy. This journal publishes many insightful articles that engage with the ways in which policy might be **reoriented** to facilitate a transition to a low carbon energy system. In spite of this, global carbon emissions continue to rise at an alarming rate and energy policy in practice is a long way from resembling the kind of sustainable best practice advocated in journals such as this one. But why, in the face of a problem as urgent and potentially catastrophic as climate change, is energy policy so resistant to change? There are a myriad of contributing factors to the dominance of policies that support high carbon energy systems, including issues such as technological lock-in, socio-technical transitions and the time-scale of the climate problem relative to electoral cycles. In this article we seek to provide readers of Energy Policy with an accessible introduction to one particular issue that has received increasing attention in the policy sciences over the last two decades, namely the role that the **linguistic framing of policy problems and solutions** can play in **sustaining the dominance of existing policy positions**. In doing so we hope to highlight the value of discourse analytic techniques to the mainstream energy policy community and to augment emerging work by other authors who have used discourse-oriented approaches to the critical analysis of energy policy (see, for example, [Bulkeley, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib3); [Smith and Kern, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib28); [Szarka; 2004](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib31); [Eames et al., 2006](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib10); [Lovell, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib18); [Lovell et al., 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib17)). Using the UK as an example, we introduce readers to the way in which linguistic framing may serve to favour the status quo in energy policy. This highlights an important task for those concerned with facilitating the introduction of more sustainable energy policy—**not only do we need to know what** such **policy might look like**, we also need to influence the **linguistic framing** of energy policy problems and solutions. This renders the project of a transition to a low carbon energy system as much political as it is technical or economic.

#### Sequencing is key – focusing on state politics absolves individual responsibility for the environment and turns case – independent reason to vote neg

**Trennel 6** (Paul, Ph.D of the University of Wales, Department of International Politics, “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security”)

Thirdly, it can be claimed that the security mindset channels the obligation to address environmental issues in an **unwelcome direction**. Due to terms laid out by the social contract “security is essentially something done by states…there is no obligation or moral duty on citizens to provide security…In this sense security is essentially empty…it is not a sign of positive political initiative” (Dalby, 1992a: 97-8). Therefore, casting an issue in security terms puts the **onus of action onto governments**, **creating a docile citizenry** who await instructions from their leaders as to the next step rather than taking it on their own backs to do something about pressing concerns. This is unwelcome because **governments have limited incentives** to act on environmental issues, as their collectively poor track record to date reveals. Paul Brown notes that “at present in all the large democracies the short-term politics of winning the next election and the need to increase the annual profits of industry rule over the long term interests of the human race” (1996: 10; see also Booth 1991: 348). There is no clearer evidence for this than the grounds on which George W. Bush explained his decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol: “I told the world I thought that Kyoto was a lousy deal for America…It meant that we had to cut emissions below 1990 levels, which would have meant I would have presided over massive layoffs and economic destruction” (BBC: 2006). The **short-term focus** of government elites and the long-term nature of the environmental threat means that any policy which puts the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of governments should be viewed with scepticism as this may have the effect of **breeding inaction** on environmental issues. Moreover, governmental legislation may not be the most appropriate route to solving the problem at hand. If environmental vulnerabilities are to be effectively addressed “[t]he routine behaviour of practically everyone must be altered” (Deudney, 1990: 465). In the case of the environmental sector it is not large scale and intentional assaults but the cumulative effect of small and seemingly innocent acts such as driving a car or taking a flight that do the damage. Exactly how a legislative response could serve to alter “non-criminal apolitical acts by individuals” (Prins, 1993: 176- 177) which lie beyond established categories of the political is unclear. Andrew Dobson has covered this ground in claiming that the solution to environmental hazards lies not in **piecemeal legislation** but in the fostering of a culture of ‘**ecological citizenship’**. His call is made on the grounds that legislating on the environment, forcing people to adapt, **does not reach the necessary depth** to produce **long-lasting change,** but merely plugs the problem temporarily. He cites Italian ‘car-free city’ days as evidence of this, noting that whilst selected cities may be free of automobiles on a single predetermined day, numbers return to previous levels immediately thereafter (2003: 3). This indicates that the deeper message underlying the policy is not being successfully conveyed. Enduring environmental solutions are likely to emerge **only** when **citizens choose to change their ways** because they understand that there exists a pressing need to do so. Such a realisation is **unlikely** to be prompted by the **top-down**, state oriented focus supplied by a security framework.

### A2 perm

**Severance – which is a voting issue – causes argumentative irresponsibility and kills neg link ground – their language is a performance that is intrinsic to the 1AC**

Trennel 6 Paul, Ph.D of the University of Wales, Department of International Politics, “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security”

With the understanding of security as a **performative** **rather than descriptive** act in place the debate over environmental security takes on a new character. As Ole Waever has detailed, under the speech act conception of security, the “use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a **political choice**, that is a decision for conceptualization a special way. When an issue is ‘securitized’ the act itself tends to lead to **certain ways of addressing it”** (Waever, 1995: 65). Therefore, the focus **shifts** from the question of whether the environment is in reality a threat to human well being – the question which underpinned the early work on the topic by those such as Mathews and Ullman – and onto the issue of whether the conditions invoked by applying the security tag are desirable for addressing the issue at hand. As Huysmans has said “One has to decide…if one wants to approach a problem in security terms or not…the is-question automatically turns into a should-question” (1998: 234, 249). The response to the should-question of environmental security is dependent on whether or not the way in which security organizes social relations can be seen as beneficial to the attempt to develop **effective environmental policy.**

#### No net benefit to the permutation, but there are DAs ---- Permutation co-opts the alt – reaffirms the discoursive hegemony of the 1AC and prevents critical interrogaton of failed methods

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

This perspective begins by seeing politics as a struggle for ‘**discursive hegemony’** in which actors seek to achieve ‘discursive closure’ by securing support for their definition of reality ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)). The notion of ‘**story-lines’** is useful here. These **narratives employ symbolic references that imply** a **common understanding of an issue** ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14); [Rydin, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib24)). Essentially, the assumption is that actors do not draw on a comprehensive discursive system; instead this is **evoked through story-lines**. By uttering a specific word or phrase, for example, ‘global warming’, **a whole story-line is in effect re-invoked**; one that is subtly different, for example, to that of the ‘anthropogenic greenhouse effect’ or ‘climate change’. ‘Global warming’ implies a story-line where the whole earth will get hotter in the future; ‘climate change’ suggests something less certain and uniform (see [Whitmarsh, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib33)); ‘anthropogenic greenhouse effect’ is perhaps the most technically correct term, and it directly attributes the warming effect to human activity. Story-lines are therefore much more than simply ‘arguments’. The meanings and connotations of familiar story-lines are often recognised at an almost **subconscious level**. They can thus act to **define policy problems while obscuring underpinning interests, values and beliefs.** They can add credibility to the claims of certain groups and render those of other groups less credible. They therefore act to create social order within a given domain by serving as devices through which actors are positioned and ideas defined and linked together. Institutional arrangements are important in structuring discourses, forming routine understandings. Complex research findings or logical arguments are often reduced to an eye-catching visual representation or memorable one-liners. These gloss over real complexities and uncertainties, and entail significant loss of meaning. This allows considerable flexibility in interpretation, which helps recruit people with differing views into a ‘discourse coalition’. It also avoids confrontation or even the necessity for direct social contact between coalition members ([Hajer, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)). In this view, to shape policy, **a new discourse** must **dominate** in public and policy discussions, **and penetrate the routines of policy practice** through institutionalisation within laws, regulations and organisations ([Hajer, 1993](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib13); [Nossiff, 1998](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib19); [Healey, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib16)). In terms of policy change then, **promoting a new story-line** is a difficult task, involving **dismantling** those promoted by those actors who were able to achieve prominence for their claims and viewpoint originally ([Rydin, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib24)) and which may have become **embedded in institutions**. For example, it took over a decade for the issue of acid rain to impact on UK air pollution policy. A discourse coalition formed around the issue that promoted a story-line highlighting the negative international environmental impacts of emissions from coal-fired power stations, particularly trees dying in Scandinavian countries, and the related need for tighter pollution controls in Europe. In the UK the acid rain discourse coalition first had to confront the institutionally entrenched British discourse on air pollution. This was dominated by local and national concerns with urban air pollution and health effects, which left little room for the consideration of new ideas related to the international environmental impacts of industrial emissions ([Hajer, 1995, p. 268](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#bib14)).

## 1nr

### Senkaku Islands

#### No war from Senkaku islands—stability prevails in Asia

**Bitzinger & Desker 8** – senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328\_731200556\_906256449.pdf)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints**. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect**. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. **All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.**

### AT: Regionalism

#### Regionalism is high now – ASEAN cooperation in the South China Sea

Lai 7 (Hongyi Harry, “China’s Oil Diplomacy: Is It A Global Security Threat” Third World Quarterly, Vol 28 No 3 2007)

Nevertheless, into the 2000s China has also made noticeable progress in oil and gas co-operation with Southeast Asian and South Asian nations. Therefore, the worst-case scenario about clashes over oil between China and other claimant states in the South China Sea, or between China and India, or even between China and Japan have not happened. The South China Sea contains deposits of oil and gas. The US Geological Survey and others estimate that about 60% – 70% of the region’s hydrocarbon resources are gas. South China Sea has proven oil reserves estimated at about 7 billion barrels. Oil production in the region is around 2.5 million barrels per day and has increased gradually over the past few years, as China, Malaysia and Vietnam step up production. China and Southeast Asian nations have overlapping claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, these nations have worked out a temporary solution. In November 2002 China and 10 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members signed a Joint Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties, pledging to ‘resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means’. 61 In March 2005 three oil companies from China, Vietnam and the Philippines signed a landmark tripartite agreement in Manila on joint exploration of oil and gas resources in the disputed South China Sea. The three parties stated their willingness to prospect the reserve of petroleum resources within the area agreed by them, without undermining the basic positions held by their own governments. 62 China has also furthered its co-operation with Indonesia in gas exploration and trade. In September 2002 China awarded a $8.5 billion liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) purchase contract to Indonesia. 63 In 2002, with a purchase of a ﬁeld from the Spanish ﬁrm Repsol YPF SA, CNOOC became the largest oﬀshore oil producer in Indonesia.

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#### No risk of a war -

Lai 7 (Hongyi Harry, “China’s Oil Diplomacy: Is It A Global Security Threat” Third World Quarterly, Vol 28 No 3 2007)

Million tons of oil in 2005, 1.08 million tons less than in 2004. 73 Second, China’s leadership has been taking great care to ease external fears about its economic and political rise. Under President Jiang Zemin China has striven to portray itself as ‘a responsible great power’ which has enhanced peace, prosperity and stability in the world. Under the current president, Hu Jintao, China has proclaimed that it is pursuing a peaceful rise. China later rephrased this as ‘peaceful development’ in order to allay sensitive concerns with a rising China around the world. Thus the Chinese leadership is aware of and sensitive to the international reaction to China’s oil diplomacy and is trying to minimise negative repercussions. China’s eventual acquiescence to the US stance over Iraq and Iran and its compromise with the USA over Sudan’s human dislocation illustrate its pragmatic and low-key approach in securing imported oil and managing issues of vital concern to the USA. In addition, China has also displayed considerable interest and enthusiasm for peaceful resolution of conﬂict and for constructive co-operation over oil with its Asian neighbours. China’s co-operation with India in joint oil development and with claimant states in the South China Sea oﬀers the best, albeit very surprising, examples.

### China Link

#### Descriptions of China are not neutral or objective – Their strategies are self-fulfilling prophecies that must be critically interrogated

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 305-307

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers**/**mainstream China **specialists** see themselves (as representativesof theindispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

### Warming

### No Warming

#### No warming now --- computer models are exaggerated and alarmism is used for funding

**WSJ ’12** (Wall Street Journal 1/19/12, “No Need to Panic About Global Warming” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html>)

\*The following has been signed by the 16 scientists with the following credentials: Claude Allegre, former director of the Institute for the Study of the Earth, University of Paris; J. Scott Armstrong, cofounder of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting; Jan Breslow, head of the Laboratory of Biochemical Genetics and Metabolism, Rockefeller University; Roger Cohen, fellow, American Physical Society; Edward David, member, National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences; William Happer, professor of physics, Princeton; Michael Kelly, professor of technology, University of Cambridge, U.K.; William Kininmonth, former head of climate research at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology; Richard Lindzen, professor of atmospheric sciences, MIT; James McGrath, professor of chemistry, Virginia Technical University; Rodney Nichols, former president and CEO of the New York Academy of Sciences; Burt Rutan, aerospace engineer, designer of Voyager and SpaceShipOne; Harrison H. Schmitt, Apollo 17 astronaut and former U.S. senator; Nir Shaviv, professor of astrophysics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Henk Tennekes, former director, Royal Dutch Meteorological Service; Antonio Zichichi, president of the World Federation of Scientists, Geneva.

A candidate for public office in any contemporary democracy may have to consider what, if anything, to do about "global warming." Candidates should understand that the oft-repeated claim that nearly all scientists demand that something dramatic be done to stop global warming is not true. In fact, a large and growing number of distinguished scientists and engineers do not agree that drastic actions on global warming are needed. In September, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ivar Giaever, a supporter of President Obama in the last election, publicly resigned from the American Physical Society (APS) with a letter that begins: "I did not renew [my membership] because I cannot live with the [APS policy] statement: 'The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring. If no mitigating actions are taken, significant disruptions in the Earth's physical and ecological systems, social systems, security and human health are likely to occur. We must reduce emissions of greenhouse gases beginning now.' In the APS it is OK to discuss whether the mass of the proton changes over time and how a multi-universe behaves, but the evidence of global warming is incontrovertible?" In spite of a multidecade international campaign to enforce the message that increasing amounts of the "pollutant" carbon dioxide will destroy civilization, large numbers of scientists, many very prominent, share the opinions of Dr. Giaever. And the number of scientific "heretics" is growing with each passing year. The reason is a collection of stubborn scientific facts. Perhaps the most inconvenient fact is the lack of global warming for well over 10 years now. This is known to the warming establishment, as one can see from the 2009 "Climategate" email of climate scientist Kevin Trenberth: "The fact is that we can't account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can't." But the warming is only missing if one believes computer models where so-called feedbacks involving water vapor and clouds greatly amplify the small effect of CO2. The lack of warming for more than a decade—indeed, the smaller-than-predicted warming over the 22 years since the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began issuing projections—suggests that computer models have greatly exaggerated how much warming additional CO2 can cause. Faced with this embarrassment, those promoting alarm have shifted their drumbeat from warming to weather extremes, to enable anything unusual that happens in our chaotic climate to be ascribed to CO2. Alarmism over climate is of great benefit to many, providing government funding for academic research and a reason for government bureaucracies to grow. Alarmism also offers an excuse for governments to raise taxes, taxpayer-funded subsidies for businesses that understand how to work the political system, and a lure for big donations to charitable foundations promising to save the planet. Lysenko and his team lived very well, and they fiercely defended their dogma and the privileges it brought them. Speaking for many scientists and engineers who have looked carefully and independently at the science of climate, we have a message to any candidate for public office: There is no compelling scientific argument for drastic action to "decarbonize" the world's economy. Even if one accepts the inflated climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive greenhouse-gas control policies are not justified economically.

### AT: Sea Level Rise

**Sea level rise will not cause catastrophe—humans will quickly adapt**

**Dale ‘7** (Dale, Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 2007 (Helle Dale, “Skeptics Needed.” http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed101007d.cfm)

It makes the case that while global warming is real, it shows no sign of leading to the apocalypse, and that the money and effort invested in limiting the emission of greenhouse gases could be far better spent on saving human lives from other environmental threats. Mr. Lomborg estimates that the $180 billion spent on the Kyoto Protocol each year will delay the effects of global warming by four days by the end of this century. If the United States had signed on and every signatory nation had lived up to its treaty commitments (which they don't), the delay by the end of this century would be five years. And the consequences in terms of sea level would not even be that hard to live with. While European politicians now go on to pilgrimages to Greenland to pay homage to the supposedly melting glaciers, it seems to be the case that only some glaciers are melting, and that while the Arctic might be seeing some melting, the Antarctic is seeing **its icecap grow**. The rise in sea level by the end of this century, according to the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, will be about one foot. Other estimates are as low as three inches. This increase in sea level is something that economically prosperous nations can easy deal with, argues Mr. Lomborg. In fact, we have seen a one-foot rise in sea levels over the past century, which the world has managed to survive.

### No Impact Warming

**No extinction**

**NIPCC 11**. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>

In a paper published in *Systematics and Biodiversity*, Willis *et al*. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas *et al*., 2004; Solomon *et al*., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford *et al*., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**More evidence - claims of warming causing wars and destruction are speculative and wrong**

**NIPCC 10**. Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Past Warm Episodes did not Cause Extinction. 15 July 2010. <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2010/jul/15jul2010a7.html>

Many claims have been made about catastrophic negative effects of increasing air temperature on biodiversity; but nearly all of these claims are based on either speculation or simple correlative models. In the study of Willis *et al*. (2010), on the other hand, past historical periods were identified in which climate was either similar to that projected by global climate models for the next century or so, or in which the rate of temperature change was unusually rapid; and these *real*-world periods were examined to see if any *real*-world climate-related extinctions had occurred. The first period they examined was the Eocene Climatic Optimum (53-51 million years ago), during which time the atmosphere's CO2 concentration exceeded 1200 ppm and tropical temperatures were 5-10°C warmer than modern values. Yet far from causing extinctions of the tropical flora (where the data are best), the four researchers report that "all the evidence from low-latitude records indicates that, at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time in the Neotropics." They also note that "ancestors of many of our modern tropical and temperate plants evolved ...when global temperatures and CO2 were much higher than present...indicating that they have much wider ecological tolerances than are predicted based on present-day climates alone." The second period they examined consisted of two rapid-change climatic events in the Holocene -- one at 14,700 years ago and one at 11,600 years ago -- during which times temperatures increased in the mid- to high-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere by up to 10°C over periods of less than 60 years. During these events, there is evidence from many sites for rapid plant responses to rapid warming. And the authors note that "at no site yet studied, anywhere in the world, is there evidence in the fossil record for large-scale climate-driven extinction during these intervals of rapid warming." On the other hand, they report that extinctions *did* occur due to the *cold* temperatures of the *glacial* epoch, when subtropical species in southern Europe were driven out of their comfort zone. The study of Willis *et al*. also makes use of recent historical data, as in the case of the 3°C rise in temperature at Yosemite Park over the past 100 years. In comparing surveys of mammal fauna conducted near the beginning and end of this period, they detected some changes, but no local extinctions. Thus, they determined that for all of the periods they studied, with either very warm temperatures or very rapid warming, there were no detectable extinctions.

**Err neg – aff authors overestimate warming and underestimate adaptation**

**Goklany ‘11** - a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior (Indur M., “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming” December 2011, <http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf>)

A third approach would be to fix the root cause of why developing countries are deemed to be most at-risk, namely, poverty. Sustained economic growth would, as is evident from the experience of developed countries, address virtually all problems of poverty, not just that portion exacerbated by global warming. It is far more certain that sustainable economic growth will provide greater benefits than emission reductions: while there is no doubt that poverty leads to disease and death, there is substantial doubt regarding the reality and magnitude of the negative impact of global warming. This is especially true as assessments often ignore improvements in adaptive capacity. Of these three approaches, human well-being in poorer countries is likely to be advanced most effectively by sustained economic development and least by emission reductions. In addition, because of the inertia of the climate system, economic development is likely to bear fruit faster than any emission reductions. These figures also indicate that the compound effect of economic development and technological change can result in quite dramatic improvements even over the relatively short period for which these figures were developed. Figure 5, for instance, covered 26 years. By contrast, climate change impacts analyses frequently look 50 to 100 years into the future. Over such long periods, the compounded effect could well be spectacular. Longer term analyses of climate-sensitive indicators of human well-being show that the combination of economic growth and technological change can, over decades, reduce negative impacts on human beings by an order of magnitude, that is, a factor of ten, or more. In some instances, this combination has virtually eliminated such negative impacts. But, since impact assessments generally fail to fully account for increases in economic development and technological change, they substantially overestimate future net damages from global warming.

### AT: Oceans

**Ocean ecosystems can survive climate change**

Kennedy ‘2 (Victor S., University of Maryland, Pew Climate, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

**Most recent, peer reviewed study disproves warming harms coral reefs**

C3 Headlines ’12 (5/23/12 (“Carbon Dioxide Emissions Facts: Ocean Acidification Impact On Marine Species Overestimated, Study Finds” <http://www.c3headlines.com/are-coral-reefs-dying/>)

Alarmists and anti-CO2 activists have loudly suggested that sea water that becomes more "acidified" will significantly harm marine species. Listening to the alarmists, one would surmise that mollusks such as clams and oysters would literally have their shells disappear from lower pH levels of oceans. A new peer reviewed study by Parker et al. punctures this hot air balloon of alarmism with empirical evidence from actual experiments. "The authors write that studies on the impact of ocean acidification on marine organisms that have been conducted to date "have only considered the impacts on 'adults' or 'larvae', ignoring the potential link between the two life-history stages and the possible carry-over effects that may be passed from adult to offspring,"...placed adults of wild-collected and selectively-bred populations of the Sydney rock oyster which they obtained at the beginning of reproductive conditioning - within seawater equilibrated with air of either 380 ppm CO2 (near-ambient) or 856 ppm CO2 (predicted for 2100 by the IPCC)...found that the larvae spawned from adults living in the "acidified" seawater were the same size as those spawned from adults living in near-ambient seawater; but they report that "larvae spawned form adults exposed to elevated CO2 were larger and developed faster."...concluding that the results of their work suggest that "marine organisms may have the capacity to acclimate or adapt to elevated CO2 over the next century."" [Laura M. Parker, Pauline M. Ross, Wayne A. O'Connor, Larissa Borysko, David A. Raftos, Hans-Otto Pörtner 2012: Global Change Biology] Conclusion: Climate alarmists claims of the ocean acidification impact on marine species has not been factual. As researchers continue their research, the carbon dioxide emissions facts are being firmly established with empirical evidence while exposing the frequent fearmongering and exaggerations to scientific sunlight.

### Warming – Apocalypticism Generic Link

**Apocalyptic environmental rhetoric causes eco-authoritarianism and political apathy – turns the case**

**Buell 3** (Frederick, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, From Apocalypse To Way of Life, pages 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a political liability almost as much as an asset. It calls up a fierce and effective opposition with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too vulnerable to refutation by events. It also exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “total solution” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “final solution.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same time it **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to **accept their impotence** **as** **individuals**; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes **no difference** at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and **psychological** as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to **turn one’s back on the environment**. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need to delink from nature and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to further **indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style **environmental apocalypticism**. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “total solution.” Thus **doomsterism** was its reigning mode; **eco-authoritarianism** was a grave **temptation**; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or **give up**, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

### Warming – Apocalypticism Turns Warming

**Crisis discourse causes conservative backlash – makes their politics indefensible and labeled as hyperbole**

**Buell 3** (Frederick, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, From Apocalypse To Way of Life, pages 2-4)

Something happened to strip environmental crisis of what seemed in the 1970s to be its self-evident inevitability. Something happened to allow environmentalism’s antagonists to stigmatize its erstwhile stewards as unstable alarmists and bad-faith prophets—and to call their warnings at best hysterical, at worst crafted lies. Indeed, something happened to allow some even to question (without appearing ridiculous) the apparently commonsensical assumption that environmentalists were the environment’s best stewards. The most important explanation for these events isn’t hard to find. In reaction to the decade of crisis, a strong and enormously successful anti-environmental disinformation industry sprang up. It was so successful that it helped midwife a new phase in the history of U.S. environmental politics, one in which an abundance of environmental concern was nearly blocked by an equal abundance of antienvironmental contestation. Prophets rushing into the public space bearing environmental warnings like lanterns held high found themselves suddenly in a very crowded square, one now jammed with antienvironmental spokespeople also waving lanterns. If formerly too little information had hampered environmental activism, now too much information achieved the same end. According to Samuel Hays, who carefully chronicled American environmental politics between 1955 and 1985, the public drive for environmental change had been “neutralized” by the 1980s, blocked by an increasingly organized and elaborate corporate and conservative opposition.1 Despite scientific evidence and even, in a number of cases, virtual scientific consensus to the contrary, issue after issue was contested. The ozone hole was denied and trivialized, food and population crises were debunked, and global warming was hotly denied, doubted, and dismissed as unproven. Even the most sacred of environmental cows was vigorously attacked: voices were even raised in defense of DDT, arguing that Carson- inspired hysteria eliminated a chemical essential to preserving public health from diseases like malaria. Environmentalists, in turn, were stigmatized as extremists. Even to mention environmental crisis meant being called “Chicken Little,” or “doomster” or “doomsayer.” Ronald Bailey, in his book Ecoscam: The False Prophets of Eco-logical Apocalypse, went for this particular jugular with even more ferocity than did his predecessor and model, Julian Simon. Bailey put a different spin from Thomas Disch’s on the filiation of environmental crisis from fear of nuclear apocalypse. “Modern ecological millenarians, impatient with waiting for the flash of thermonuclear doom, now claim there is a ‘global environmental crisis’ threatening not just humanity, but all life on earth.”2 Anything but respectable scientists or responsible citizens, environmentalists were both pathological fanatics (they were contemporary millenarians) and ill-motivated manipulators of the innocent public. Bailey thus coined a new term for them. They were “apocalypse abusers”—a disreputable group that presumably used and misused apocalypse like others did alcohol or dangerous drugs. Environmentalists were also entirely wrong, Bailey asserted. Along with making ad hominem attacks, he proceeded to marshal supposedly scientific evidence to show how wrong environmentalists were. In doing so, Bailey joined a large and surprisingly well-organized movement of such writers. For, along with sneering at environmentalists, crisis debunkers began the “counterscience” movement—a movement devoted to countering the findings of environmental science with the creation of a body of antienvironmental science. It grew so galling and influential that one of its targets, Paul Ehrlich, in collaboration with his wife Anne, sought to answer it in a book significantly entitled The Betrayal of Science and Reason; and environmental scientists and organizations generally recognized that they had to grow adept at quickly refuting disinformation as well as at researching issues and uncovering new information

### Warming – Framing Key

**Alt solves – clears space for environmental paradigms not grounded in apocalypticism – that’s key to reclaiming political space from the right**

**Buell 3** (Frederick, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, From Apocalypse To Way of Life, pages 185-186)

If ecoterrorism, ecocentrism, and the wilderness tradition clearly provided the right with ways to **invalidate** and disunify environmentalism, so did targeting environmental crisis. But there was a difference. The power that crisis elaboration had to mobilize a wide variety of people on a wide variety of societal, urban, and technological as well as nature-based issues made it the most important **target** of attempts to **discredit environmentalism** and divide environmentalists. Ecoterrorism was easy to condemn, and nature purism easy to satirize; both, however, involved limited constituencies. Environmentalism’s discourse of crisis, bolstered by science as well as sentiment, was by contrast much more difficult to dismiss. At the same time, it was the most necessary to delegitimize: its constituency was the largest and most various, and it was the environmental discourse that offered the most forceful and telling critique of industrial capitalism. Thus by the end of the 1970s, environmentalists were regularly and extravagantly vilified as **pathological crisis-mongers**, Chicken Littles, apocalypse abusers, false prophets, joyless, puritannical doomsters, chic- apocalyptic neoprimitives, sufferers from an Armageddon complex, and toxic terrorists: calling them this in serious social analysis and on talk-back radio alike, as noted above, became a big business. Also as noted above, the elaboration of **counterscience became a well-funded** and widespread enterprise. Under this withering fire, fault lines appeared among environmental advocates and theorists. Theodore Roszak was far from alone in deciding that crisis elaboration meant doomsterism and was thus a political liability for environmentalism. And other more academic writers, such as the Marxist geographer David Harvey, found philosophical and theoretical as well as important political reasons for dispensing with the discourse of crisis, a discourse he unsympathetically characterized as the “millenarian and apocalyptic proclamation that ecocide is imminent.”59 And if, for Roszak, Harvey, and others, crisis talk was retrograde and to be dispensed with, new environmental paradigms and theories were needed to fill the gap. The result was not a reconception of crisis in the face of new political circumstances but a jettisoning of crisis in favor of new environmental-political paradigms, ones crafted to take its place.